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Preface to the Handbook
Building an effective, inclusive, and accountable public administration has 
increasingly factored in the agenda of policymakers and other stakeholders, 
including the academia, in the effort to achieve sustainable development. 
This first Ethiopian Public Administration Handbook is the product of a 
joint effort by Ambo University, KU Leuven Public Governance Institute 
(Belgium) and the Addis Ababa University JOINT Project, funded by 
VLIR-UOS, Belgium (2018–2020). The handbook builds on the results of a 
TEAM project on “Strengthening Institutional Capacity to Support Public 
Administration and/or Development Management Programmes at Ambo 
University,” carried out by Ambo University and KU Leuven and funded by 
VLIR-UOS, Belgium (2013–2018).
The handbook was coauthored by Ethiopian academics and practitioner-
academics, also called “para-academics.” It is built on PhD studies and conference 
papers, written for a series of conferences organized within the framework of the 
TEAM and JOINT projects by project partners and other partners, including 
the Ethiopian Public Administration Association (EPAA), which was created 
by TEAM Project in 2016. The establishment of EPAA after over five decades 
of public administration teaching in Ethiopia has significant implications.
The handbook addresses a wide range of timely crucial issues and will 
be a required reading for public administration students, practitioners, and 
theorists interested in public administration, public policy, and sustain-
able development. In fact, it not only discusses public administration in 
the Ethiopian context but also creates a stepping-stone for teaching and 
researching issues related to public administration in Ethiopia in a manner 












This handbook would not have possible without the incredible support of a 
number of institutions and individuals. First, we are exceedingly indebted 
to VLIR-UOS (Belgium) for funding the TEAM Project “Strengthening 
Institutional Capacity to Support Public Administration and/or Development 
Management Programmes at Ambo University” between Ambo University 
and KU Leuven (2013–2018) and the JOINT project “Professionalizing 
Ethiopian Public Administration to Support Development Practitioners” 
between Ambo University, KU Leuven Public Governance Institute (Bel-
gium), and Addis Ababa University (2018–2020). An eight-year grant allowed 
participants to pragmatically learn from project activities, such as the organ-
ized conferences, to benefit from interaction between the partners and other 
stakeholders, and ultimately, to create this Ethiopian Public Administration 
handbook.
The Projects were awarded to Geert Bouckaert (Flemish Promoter) and 
Bacha Kebede Debela (local promoter-Ambo University). Beyond partner 
institutions, interestingly, the grant was used to connect Ethiopian PA scholars 
and practitioners to each other and other international PA scholars and PA 
professional associations, notably the International Institute of Administrative 
Sciences (IIAS) and the Association of African Public Administration and 
Management (AAPAM).
We are also grateful to the project partners – the KU Leuven Public 
Governance Institute, Ambo University, and Addis Ababa University – for 
supporting the projects, including the writing of the handbook. Furthermore, 
we are indebted to many individuals, especially to Martine De Koninck, Ann 
Hasendonckx, and Christel Maes (KU Leuven International Office); Annie 
Hondeghem and Trui Steen (KU Leuven Governance Institute); the KU 
Leuven Governance Institute secretariats, particularly to Anneke Heylen 
(Project financial manager) and Inge Vermeulen; and Wannes Verbeeck 
and Peter Verbeeck (both from VLIR-UOS) for their incredible support 
since 2012.
This book also exceedingly benefited from Ethiopian PA scholars and 
para-academics who presented the papers at the conferences organized by 
project partners and other collaborators. Our thanks also goes to conferences 
participants, who diligently discussed the papers and contributed to the 
improvement thereof. We are profoundly thankful to the contributors of 
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the handbook. We owe many thanks to reviewers at the Public Governance 
Institute (Belgium), who provided stimulating comments and suggestions. 
We are grateful to Leuven University Press for publishing this handbook. We 
are also indebted to Leuven University Press team, which did extraordinary 
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Public Administration in Ethiopia : 
Case Studies and Lessons for 
Sustainable Development
Bacha Kebede Debela, Geert Bouckaert, Meheret Ayenew Warota, 
and Dereje Terefe Gemechu
Background and Objectives
In the West, scholars have identified four public administration/manage-
ment models: Public Administration, Public Management, New Public 
Management, and Public Governance. The Public Administration model 
marks the first systematic and formalized approach to public administration 
(Van Dooren et al., 2015) and is characterised by Weberian features such as 
hierarchy, continuity, impartiality, legal-rational authority, and professional-
ism in public administration (Cheema, 2007). The Public Management model 
focuses on managing the public sector and is based on private management 
approaches and principles (Blum & Manning, 2009; Bouckaert & Halligan, 
2008). The New Public Management (NPM) was the dominant model from 
the late 1970s to the late 1990s (African Development Bank, 2005; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2017). It was driven by the leading proponents of the neoliberal 
economic ideal, which advocates the need to reduce the size of government, 
apply market-type mechanisms, and implement private sector leadership 
principles in public sectors to improve performance (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2007; Van Dooren et al., 2015). The NPM traveled across the world, including 
to developing countries, and was diffused by many actors, including such 
transnational institutions as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and the OECD, through their funding, research publications, and 
consultancy work (Andrews, 2013; Peterson, 2015).
New Public Governance (NPG) was introduced in the 2000s, partly due to 
the failure of NPM to deliver expected results (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017); to 
its unintended consequences, such as increased socio-structural inequalities, 
particularly in developing countries; and its dysfunctional effects on public 
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sector performance and accountability frameworks (Bouckaert et al., 2010; 
Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). This model emphasizes vertical and horizontal 
interaction and partnerships, as well as mutual accountability and responsibil-
ity, between and among the state, the private sector, civil society, and citizens 
and stakeholders who participate in joint efforts to achieve several societal 
objectives (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008; Hughes, 2012; Steen et al., 2018).
Despite the expected variation, and despite the fact that all four models are 
Western models, they have been introduced by developing countries. Indeed, 
the literature shows that there are differences in adoption and implementation 
of reform programmes, even in the West (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017), which 
is partly explained by the differences in politico-administrative contexts 
(Ongaro & Ferlie, 2019; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017).
Recently, some African countries such as Ethiopia, Botswana, Mauritius, 
Tanzania, Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda have adopted the Asian Devel-
opmental State (DS) doctrine (Clapham, 2018; Edigheji, 2010; Evans, 2010; 
Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005; Taylor, 2005; Vaughan & Gebremichael, 2011). The 
African Union (AU) and the UN-ECA are also promoting the DS doctrine 
to ensure socioeconomic transformation in Africa (AU, 2014; UN-ECA, 
2011). There is also a rhetoric on African consensus-oriented leadership/
pan-Africanism leadership (Jackson, 2004), which accentuates the need 
to “correct the historical injustice” by strengthening mutually beneficial 
relationships within the continent and at a global scale (AU 2014, 10–11).
Moreover, African countries, including Ethiopia, have subscribed to the 
United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which aim to ensure 
“no one left behind” by 2030, an a goal also on the African Union’s agenda 
2063 (AU, 2014). The UN (2015) claims governments are responsible for 
ensuring better economic, social, and ecologal performance to safeguard the 
well-being of citizens. The failure to achieve sustained results on economic, 
social, and ecologal dimensions not only threatens the well-being of citizens 
but also erodes the legitimacy and trustworthiness of governments.
The UN and the AU promote strengthening institutions, partnerships, and 
stakeholders’ participation in development programs. The UN SDGs 11, 16, 
and 17 are specifically related to public administration. Goal 11 focuses on 
inclusive, resilient, and sustainable cities and human settlements. Goal 16 
and 17 focus respectively on building effective, accountable, and inclusive 
public administration at all levels, as well as on effective global partnership 
to revitalize sustainable development (UN, 2015; see also Bouckaert, 2020).
The winds of decentralization and democratization have blown in many 
African countries since the 1990s. However, the democratization and 
liberalization process has been uneven across the continent. Worse, it has 
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been scaled back in many African countries, partly due to the divide and 
rule of historical colonial legacies, which destroyed African civilizations; 
the increasing neopatrimonialism, authoritarianism, and suppression of 
opposition parties by the ruling party; and the gradual shift to a single-party 
state in many African contexts (Southall, 2003). Secondly, as observed by 
Kyed and Buur (2007), the ambiguous and sometimes the contradictory 
relationship between the indigenous institutions (indigenous leaders) and 
government institutions based on Western models is also an important factor.
At the same time, higher education plays a significant role in helping coun-
tries achieve SDGs; among other things, effective PA teaching and research 
not only generate relevant knowledge and increase graduates’ employment 
opportunities (Pinheiro et al., 2018) but also are crucial to strengthening 
institutions so they can effectively solve societal problems (Rosenbaum 2015). 
Bouckaert (2020) rightly claims the study of public administration should 
be concerned both with producing knowledge and with improving public 
administration and public policy (see also Ongaro, 2020). Therefore, how to 
ensure the relevance of PA teaching and research, how to organize PA teaching 
and research (Bouckaert & Jann, 2020), and how to attract competent PA 
students are crucial issues (Bertels et al., 2020). Accordingly, it is important 
to recall that the mere existence of higher learning institutions is not sufficient 
for national and reginal development. It also crucial to note that, as Newcomer 
and Allen (2015) rightly point out, PA teaching may vary in terms of missions, 
institutional locations, and the nature of the student population. It may also 
vary within countries and across regions, suggesting that effective public 
administration presupposes contexts that fit knowledge and solutions.
Nevertheless, while the applicability of Western theory to Africa is contest-
able from theoretical, policy, and managerial perspectives, most African 
universities rely on Western theories for teaching and research, including 
in the areas of public administration/management/policy. This could be 
due to the effect of colonialization and the fact that many Africans have got 
their education, among others fields in public administration, in the West 
(Kolisnichenko, 2015). The other fairly important factor could be the lack 
of sufficient publications by African scholars and practitioners. As Rugasira 
(2013) observes, while specific African problems have to be addressed by 
Africans, the contribution of African scholars to scientific publication is 
scarce, only 0.5 percent. As a consequence, most knowledge production on 
Africa comes from Western authors.
Public administration in Ethiopia can be analyzed over the three Ethiopian 
regimes: The Imperial regime (-1974), the Derg regime (1974-1991) and the 
EPRDF regime (1991-), with each having overlapping and unique features. 
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This book primarily focuses on the current regime but accounts for historical 
and sociological factors inherited from the previous regimes. The monarchical 
and highly centralized imperial regime introduced elements of Western 
public administration. The 1931 Constitution vested all ultimate legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers in the emperor (Clapham, 1969), who regarded 
himself as an elect of God and thus theoretically absolute and unchallenged 
(Clapham, 1969; Hiwet, 1975; Holcomb & Ibssa, 1990; Howard, 1955). The 
imperial parliament was instrumental in further centralization and suppres-
sion of citizens’ voices (Ayenew, 2019). PA teaching in Ethiopia started during 
the reign of Emperor Haile Sellassie in the 1950s at Addis Ababa University.
The Derg regime was also an exceedingly centralized government and 
adopted Marxist and Leninist socialist ideology (Adejumobi, 2007; Hiwet, 
1975; Holcomb & Ibssa, 1990).The national shengo, the parliament of the 
Derg regime, was also substantially weak; meanwhile, the president was 
extremely powerful (Ayenew, 2019). Since coming into power after top-
pling the Derg regime in the 1990s, the EPRDF has introduced a series 
politico-administrative reform programs. Three major reform waves could 
be distinguished: regionalization, federalization and local decentralization, 
and federalization and Democratic Developmental State (DDS) doctrine. 
The first wave took place under the Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
(1991-1995), which established fourteen regional governments and entrusted 
the responsibility for public services to regional governments (Debela & 
Troupin, 2016; Peterson, 2015). During this period, the country adopted 
a neoliberal economic policy (Adejumobi, 2007). The 1995 Constitution 
established the federal government as having nine regional states and two 
city administrations, with the country officially continuing the tenets of the 
NPM doctrine (Mengesha & Common, 2007). In 2001 the second phase 
of decentralization occurred (Peterson, 2015; World Bank, 2013). In the 
aftermath of the relatively free but contested 2005 national elections (Abbink, 
2006; Ayenew, 2019), the government officially adhered to the Democratic 
Developmental State (DDS) doctrine (Clapham; 2018; Lefort, 2012; Vaughan 
& Gebremichael, 2011). In general, the post-1990s reforms have been driven 
both by internal and external factors (Debela, 2017; Peterson, 2015).
Overall, since the 1990s, Ethiopia has registered impressive economic 
growth. Among other positive developments, access to education has in-
creased and the number of higher education institutions and the students 
pursuing higher education has expanded many times over. Yet, inequality 
has remained a critical issue. Importantly, the democratization process and 
inclusiveness have been rolled back significantly. In the 2015 elections, the 
ruling party took all the national parliamentary seats, confirming that the 
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relationship between economic growth and sociopolitical development is 
not linear or automatic. Consequently and unsurprisingly, a few months 
after the national election the country was hit by mass protests, leading to 
the appointment of Prime Minister Abiy Ahemed in 2018.
Against this general backdrop, the chapters in this book analyze the con-
texts, processes, and results of politico-administrative reforms in post-1990 
Ethiopia. The modest aim of this volume is to contribute to PA teaching and 
research in Ethiopia. The principal question of the handbook is: How can we 
describe and explain the contexts, the processes, and the results of the post-1990 
politico-administrative reforms in Ethiopia and what are the implications for 
sustainable development?
From Projects and Conferences to a Handbook: How Did 
This Handbook Come About?
The First Project (2013-2017)
The seeds for this book were sown in 2012. That year, Geert Bouckaert (Flem-
ish promoter) and Bacha Kebede Debela (local promoter) – with the support 
of Martine De Koninck (KU Leuven International Office) and Steve Troupin 
(KU Leuven) – developed a project entitled “Strengthening Institutional 
Capacity to Support Public Administration and/or Development Management 
Programmes at Ambo University.” Geert Bouckaert submitted the proposal 
for funding to VLIR-UOS and the project was selected for the second-round 
application. Hence Geert Bouckaert and Steve Troupin came to Ambo to 
participate in a workshop (August 27, 2012) and to jointly formulate the 
proposal. At the workshop, capacity building and the relevance of PA teaching 
and research stood out as critical issues, which were therefore systematically 
incorporated into the final project proposal submitted by Geert Bouckaert; 
this was subsequently selected by VLIR-UOS for funding in 2013.
The First National PA Conference (2015)
While part of the project activities involved the financing of PhD studies, 
other elements included the holding of workshops. Thus, on September 21, 
2015, the First National PA conference was organized by Ambo University 
and KU Leuven, in collaboration with CCRDA, in Addis Ababa. The theme of 
the conference was “Governance for Sustainable Development in Ethiopia.” 
Interestingly, the participants (six universities with PA programmes and 
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practitioners [federal and regional equivalents], among others), stressed 
improving capacity-building and ensuring the relevance of PA teaching 
and research and ultimately agreed on the need to establish an interactive 
structure for dialogue on PA teaching and research in Ethiopia.
Consequently, on September 29, 2016, another interesting landmark was 
achieved. More than five decades after the teaching of public administra-
tion had been introduced in Ethiopia; the Ethiopian Public Administration 
Association (EPAA) was established at a founding conference, facilitated 
by Ambo University, KU Leuven, and Addis Ababa University. Fifty-one 
delegates from thirteen institutions participated. EPAA was officially launched 
on February 8, 2018, at Addis Ababa University.
The Second Project (2017-2020)
In 2017, capitalizing on the ongoing project and supported by Martine De 
Koninck (KU Leuven International Office) and Steve Troupin (KU Leuven), 
Geert Bouckaert (KU Leuven), Bacha Kebede Debela (Ambo University) and 
Frehiwot Gebrehiwot Araya (Addis Ababa University) developed a project 
entitled “Professionalizing Ethiopian Public Administration to Support 
Development Practitioners,” to be run jointly by KU Leuven Public Govern-
ance Institute, (Belgium), Ambo University, and Addis Ababa University. 
Geert Bouckaert (the Flemish promoter) submitted the proposal and the 
project was funded by VLIR-UOS and launched in 2018. Both projects 
were coordinated by Steve Troupin (KU Leuven), and Anneke Heylen (KU 
Leuven) was responsible for their financial/administrative management.
The Second National PA Conference (2018)
On September 22, 2018, the Second National PA Conference was organized 
on the theme of “Administrative Resilience for Sustainable Development 
in Ethiopia” by Ambo University and KU Leuven, in close collaboration 
with the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) and the 
Association of African Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), 
in Addis Ababa. Several papers were presented and discussed by participants, 
including EPAA members.
The Third National PA Conference (2020)
In 2020 the third National PA Conference was organized by Ambo University, 
KU Leuven Public Governance Institute, and Addis Ababa University in 
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partnership with the Ethiopian Public Administration Association (EPAA) 
and with the support of VLIR-UOS and the Belgian Cooperation to Develop-
ment, on the theme “Strengthening Institutions for Sustainable Development 
in Ethiopia/Africa” in Addis Ababa, on January 24-26. Several participants, 
including EPAA members and the Federal Civil Service Commission Com-
missioner, took part in the conference and actively discussed the papers.
Based on the aforementioned projects and conferences, we invited the 
authors of the second and the third National PA Conference papers to submit 
improved versions of their papers for potential inclusion in this volume. 
We received twenty-six contributions, which were carefully reviewed and 
commented, with feedback sent to each author for revision. In the end, we 
received twenty-three completed chapters, the majority of them revised 
three times.
We believe the contributions in this book are not only helpful for PA teach-
ing and research in Ethiopia but also witness the importance of strengthening 
effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions for sustainable development. 
Governance, institutions, and sustainable development were the core issues 
discussed at the three National PA conferences. Enjoy reading these chapters, 
and long live EPAA!
The Handbook and Its Chapters 
The chapters in this handbook address a wide range of issues and are system-
atically clustered into five parts. Part II of the book focuses on governance, 
partnership, participation, and institutions. The contribution by Deribe 
Assefa Aga (chapter 2) is generic but arguably applies to Ethiopia. Using 
explanatory research design, he finds that democratic quality enhances public 
trust in government and that public trust in turn mediates the relationship 
between democracy and overall citizens’ life satisfaction. Belayneh Bogale 
Zewdie (chapter 3) uses exploratory research and shows the challenges and 
prospects of the Ethiopian developmental state in promoting democratic 
governance. The contribution by Aklilu Wubet, Challa Amdissa, Defferew 
Kebebe, and Frehiwot G/hiwot (chapter 4) reveals that the federal legislature 
of Ethiopia has various oversight tools at its disposal, but that among them 
it predominantly relies only on reports and committee hearings. Therefore, 
in the related contribution by Challa Amdissa, Defferew Kebebe, and Aklilu 
Wubet (chapter 5), we learn that public-parliamentary engagement is low, 
partly due to exceedingly limited institutional capacity. Hiwot Amare Tadesse 
and Trui Steen (chapter 6), using the most-similar-case study strategy, analyze 
28 b. KEbEdE dEbElA, G. boucK AErt, m. AYEnEW WArotA, And d. tErEFE GEmEchu
the impact of the developmental state doctrine on the functioning of multi-
stakeholder partnerships for health service delivery in Ethiopia. They conclude 
that the state dominates and excessively controls stakeholders in health 
service delivery. The contribution by Bahiru Detti (chapter 7) concentrates 
on citizen participation and empowerment at the level of local government. 
He finds local residents’ participation in development programs to be low 
and that local development programmes have not substantially empowered 
Ethiopian citizens. The contribution by Bacha Kebede (chapter 8) discloses 
that much is to be done to shattering the glass ceiling and glass walls and 
to increase genuine women participation in political and managerial jobs. 
Drawing on the new institutionalism and the political settlement approach, 
Hirko Wakgari (chapter 9) argues that the NPM-driven reform in Oromia 
National Regional State is constrained by inadequate institutional capacity 
(bureaucratic capacity) and an overly politicized bureaucracy and civil service. 
A related contribution by Tewelde Mezgobo (chapter 10) highlights that 
effective NPM-driven reform needs to break the one-size-fits-all path depend-
ency, and that there is a need for a sector specific approach and clarity on the 
assumptions of NPM related reform tools. By comparing and contrasting 
the indigenous Gadaa System and Western democracy Moti Mosisa Gutema 
(chapter 11) reveals the difference in values and decision-making process 
between the two systems.
Part III is devoted to people as human resources. Henok Syeoum (chap-
ter 12) examines meritocracy, career development, and promotion in the 
Ethiopian Federal Civil Service. He reveals that despite the legal frameworks, a 
prevalence of a mix of meritocratic and political patronage in the recruitment, 
career development, and promotion in the Federal Civil Service. Similarly, 
using historical neoinstitutionalism Bacha Kebede Debela, Geert Bouckaert, 
and Steve Troupin (chapter 13) finds a shift from centralized HRM to a 
decentralized system, a shift from seniority to merit and qualification, and 
the systematic use of politico-administrative reforms and reform tools to 
enhance the allegiance of civil servants to political executives in the Oromia 
National Regional State. The chapter by Alebachew Asfaw (chapter 14) 
examines the strategic contribution of middle managers in Ethiopian civil 
service organizations. He finds that mid-level managers play a significant 
role in the civil service and that they predominantly emphasize facilitation 
and mentoring roles, followed by production roles, and change orientations 
roles. Adare Assefa and Annie Hondeghem (chapter 15), using historical and 
sociological institutionalisms, examine the leadership context of the Ethiopian 
Civil Service. They argue that the continuous politicization of civil service and 
the deep-seated sociological factors have led to the use of a predominantly 
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authoritarian leadership style in the federal civil service and yet at the same 
time resulted in a preference for a pragmatic leadership approach.
Part IV is devoted to performance and quality. Using Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) reference technology Bacha Kebede Debela, Geert Bouckaert, 
and Steve Troupin (chapter 16) analyse the technical efficiency of tewnty-nine 
towns in Oromia National Regional State in ensuring the drinking water 
supply. They find that the majority of municipalities were inefficient and the 
technical efficiency of the municipality depends on DEA model specifications. 
The chapter by Temesgen Genie Chekol and Denamo Addissie Nuramo 
(chapter 17) reveals that the cost and time performance of Ethiopian Mega 
Sugar Construction Projects is poor. Gutata Amante (chapter 18) assesses 
the performance of Ethiopia on general good governance indictors and finds 
the performance of the country to be inconsistent; he finds improvement in 
adherence to the rule of law, a decline in voice and accountability, and no 
significant change in the regulatory quality dimensions, as well as fluctuating 
trends in the remaining performance indicators. Kassa Teshager and Zekarias 
Minota (chapter 19) on their part reveal that organizational climate and 
individual factors are important factors for explaining public servants’ attitude 
and performance in federal public sectors in Ethiopia.
Part V addresses the governance of policies. Using the European University 
Association University Autonomy Scorecard, Solomon Gebreyohans Gebru, 
Annie Hondeghem, and Bruno Broucker (chapter 20) examine the institu-
tional autonomy of Ethiopian public universities. They find the institutional 
autonomy of the Ethiopian higher education institutions to be low and suggest 
the relevance of the European University Association University Autonomy 
Scorecard to improve institutional autonomy and performance. Likewise, 
the contribution by Challa Amdissa Jiru (chapter 21) analyzes the outcome 
of the Ethiopian education policy since the 1990s. He reveals that Ethiopia 
has impressively improved access to education, but ensuring equity remains 
a critical challenge. The chapter by Kiflie Worku (chapter 22) is specifically 
on public administration education in Ethiopia. He finds several challenges, 
including inappropriate and inadequate PA staff educational profile and the 
employability challenges facing PA graduates.
The contribution by Wondem Mekuriaw (chapter 23) focuses on examining 
the implementation of community policing in Addis Ababa City Administra-
tion. He discovers that the implementation of community policing is modest, 
partly due to inadequate institutional capacity. He also point out that the 
government has used community policing to control citizens at grass root 
level. The other related study, by Dessalegn Kebede Kedida (chapter 24), 
explores the practices and challenges of community policing in Adama 
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Town Administration. Kedida discloses that limited institutional capacity, 
inadequate incentives for community police officers and limited community 
participation persist as major challenges to the implementation of community 
policing in the town. Finally, Bacha Kebede Debela, Geert Bouckaert, Meheret 
Ayenew Warota, and Dereje Terefe Gemechu (chapter 25) draw conclusions 
and implications for sustainable development and PA teaching and research 
in Ethiopia.
How to Use This Very Ethiopian Handbook
This Handbook is based on Ethiopian cases, which are researched by Ethio-
pian researchers, using Ethiopian (mostly primary) data. The Handbook is 
developed for teaching in Ethiopian PA programs by Ethiopian scholars, for 
Ethiopian masters and PhD students and researchers, as stepping-stones for 
their own research.
This Handbook invites the Ethiopian academic (PA) community, but 
also and even more the practitioners, to not copy-paste models that do 
not fit the context. The best guarantee for failure is to blindly copy-paste 
(Western) models, even if one can learn for a range of models. This Handbook 
invites practitioners and academia to push for research-based teaching using 
Ethiopian cases.
Seminars allow for the replication of some of the research, or at least 
for the critical disussion of methods, data, models, conclusions, and even 
recommendations.
It is our hope that this Handbook contributes to building capacity for 
better public governance. We hope that the volume inspires ideas to realize 
the SDGs in a resilient Ethiopian society, where “nobody is left behind.” For 
this, we need a public sector that is proactively matches SDG 11 (focusing 
on inclusive, resilient, and sustainable cities, and human settlements), SDG 
16 (building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions, with peace 
and justice at all levels), and SDG 17 (on effective global partnerships with 
the private sector, NGOs, and citizens).
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Situated within the broader Public Governance Model, this Part (II) focuses 
on democratic governance, partnership, and participation. In shifting from 
“administration” to “management,” and from “management” to “governance,” 
there is an increasing need to include stakeholders as citizens and as users 
of services and policies. This requires visions on how to include citizens, as 
citizens and as users, at different stages and in their different roles of “involve-
ment,” “engagement,” “commitment,” “participation,” and even “partnerships.” 
Even if these chapters demonstrate some gaps between intentions and reality, 
a reform and implementation program is emerging.
The first chapter (chapter 2) discusses the relationship between electoral 
democracy, public trust, and citizens’ life satisfaction. The core message 
is that public trust in government positively mediates the relationship 
between electoral democracy and citizens’ life satisfaction. Informed by 
an exploratory research design, the second chapter (chapter 3) analyzes the 
effect of Developmental State (DS) doctrine on the democratization process 
in Ethiopia. The chapter clarifies that the DS doctrine enabled the regime 
in power to systemically and strategically turn a multiparty parliamentary 
party system enshrined in the constitution into a single-party state. Chapter 4 
is tasked with analyzing mechanisms and parliamentary oversight tools 
used by the National Parliament of Ethiopia. The chapter pinpoints that 
although the parliament has used different oversight tools, among them 
predominantly reports and committee hearings, the executive government 
branch overwhelmingly dominates the legislature. As a consequence, due 
to the non-representativeness of the parliament and other factors, the next 
chapter (chapter 5) shows that the parliamentary-public engagement necessary 
for improving democracy and governance is low. Chapter 6 reveals that the 
DS doctrine has constrained multistakeholder partnership development 
to deliver health service, confirming that the developmental state doctrine 
not only restrains the democratization process but also limits the space for 
multistakeholder engagement in development activities. Perhaps, due to the 
influence of DS, chapter 7 also shows that the local people’s participation 
in development activities are inadequate. Likewise, the chapter on gender 
(chapter 8) clarifies that the DS doctrine cannot warrant gender equality in 
political executive and managerial jobs, even when the legislation supports 
gender parity. Chapter 9 reveals that, despite existing elements of the NPM 
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doctrine that should in theory counteract this trend, the public service in 
Oromia/Ethiopia is highly politicized. Chapter 10 challenges the one-size-fits-
all approach and suggests a sectorial approach to implement NPM elements. 
The authors have provided key conclusions and insights.
Culture makes a difference for administrating, managing, and governing. 
Cultures also differ across global space. As a consequence, it is necessary 
to also focus on administrative culture in Ethiopia to show its features and 
specificities. This is crucial to avoid blind copy-pasting of “solutions” coming 
from abroad, from regions with a different cultural background. Even if 
students, teachers, researchers, and practitioners need to be aware of other 
models, there is a need to be critical from the point of view of differences and 
their implications. Blind copy-pasting and uncritical teaching of models, 
mostly from the West, could result in a mismatch with the culture at hand. 
There is not much research about differences of administrative cultures and 
their implication for Ethiopia. Therefore, chapter 11 compares and contrasts 
the indigenous Gadaa system (institution) with the Western democratic 
system. It reveals the differences in the process and values between the two 
systems. The authors have provided key conclusions and insights for the public 
administration and democratization process in Ethiopia and demonstrated 





Electoral Democracy and Citizen Life 
Satisfaction : The Mediating Role of 
Public Trust
Deribe Assefa Aga
Box 1: Key points of this chapter
the key points of this chapter, inter alia, include:
 citizen life satisfaction or happiness is one of researchable topics in public 
administration and political science;
 Electoral democracy may influence citizen life satisfaction;
 Public trust mediates the positive relationship between electoral democracy and 
overall citizens’ life satisfaction;
 this study employs multiple regression and mediation models.
Box 2: Learning objectives
readers will gain the following insights from this chapter:
 Appreciate the importance of citizen life satisfaction or happiness in enhancing 
social tolerance and people’s participation in economic activities;
 Explain the meanings and components of electoral democracy, public trust, and 
citizen life satisfaction;
 understand the relationship between electoral democracy, public trust, and 
citizen life satisfaction;
 describe the mechanism through which electoral democracy explains citizen life 
satisfaction.
Box 3: Abbreviations
Adj. r-sq = Adjusted r-squared (r2)
sd = standard deviation
sWl = satisfaction with life
WVs-6 = World Values survey –sixth wave
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Introduction
Life satisfaction refers to “the degree to which individuals evaluate positively 
the quality of their life in total” (Pacek & Radcliff, 2008:268). It is often used 
interchangeably with “happiness” and is one of researchable topics in public 
administration and political science (Curini, Jou, & Memoli, 2014; Pacek 
& Radcliff, 2008). This is mainly because it plays an indispensable role in 
enhancing social tolerance and people’s participation in economic activities, 
which may in turn contribute to economic growth in a given country. Life 
satisfaction, or happiness, also helps to reduce the potential for revolutionary 
change of governments (Inglehart 1990 as cited in Curini et al. [2014]). From 
a development point of view, “sustainable development” captures human 
well-being, social inclusion, and environmental dimensions. This implies that 
the quest for happiness paves the way for the quest for sustainable development 
(Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2012). Accordingly, scholars highlight that social 
science should discover what enhances and what hinders life satisfaction or 
happiness, which is the fundamental goal of every citizen (Curini et al., 2014).
Citizens’ life satisfaction is generally considered as an ultimate goal of 
public administration. In line with this, prior studies indicate that public 
administration plays a significant role in influencing whether individuals are 
able to make a good living and should nurture the maximization of people’s 
satisfaction. Supporters of this argument note that genuine election is at the 
heart of creating governmental accountability to the citizenry, which in turn 
enhances life satisfaction. There is, however, an ongoing debate about the role 
of democratic election in the creation of the outcome forms of democracy, 
such as political legitimacy, public trust, and life satisfaction (Rothstein, 
2009). In African context in particular, there is scant empirical literature 
providing explanations for how politics and public administration influence 
citizens’ life satisfaction.
The scholarly literature has documented certain variables as predicators 
of life satisfaction, which may be mainly categorized into micro and macro 
factors. The micro factors relate to employment status, income, education, 
people’s community ties and friendships, health, personal freedom, indi-
vidual values, and demographic variables. The macro factors include the 
unemployment rate, inflation rate, gross domestic product per capita, and 
unemployment benefits (Frey & Stutzer, 2000c; Whiteley, Clarke, Sanders, 
& Stewart 2010). At the same time, debates over what contributes to life 
satisfaction receive more attention in the political culture literature. Past 
studies about determinants of life satisfaction that relate to government 
performance and political process, however, focused on macro-level factors, 
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such as institutional conditions (Bjørnskov, Dreher, & Fischer, 2010), govern-
ance quality (Helliwell et al., 2012; Ott, 2010) and policy outputs (Pacek & 
Radcliff, 2008; Whiteley et al., 2010). These macro-level determinants in 
aggregate forms neglect the potential influence of individual-level attitudes 
toward government performance on life satisfaction (Curini et al., 2014).
With regard to the role of democracy in satisfaction, studies indicate 
that the ability to participate in the political process influences individuals’ 
subjective well-being (Owen, Videras, & Willemsen, 2008). In the same line 
of inquiry, the work by Dolan, Metcalfe, and Powdthavee (2008) reveals that 
electoral democracy can significantly influence citizens’ life satisfaction. 
However, the findings from such studies are not conclusive (Potts, 2016). In 
addition, there is little empirical work that explicates about the mechanisms 
through which electoral democracy influences life satisfaction (Frey & Stutzer, 
2000a, 2000b; Inglehart, 2009).
Thus, this study examines whether and to what extent democratic electoral 
affects life satisfaction. Using data from the latest World Values Survey (WVS-
6), the present study aims to investigate the mediating role of public trust in 
the relationship between democratic electoral quality (as a proxy measure 
of democracy) and citizen life satisfaction. More specifically, the study seeks 
to address three basic research questions, namely (1) What is the status of 
democratic electoral quality? (2) What is the overall citizen life satisfaction? 
(3) To what extent does public trust play a mediating role in the relationship 
between democratic electoral quality and life satisfaction?
1. Theoretical Background
This section explains conceptual definitions and the theoretical literature 
related to the core constructs of the study, namely electoral democracy, life 
satisfaction, and public rust.
1.1. Democracy
Democracy is defined as “a government in which the supreme power is vested 
in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system 
of representation usually involving periodically held free elections” (Potts, 
2016:87). The popular definition of democracy is a system of government 
of the people, by the people, and for the people (Blind, 2007). Democratic 
electoral quality, which is one of the important constructs in this study, 
depends on the openness of nomination and selection of candidates, the 
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degree of electoral contestation, and the inclusiveness of voting procedures. 
If political parties undertake the nomination and selection of candidates in a 
transparent manner by letting the community to participate, this enhances 
democratic electoral quality. Similarly, the extent to which there is choice 
and contestation among potential candidates for election is a good measure 
of democratic electoral quality. What is of interest in the inclusiveness of 
voting procedures is the extent to which citizens as individual voters take 
part in the voting process (Manion, 2006).
1.2. Life Satisfaction
Veenhoven (1996) defines “life-satisfaction as the degree to which a person 
positively evaluates the overall quality of his/her life as-a-whole. In other 
words, how much the person likes the life he/she leads.”
The literature documents three theories that explain what factors drive life 
satisfaction (Veenhoven, 1996). The first theory is relativism, which assumes 
that life satisfaction varies over time because the standards against which the 
comparison is made simply change. This suggests that satisfaction is the result 
of a comparison between life-as-it-is to conceptions of how-life-should-be. In 
this approach, life satisfaction is the difference between people’s perceptions 
and expectations and the course of life events that cover political, economical, 
and social activities. In this view, it is not possible to create lasting satisfaction, 
neither at the individual level, nor the societal level (Veenhoven, 1996).
The second theory is dispositional, which suggests that innate personality 
characteristics determine life satisfaction. According to this theory, people 
are born either happy or unhappy, and policy interventions have little influ-
ence in determining the level of life satisfaction or happiness (Veenhoven, 
2004). It assumes that life satisfaction is a fixed disposition, implying that an 
improvement in society does not make people more satisfied. At the individual 
level, life satisfaction is a general tendency to like or dislike things, which 
may emanate from innate temperament as well as past life experiences. The 
implication of this theory is that the evaluative reaction will remain the same 
whether the phenomenon is good thing or bad thing. This means that the 
discontented will always be pessimistic while the satisfied will always see the 
better side of things. At the societal level, some cultures may tend to have a 
gloomy outlook on life, whereas others are optimistic (Veenhoven, 1996).
The third theory of life satisfaction is pragmatism, which proposes that life 
satisfaction is mainly the outcome of citizens’ evaluation of public administra-
tion system and government efforts in enhancing economic affluence, social 
equality, political freedom, and access to knowledge (Veenhoven, 1996). The 
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present study fits within the pragmatism of life satisfaction view, in which life 
satisfaction or happiness can be enhanced by facilitating some conditions for 
people (Veenhoven, 2004). Following this line of argument, the literature 
documents a number of empirical studies concerning factors determining 
life satisfaction.
Using Switzerland as a case study, Frey and Stutzer (2000a) categorize 
the determinants of happiness as demographic, economic, and institutional 
factors. Demographic factors comprise personality attributes such as age, 
gender, citizenship (national/foreigner), extent of foreign education, family 
setting, and employment status. Economic factors include both micro- and 
macroeconomic conditions, such as income level and inflation. Institutional 
factors relate to the presence of constitutional conditions deemed necessary 
for democracy and federalism, as well as the extent of their implementation. 
In a similar manner, Stutzer and Frey (as cited in Dorn, Fischer, Kirchgässner, 
and Sousa-Poza (2008)]) found that economic, socio-demographic, and 
institutional variables have a positive significant effect on general level life 
satisfaction. They operationalize the strength of democratic institutions as 
the extent of citizen empowerment through a specific institution of direct 
democracy. A study by Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer (2008) indicates 
that levels of income and education tend to be positively associated with life 
satisfaction. In yet another individual level factor, an employed person has a 
higher level of satisfaction than an unemployed person.
1.3. Public Trust
The literature on trust studies identifies two types of trust. One relates 
to interpersonal trust, which refers to trust between people. The second 
one is institutional trust, which refers to people’s trust in the functioning 
of organizational, institutional, and social systems (Wittmann Zhang & 
Schenker-Wicki, 2012). The present study is confined to public trust as an 
aspect of institutional trust.
According to Camões and Mendes (2019:2), public trust refers to the 
“belief in ethical values and behavior, such as fairness, equity, and the defense 
of civic and human rights” that citizens lean on in making a judgment on 
the trustworthiness of government. The concept has affective, cognitive, 
and behavioral dimensions. Public trust encompasses citizens’ support for 
both process-related and outcome-related elements in the political system. 
The process aspects concern how decision-making processes are organized 
in terms of level of participation, the approach to problems and solutions, 
and the competence of government employees. In short, this implies “doing 
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things the right way.” Output-related elements, one of the pillars of the New 
Public Management movement, concern “who gets what” in politics. This 
aspect argues that governments should be much more output-oriented and 
more effective, which can be explained as “do the right things” (Christensen 
& Lægreid, 2005).
Sako and Helper (1998) provide a broad definition for citizens’ trust in 
government by using three dimensions, namely (1) Competence (are public 
institutions capable of doing what they say they will do?); (2) Contractual 
(will public institutions carry out their contractual agreement?); and (3) 
Good-will (will public institutions make an open-ended commitment to take 
initiatives for mutual benefit while refraining from taking unfair advantage?).
As stated by Norris (2011), public trust reflects support for the political 
system, which may imply confidence in the political community, institutions, 
and political leaders. Similarly, Park and Blenkinsopp (2011) define public 
trust as citizens’ subjective assessment on the extent to which a government 
or its public service is competent, reliable, and honest, while also meeting 
their needs.
Public trust in this study’s context refers to citizens’ general level of trust 
in government and its key institutions. Thus, public trust is a subjective 
attitudinal indicator about the degree of confidence that citizens have in 
state authorities and administrative branches such as the police, the courts, 
federal government, federal parliament, and the civil service system (Beeri, 
Uster, & Vigoda-Gadot, 2019).
2. Research Model and Hypotheses of the Study
This section deals with the study’s conceptual framework and hypotheses. 
As depicted in figure 1, the study argues that public trust in government 
mediates the positive relationship between democratic electoral quality and 
life satisfaction.
2.1. Democratic Electoral Quality and Life Satisfaction
The dependent variable of this study is respondents’ level of satisfaction with 
life, usually referred to as Satisfaction with Life (SWL), or happiness. In each 
WVS, respondents are asked the following question: “All things considered, 
how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” Response categories 
range from “dissatisfied” (with a value of 1) to “satisfied” (with a value of 10).
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Democracy is the rule of the people by the people. This is realized through 
free and fair elections, resulting in a government that represents the majority 
of citizens. Thus, people will accept a political authority if they perceive 
that the election is fair and free. This would in turn enhance life satisfaction 
(Rothstein, 2009). However, flaws in electoral processes, such as lack of clear 
and electoral rules, registration problems or deficiencies, unequal access to the 
media/public resources, and vote buying would adversely affect democracy. 
For instance, when citizens observe these electoral malpractices, they judge 
the process as undemocratic, which in turn makes people less happy (Carreras 
& İrepoğlu, 2013). Overall, electoral democracy may enhance high levels 
of political autonomy and extensive participatory opportunities, which in 
turn tends to increase life satisfaction. This means if people feel that they 
can influence political process, they should have high level of life satisfaction 
(Whiteley et al., 2010). In the same vein, Potts (2016) underlines that people 
value not only policy decisions made by the government but also the way 
the decisions are reached. This means that if people trust the procedure 
followed to reach a decision, they will be happier. Such euphoria emanates 
from procedural utility.
On basis of the above arguments, I propose the following research 
hypothesis:
Democratic electoral quality has a positive and significant effect on citizen life 
satisfaction.
2.2. Electoral Democracy and Public Trust
There is an ongoing debate about whether electoral democracy is an indis-
pensable source for the creation of public trust. One argument suggests that 
electoral democracy enhances public trust. In electoral democracy, free and 
fair elections result in a government representing the majority of the citizens. 
It upholds the essence of democracy, which is “rule of the people by the 
people” (Lindberg & Lindberg, 2006; Manion, 2006). From a contrasting 
point of view, Rothstein (2009) argues that there is little evidence showing 
the positive contribution of electoral democracy in creating public trust. In 
this study, we argue that electoral democracy helps to create public trust in 
government. This leads to the next hypothesis of the study:
Democratic electoral quality has a positive and significant effect on public trust.
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2.3. The Mediating Effect of Public Trust 
Electoral democracy influences life satisfaction because democracy implies 
that government adopts policies that are closer to citizens’ preferences. This 
should increase people’s happiness (Dorn, Fischer, Kirchgässner, & Sousa-
Poza, 2007). Therefore, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
Public trust plays a mediating role in the relationship between democratic 
electoral quality and citizen life satisfaction.
2.4. Conceptual Framework of the Study
Here, I present the study’s conceptual framework, comprising its independent, 
mediating, and dependent variables.








(Source: based on work by Owen et al. [2008]).
3. Research Methods
This section comprises subsections on research design, population, sample 
size and sampling technique, data sources, and data collection instruments. 
It also deals with data collection procedures, methods of data analysis, model 
specifications, a description of study variables, and ethical considerations.
3.1. Research Design
This research project is both descriptive and explanatory in nature. It is a 
descriptive study in the sense that it seeks to describe citizens’ perceptions 
about electoral democracy as well as levels of public trust in government and 
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life satisfaction. The study is explanatory in the sense that it investigates the 
effect of electoral democracy on life satisfaction. In addition, it elucidates 
the mediation effect of public trust in the relationship between electoral 
democracy and public trust.
3.2. Data Sources
This study used secondary data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The 
WVS provides data on sociocultural and political change worldwide. It consists 
of national sample surveys in over ninety countries, using a common question-
naire with variables on beliefs, values, economic development, democratization, 
religion, gender equality, social capital, and subjective well-being. The survey 
has been coordinated by the World Values Survey Association since 1981. 
So for, the WVS comprises six waves. Its first wave was from 1981-1984 and 
covered twenty-three countries, mostly developed nations. The second was 
undertaken from 1990-1994. A third wave of surveys was carried out in 1995-
1998, this time in fifty-five nations and with increased attention being given to 
analyzing the cultural conditions for democracy. A fourth wave of surveys was 
carried out in 1999–2004 in sixty-five countries and included better coverage 
of African and Islamic societies, which had been under-represented in previous 
surveys. A fifth wave was carried out in 2005-2009 and a sixth wave, which is 
the latest survey, was carried out in 2010–2014 in sixty countries (see WVS 
website at www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
The data source for this study was WVS- 6, which covered 2010-2014. 
From a total of 89,565 participants covering sixty countries, 51.1 percent were 
female and the remaining 48.9 percent were male. In this survey, 19.1 percent 
of the participants (n= 17127) were from ten African countries.
3.3. Measures
For electoral democracy, nine question items ranging from V228A to V228I 
in WVS-6 were considered. All these items reflect the quality of election in 
a democratic system and respondents assessed each of the items on a Likert 
scale of 1-4, ranging from “very often” to “not at all often.” Some items, which 
were stated in a positive direction, were recoded before running descriptive 
and inferential analyses. This was to ensure that higher values indicate better 
electoral democracy ratings.
In the WVS-6 questionnaire, public trust was measured by a 4-point scale 
from 1, for “a great deal,” to 4, for “none at all.” In this survey, public trust 
question items cover question items that range from V113 to V118, excluding 
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V116. But, this scale was recoded in such a way that higher values express 
higher levels of trust in government and its key institutions. Particular to 
this study, the institutions that were considered in the analysis include the 
police, the courts, federal government, federal parliament, and the civil 
service system. For the purpose of inferential statistics, a public trust index 
was created by computing the mean trust score from the public trust in each 
of the institutions measured on a 4-point scale (Cronbach’s α = .851). Such 
an approach is in line with the works of Beeri et al. (2019), Chevalier (2019), 
and Martinez-Martin (2010).
Life satisfaction, the dependent variable in this study, is coded on a 10-point 
scale. In each WVS, respondents are asked the following one item question: 
“All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days?” Response categories range from “completely dissatisfied” (which is 
assigned a value of 1) to “completely satisfied” (with a value of 10). On this 
scale, high scores indicate high level of life satisfaction or happiness. In the 
WVS-6 questionnaire, question number V23 represents life satisfaction. For 
analysis purposes, life satisfaction was considered as a continuous variable 
(Beeri et al., 2019; Chevalier, 2019; Martinez-Martin, 2010).
3.4. Reliability and Validity Test
A reliability test shows the internal consistency of items that make up a given 
construct, whereas a validity test confirms the accuracy of measurements. 
The reliability of the study’s constructs was tested by using Cronbach’s alpha. 
Following the recommendations by Field (2013), the analyses of internal 
homogeneity showed acceptable results, as presented in table 1.
Table 1: Number of items and Cronbach’s alpha
Construct Number of items Cronbach’s alpha
Electoral Democracy Quality 9 .737
Public trust 5 .851
Life-satisfaction One-item -
Source: Computed from WVS- 6 dataset
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3.5. Methods of Data Analysis
This study employed mainly quantitative data analysis, whereby both 
descriptive and inferential data analysis methods were used. Descriptive 
analysis provides the realities as they exist using a frequency table, mean, 
and standard deviations (SD). Using the means or percentages of a certain 
response is very simple and useful for comparison purposes. For Likert scale 
data, analysis must take into account the distribution of responses to the 
question (Gundelach & Kreiner, 2004).
For Likert scale type of data with a 4-point scale, the responses for each 
item of the main constructs of the study were transformed from a 4 points 
Likert scale to a 2-point scale, in order to make the analysis process very 
simple and understandable. For example, response options comprising [1. a 
great deal, 2. quite a lot, 3. not very much, 4. none at all] were transformed 
to “a great deal, /quite a lot” and “not very much/none at all.” Subsequently, 
a frequency table was used to present this type of data.
In addition to using frequency percentages (%), the composite mean 
was computed for each of the main constructs to show the overall findings. 
Though there is a debate whether to consider a Likert-scale measure as ordinal 
or interval, it is acceptable to assume Likert-scale as an interval scale of 
measurement (Martinez-Martin, 2010). In this line of methodology, Chevalier 
(2019) indicated that it is meaningful to produce a scale of attitudes from a 
Likert-scale measure when Cronbach’s Alpha is greater than 0.7. Accordingly, 
this study considered all the three main constructs (i.e., electoral democracy 
quality, public trust, and life satisfaction) as continuous variables.
For all the proposed hypotheses, the study employed mediation analysis, 
which assumes four classical conditions as requirements (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). First, the independent variable, a composite of democratic electoral 
quality in this case, must be associated with the outcome, life satisfaction. 
Second, the independent variable must be significantly related with the 
mediator, public trust in government. Third, there must be a significant 
relationship between the mediator and the outcome. Finally, the effect of 
the independent variable on the outcome must be significantly reduced for 
partial mediation, or to zero for full mediation when the mediator is entered.
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4. Results
This section presents the study’s findings using descriptive and inferential 
analysis techniques.
4.1. Profile of the Respondents
This study used secondary data from WVS- 6, which covered 2010-2012. 
From a total of 89,565 participants in the survey, 51.1 percent were females 
and the remaining 48.9 percent were male. In this survey, 19.1 percent of the 
participants (n= 17127) were from ten African countries.1
4.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Main Constructs of the Study
Table 2 reveals descriptive statistics for the main constructs of the study, 
namely life satisfaction, public trust, and democratic electoral quality.
As indicated in table 2, the mean life satisfaction level in our sample is 
around 6.82 (which represents 68.2 percent), with a standard deviation of 
2.3. This suggests considerable variation in average level of life satisfaction. 
Computed from a 4-point Likert scale, the public trust in government and 
democratic electoral quality are 61 percent and 68 percent respectively.
Table 3 provides information about the descriptive statistics on the main 
constructs between African and other countries. Specific to African countries 
covered by the WVS-6 survey, the level of citizen life satisfaction is about 
62 percent, which is lower than the satisfaction level of other countries 
(70 percent). Similarly, the performance of African countries in electoral 
democracy (26 percent) is below that of other countries (27 percent). Though 
the study did not have prior hypotheses about the level of life satisfaction 
and electoral democracy between African and other countries, both findings 
show that the differences are statistically significant (t= -37.295, P<0.05 for 
life satisfaction, and t=-20.101, P<0.05 for democratic electoral quality; 
please see appendix 3 and appendix 4). These findings indicate that the better 
the quality of electoral democracy in a given country, the more satisfied its 
citizens are with their life (Beeri et al., 2019).
4.3. Qualities of Electoral Democracy
According to Manion (2006), the qualities of electoral democracy inter alia 
include the openness of nomination and selection of candidates, the degree 
of electoral contestation, and the inclusiveness of voting procedures. This 
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subsection examines whether elections across the world fulfill democracy 
characteristics as presented in table 4.
The findings in table 4 show that the majority of the respondents (more 
than 60 percent) had good perceptions about the counting of votes, fairness 
of election officials, coverage of elections by the media, and availability of a 
genuine choice in the elections. Contrary to this, they replied that opposition 
candidates lack freedom to participate and voters are threatened with violence 
at the polls.
4.4. Public Trust in Government
Public trust refers to the degree to which citizens evaluate how well the 
political system is performing (Kim, 2005). Table 5 shows public trust in 
government.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for all respondents
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Satisfaction with your life 88987 1 10 6.82 2.284
Public trust 88342 1 4 2.4535 .74745
Democratic electoral quality 56443 1 4 2.7062 .59317
Valid N (listwise) 56018
Table 3: Descriptive statistics by continent: African and other countries







Satisfaction with your life 17033 1 10 6.23 2.473
Democratic electoral quality 13961 1 4 2.6190 .58984
Public trust 16820 1 4 2.4425 .75956










Satisfaction with your life 71954 1 10 6.95 2.215
Democratic electoral quality 42483 1 4 2.7349 .59147
Public trust 71523 1 4 2.4560 .74455
Valid N (listwise) 42,158
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As reported in table 5, a large number of citizens had low trust in parlia-
ment, the federal government, and the civil service system. In relative terms, 
they had a moderate trust in the police and the courts.
Table 4: Qualities of electoral democracy
Not often/ 




Votes are counted fairly 35.2% 64.8%
Opposition candidates are prevented from running 38.3% 61.7%
TV news favors the governing party 56.9% 43.1%
Voters are bribed 51.0% 49.0%
Journalists provide fair coverage of elections 38.9% 61.1%
Election officials are fair 42.2% 57.8%
Rich people buy elections 53.2% 46.8%
Voters are threatened with violence at the polls 30.9% 69.1%
Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections 33.0% 67.0%
N= valid response rates ranges from 49,826 to 53,300 
Composite mean: 2.7062 (on the basis of a 4-point Likert scale from the original questionnaire) 
Source: Computed from 2014 WVS dataset
Table 5: Public trust in government and its institutions
Not very much/None at all Quite a lot/A great deal
% %
Trust: The police 44.0% 56.0%
Trust: The courts 45.4% 54.6%
Trust: The government 53.7% 46.3%
Trust: Parliament 60.3% 39.7%
Trust: The Civil service 52.5% 47.5%
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4.5. Correlations between the Main Constructs
Correlation analysis shows the association between variables. In this regard, 
table 6 presents the findings from the correlation analysis for the main 
constructs of the study, namely electoral democracy, public trust, and life 
satisfaction.
The results of correlation analysis (table 6) indicate that both electoral 
democracy and public trust have a positive and significant correlation with 
life satisfaction. This shows that life satisfaction (happiness) can be advanced 
by further democratization (Veenhoven, 2008).
4.6. Towards Explaining Life Satisfaction 
The central issues of this study are to examine the effect of electoral democracy 
on life satisfaction and to investigate whether public trust plays a mediating 
role between electoral democracy and life satisfaction. Accordingly, table 7 
displays results from the mediation analysis, which entailed performing a 
series of regression analyses that capture all the three hypotheses of the study.
In model 1 of table 7, the result indicates that democratic electoral quality 
has a positive significant effect on the dependent variable, life satisfaction 
(β = 0.415, P< .001). Thereby, hypothesis 1 is confirmed and step 1 of the 
mediation analysis is fulfilled. The result of model 2 in table 7 shows that the 
composite of democratic electoral quality has a significant positive effect 
on public trust (β = 0.375, P< .001), showing that step 2 of the mediation 
analysis is also satisfied.
Model 3 in table 7 entails performing step 3 and step 4 of the mediation 
analysis at the same time. Step 3 confirms that public trust in government, 
the mediator variable, is significantly related to life satisfaction (β = 0.280, 
P<.001). Once public trust (the mediator variable) is entered into the regres-
sion model, the effect of democratic electoral quality on life satisfaction is 
reduced from β = 0.415 to β = .310, which is step 4 of the mediation analysis. 
This represents a 25.3 percent reduction. This confirms the significance of the 
indirect effect of democratic electoral on life satisfaction through its positive 
relationship with public trust. Thereby, public trust partially mediates the 
relationship between democratic electoral and life satisfaction.
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5. Discussion
This study has shown that electoral democracy contributes to life satisfaction. 
In other words, citizens’ assessment on electoral democracy influences their 
level of life satisfaction.
It also explicates that public trust partially mediates the positive relation-
ship between electoral democracy and life satisfaction. These findings have 
both theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical point of view, 
the study contributes to the existing literature focusing on the unsolved 
issue of what explains life satisfaction. More specifically, the finding that 
electoral democracy has a significant positive effect on life satisfaction is in 
line with democratic theory, which states political structures and processes 
Table 6: Correlations
  Electoral Democracy Public trust Life Satisfaction
Electoral Democracy 1    
Public trust .308** 1
Life Satisfaction .102** .133** 1
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). N is greater than 56,000
Table 7: Regression statistics for the effect of public trust as a mediator between 
electoral democracy and life-satisfaction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Life satisfaction Public trust Life satisfaction




_cons 5.726*** 1.367*** 5.344***
(0.0452) (0.0135) (0.0490)
adj. R-sq 0.011 0.095 0.018
Notes: N= 56090, Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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have significant effects on citizens’ quality of life and their sense of subjective 
well-being (Whiteley et al., 2010).
Contrary to the prior proposition that government has less effect on 
happiness (Headey and Wearing, 1992 as cited in Ott [2011]), the current 
study confirms that political factors and government are the sources of happi-
ness. This shows that collective conditions in a nation (in this case, electoral 
democracy) explain happiness beyond the effect of individual differences in 
terms of employment, income, personality, education, gender, social relations, 
and age.
In a practical sense, the study highlighted the importance of making 
elections free, fair, and inclusive, as this would enhance both public trust and 
citizens’ life satisfaction. This would require a concerted action by politicians, 
policy makers, public managers, and the public at large. Democratic electoral 
quality, which is one of the important constructs in this study, reflects the 
openness of nomination and selection of candidates, the degree of electoral 
contestation, and the inclusiveness of voting procedures. When political 
parties undertake the nomination and selection of candidates in a transparent 
manner by letting the community participate, this enhances democratic 
electoral quality. Similarly, greater degrees of choice and contestation among 
potential candidates for election improve democratic electoral quality. Fur-
thermore, the extent to which citizens as individual voters actively take part 
in the election process would promote the inclusiveness of voting procedures.
5.1. Limitations of the Study
The study has some limitations that should be considered when interpreting 
its findings. First, this study used a cross-sectional data set, not a longitudinal 
one. As a result, the study does not reveal the changes in the relationship 
between electoral democracy, public trust, and life satisfaction over a period 
of time. In addition, a cross-sectional research design could not establish a 
cause and effect relationship. Second, the findings are based on subjective 
ratings instead of objective data with regard to the main constructs of the 
study. However, multiple scale items were used to measure each construct 
except life satisfaction, in order to consider all possible information on the 
constructs.
The third limitation concerns the use of parametric inferential analyses 
for the Likert scale of measurement. This study, however, employed multiple 
items to capture important aspects of the constructs, just as applied by the 
prior studies (Beeri et al., 2019; Chevalier, 2019; Martinez-Martin, 2010). The 
fourth limitation relates to the small value of coefficient of determination (i.e., 
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adj. R-sq is lower than 10 percent), which poses a question on the explanatory 
capacity of the model. In this regard, future research could attempt to identify 
other potential mediators and moderators that influence the relationship 
between electoral democracy and life satisfaction.
Conclusions
The study of life satisfaction is of great importance, as it influences people’s 
personal life as well as their level of participation in political and economic 
affairs. This study aimed to examine whether and how electoral democracy 
influences citizens’ life satisfaction. Accordingly, this study demonstrated that 
electoral democracy has both direct and indirect effect on life satisfaction. 
In other words, the findings indicated that democratic election significantly 
enhances public trust in government. Chiefly, the study underlines that public 
trust mediates the positive relationship between electoral democracy and 
overall citizens’ life satisfaction.
The study showed that political factors in terms of electoral democracy 
and public trust have significant effect on life satisfaction. This shows that not 
only demographic factors (age, gender, citizenship [national/foreigner], level 
of education, family setting, and employment status) and economic factors 
(such as income level and inflation) but also political factors significantly 
explain citizen life satisfaction or happiness.
Thus, politicians and election officials need to uphold democracy principles 
and electoral qualities so as to improve life satisfaction. This can be achieved 
by government policy that requires making election process (pre-election 
period, the election period, and post-election period) free, fair, and inclusive.
In addition to electoral democracy, public trust is of importance in influ-
encing life satisfaction. As clearly suggested by Welch, Hinnant, and Moon 
(2005), government and its institutions can enjoy a high level of public trust 
by adopting ICT-based public service delivery, improving their administrative 
rules, making its process more transparent, and reducing public officials’ 
discretionary power. Building public trust would in turn have a positive 
effect on life satisfaction.
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Notes
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Male 43782 48.9 48.9 48.9
Female 45691 51.0 51.1 100.0
Total 89473 99.9 100.0
Missing
Missing; Unknown 40 .0
No answer 51 .1
Total 91 .1
Total 89565 100.0







Other countries 72438 80.9 80.9 80.9
African 17127 19.1 19.1 100.0
Total 89565 100.0 100.0
Appendix 3: Independent Samples Test for mean life satisfaction 
by continent
Group Statistics





Satisfaction with your life
African 17033 6.23 2.473 .019
Other 
Countries
71954 6.95 2.215 .008
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Independent Samples Test















-37.295 88985 .000 -.720 .019 -.758 -.682
Appendix 4: Independent Samples Test for democratic electoral 
quality by continent
Group statistics






African 13961 2.6190 .58984 .00499
Other 
Countries
42483 2.7349 .59147 .00287
Independent Samples Test
















-20.101 56441 .000 -.11590 .00577 -.12720 -.10460

3 
Status, Challenges, and Prospects of 
the Ethiopian Developmental State 
(Emphasis on Democratic Governance)1
Belayneh Bogale Zewdie
Box 1: Key points of the chapter
 the debate on democratic governance vs. development seems a “false choice” 
and a sequencing fallacy.
 there exists a considerable gap between form and reality when it comes to 
democratic governance in Ethiopia.
 the bottlenecks include the dispute between a shared vision and the quest for 
nations, nationalities, and people’s self-determination; the hostile relationship 
between the government and media, political opposition, and civil societies; the 
poor performance of some governance indicators.
 the achievements in hdi Ethiopia has made in the ten years since it shift 
toward the developmental state model are undisputed. the policy and strategic 
commitments and constitutional guardianship of democratic governance are 
positive factors.
 dealing with such a state demands appropriate innovation and a pragmatic 
approach in order to deepen the democratic governance agenda in the context of 
the developmental state.
Box 2: Reading this chapter will give you insight in
 conceptualization of the developmental state;
 characteristics of the developmental state;
 Gray areas in the Ethiopian “democratic developmental state” model; and
 challenges and prospects of democratic governance in the Ethiopian 
developmental state.
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Box 3: Abbreviations
EPrdF = Ethiopian People revolutionary democratic Front
FdrE = Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia
GtP = Growth and transformation Plan
hEP = higher Education Proclamation
hdi = human development index
sAP = structural Adjustment program
tPlF = tigrayan People’s liberation Front
tVEt = technique and vocational education and training
un = united nations
undP = united nations development Program
usA = united states of America
Wb = World bank
1. Introduction
Nowadays the terms “governance” and “democracy” are accepted as the 
nucleus of development politics. Bad governance is being increasingly regarded 
as one of the root causes of all evil within our societies. Major donors and 
international financial institutions are also basing their development as-
sistance on the condition that reforms that ensure “democratic governance” 
are carried out (WB, 1992; UNESCAP, n.d; WB, 2013). On top of this, the 
concept of democratic governance has been widely recognized as prerequisite 
for successful nation-building and socioeconomic progress.
The concept of democratic governance has received increasing attention in 
Africa over the last three decades. The importance of the concept for African 
development is related to three major issues (WB, 2013). Firstly, it is related 
to the need to create the basic extra-economic conditions necessary for the 
growth of the African economy, such as effective public administration, an 
independent and functioning judiciary, a transparent financial system, and 
accountability. Secondly, the concept is related to the common developmental 
challenges of Africa, such as accountability, rule of law, freedom of expression 
and association, and legitimate and inclusive governments. Improving these 
factors may be considered as a significant move toward African renewal. 
Thirdly, the adoption and continuous improvement of the market-oriented 
system in Africa has been prescribed as a key to development.
In line with this, according to government reports, Ethiopia has achieved 
encouraging development results, maintaining an economic growth rate 
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of 10 percent over the last ten years. The international community has also 
recognized that there has been growth, though there is not much agreement 
on the rate (statistics). It has also been reported that the country has come to 
enjoy the fastest improvement in the Human Development Index among the 
Least Developed Countries (IIAG, 2015; Bekele & Regassa, 2012). Moreover, 
the government claims that it is determined to accelerate and maintain this 
development result while strengthening its democratic governance agenda. 
It has set for itself a challenging goal of creating a “democratic developmental 
state” and building a green economy (MoFED, 2010; Bekele & Regassa, 
2012). Additionally, the county has also the ambition to become a middle-
income state by 2025. In short, Ethiopia, a self-declared developmental state, 
seeks to construct a developmental state while also deepening its democratic 
governance.
The country has recently launched a set of coordinated comprehensive 
development plans, called the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) I 
and II. The first phase, which lasted for five years from 2010/11 to 2014/15 
(MoFED, 2010), has come to a conclusion, leading to the kick-off of the second 
phase as of the 2015/16 budget year. The idea of the developmental state 
calls for such coordinated development plans, which identify the develop-
ment priorities of the country and the respective roles of each sector, so as 
to facilitate the achievement of the national goals.
The concept of constructing a developmental state while also deepening 
democracy and good governance, as stimulating as it is to those who value 
a democratic developmental state, poses a set of challenges. It evokes the 
question as to whether pressing the democratic governance agenda impedes 
or facilitates development. The issue of whether there is a relationship of 
priority, or primacy, between development and democratic governance has 
not been resolved (Bekele & Regassa, 2012) and has evoked difficult ques-
tions and lengthy debate among development scholars. These questions are 
raised in different forms in different contexts and lead to smaller, local, and 
context-specific issues that need to be raised and discussed.
Hence, there has to be continuous rhetoric and discourse within the 
academic community and practitioners in the field so as to attain conceptual 
clarity. To this end, the author of this chapter strongly believes that this 
chapter will serve to provoke thought and stimulate discussions. Especially 
in Ethiopian context, where the culture of boldly discussing politics is not 
yet very deep, the importance of this chapter is self-evident.
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2. Objectives of the Review
The general objective of this chapter is to explore the status, challenges, 
and prospects of good governance in a developmental state, with particular 
emphasis on the Ethiopian context. Specifically;
– To come up with conceptual clarity regarding the developmental state;
– To portray the characteristics of the developmental state model;
– To point out the gray areas in the Ethiopian democratic developmental 
state model; and
– To discuss the challenges and prospects of democratic governance in the 
Ethiopian developmental state.
3. Materials and Methods
By way of desk review, the chapter attempts to point out the status, challenges, 
and prospects of democratic governance under the Ethiopian developmental 
state model, examining national legal, strategic, and policy documents (such as 
the Growth and Transformation Plan I and II and different related programs) 
and various publications and prior studies in this area. Hence, the reviewer 
looked into the literature on the developmental state in general and the 
Ethiopian state in particular. The overall goal of the review is to provoke 
thoughts and to stimulate discussions.
4. Conceptualizing Developmental State
The concept of a developmental state is not utterly new to the literature in 
politics, development studies, and economics. While the term has been 
used to refer to state-led economic planning as experienced in the countries 
of East Asia and some other countries that have worn the label since the 
1970s, a serious attempt at conceptualizing it is said to have begun with the 
work of Chalmers Johnson in the 1980s (Johnson, 1982). In his analysis of 
Japanese development in the 1970s, Johnson created the foundations for the 
model of the developmental state. He first used the term to describe strong 
interventionist policies that led to sustained, rapid industrialization and 
long-term economic development. For example, in the period that began 
with the Second World War and continued up to the 1980s, the economy of 
Japan was shaped by a political ideology that privileged raising income levels 
and sustaining industrial growth.
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But it was the small East Asian “tigers”—Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—
that became the archetypal instantiations of the model (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 
1990). The East Asian “tigers” managed to change their position in the world 
economic hierarchy, moving from “underdeveloped” to “developed” in the 
course of two generations. This kind of shift is not only unprecedented among 
twentieth-century developing countries. It is exceptional even in the broader 
context that includes the historical experience of Europe and the Americas 
(Evans and Heller, 2018).
In the context of Africa, Mckinsey (2010) labeled Botswana and Mauritius 
as the “African Lions” to demonstrate the two states as the African version of 
successful developmental states. In Ethiopia, the term is increasingly being 
used and dominating political discourse.
4.1. Meaning of Developmental State
There is no agreed definition of the developmental state; rather, the discus-
sion and debate on it is a work in progress. However, just like many other 
social science concepts, it can be defined and conceptualized in diverse ways 
(Jaleta, 2015). A developmental state may be defined as a state wherein the 
government is closely involved in macro- and microeconomic planning in 
order to grow the economy. It has generally been observed that successful 
developmental states are able to advance their economies much faster than 
regulatory states that use regulations to manage the economy. As an example, 
according to Hollander (2011), it took the USA and United Kingdom ap-
proximately fifty years to double their economy while it took China, which 
is a developmental state, approximately ten years to achieve the same goal. 
However, this argument seems simplistic, since the contexts and periods of 
the Chinese and the aforementioned western countries economic doubling 
time were quite different.
A developmental state is often defined in terms of its ideological orientation 
(i.e., promoting the ideal and agenda of developmentalism) and its institutional 
arrangements (i.e., its institutional capacity to formulate and implement its 
policies and programs), whereby the state has to build efficient and effective 
institutions to achieve its developmental goals. Standard descriptions also 
maintain that a developmental state is a state with instincts to resist external 
demands (e.g., multinational corporations) and oppress internal resistance 
(from groups focused on transient political gains or short–term profits, i.e., 
local political and business elites) (Bekele & Regassa, 2012).
This latter description suggests that a developmental state ought to have the 
capacity to control internal strife and build consensus among citizens on the 
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national developmental agenda by drawing attention to the long-term benefits 
for all (Zenawi, 2006; Bekele & Regassa, 2012). An economic report on 
Africa holds that a developmental state is “one that has the capacity to deploy 
its authority, credibility and legitimacy in a binding manner to design and 
implement development policies and programs for promoting transformation 
and growth, as well as for expanding human capabilities” (ECS & AU, 2011, 
p. 7). Ideally, therefore, a developmental state needs to be a persuasive state 
with the competence to mobilize people and resources around its development 
plan (Zenawi, 2006). In other words, a democratic developmental state 
requires a shared vision and national consensus as preconditions for success. 
Peter Evans refers to it as a state with institutional design meant to advance 
the transformative role of the state “rather than constraining the state,” a 
state with the capacity to formulate and implement its development goals 
in an authoritative and binding fashion resulting in improved economic 
performance (Evans, 1995).
The developmental state is also referred to as an autonomous/independent 
state, with a decidedly interventionist bent, as it seeks to monitor and control 
the economy. In this sense, it can even be viewed as a model of capitalism that 
nonetheless differs from a minimalist state or other species of interventionist 
states such as the regulatory state and the welfare state (Wade, 1990; Edigheji, 
2005; Bekele & Regassa, 2012). The late prime minister of FDRE, Melese 
Zenawi, contrasted the developmental state with weak states (which easily 
bow to the pressure mounted on them by the business or political elite) 
or predatory states (which tend to be extractive and exploitative of public 
resources for private purposes) (Zenawi, 2006).
A developmental state is, therefore, a state that is and seeks to be a strong 
player in the economy of a nation with a view to enhancing economic develop-
ment. It is a state that promotes macroeconomic stability and establishes an 
institutional framework that provides law and order, effective administration 
of justice and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Mkandawire, 2001). The 
aspiration of developmental states is chiefly catching up with the advanced 
world by breaking out of a path dependency that has not led to the economic 
transformation needed to overcome poverty. In words of Bekele and regassa 
(2012) “the goals are articulated as achieving development (mainly to mean 
economic growth) without necessarily treading upon the neoliberal tradition” 
(p. 10). Their aspiration is to facilitate, if not dictate, economic transformation 
and capacity building while cautiously controlling internal and external 
market forces.
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4.2. Characteristics of a Developmental State (in the Ethiopian 
Context)
In order to understand the concept of a developmental state, it is helpful to 
highlight some of the characteristics of the model. Developmental states 
generally put strong emphasis on technical education and the development 
of numeracy and computer skills within the population. This technically 
oriented education is strategically used to improve the capacity of government 
structures, particularly the bureaucracy (Amsden, 1989). What emerges out 
of this strategy is that the political and bureaucratic layers are populated by 
extremely educated people who have sufficient analytical tools to be able to 
take leadership initiatives, based on sound scientific basis.
In Ethiopia, a review of policy and strategic documents demonstrates 
the critical role of education in the overall development endeavors. As such, 
the country’s Education and Training Policy provides a definition of educa-
tion that is strongly rooted in the purpose and role it plays in human life in 
general. Similarly, the HEP sets objectives for higher education that include 
the promotion and enhancement of research focusing on knowledge and 
technology transfer consistent with the country’s priority needs (FDRE, 
2009). This objective not only emphasizes the importance of technology 
transfer, it also implies the identification of priority areas for the country. 
A similarly adequate policy focus has been given for TVET providers and 
related institutions, which are meant to be strengthened to become “centers for 
technology capabilities’ accumulation and transfer” (Ibid, 2009: 55) However, 
the ever-increasing rate of graduate unemployment and the deteriorating 
quality of higher education is becoming a cause of concern in the country.
The other characteristic of a developmental state is the centrality of a 
development‐oriented political leadership bound together by a powerful 
economic and political ideology focused on development (Fritz and Menocal, 
2006; Pempel, 1999, Waldner, 1999). The circumstances that give rise to a 
development‐oriented political leadership can be quite diverse. According to 
Waldner (1999), this leadership grows out of a political context characterized 
by the absence of pressure, which gives these leaders scope to construct 
institutions conducive to economic development. Other analysts suggest that 
a development‐oriented leadership evolves from of a clear consensus within 
the governing elites, both administrative and political, over the scope and 
direction of development (Leftwich, 2010). The final factor is the interests 
of political survival and legitimacy, which push political elites toward a 
developmental orientation.
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However, given the relatively polarized politics and the heterogonous nature 
(multiethnic, multilingual, and multicultural) of Ethiopia, where the quest for 
the rights of nations, nationalities, and people is the center of political discourse, 
engendering a development-oriented political leadership with lesser pressures 
is quite difficult. The experience of East Asian countries also suggests the 
importance of clear consensus and shared vision between different elites as an 
instrument to build a development-oriented leadership. However, at least as far 
as the reviewer is concerned, the Ethiopian state lacks this virtue. Worse, part of 
the political leadership has been accused of rent-seeking and predatory bandit 
behavior, which is a clear obstacle for the creation of development-oriented elite.
Compared to other developing regions, the autonomy, capability, and ef-
fectiveness of the permanent executive in the East Asian developmental states 
are quite impressive. This may be traced back to the presence of a bureaucracy 
in the Weberian tradition, which prioritizes meritocratic recruitment, provides 
promotion incentives, shows rationality, and guarantees high levels of prestige 
and legitimacy to bureaucratic officials (Meyns and Musamba, 2010; Wong, 
2004). Onis supports this observation: “Rigorous standards of entry not 
only ensured a high degree of bureaucratic capability, but also generated 
a sense of unity and common identity on the part of the bureaucratic elite. 
Hence the bureaucrats were imbued with a sense of mission and identified 
themselves with national goals which derived from a position of leadership 
in society” (Onis, 1991: 114). Such a bureaucracy exhibits uncommon levels 
of autonomy and effectiveness when it is obviously free from unproductive 
interference from the political leadership. As a result, decision‐makers and 
technocrats were able to effectively formulate economic policy and employ 
innovation in public service delivery (ECA and AUC, 2011; Pempel, 1999).
Nonetheless, the Ethiopian public sector lacks these key manifestations 
of a developmental bureaucracy. There is also evidence of recruitment and 
promotion based on political patronage in some key public agencies. In the 
words of Mebratu (2015):
“……the civil service in Ethiopia today is actually being re-politicized. Thus, 
understanding of Ethiopian efforts to adopt reforms—in the context of devel-
opmental paradigm—provides key perspectives and experiences to end hiding 
behind development if there is actual need to transform civil service institutions 
and save them from being simple cogwheels that conclusively carry out the 
wishes of politicians.”
A production‐oriented private sector working closely with an intervention-
ist government has been at the center of the rapid building of a successful 
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developmental state. Based on long‐term institutionalized alliances among 
political power, the financial sector, and industrial capital, these state‐private 
sector partnerships were crafted on the principle of reciprocity, such as con-
necting subsidies to performance, and acted as an incentive for productivity 
(Caldentey, 2008; Wade, 2010). Nonetheless, the reality on the ground 
demonstrates that the majority of Ethiopian business is characterized by 
short-term investments that are seeking for short-term returns and “hot 
money”. This makes profit, particularly short-term profit, a significant factor 
in the investment decision-making process.
The other characteristic of the developmental state is the existence of 
performance-oriented governance. Developmental states are found to enjoy 
support because they are associated with promoting rapid economic growth 
and providing economic benefits to both the ruling elites and the general 
public. Hence due attention is given to performance orientation and the 
delivery of services (performance legitimacy) to citizens rather than to 
the ballot (electoral legitimacy) (Johnson as cited by Musamba, 2010). In 
Ethiopia, state legitimacy is achieved through the ballot; however, the main 
shortcoming is that society has, arguably, not reached an equilibrium stage 
where the feedback mechanism between voting patterns and the delivery of 
services reinforce each other. Moreover, there is emerging criticism of the 
Ethiopian government related to election frauds and suppressive laws that 
“has narrowed the political arena”. Critics often also accuse the regime of 
having room only for weak, fragile, and puppet political oppositions.
To conclude, developmental states tend to manifest the following traits: 
economic nationalism (skepticism about neo-liberalism), strong government 
bureaucracy, and production oriented private sector, prioritization of economic 
growth over political reform, performance legitimacy, and focus on technical 
education. Successful developmental states have used the aforementioned 
traits to transform their economies and be globally competitive, to reduce 
poverty and inequality in their societies and by and large to enhance quality 
of life. In this regard, Ethiopia, a self declared democratic developmetal state, 
lucks most of the manifestations of successful developmental states.
4.3. The Genesis of the Developmental State in Ethiopia
The first attempt to adopt a developmental state in Ethiopia dates back to the 
early twentieth century. Reformist intellectuals of 1920s like Negadras Gebre 
Hiwot Bykedagne, Blatten Geta Hiruy W/Silassie, Dr. Martin Workneh, 
and Ato Kebede Michael were passionate about the Japanese development 
model. In October 1931, the imperial government of Ethiopia sent a group of 
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government officials and intellectuals to Japan to study different aspects of 
that country’s development for use as a development model (Zewde, 2002). 
The first Ethiopian Constitution of 1931 directly modeled Japan’s Meiji 
constitution of 1890 (Zewde, 1990).
However, Ethiopia’s attempt to adopt the Japanese development state 
model was not successful for various reasons. The most notable one is the 
fact that the Ethiopian intellectuals did not conduct an in-depth study of the 
Japanese model (Jaleta, 2015). The imperial government’s commitment was 
also not up to the required level. The model was not supported by the objective 
reality of the then Ethiopia due to the great deal of difference between the 
two countries (Zewde, 1990). Some other external factors that contributed 
to the unsuccessful attempt to adopt the Japanese model included the Italian 
invasion and occupation of Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941 and the eruption of the 
Second World War in 1939 (Jaleta, 2015). Additionally, this attempt to join 
the first generation of developmental state was aborted by the feudo-capitalist 
orientation of the empire after the Second World War and its successor – the 
socialist military dictatorship.
In the contemporary Ethiopia, there is no agreement on the exact time 
when Ethiopia officially embraced the developmental state model. There are 
authors, for example Gebremichael (2013), who argue that certain elements 
of the developmental state were observed in the 1995 constitution. For oth-
ers, the revival of the developmental state in Ethiopia has been affected by 
multiple interconnected factors. According to Clapamn (2013), the 2001 crisis 
within the TPLF and the resultant split of the party was one of the factors. 
The divisions within the party, among others, emanated from differences in 
ideology, on development strategies and the war with Eritrea. The victorious 
group then came up with its revisionist idea, declaring its commitment to 
building a developmental state (Clapham, 2013). Another factor was the 
surprising emergence of strong contestants for office in the 2005 national 
elections. EPRDF had admitted that its programs were not well-received 
by the people and that the party was forced to come up with new national 
development-oriented programs to win the hearts of the electorate. To this 
effect, the late Meles Zenawi’s government instituted the idea of a democratic 
developmental state, as a rebrand to their earlier ideology of a revolutionary 
democracy (Negash, 2012). Moreover, the ideological pitfalls of the neoliberal 
paradigm, which had led Africa into another economic dead-end and into a 
state of fragile, unstable democracy, were another source of pressure (Zenawi, 
2011). Hence, the reemergence of the developmental state in Ethiopia is 
a result of contentious twists and turns in search of an alternative path of 
development that fits the reality of the country.
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Jaleta (2015) claims that the Ethiopian model is drawn from South Korea, 
Taiwan, and China, that is, on the belief that the path to accelerated economic 
growth is through a strong developmental state that creates policy space, 
encourages and directs investments, and promotes a strong work culture 
and ethics among the population. The Ethiopian developmental state model 
reveals an emulation of the Chinese model, in that there is a de facto one-
party state that prioritizes economic development over the democratization 
process (Jaleta, 2015). Although Ethiopia is a self-declared “democratic” 
developmental state, the country is facing sharp criticisms on its commitment 
to real democratic governance.
4.4. Grey Areas in the Ethiopian “Democratic Developmental 
State” 
It is helpful to think of the developmental state as a state-led capital develop-
ment process and a conscious effort at finding a short-cut to the advanced 
capitalist mode of development. In this sense, one notes that the developmental 
state model stands in stark contrast to the “Revolutionary Democratic State,” 
which can be seen as a Marxsism-Leninism inspired doctrine in which the 
stopover in capitalism is temporary as the state is meant to steadily but inexo-
rably head into a planned socialist economic system (Bekle & Regassa, 2012).
However, the Ethiopian approach toward development has been character-
ized by the doctrinal confusion of the democratic developmental state and 
revolutionary democracy. Though the country is a self-declared democratic 
developmental state, the ruling coalition uses the two doctrines interchange-
ably as if they are one and the same. Hence, there has to be a clear position 
on what the democratic developmental state is and what it is not, so as to 
shed light on the gray area.
The other gray area in the Ethiopian developmental state model is the quest 
for ideological hegemony and strategic policy-making, which contrasts with 
constitutionally recognized multiparty electoral democracy. Developmental 
states generally believe that they will attain state legitimacy through delivery of 
services to citizens (Edigheji, [2005]; Musamba [2010]), rather than through 
the ballot. As it has been mentioned above, most successful developmental 
states are found to enjoy support because they are associated with promoting 
rapid economic growth and providing economic benefits to both the ruling 
elites and the general public. Article 56 of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia constitution stated that legitimacy is achieved through the ballot 
(FDRE, 1995). However, the main shortcoming is that Ethiopian society, 
arguably, has not reached an equilibrium stage where the feedback mechanism 
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between voting patterns and service delivery reinforce each other. Addition-
ally the scheme on how to reconciling the constitutionally granted multi 
party democracy and that of hegemonic performance legitimacy sentiment 
in developmetal state model is not clear. That’s why critiques often accuse the 
regime for having room only to weak, fragile and puppet political oppositions.
5. Governance in a Developmental State 
By governance we mean the manner in which power is exercised by govern-
ments in the management of a country’s social and economic resources. 
“Good” governance is the exercise of power by various levels of government in 
an effective, honest, equitable, transparent, and accountable manner (Smith, 
2007; WB, 2003).
Good governance has eight major characteristics (UN, 2007; UNES-
CAP, n.d). It is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the 
rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities 
are taken into account, and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society 
are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future 
needs of society.















5.1. The Ethiopian Governance Status 
The government claims that Ethiopia is an emerging democracy departing 
from its authoritarian past. There are appreciable formal attempts at capacity-
building as the basis of installing the culture of democratic governance. There 
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is also evidence that there are considerable improvements in some indicators 
of democratic governance. Nevertheless, the reality on the ground, on some 
key indicators of democratic governance, remains utterly opposed to the 
formal rhetoric in official documents. The reality of Ethiopia’s democratic 
status, based on some key indicators of democratic governance, is highlighted 
in the subsequent paragraphs.
Based on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), which meas-
ures the quality of governance in African countries on an annual basis by 
compiling data from diverse global sources, Ethiopia demonstrates notable 
progress at the overall governance level. Since 2011, as one of the top ten 
improvers on the continent, Ethiopia has shown steady improvement in 
overall governance. In 2015, Ethiopia ranked thirty-first in Africa and sixth 
out of the thirteen countries in its geographical region (IIAG, 2015). The same 
index indicated that the country has registered a considerable improvement 
of performance in safety and rule of law and in human development in 
particular.
Despite the surge in the overall governance status of Ethiopia, the 
index score of 48.6 (out of 100) is lower than the African average (50.1). 
Moreover, the progress is not comprehensive, with the country showing 
weakening performance in some subcategories and indicators (IIAG, 2015).
The performance in some specific governance indicators was also reported 
as deteriorating. For example, the lowest indicator under the safety and rule 
of law subcategory was seen in accountability, with a score of 43.8. Similarly 
the county has performed poorly and slipped in score in human rights and 
participation. Particularly, the indicator “Free & Fair Elections” has fallen 
by 11.1 points since 2011 (IIAG, 2015). Transparency International in 
its 2016 corruption perception index also ranked Ethiopia 108th out of 
176 countries, indicating a high degree of corruption. As per the report, 
the country is overwhelmed with corruption, which permeates all sectors, 
with land as a particularly important sector of corruption (Transparency 
International, 2016).
5.2. Challenges of Democratic Governance in the Ethiopian 
Developmental State
The challenges of good governance in a developmental state are many and 
varied. Creating an inclusive responsive state with efficient and effective 
institutions and accountable and transparent government that is based on 
rule of law while making the government the leader of the economy is not 
something one can do easily. Accordingly, the summary of the most critical 
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challenges of building good governance in the Ethiopian developmental 
state are as follows:
a) Harmonizing the ethno-linguistic based federal system and the quest 
of nations, nationalities, and peoples with the need to install a shared 
vision and national consensus;
b) Overcoming the historical legacy of feudalism, authoritarianism, and 
inequality;
c) Forming a capable state with an efficient bureaucracy, meritocratic public 
service system, and overcoming turnover and poor skill levels (Mebratu, 
2015);
d) Dismantling and fighting corruption and rent-seeking behavior, which 
is deep-rooted in the current system;
e) The prevailing hostile relationship between the government and media, 
political opposition, and civil societies is an area of concern that impedes 
democratic governance in Ethiopia. Several reports (for example, APRM 
Ethiopian Report, 2011; Kelsall, 2013), have noted that journalists and 
publishers are being harassed and prosecuted for alleged violations of 
press and counterterrorism legislations (the Mass Media and Freedom of 
Information Proclamation of 2008, and the Anti-Terrorist Proclamation 
of 2009). There is also an apparent challenge with regard to civil society 
organizations. Civil society organizations have been pressed firmly in line 
with the government’s policy through the 2009 Charities and Societies 
Proclamations, which restrain the scope of their activities and funding. 
The same holds true for the opposition parties. As of today (UNECA, 
2012 cited in Jaleta, 2015), the ruling coalition does not seem to have a 
genuine belief that opposition parties can play positive roles in building 
democratic governance and national consensus. Hence, living under 
a constitutional democracy with the duty of protecting and enforcing 
human rights by harmonizing the relationship between collective and 
individual, and civil/political and economic/socio-cultural rights is a 
trillion-dollar assignment given the aforementioned track records.
f) Confronting the external elements that constrain the freedom of the 
developmental state to achieve its objectives (Zenawi, 2006).These chal-
lenges need to be met as we seek to build a democratic developmental state 
in Ethiopia. They remain as challenges in spite of the fact that, owing to 
the collapse of the “Washington Consensus” and the emergence of new 
global players, their toll might not be as large as it once was (Bekele & 
Regassa, 2012).
g) The challenges of democratically mobilizing people and resources for 
the developmentalist project and winning popular trust. As this sort of 
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mobilization towards the realization of vision set has to be carried out 
voluntarily in democratic state, it puts heavy burden on the government 
to strike the delicate balance.
Moreover, institutional capacity building of the public sector should be 
stressed here. Currently public institutions are strongly influenced by the 
ruling elite. From the point of view of equal representation, the higher 
positions in many governmental departments are assigned according to 
an ethnic-based quota system. Willingly or unwillingly, the bureaucrats 
are expected to operate in conformance with their ethnic affiliation rather 
than in pursuit of the goals of their organization. Because of this, instead of 
transparency, the desire to fulfill the wishes of the political agenda introduces 
the temptation for corruption that has become endemic in the functioning 
of the Ethiopian bureaucracy (Asayehegn, 2012). Therefore, if the Ethiopian 
government desires to use the state as a very important medium to tackle the 
chronic developmental problems (beyond empty promises and short-term 
political advantages to sustain power), it needs to improve the capability 
of its public administration sector and keep the permanent executive/the 
bureaucracy politically neutral.
5.3. Prospects of Democratic Governance in Ethiopia
The sharp focus of the Ethiopian government on economic development and 
the clarity of goals (eradication of poverty and becoming a middle-income 
country by 2025) manifest the ideological orientation of the government 
toward developmentalsim. In this regard, the government has been working on 
important plans that have brought significant economic growth and poverty 
reduction in the country. These plans are the Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP), followed by the Plan for Accelerated 
and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (from 2005–2010), 
the Growth and Transformation Plan One (from 2011 to 2015) (MoFDD, 
2010), and the current Growth and Transformation Plan Two. Despite the 
weak capacity of institutions (the capacity of the executive, availability and 
strength of the central planning, the quality of public enterprises to control 
the commanding heights, availability of national consensus and shared vision, 
etc. are all elements to be further explored), there has been an encouraging 
success story. For instance, poverty in Ethiopia is reducing at one of the 
fastest rates in the world. The percentage of the population living below the 
poverty line declined from 44 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2010 and to 
23.5 percent in 2016 (UNDP, 2017).
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The government has also set its vision on building a democratic state, 
a system of good governance and social justice based on the blessing and 
full participation of citizens. This commitment is clearly expressed in the 
country’s higher-level policies and national strategic plans. For instance, 
the vision of the GTP is “to become a country where democratic rule, good 
governance and social justice reign, upon the involvement and free will of its 
peoples….” (MoFED, 2010). Likewise in the same document, the economic 
vision is expressed as building an economy exhibiting sustainable economic 
development and securing social justice and increasing per capita income of 
the citizens.
Besides ideological orientation and national polices and strategies, the 
constitution (the supreme low of the land) itself can be seen as prospectively 
important for building good governance. To directly quote the preamble of 
FDRE constitution:
“We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia: Strongly committed, 
in full and free exercise of our right to self-determination, to building a political 
community founded on the rule of law and capable of ensuring a lasting peace, 
guaranteeing a democratic order, and advancing our economic and social 
development; Firmly convinced that the fulfillment of this objective requires 
full respect of individual and people’s fundamental freedoms and rights, to live 
together on the basis of equality and without any sexual, religious or cultural 
discrimination;….” (FDRE constitution, Preamble)
The explicit recognition of the whole range of human rights set in international 
human rights conventions in what constitutes one-third of the corpus of 
the constitution shows the country’s commitment, at least in principle, to 
democratic values and the principles of good governance.
The investment and remarkable development in economic infrastructure 
is promising. Thousands of kilometers of roads have been built to connect all 
sates and districts (Woredas) of the country. The Ethio-Djibouti rail is also 
operational while other networks are in the pipeline. There is an astonishing 
boost in mobile phone subscribers. Despite the restrictive government, there 
is also growing private media. As the economy is booming, the expansion 
of higher education and production of a university-trained work force in the 
country holds great promise and returns. All this will significantly increase 
the flow information (Jaleta, 2015), commodities, human capital, and the 
like, thus helping create a more enlightened citizenry. Having enlightened 
citizens is, in turn, an important tool to build democratic governance.
stAtus, chAllEnGEs, And ProsPEc ts oF thE EthioPiAn dEVEloPmEntAl stAtE 81
6. Conclusion
In this desk review, an attempt has been made to explore the status, the 
challenges, and the prospects of democratic governance in a developmental 
state by reflecting on the case of Ethiopia. It is far beyond the scope of this 
chapter to pretend to solve the puzzle that has preoccupied the subject of 
the relationship between the developmental state and democratic govern-
ance. The review also may lack comprehensiveness due to an inadequate 
literature review in the area. These are the limitations of the chapter. However, 
contributes to shedding light on the debate and hopes to stimulate further 
inquiries concerning the quest for democratic governance in the context of 
the developmental state.
Nowadays, it is common to witness a never-ending debate on democratic 
governance vs. development, which lucks a practical relevance. It seems a “false 
choice” and a sequencing fallacy form logical point view too. Hence, the author 
claims that future scholarship in the area should focus on practical harmony 
of the two than impossibility and incompatibility theorem. The chapter 
has also noted that Ethiopia has declared itself to be a developmental state. 
However, when we compare the characteristics of successful developmental 
states with the reality in Ethiopia, much remains to be done, especially in 
the areas of the autonomy and implementation capacity of the bureaucracy, 
and the incongruity between a shared vision (national consensus) and the 
quest for nations, nationalities, and people’s self-determination. The hostile 
relationship between the government and media, political opposition, and civil 
societies is also a bottleneck. Furthermore, despite the overall improvement 
of governance indicators in Ethiopia, the index score is still lower than the 
African average. Therefore, one is tempted to conclude that there exists a 
considerable gap between form and reality concerning the key governance 
indicators in the Ethiopian “democratic developmental state.”
The achievements Ethiopia has made in the ten years since shift toward the 
developmental state model are undisputed. Particularly, the improvement in 
human development index, infrastructural development, and expansion of 
higher education are promising. In addition, the explicit ideological orienta-
tion, policy, and strategic commitments and constitutional guardianship of 
good governance suggest it may be possible to install democratic governance 
without compromising development. Dealing with such a state demands 
appropriate innovation and a pragmatic approach in order to deepen the 
democratic governance agenda in the context of the developmental state.
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Notes
1. This paper was prepared for discussion at the national public administration conference 
“Administrative Resilience for Sustainable Development in Ethiopia,” held from Septem-
ber 21 to 22, 2018 in Addis Ababa. It doesn’t reference recent political developments and 
changes made by the current reformist government.
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Assessment of Parliamentary Oversight 
Tools and Mechanisms Used by 
the Ethiopian House of Peoples’ 
Representatives (HoPRs)
Aklilu Wubet Lema, Challa Amdissa Jiru,  
Defferew Kebebe Tessema, and Frehiwot Gebrehiwot Araya
Box 1: Key points of this chapter
major points drawn from the chapter include:
 the federal house of People’s representatives (hoPrs) of Ethiopia uses various 
tools and mechanisms to control the work of executive;
 hPrs mostly relies on the evaluation of performance reports and committee 
hearings to conduct oversight and control the work of the executive;
 Field visits, especially sudden visits, are the most effective oversight tool to 
oversee the work of the executive but is rarely used due to budget shortage, 
capacity limitation, logistics-related issues, and other problems;
 Gaps were observed in the overall effectiveness of the oversight function of the 
hoPr;
 there are constraints that need to be addressed to enhance and effectively 
undertake the oversight functions of hPrs of Ethiopia.
Box 2: Key insights of this chapter
After reading this chapter, you will be able to understand:
 important oversight tools and mechanisms used by the Ethiopian hoPrs;
 Whether hoPrs is effective in using those oversight tools;
 the overall effectiveness of the house in achieving oversight goals.
 challenges faced by the hPrs in undertaking its oversight functions.
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Box 3: Abbreviations
EPrdF = Ethiopian People’s revolutionary democratic Front
FdrE = Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia
FGd = Focus Group discussion
hF = house of Federation
hoPr = house of People’s representatives
iFEs = international Foundation for Electoral system
iPu = inter-Parliamentary union
Kii = Key informant interview
mP = member of Parliament
ndi = national democratic institute
1. Introduction 
Parliament is the institution that represents the people’s voice in government. 
The functions that parliaments undertake, notably law-making, oversight, 
and representation, are fundamental to the legitimacy of the government and 
the upholding of democracy. A country in a transitional stage to democracy, 
in particular, needs a long-term commitment to build a culture of democracy 
(IPU, 2015) and there can be no democratic system of government without 
transparency and accountability. The primary responsibility in democratizing 
the system directly falls on the shoulders of Parliament. Through its core 
oversight function, Parliament holds the government to account on behalf 
of the people, ensuring that government policy and action are both efficient 
and commensurate with the needs of the public. Parliamentary oversight is 
also crucial in checking any excesses of the government (Yamamoto, 2007).
However, though the Parliament remains a symbol of hope and a voice 
of the people, many parliaments continue to face various challenges, in the 
past as well as in more recent times. According to the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (2015), one of the challenges is the low level of and even decrease in 
public confidence in parliamentary authority. Similarly, the unequal power 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government 
is a widely acknowledged challenge to the parliamentary oversight function. 
In countries having parliamentary systems of government, in particular, 
the executive can exercise control over the members of its political party 
(i.e., the majority party in Parliament), with rewards for faithful support 
and sanctions for dissent. In the most extreme cases, the Parliament can be 
reduced as a “rubber-stamp” of popular approval for the executive branches 
proposals. Even in long-established democracies, many questions have been 
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raised about whether the balance of power has swung too far in favor of the 
executive. A similar criticism stems from the fact that the executive can in 
fact influence the agenda setting in the legislature (IPU, 2015).
Based on the experience of Ghana, Gyampo (2015) for instance under-
scores that the imbalance of power created between the executive and the 
legislative arms of government undermines the authority of the Parliament 
as an oversight body. The Parliament, inter alia, makes itself subservient the 
executive, thereby sacrificing parliamentary oversight responsibility as well 
as objectivity during legislative debates. In a large majority of countries, 
parliaments have the constitutional right to initiate legislation, yet most laws 
originate with/in the executive. Parliament’s law-making role tends to focus 
on the scrutiny of executive proposals, which results in limited opportunities 
for individual parliamentarians to craft legislation.
Parliament’s power to hold government to account lies at the heart of 
executive-legislative relations. And yet in practice, the members of a party in 
a government have strong incentives not to challenge that government, such 
that the oversight function is typically left to opposition parties. However, 
in most developing countries, opposition parties are either very weak or 
non-existence, limiting their ability to challenge the government. For instance, 
in Ethiopia, the opposition parties were prevented from securing seats in 
parliament in two election periods (2005 and 2010). Furthermore, the human 
and financial resources available to the executive and its access to information 
put the executive in a dominant position in relation to the legislative body.
In many countries, the capacity of parliamentary administration to provide 
effective support for the work of Parliament, such as nonpartisan research 
in the interests of informed decision-making as well as the ability of the 
parliaments to keep up with changes in society, is limited. Unless otherwise 
constrained, the Parliament is ready to work with important institutions like 
universities and other independent researchers, to help the legislative body 
acquire the necessary capacity to make informed decisions. The Ethiopian 
Parliament is by no way an exception.
According to the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (FDRE), the parliament has two houses, namely, the House of 
Peoples’ Representatives (HoPRs) and the House of Federation (FDRE 
Constitution, 1995). The power to legislate and to oversee the workings of the 
executive body is vested in the HoPRs. Major constitutional responsibilities 
and functions of the HoPR include law making, representation, oversight, 
diplomatic work, and others. However, as far as Ethiopia is concerned, no 
adequate research has been conducted to assess the effectiveness of the 
oversight function and oversight tools used by the HoPRs.
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In view of this gap, this study therefore, by and large aims to assess the 
oversight tools and mechanisms used by the HoPRs and its effectiveness in 
using those tools as well as challenges faced by the HoPR in overseeing the 
work of executive.
2. Overview of Parliamentary Oversight
2.1. Introduction
In John Locke’s model of the separation of powers, the legislative and executive 
powers of a government are to be separated. The legislature is to prescribe 
rules and the executive has the power of execution and is subordinate and 
accountable to the legislature. As the body that represents the people, the 
Parliament is called upon to see to it that the administration of public policy 
reflects and meets the people’s needs. Parliament is also called upon to ensure 
that agreed policy is properly implemented and delivered to target citizens.
As the IFES’s Model State of Parliament Report (2005) discussed, the 
five internationally recognized broad and basic functions of the Parliament 
are policy making, oversight of the executive, constituency representation, 
and political recruitment. Yet, representation, law making and oversight 
roles are the most important and common functions of the parliaments of 
various countries.
Parliamentary oversight, the theme of this research, has been defined in 
different ways by different authors. One defines parliamentary oversight as 
the legislature’s review and evaluation of selected activities of the executive 
branch of government. In other words, oversight is about keeping an eye on 
the activities of the executive and holding the executive to account on behalf 
of the country’s citizens. The legislative branch conducts oversight activities 
because it is not only enacting new programs for the state but also has a duty to 
ensure that existing programs are implemented and administered efficiently, 
effectively, and in a manner consistent with legislative intent (Ahmed, 2011 
and Yamamoto, 2007).
Furthermore, in a parliamentary system, parliamentary oversight can 
be said to be a tool and means of holding the executive arm of government 
accountable for its actions and also for ensuring that it does implement 
policies in an effective and efficient manner. Parliamentary oversight is “the 
review, monitoring and supervision of government and public agencies, 
including the implementation of policy and legislation” (Yamamoto, 2007). 
This definition focuses on the purpose and nature of the oversight activities 
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rather than on the procedural stages in which they take place. It covers the 
work of parliamentary committees and plenary sessions, as well as hearings 
during the parliamentary stage of bills and the budgetary cycle.
The oversight function entails accountability relations between the two 
government bodies. By its nature, oversight and accountability functions 
involve three essential obligations as discussed by the Global Parliamentary 
report (2017). Those obligations are the obligations of the executive to provide 
information on their activities and decisions; the obligation of the Parliament 
to scrutinize the information and provide constructive and appropriate 
recommendation as well as the obligation of those accountable to respond 
to the feedback from the Parliament. The relationship and the obligation 
determine the effectiveness of the oversight and scrutiny functions of the 
Parliament.
2.2. Key Roles of Effective Parliamentary Oversight
The concept of oversight comprises many aspects, including political, adminis-
trative, financial, ethical, legal, and strategic elements. It is important to define 
effectiveness in relation to the oversight function. Webb and Roberts (2014) 
argue that effectiveness in parliamentary oversight can be approached from 
the goal-based model of institutional effectiveness. For them, effectiveness is 
all about how an institution responds to the demands and expectations of the 
public and the executive. In addition, effectiveness also requires legitimacy 
as it is stipulated in the constitution. In most cases, parliaments suffer from 
a lack of legitimacy and understanding of their actual purpose and power. 
Thus, effectiveness in parliamentary oversight can be conceived as how far 
the parliament exercises the legitimate power to respond to the needs of the 
constituencies, the public, and other stakeholders.
As indicated by Griffith (2005), the oversight function mandates Parliament 
to guard public interest against legislative invasion of individual rights, to serve 
as watchdogs over the executive, and to serve as the guardians of integrity. 
Yamamoto (2007) identified a couple of key functions or roles of effective 
parliamentary oversight. The most important function of oversight is to 
protect the rights of voters from abuse of arbitrary behavior, or illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government and public agencies.
That is, parliaments, as the representatives of the citizens, should uphold 
the rule of law and protect the right of citizens by the monitoring policies and 
activities of the executives. Oversight function also contributes to providing 
financial accountability and helps to hold the government to account in 
respect of how the taxpayers’ money is used. It detects waste within the 
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machinery of government and public agencies and therefore improves the 
efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of government operations (Global 
Parliamentary Report, 2017).
Equally, parliamentary oversight holds the executive branch accountable for 
its performance and the outcomes of implemented policies. The oversight role 
scrutinizes whether the policies and programs announced by the executives 
and authorized by the Parliament have been implemented and whether they 
are having the desired impact (Global Parliamentary Report, 2017). This 
function includes monitoring the achievement of goals set by legislation and 
the government’s own program. Finally, parliaments ensure the transparency 
and openness of the executive’s activities through oversight and scrutiny. 
Parliaments can use the oversight function to open a room for the public 
to debate, scrutinize, and deliver opinions on the policies and operation of 
the government. Such functions improve the transparency of government 
operations and enhance public trust in the government, which is itself a 
condition of effective policy delivery.
The purposes and objectives of oversight stress the significance of oversight 
in holding the executive to account for its actions or inactions. These facets 
among others stress the obligation of Parliament to uphold and defend the 
constitution. This is essential and underscores the significance of the existence 
of a democratic parliament. In performing its constitutional mandate, the 
relations between Parliament and the executive is fundamental as defined 
through the separation of powers (Malapane, 2016). The complexity of this 
relationship when it comes to oversight is discussed below.
2.3. Power Relationship between the Legislative and Executive 
in Parliamentary System and Its Influence on Oversight
Scholars of legislative studies state that over the years, the executive has 
endured criticism for Parliament’s inability to effectively hold the executive 
accountable, yet also recognize the weaknesses of Parliament (Malapane, 
2016). For instance, Rapoo (2004) asserts that inadequate resources and weak 
institutional capacity create the overdependence of the legislative branch on 
the executive. This takes place regardless of the clearly defined constitutional 
mandate of Parliament to conduct oversight over the executive. Khmelko and 
Beers (2011) acknowledge that effective oversight is required to maintain 
the balance of power between the executive and legislative branch. However, 
Malapane (2016) argues that the nature of the relations between the two 
branches influences effective oversight.
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Friedberg (2011), states that in a parliamentary system, the government 
emerges from Parliament. Although Ahmed (2011) is of the opinion that 
there is a strong relation between the legislative and executive branch in the 
parliamentary form of government, this creates ambiguity with regard to the 
separation of powers as the members of the executive are also MPs. According 
to Hudson and Wren (2007), it is fair to point fingers at the nature of the 
political systems, which include among others electoral rules, constitution, 
and characteristics of political parties conducive to the dominance of the 
executive and marginalization of Parliament. MPs are elected representa-
tives who represent the interests of the electorate and to a certain degree 
the mandate of their political parties. This places Parliament in a difficult 
situation, as Salih (2005) asserts that Parliament is faced with competing 
roles as it is part of the machinery that confers legitimacy on the executive 
and yet is constitutionally mandated to hold the executive to account for its 
actions to safeguard the public interests.
Party discipline is another factor that contributes to the tension between 
executive-legislative relationships and effective oversight. According to 
Mickler (2013), partisan theory supports the role of political parties in 
Parliament that influence oversight. Political parties per this theory are the 
key actors, which makes member of the parliaments accountable to their 
own parties. Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2014) define party discipline as 
“the extent to which elected legislators keep their party’s campaign promises 
after being elected.”The ruling party utilizes the whip system to maintain 
strong discipline and unity among its MPs who are a majority in Parliament. 
Of course, instilling party discipline and unity in Parliament may not be an 
easy job, requiring a lot of compromise.
The aforementioned complications mean that effective oversight by the 
parliament is lacking in an environment where in the cost of conducting 
oversight outweighs the benefits, due to the nature of executive-legislative 
relationships and party discipline. Malapane (2016) for instance argues that 
MPs may know what is expected to them but are hindered by the fear of losing 
their seats in Parliament if they become more objective in their work. This 
implies that MPs may know the difference between right and wrong, yet they 
decide to do the latter as they are perpetually caught between serving the 
interests of the electorate and the mandate of their political parties. Johnson 
(2005) however argues that while the complex nature of the environment is 
recognized, this should not be the motive for neglecting oversight as “modern 
democracies are characterized by shared decision making between the legisla-
tive and executive branch of the state.”
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2.4. Tools and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Oversight
In overseeing the executive, parliaments have several different oversight tools 
at their disposal. The most common oversight tools are committee hearings, 
hearings in plenary sessions of the Parliament, the creation of commissions of 
inquiry, questions, question time, interpellations, the ombudsman, auditors 
general, and public account committees (NDI, 2000).
However, the oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of gov-
ernment and levels of democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of 
government that are more democratic have a greater number of oversight 
tools and greater oversight potential (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004). The 
tools used by the Parliament to oversee executives in the parliamentary 
system of government are discussed below.
Questions
In the parliamentary system of government, members of the Cabinet are 
accountable collectively and individually to the Parliament for the exercise 
of their powers and the performance of their functions. The procedure of 
putting questions to the executive is one of the ways in which Parliament 
holds the executive to account (Yamamoto, 2007).Questions can be put 
for oral or written reply to the chief executive and the cabinet ministers on 
matters for which they are responsible. Question time affords members of 
Parliament the opportunity to question members of the executive on service 
delivery, policy, and other executive action on behalf of both their political 
parties and the electorate.
A parliamentary question is, by definition, a request for information and 
asking for clarifications. Regular questioning can be used by Parliament to 
hold the government to account. When there is a question from an MP, the 
government is obliged to provide an answer in the floor of the House (Pelizzo 
and Stapenhurst, 2004; and Yamamoto, 2007). Answers to questions can be 
available not only to the person who asks them but also to all parliamentarians 
in the chamber. This is in the case of oral questions that demand an oral reply. 
Parliamentary questions are among the most commonly used oversight tool. 
As identified by Yamamoto (2007), if a question is not answered, the parlia-
ment may incline to take some additional measure, such as interpellation.
Motions and Plenary Debates
Motions are a mechanism available to members of all political parties that 
can be used to help fulfill their oversight responsibilities in Parliament by 
bringing issues to debate on the floor of the House. Debates are oral exchange 
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of opinions and views with the objective of facilitating collective decision on 
certain issues. Such oversight mechanism can be useful to make informed 
decision (Yamamoto, 2007). Both motion and debates open valuable op-
portunity to conduct detailed oversight and publicize the issue to the general 
public (Global Parliamentary Report, 2017).
Debates are about subjecting the government to public scrutiny, bringing 
matters into the public domain, and providing MPs and peers with opportuni-
ties to give voice to public opinion. The absence or curtailment of debate 
reduces parliament’s ability to fulfill one of its major functions. However, 
since what is said in debate on the floor of the House rarely affects the result 
of the vote at its end or induces the government to reverse a decision already 
taken, it is apparent that debates are not strong instruments of control. At the 
same time, they are essential parts of the continuous parliamentary scrutiny 
of government and compelling it to explain and defend its policies.
The Committees as a Tool of Parliamentary Oversight
Parliamentary committees are the most significant and frequently used tool 
in the oversight function. The broad objective of committees as stated in the 
Global Parliamentary Report (2017) is as follows: “Parliamentary oversight in 
committee is to enhance the quality of government through evidence gathered 
in inquiries from which appropriate conclusions and recommendations are 
drawn and presented to parliament and beyond to the government and the 
wider public.” Moreover, committees are identified as the most effective and 
powerful accountability mechanism (Griffith, 2005).
Parliamentary committees have various ways of conducting oversight, 
including departmental briefing session, annual and departmental budget 
analysis, calls for submission and petition from the public, the consideration 
of strategic plans and annual reports, and public hearings. In many parlia-
ments, permanent committees oversee the programs of the corresponding 
government departments. Committees of inquiry can be established to 
examine the positive and negative aspects of particular policies and to pursue 
the responsibility of the officials in charge.
Though parliamentary committees are considered as the most effective 
tool of parliamentary oversight, their effectiveness depends on different 
factors (Griffith, 2005; and Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004). Among such 
factors, the most important ones are: the legal authority to compel change, 
the committee’s relations with the executive and its official as well as the 
programs and policies, resources, such as the staff of the committee, the role 
of the individual in the committee, the party system and the composition of 
the committee, and the structure, prestige, and leadership of the committee.
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Legislative Oversight over Delegated Power
Delegated legislation is any law that can be made by ministers, administrative 
agencies, and other state authorities. Delegated legislation is necessary for a 
number of reasons: Parliament does not have time to contemplate and debate 
every small detail of complex regulations, as it only has a limited amount of 
time to pass legislation. Delegated legislation, however, allows thoroughly 
debated regulations to pass through as well as saving parliamentary time. 
But it is necessary to have control over delegated legislation.
Budget as an Oversight Tool
Budgetary oversight is a core function of department-related permanent com-
mittees, since most government programs entail a budget for their execution 
(Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004). Budget scrutiny is also a significant source 
of parliamentary power (Global Parliamentary Report, 2017). Conversely, 
the budget law authorized by Parliament or documents annexed to this law 
show how much money is allocated to each of the policy goals to be achieved 
by one or more government programs. Budgetary oversight is therefore the 
key tool with which department-related committees assess government 
programs. While committee scrutiny is based on the budget law and the 
state accounts, the scope of inquiries can go further, into the question of the 
appropriateness of a policy itself.
Using Oversight Institutions
There are institutions directly accountable to the legislature, such as the Office 
of the Auditor General Human Right Commission, the Ombudsman, the 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004 and 
Yamamoto, 2007). These institutions are considered as arms of the legislature 
because they play a significant role in overseeing the executive’s performance. 
Their reports are basic inputs of oversight activity of the legislature. In addition 
to this, information that comes from the general public and public offices is 
also taken as input in the oversight process.
3. Research Method Employed
The study used a mixed-method research approach to describe and explain 
oversight tools and their effectiveness. The principal method followed is 
qualitative, supplemented by the quantitative method.
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In order to achieve the study’s objectives, data were gathered from various 
sources. Both primary and secondary sources were collected, analyzed, 
and triangulated to answer the research questions. The primary data were 
collected through survey methods using a questionnaire, Key Informant 
Interview (KII), and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). The secondary data 
were collected from legal documents including the Constitution, a regulation 
oversight checklist, and standing committee reports.
Key Informant Interview (KII):In-depth qualitative information was 
generated from the standing committee chairpersons of the HoPRs, who serve 
as key informants using open-ended, semi-structured questions. The KIIs 
were administered in the informants’ respective offices for their convenience. 
Although the research team planned to conduct key informant interview with 
all standing committee chairpersons (there were around twenty standing 
committee chairpersons at the time of data collection), only eleven KIIs were 
conducted due to the MPs busy schedule and lack of interest.
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) is a type of conversation conducted in 
an informal setting that aims at gathering data on topics of interest. A small 
group of people (five to ten) with specialist knowledge, interest, or who share 
a particular characteristic, is invited to discuss specific topics in detail. Similar 
to KIIs, the research team had a plan to conduct several FGDs; however, the 
research team was able to organize and conduct only one FGD with purposely 
selected parliamentarians and staff of the secretariat. Despite this limitation, 
the team managed to generate adequate information from the discussion.
A Questionnaire was randomly distributed to 15 percent of the total 
number of the federal HoPRs, of which fifty-one (62 percent) questionnaires 
were properly filled in and returned. Since all respondents included in the 
survey were member of the parliament who are well-acquainted with the 
issues under discussion, the research team believes that the questionnaire 
generated representative information.
Both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis were employed. 
Quantitative data were presented and analyzed using descriptive statistics 
managed with the support of statistical packages for social science (SPSS), 
while qualitative analysis was used to present the observation and understand-
ings of the researchers on the different qualitative aspects of oversight through 
the use of text and narrative techniques.
Before using primary or secondary data for analysis, the research team 
conducted data quality assessment with respect to the trustworthiness of the 
instruments employed (both for qualitative and quantitative components).
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4. Findings and Discussions
4.1. Introduction
This section is concerned with the analysis of data collected through document 
analysis, a questionnaire survey, KIIs with representatives of Parliamentary 
standing committees, a FGD with both parliamentarians and member of the 
secretariat of the HoPR, and document reviews. The data obtained through the 
KIIs and FGD were triangulated with data obtained from the questionnaire 
and desk reviews. The responses of each key informant were related to her/his 
experience in the committee that he/she is representing. At the time of data 
collection, the House of Peoples’ Representative had about twenty standing 
committees organized to oversee a certain number of clustered executive bodies.
4.2. Legal Provisions Expressing Powers and Functions of HoPRs 
on Oversight in Ethiopia 
The FDRE’s constitution confers the HoPRs with the powers and responsibili-
ties to effectively undertake the function of oversight on the executive branch 
of government. According to article 55(17) of the constitution, the House is 
vested with the power to approve the appointment of higher state officials, 
including the chief executive and vice chief executive, the president and vice 
president of the federal supreme court, and the auditor and vice-auditor general 
of the federal government. It has also the power to approve the appointments 
of the member of the executive council. The same article also states that the 
House shall also call the PM and order him to give oral answers to the question 
of the House. Put otherwise, as per the FDRE Constitution, the HoPRs has 
the power to call and question the prime minister and other federal officials 
and to investigate the executive’s conduct as to whether they are discharging 
their responsibilities in accordance to the parameters and the limit the law 
has conferred on them. Article 76 also confirms that the Council of Ministers 
is responsible to the HoPR in all its decisions.
These provisions reveal that the HoPRs has the constitutional power 
to oversee and hold the government accountable and answerable for the 
consequence of their action. This means the Parliament has the responsibility 
to make sure that the government institutions (especially the executive 
of government) exercise their power in accordance with the limit of the 
constitution and execute the legislature’s bill, programs, and proposals.
The HoPRs has also issued Supervision and Follow-up Procedures, includ-
ing Regulation No.3/2006 and proclamation No.470/2005 to oversee the 
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work of the executive. Proclamation No.470/2005 and Regulation No.3/2006 
have provided for the establishment of different standing and ad hoc com-
mittees in the HoPRs that play a great role in assisting the parliament to 
conduct its oversight function.
According to article 19(2) of Regulation No.3/2006, these different stand-
ing committees of the HoPRs are vested with the power to engage in active 
supervision of the executive institutions, which are under their supervision. 
As such, the performances of the various organs of administrative agencies 
are subject to oversight by the House through these committees. In addition, 
executive offices are to be overseen as to the proper implementation of laws, 
policies, strategies, and programs, which are enacted mainly by the HoPRs. 
Standing committees are also endowed with the power to examine thoroughly 
the budget proposal of different organs of government. The HoPRs retains 
the power to ensure the effective implementation of the approved budget by 
the executive agencies, thereby preventing the public resource from possible 
abuse. As per article 153(3) of the same regulation, the House requires every 
government agency to submit regular reports to it or before the committee 
concerned at least once in a year. The committees must also summon a public 
debate on the report after their hearing. To this end, the committees invite 
pertinent social bodies and the mass media to attend the discussion.
Regulation No. 3/2006, under article 93, provides the House with the 
power to take a motion of no confidence on the executive and take measures 
it deems necessary in this situation. As a result, any member of parliament 
may move a motion of no confidence in the Council of Ministers.
What we infer from aforementioned discussions is that every federal 
government institution cannot escape from the scrutiny of the legislature. 
They are subject to questioning, investigations, and corrective measures 
as deemed necessary. Besides legal provisions, the actual oversight tools 
employed by the HoPRs and how effectively these tools are used are discussed 
in the subsequent section.
4.3. Oversight Tools Used by the HoPRs
The data obtained through the KIIs and FGD show that the HoPRs uses 
several tools and methods of oversight to scrutinize the work of the executive. 
The oversight tools being used by the HoPRs are described below.
Evaluation of the Annual plan of the Executive
One of the oversight tools of the House is monitoring and evaluating the 
annual plans of the executive bodies by the assigned standing committee of 
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the House. The government executive bodies are required to submit their 
annual plans to the committee, which will check the consistency of the annual 
executive plan with the relevant policies of government, with the second 
Growth and Transformation Plan (known as GTP II) of Ethiopia, with 
missions given to the organization, and the strategic goals of the organization 
itself. The standing committees of the House have a checklist for conducting 
the monitoring of the annual plan. Following the evaluation of the annual 
plans, feedback is given both orally and in writing.
Committee Hearings
If the annual plan of an executive body deviates significantly from the expecta-
tion of the parliamentary committee, the officials of the concerned body are 
required to explain the plan in person. At the committee hearing, the plan is 
presented to the committee by an official from the executive body. Discussions 
are conducted on the presentation, led by the supervising committee and the 
implementing body to reach a consensus. Then, the feedback given is properly 
documented and the incorporation of feedback in the revised annual plans 
is strictly followed. Committee hearing is among the oversight tools widely 
used by the HoPRs in controlling the executive.
Evaluation of Performance Report
The Parliament uses performance reports as one of the means of exercising 
oversight on the activities of the executive. Following the agreement in the 
annual plan, the executive has the duty to present performance reports 
quarterly. The standing committees use the quarterly reports to undertake 
their oversight functions on the performance of the executives they are 
supervising. Standing committees use performance evaluation checklists 
and the annual plan as yardsticks for evaluating the performance. Reports 
are presented both in softcopy and hard copy to ease the sharing of materials. 
Just as the annual plan is discussed in person between the standing committee 
and the executive in hearing sessions, discussion is also held on the quarterly 
report to reach an agreement between the executive and the standing com-
mittee. After the evaluation of the report and discussions are held, feedback 
and directions may be provided by the Parliamentary standing committee 
to the executive. Information collected from our respondents reveals that 
performance reports are among the most widely used tools by Parliament 
even though their importance and accuracy is not reliable, according to 
these respondents.
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Plenary Debates
In addition to the responsibility of submitting quarterly reports to the 
parliamentary committee, the executives has the duty of presenting annual 
and semi-annual performance report to the Parliament. After the report is 
heard, discussions and debates are conducted in the House. Data indicates that 
these debates and discussions are very important mechanisms of oversight, 
but are rarely used by the Parliament level. The informants also said that the 
supervising committee plays a special role in the evaluation of the reports 
presented to the parliamentary session, because this committee has detailed 
information about the organization presenting the report.
Questioning Time
The House uses questioning time as a means of parliamentary oversight 
over the executive. On these occasions, the prime minister/minister is 
required to come in person to the House to explain issues that may arise in 
the parliamentary session. But questioning time is not conducted regularly 
and frequently by the HoPRs.
Field Visit
The field visit is another parliamentary oversight tool that is used by the 
HoPRs. Each standing committee conducts regular field visit twice a year; 
sometimes it also organizes sudden visits, when a complaint from the public 
creates the need for the latter. Evidence indicates that the field visit is the 
most important and productive oversight tool, because it is used to make 
actual observation and also to crosscheck reports presented by the executive. 
Moreover, it provides the opportunity to meet service users, to observe the 
job process and irregularities that may not be reported. During field visits, the 
standing committee arranges discussions with service users, with employees, 
and with managers separately. Evidence also shows that sudden the field visit 
is more effective when compared with the regular field visit in controlling 
the actual performance of the executive.
Despite it’s the importance, there is limitation in using the field visit 
exhaustively, due to budget shortage, capacity limitation, logistics-related 
issues, and other problems. Instead of field visits, most standing committees 
are forced to depend on reports to evaluate the work of the executive. In 
addition, in most cases, the time given and the actual work accomplished 
through field visits do not match. In the two regular field visits, some com-
mittees (for example, the education affairs committee) cannot cover all the 
organizations they are supervising. As a result, the committee plans to visit 
each of organization assigned to it at least once in a five-year parliamentary 
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term. Even this plan does not seem to have materialized, as field visits have 
been disrupted because of security problems. Another problem reported 
was lack of guidelines for oversight of bodies with different characteristics. 
Researchers also observed that the field visit is an effective tool of oversight, 
but not effectively utilized by the HoPRs, because of the mismatch between 
the job and time schedule and budgetary constraints.
Budgetary Oversight
Standing committees are also endowed with the power to examine thor-
oughly the budget proposal of the executive. In all process of oversight, the 
standing committees take into consideration the budget being consumed 
in comparison with actual performance. This implies that budget control is 
another parliamentary oversight tool used by the Parliament. It retains the 
power to ensure the effective implementation of the approved budget by the 
executive agencies, thereby preventing the public resource from possible abuse.
Hearing on Public Forum 
Another oversight tool is the arrangement of forums where the stakeholders, 
including the public, are invited to engage in discussion with the executive 
bodies. Evidences witnessed that such a forum is helpful to get public opinions 
in the presence of the executive officials. Forums of this kind create mutual 
understanding among the users of services, the service provider, and the 
supervising committee of the House. But the Parliament is not effective in 
using this tool due to lack of interest and limited participation by the public, 
as well as to manipulation by government and its unwillingness to consider 
input from the public.
Using Democratic Institutions and Resolutions of International 
Organizations
Discussion with the FGD and KIIs confirmed that the reports of democratic 
institutions like the Audit General, ombudsman, human rights commission, 
and media are rarely used as inputs in oversight functions. As a result, it is 
better to exhaustively use information obtained through those institutions to 
effectively oversee the works of executives. In addition to work with domestic 
institutions, the respondents also strongly recommend the importance of 
using resolutions made by international institutions, like the International 
Parliamentary Union, African Parliamentary Union, and human rights or-
ganizations for effective parliamentary oversight function. Similarly, some 
informants recommended the use of information from research reports and 
whistleblowers.
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Oversight on Delegated Legislations
As the informants indicated, the follow-up of the process of issuing new 
legislation and new regulation is taken as one of the areas of focus in par-
liamentary oversight over the executive works. As observed from the study, 
the parliamentary standing committees evaluate draft laws prepared by the 
executives under their supervision, in line with the constitution and other 
existing laws, before that draft proclamation is submitted to the Parliament for 
voting in the parliamentary session. Where the draft legislation is proclaimed 
by the HoPRs, the supervising standing committee of the Parliament ensures 
the issuance of necessary regulation and directives by the executive, within 
three months after the proclamation was issued. Though the committees are 
active in follow-up of the promulgation of new proclamations and directives, 
they are not aware of the existence of the excessively large number of directives 
already in use. This poor control over directives issued by the executive limits 
the controlling capacity of the Parliament’s standing committees.
To sum up, data gathered from different sources reveals that the Ethiopian 
HoPRs uses various tools and mechanisms to control the activities of the 
executive, with varying degrees of success. Of these tools, performance 
reports and committee hearings are the most widely used, while the field 
visit is the most productive oversight tool but is rarely used due to budget 
shortage, capacity limitation, logistical issues, and other factors.
4.4. Effectiveness of the HoPRs in Using Oversight Tools
In addition to the question regarding what oversight tools and mechanisms 
are used by the HoPR, respondents were also asked to rate the effectiveness 
of the Parliament in using those oversight tools (where 1 represents “very 
high,” 2 represents “high,” 3 stands for “not determined,” 4 for “low,” and 5 
stands for “very low”). As the mean values of the responses depicted in table 2 
below demonstrate, the Parliament was not rated as very high (mean below 
1.5) in using any of the oversight tools. In relative terms, the effectiveness of 
Parliament is high in using reports and hearings in committee, while it was 
least effective in using the random field visit and the ombudsman institution 
as tools for the oversight function. The paradox was observed regarding field 
visit. While it was considered the most effective oversight tool, it was not 
effectively due to budget and time constraints.
In addition to assessing the effectiveness of the Parliament in using the 
existing oversight tools, issues related to the overall effectiveness of the 
oversight function of the Parliament in achieving oversight goals were also 
assessed based the information obtained through KIIs and FGD. Information 
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collected from respondents of KIIs and the FGD reveals that the aims of 
parliamentary oversights are enhancing public satisfaction on government 
services; respect of the rule of law; creation of checks and balances to minimize 
power monopoly; promotion of public participation; ensuring accountability; 
increasing commitment to the implementation of reform tools; proper use 
of scarce resources, including the budget; and effective implementation of 
agreed policies and programs by the implementing bodies. When evaluated 
from these perspectives, most respondents of key informants’ interviews 
and FGD agreed on the existence of gaps in the overall effectiveness of the 
HoPRs’ oversight function. Information evidenced that though there is a 
positive change in the oversight function of the Parliament, much is still left 
to be done in achieving desired results.
Having discussed oversight tools used and the overall effectiveness of the 
House in its oversight function, the subsequent section discloses the main 
factors leading to the House’s poor performance of its oversight tasks.
Table 1: Effectiveness of the Parliament in using oversight tools
Oversight tools N Mean Std. Deviation
1 Oral question 42 2.76 1.144
2 Written question 42 2.48 1.254
3 Interpellation (formal question) 35 2.23 1.087
4 Motion for debate 40 3.50 1.281
5 Hearing in committee 39 1.95 .857
6 Conducting ad-hoc committees 39 3.03 1.423
7 Planned field visit 41 3.12 1.452
8 Random field visit 41 3.78 1.294
9 Budget oversight 41 2.93 1.367
10 Audit institutions 39 2.36 1.287
11 Ombudsman institutions 40 3.52 1.261
12 Reports 42 1.86 1.181
* The higher the mean, the less effective the Parliament in using the tool 
Source: Questionnaire Survey, 2018
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4.5. Challenges of Oversight Function Faced by HoPR
To discuss issues related to challenges affecting the Ethiopian parliamentary 
oversight functions, data gathered from various instruments and the results 
of the findings are briefly described in this section.
Logistics-related Challenges
As indicated in table 2 below, from the total respondents, 42.8 percent and 
31 percent responded “agree” and “strongly agree” respectively with regard to 
poor logistical facilities for field visits. This reveals that more than 73 percent 
of the respondents agreed that shortages in the required logistical facilities 
are challenges to Ethiopian federal parliamentary oversight.
On the other hand, according to information obtained through KII and 
FGD, respondents took two positions. While most informants reported 
that shortage of facilities – like offices for members of standing committees, 
halls for conducting meetings, vehicles and other office supplies – hampered 
their oversight work, some did not consider logistical facilities to be big 
problems. According to the view of those who complained about the adequacy 
of logistics, the main problem is budget constraints. The committees do not 
have their own budget account, but they use pooled resources, in which they 
do not have adequate autonomy. For example, field visit beyond a 40km 
radius require permission, due to the shortage of vehicles and due to regular 
meetings of the HoPRs every Tuesday and Thursday. However, those key 
informants who have served in previous past terms of parliament report 
witnessing improvement in the logistic supply of the HoPRs, although the 
problem has not been totally solved.
Challenges Related to Lack of Capacity
Capacity limitation is another challenge that affects the well-functioning of 
parliamentary oversight. As shown in table 2 above, more than 70 percent 
of the respondents agreed that capacity limitation, caused by the lack of the 
human resources with the required qualifications and the inadequacy of office 
support, is a challenge for the parliamentary oversight function.
In addition, the data obtained through KII and FDG also reveal that capacity 
limitation is an acute problem. In the opinion of these respondents, gaps were 
observed in investigating and properly organizing performance evidences that 
enable the parliament to take corrective measures. Due to this capacity gap 
in committees, most of the time the HoPRs do not acquire the necessary and 
adequate evidence about executive performance and as a result, the Parliament 
most of the time is forced to refrain from taking proper corrective measures.
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The lack of technical knowledge about the subject matter also limits 
members of the committee to dig out and obtain the information necessary 
for oversight function. Particularly, during the first year of their electoral 
term, parliamentarians need continuous capacity building training; however, 
according to the responses of key informants and the FGD, they are not 
provided with the needed trainings.
Another challenge of capacity limitation is that members of the Parlia-
ment lack access to experience-sharing opportunities with other countries 
because of a lack of interest from management, resource limitation, and lack of 
consensus on the importance of experience-sharing. Some of the respondents 
among our key informants had a view that their technical competence is not 
comparable with the executive bodies they are supervising, which implies 
that the committee is not in a position to give proper direction for executing 
bodies and is not in a position to scrutinize the works of executive. In most 
cases, this challenge can be solved using technical assistances provided to each 
committee, but information obtained from key informants and discussion in 
the FGD highlighted that the assistance of professionals available through 
the parliament secretariat was not reliable.
According to evidence obtained through the KIIs and FGD, a shortage of 
competent professionals in assisting the work of the parliamentarians in properly 
conducting their oversight function is the other reason for capacity limitation. 
The standing committees expressed their dissatisfaction with the adequacy and 
competence of the HoPRs secretariat’s support staff. Only three staff members 
(secretary, office boy, and expert) are hired for assisting each standing committee 
and even these assistants do not have the required competence to provide 
technical support. The role of the expert is to provide the necessary information 
to support the oversight function of the committees. Yet, in practice, the expert 
mostly assists the preparation of meetings and taking minutes. Some committees 
face employee turnover, which worsens the shortage of supporting staff.
Failure to Use Reports of Democratic Institutions and the Lack of 
Participating Stakeholders
Though the KII and FDG participants believe in the importance of rely-
ing on reports by democratic institutions such as the media, audit general, 
ombudsman, human rights commissions, the International Parliamentary 
Union, and the African Parliamentary Union, the study results fore grounded 
the limitation of using the assistance of outside institutions to oversee the 
performance of the executives. Similarly, respondents confirmed that there are 
gaps in working with research institutions and in using the findings of those 
institutions in monitoring and evaluating the performance of the executive.
106 AKlilu WubEt lEmA Et Al.
This weakness can be linked to a lack of adequate support staff to gather 
information from potentially helpful institutions on behalf of the Parliament. 
The MPs generally have very busy schedules as they go through all the reports, 
attend sessions, conduct field visits, and carry out other activities. Thus, the 
task of compiling the information from democratic institutions rests upon 
the experts.
On the other hand, evidence indicates that in addition to weakness in 
working with democratic institutions on the side of the Parliament, the 
institutions themselves are not strong enough positions to provide adequate 
information to the Parliament.
Lack of Media Coverage 
The inadequacy of media coverage is also raised as an important challenge 
to the oversight activities of the HoPRs. In view of respondents of KIIs and 
the FGD, even if the respective committees consistently conduct serious 
debates, these are not fully reported to the public. The print media used by 
the House is not widely accessible to the general public; the proclamation 
itself is not published in a timely fashion; and the website of the Parliament 
is at an infant stage and has been visited only by very few people. The data 
on the website is not updated regularly and it is not user friendly. As a result, 
citizens are unable to get information about the process of oversight.
Low Response and Failure by Executive to Implement Suggestions
The other issue highlighted as a challenge by the parliamentary committees is 
the inability of the executive to take corrective measures as per the directions 
and recommendations provided by the supervising committee. Though 
there is no open resistance, in actual practice the executive routinely fails 
to implement the directions given for different reasons, including capacity 
limitation, budget shortage, and lack of coordination with other departments, 
among others. For example, when the department concerned is asked about 
poor performance, they blame the lack of cooperation from different organiza-
tions, like the customs authority, banks, telecommunications, and electricity 
corporation and transportation companies. In addition, respondents reported 
experiencing delays in regular quarter reports, which they consider as a 
challenge. Similarly, data gathered through the questionnaire also support 
this view, as more than 75 percent of the respondents agreed that the failure 
of the executive to implement suggestions given based on the oversight report 
was the main challenge to Parliament’s oversight function.
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Party Discipline Related Challenges
Currently all the seats of the House are occupied by EPRDF and its affiliates. 
In this regard, respondents of the KIIs and FGD were asked whether this 
condition affects the Parliament’s oversight function responsibility. Most 
respondents agreed that they see no problem in the oversight function due 
to the occupation of all seats by a single party. These respondents believe that 
party membership even motivates them to struggle for efficient implementa-
tion of the policy of their party.
In contrast to this positive aspect, a negative aspect of oversight by members 
of the ruling party was inferred from what these respondents believe and 
behave in practice. They believe that they have the responsibility to represent 
the interest of their party and therefore always support whatever policy issues 
it proposes. Most of them argue that supporting policies proposed by their 
own party is customary practice, which should not be violated unless the 
individual parliamentarians leave his/her party. What we can infer from this 
response is that there is always the possibility that the MPs will stand with the 
interests of the party at the expense of the interest of the constituency, which 
of course could undermine the principle of representation. If the Parliament 
always supports the policies proposed by the ruling party, its role is reduced 
to rubber stamping the executive’s proposals.
There were also some respondents who argued that there is no conflict 
between their conscience and party direction, as they joined the party because 
of the absence of any conflict. These respondents also that added that, in 
their view, the Parliament is in fact facing a recent tendency to violate party 
discipline, which they see as a problem. But unconditional agreement is 
against the changing nature of the interest of human beings. We also found 
some respondents who held the view that “there is no option of opposing any 
policy, because we were elected for supporting the policies, but supervising 
the effective implementation of the party directions is not conflicting with 
party discipline. We are representing our party, hence supporting its policy 
and program is a must.”Most respondents shared a consensus that on programs 
and policy issues, there is no way to say ‘’no;’’ at the same time, most of 
them believe party discipline has no effect on the supervision of program 
implementation.
Though most respondents did not consider party discipline as a challenge 
to their responsibility of oversight, there were a few informants who consider 
EPRDF party discipline as one of the major challenges affecting their oversight 
functions. This group of informants argued that since all of them are from 
only one party, they do not expose each other for wrongdoing; as a result most 
executive heads come to parliamentary meeting without any preparation.
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In EPRDF party structure, top party leaders occupy executive positions 
in government and hence the power balance between the legislative and the 
executive favors the later. In some instances, Member of Parliament may not 
get the chance to participate in the process of policy or program formulation 
but are expected to vote in favor of it, simply because it is the party decision. 
This obviously creates conflict between party discipline on the one hand 
and conscience and public accountability on the other hand. Additionally, 
informants express concern that failure to observe party discipline may 
lead to loss of immunity. Therefore, party discipline is in effect a means of 
exercising control over MPs’ freedom of expression.
Other Challenges 
Participants of the FDG reported the low-quality reports and low-quality draft 
legislation as another oversight challenge they face. Furthermore, members of 
committees confess their inability to make field visit due to security problems, 
for instance in 2017. One standing committee was mandated to undertake 
oversight on forty-eight different organizations, which is technically impos-
sible to cover in a year. This committee planned to visit each organization at 
least once in the five-year parliamentary term. Respondents said that people 
expect as their representative or the HoPRs to give them lasting solutions 
to their problems, but unfortunately the reality is different. They stressed 
that since democracy is becoming weakened gradually, it is very difficult to 
transform the voice of the public. They further demonstrated that questions 
coming from electorate have no owner; they are screened and filtered at each 
step and are not given adequate response.
5. Conclusions and Area for Further Studies
5.1. Conclusions
The following conclusions were drawn from the findings of the study:
The HoPRs of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia uses various 
oversight tools, such as questions time, plenary debate, motion, field visit, 
public hearings, and reports to scrutinize the work of the executive. Among 
these tools, reports and committee hearing are the most widely used, while 
the field visit is the most productive but rarely used due to budget shortage, 
capacity limitation, logistical issues, and other problems.
From the perspectives of public satisfaction with government services, 
respect for good governance, ease of existing laws for understanding, respect 
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of the rule of law, commitment to the implementation of reform tools and 
proper use of budget, the effectiveness of Parliamentary oversight is far from 
meeting the goals of oversight.
There are different challenges influencing the oversight functions of the 
Ethiopian HoPRs, including the lack of qualified and professional supportive 
staff; lack of strong institutional framework for coordination of interdependent 
organizations; lack of willingness and capacity to ensure accountability and 
failure by the executive to take corrective measures for wrong actions; lack 
of strong democratic institutions such as audit general, the ombudsman 
institution and human rights commission in the country; a single party system 
that does not entertain diverse ideas; the strictness of party discipline; and 
lack of media coverage.
The HoPRs also has limitations in using the assistance of other institutions, 
such as the audit general, ombudsman, human rights commission, media, 
research institutions, and international organizations that produce vital 
inputs for undertaking the parliamentary oversight function.
Due to the existing party discipline, member of the Parliament wrongly 
believe that they have the responsibility to represent the interest of their party 
and therefore always support whatever policy issues are proposed by it unless 
the individual parliamentarians leave his/her party. This shows that there is 
always possibility that the MP will stand with interest of party at the expense 
of the interest of the constituency, undermining the principle of representation. 
If the Parliament always supports the policies proposed by the ruling party, 
its role is reduced to rubber-stamping of the executive’s proposals.
5.2. Areas for Further Study
The conclusions of this research on oversight were drawn only from the 
perspectives of HoPRs. Thus, the research team believes that to have a 
balanced understanding of the overall oversight functions of the House, 
study on oversight functions of the HoPRs from the executive and public 
perspectives is needed.
This research was confined only to the oversight functions of the 
Parliament. Hence, research on the other major functions of the HoPRs, 
including law-making, representation functions, diplomatic functions, and 
parliamentary public engagement could be carried out in order to have an 
understanding of the overall performances of the House in undertaking its 
constitutional responsibilities.
The federal parliament of Ethiopia has two Houses/chambers. From these 
two Houses, this research considers only the lower house (HoPRs), because it 
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is this House that is vested with the power of overseeing the executive branch 
of government. Regional Councils are not part of this study. Therefore, the 
research team recommends for more studies to be carried out in these areas 
to arrive at a better understanding of the overall oversight functions of the 
Parliament found at each levels of government.
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5 
Public Engagement for Improving 
the Relationship between the People 
and the Parliament
Challa Amdissa JIru, Defferew Kebebe Tessema,  
and Aklilu Wubet Lema
Box 1: Key Points of this chapter 
 Public engagement enhances participatory democracy and public trust by 
improving the relationship between people and parliament.
 Engagement strategy and policy determines the effectiveness of public 
engagement.
 the People’s representatives of Ethiopia lacks institutional capacity and resources 
required for parliamentary public engagement.
 Parliament’s inaccessibility, a hasty law-making process, low coverage of 
constituency visits, limited use of modern communication technologies, and a 
one-language policy has prohibited the effectiveness of parliamentary public 
engagement in Ethiopia.
Box 2: Lessons of this chapter
reading this chapter will give you insights in:
 Public engagement mechanisms set in place by the house of People’s 
representatives to strengthen parliamentary representation and participatory 
democracy
 Effectiveness of public engagement mechanism in creating public trust
 changes desired for improving public engagement so as to combine participatory 
democracy with representative democracy in Ethiopia
Box 3: Abbreviations
FdrE = Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia
FGd = Focus Group discussion
hoPrs = house of People’s representatives
Kii = Key informant interview
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1. Introduction
As indicators of political apathy have increased and trust in politics has 
fallen (Dalton, 2004; Hay, 2007; Stoker, 2006), efforts to engage citizens in 
politics have become a standard theme of modern democracy and a central 
parliamentary activity. Leston-Bandeira (2016) describes the characteristics 
of modern Parliament as a questioning of traditional forms of representa-
tive democracy and the expansion of participatory and advocacy types of 
democracy. The steadily declining levels of trust in political institutions leads 
to the significant role of public engagement in the democratization process, 
as it increases the interface between the people and the Parliament, not just 
every election year but every day. There is a widespread belief that above 
and beyond the occasional opportunity to vote, citizens should be allowed 
to participate in decisions that affect their daily life. This belief is enshrined 
in article 21 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and 
is espoused by governments of most political persuasions (Whiteley, 2009).
Despite the importance of public engagement for deepening democracy, 
however, governments in undemocratic system are found to be reluctant to 
seize the opportunities that public engagement will create. When government 
fails to introduce effective parliamentary public engagement, the relationship 
between the people and parliament is weakened and the legislature loses 
its role as mediator between the people and the government. Therefore, it 
is essential to undertake the study of parliamentary public engagement to 
understand the relationship between people and parliament.
Paul (2009) recognizes the importance of public engagement beyond 
occasional participation in voting. He noted that while public engagement is 
widely accepted, the practice has remained remarkably free from empirical 
scrutiny. It is essential to know the relationship between public engagement 
and trust in government and how public engagement may help strengthen 
inclusive government along gender and ethnic lines. Thomas (2006) believes 
that while engagement has received much attention in the popular press, 
scholarly work has lagged behind.
While research on parliamentary public engagement is generally scarce 
(Leston-Bandeira, 2016), the existing studies themselves are limited to the 
experiences of the Western countries, which are much advanced in exercising 
democracy, and hence cannot be generalized to the developing context of 
developing countries. Therefore this research presented here contributes to 
the literature an understanding of the context of developing countries by 
focusing on the experiences of Ethiopia. Leston-Bandeira (2016) explores 
the role that public engagement plays in the relationship between parliament 
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and the public in the UK, reflecting in particular on its elements of symbolic 
representation.
Leston-Bandeira (2016) investigates the supply side of parliamentary 
public engagement and suggests further studies in this area. The supply side 
of parliamentary public engagement is essential for exploring how the public 
does indeed receive public engagement and whether multiple representative 
claims do take place, and whether this has any effect on the public’s perception 
of the institution. Therefore, to find a balanced view on parliamentary public 
engagement, the research for this chapter involved both people and parliament, 
by taking samples from both sides.
In response to the scarcity of research on parliamentary public engagement, 
this research investigated the relationship between parliaments and people 
in Ethiopia, with the objective of identifying changes required for combining 
participatory democracy with the Ethiopian representative democratic system. 
In order to improve the public trust in parliament, it is vital to know the 
perception of the people toward that institution. Hence, this research tried to 
address the following questions: What public engagement mechanisms are set 
in place by the legislature of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to 
strengthen parliamentary representation and participatory democracy? And 
how effective is the existing form of public engagement in creating public trust?
As a true democracy develops with the emergence of demand from organ-
ized people who are capable of actively engaging in public affairs and who 
have skills to influence their representatives, this research serves as seeds 
to instigate the people to participate and take actions required to strength 
participatory democracy. This research also contributes to our knowledge 
of the importance of combining public engagement with representative 
democracy, which is crucial for deepening democratization in Ethiopia.
The study is delimited in scope to the identification of public engagement 
mechanisms being employed by House of People’s Representative of Ethiopia 
(HoPRs) and the role of parliamentary public engagement in improving 
public trust in the Parliament. The study assesses public engagement practiced 
since 2015, focusing on parliamentary practices in during the course of one 
electoral term
This chapter has five parts. The first is the introduction presented here; the 
second presents a review of related literatures with regard to parliamentary 
public engagement mechanisms and its importance in promoting public trust 
in parliament as well as in strengthening democracy. The third part deals 
with methods of data collection and analysis, while the fourth is concerned 
with findings and discussion. The last part presents some conclusions and 
implications for future research.
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2. Related Literatures
2.1. Purposes of Parliamentary Public Engagement
Modern parliament is characterized by a questioning of traditional forms 
of representative democracy that reestablished the division between the 
rulers and the ruled, making the people simply selectors of their rulers. The 
weakness of representative democracy has led to a search for alternative forms 
of democracy and the development of the public engagement function (Maija, 
2017). Public engagement plays an important role in the democratization 
process, as it increases the interface between the people and the parliament, 
not just every election year but every day.
The term “public engagement” covers a wide range of communication 
activities: from straightforward awareness raising, providing information, 
visits programs, and education initiatives; through two-way consultation 
activities; to increasingly empowering citizen participation and decision-
making opportunities. In parliamentary terms, this can mean anything from 
reading a leaflet explaining how laws are made to submitting a petition to 
parliament or giving views to a committee inquiry, to having direct input on 
bills being passed (Walker, 2017).
There are a variety of reasons for parliament seeking to engage with the 
public, including increasing public understanding of parliament and its work, 
broadening the range of voices heard by parliament, and potentially enhancing 
its legitimacy (Kelly and Bochel, 2018). Public engagement is said to be essential 
to a healthy democracy, to greater participation in democratic processes, to a 
better understanding of the role of parliament and members of parliament and, 
by extension, to greater trust that the Parliament and the people’s representa-
tives will better represent the public’s interest (PNSW, 2017). Strengthening 
citizen involvement in parliament is a desirable democratic goal in and of itself. 
It improves the quality of legislative decision-making, links citizens to their 
government, and provides legitimacy to democratic institutions (Kurtz, 1997).
According to Walker (2017), at a fundamental level, there are three reasons 
why parliaments are wise to develop strategies to engage effectively with their 
citizens between elections. Firstly: the legitimacy of any parliament depends on 
the support and engagement of its electorate. Secondly: the quality of legisla-
tion and policy is improved if it is informed by citizens’ concerns, experiences, 
and views. The scrutiny role of parliaments can positively influence national 
policies, priorities, and development goals and ensure that they meet the needs 
of the people. Thirdly: a parliament that is seen by its citizens to be connected 
and responsive to their concerns is more likely to earn the trust of the people. 
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If citizens understand the vital role the legislature plays in representing and 
championing citizens’ rights and concerns, they will be more likely to value the 
institution and its work. When policy decisions incorporate the perspectives 
of those affected, they can capture a wider range of inputs, and in doing so 
they can secure public legitimacy (Dryzek, 2010) and relatively improve 
trust in the performance of public institutions (Newton and Norris, 2000).
2.2. Public Participation Framework
According to Thomson-Senanayake (2012),there are a number of recognized 
levels of public participation, which includes: inform, consult, involve/
deliberation, and engage/collaborate. The first level of public participation 
is to “inform” the public (e.g., of the status of a proposed project or the rel-
evant process). This level provides the public with balanced and objective 
Table 1: Form of engagement
Form of engagement Purpose Tools 
Inform
Providing the public with the 
information required to understand 
the issue
To facilitate increased 
knowledge of the 
issue and the decisions 
concerning it 
Fact sheets, web 




Providing the public with clear and 
coherent information regarding the 
issue, welcoming the public’s thoughts 
on the topic, and indicating how their 
input affected the outcome
To obtain feedback on 






Twitter town halls, 
online idea forums 
Deliberate
Engaging with the public in two-way 
conversation to make certain that 
the public’s thoughts and concerns 
are factored into proposed solutions/
decisions
Greater level of 
participation by 
stakeholders as they 





Relying on relevant stakeholders’ 
input in combination with 
organizational expertise to incorporate 
recommendations into decisions to 
the maximum extent possible
Shared ownership 
between the organization 
and the stakeholders 
as the community is 
involved in each aspect 









Source: Public Policy Forum, 2009
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information to assist them in understanding the problems, alternatives, and/
or solutions. Individuals and stakeholders are then able to properly assess 
and evaluate the impacts of policies and initiatives proposed by government. 
The second level is to “consult,” in which the people are invited to provide 
feedback, input, or comment on analyses, alternatives, and/or decisions. This 
gives the public an opportunity to provide input on policies and initiatives 
before they are finalized.
The third level is to “involve/deliberation,” in which the people are provided 
with opportunity for dialogue and interaction. This could also be described 
as direct public participation throughout the process to ensure that issues 
and concerns are consistently understood and considered. However, it is with 
the understanding that the legislature is still the decision maker. The fourth 
level is to “collaborate/engage”. At this level, the public is provided with the 
opportunity to partner or work jointly on the active development of alternatives 
and the identification of the preferred solution. The purposes of engagement 
and tools or strategies used at each level are summarized in the table 1.
2.3. Parliamentary Public Engagement Mechanisms
The push for parliaments to engage with the public is consistent with a broader 
participatory trend in contemporary governance (Fung & Wright, 2003; New-
man, 2005). Increasingly, decision-makers, public agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations, and corporations are seeking novel ways to engage with their 
constituents in response to perceived failings in legitimacy (Bingham et al., 
2005) and an observed decline in trust in the institutions of representative 
politics (Tormey, 2015). In the particular context of legislatures, the drive to 
“connect” with the public is an attempt to make parliaments more relevant 
and accessible to citizens at a time when there is low public trust in politics 
(Leston-Bandeira, 2014).
Parliaments around the world are experimenting with new forms of public 
communication and engagement. We can witness, for example, legislatures 
taking an active approach to communicating with the public through websites, 
blogs, YouTube, and social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook. 
Some parliaments have experimented with novel participatory mechanisms, 
for example e-petitions and innovative consultative forums to engage with 
“hard to reach” publics (Hendriks,2019). The Parliament of New South Wales 
employs many engagement methods, such as comprehensive publication, 
“House in Review,”“Running the Record,” education and outreach, school 
tours, school outreach, community workshops, providing parliament and 
democracy courses, conducting public sector seminars, encouraging the public 
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to visit the Parliament, open days, public tours, comprehensive website, and 
social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and others (PNSW, 2017).
According to Beetham (2006), there are a number of different ways in 
which parliaments are working to involve citizens in the legislative process, 
both through contributions to work on bills in progress and through sugges-
tions for new or amended legislation. These may involve: open invitations to 
citizens to make submissions on bills; invitations to specified nongovernment 
organizations and social movements; ongoing arrangements for collaboration 
between parliamentary committees and citizen groups and experts; special 
forums or chambers for civil society, whether meeting independently or jointly 
with parliamentarians; procedures for citizens’ initiatives and referendums; 
or some combination of a number of these modes.
2.4. Public Engagement and Public Trust in the Parliament
According to Petts (2008), public engagement through deliberative processes 
is promoted in both academic and policy circles as a potential means to build 
public trust in decision-makers. Governments in general and the parliament 
in particular seem to optimistically take a positive relationship between 
public engagement and trust almost for granted. According to the American 
psychologist Julian Rotter (1971), trust is the expectation that the promise 
of an individual or group can be relied upon. Trust in government refers to 
one’s perceptions regarding the integrity and ability of the public agency to 
provide the expected service (Welch, Hinnant, & Moon, 2005).
Löfstedt (2005) argues for modifying the concept of trust in favor of 
confidence in the outcome as well as the decision process itself, contending 
that the public can in some circumstances trust a regulator even if they do 
not agree with the decision as long as the process by which it was reached 
was credible. Löfstedt (2006) in his work also favors dealing with a decline 
in trust through a focus on perception of competency, fairness, or efficiency 
of government. Hence, he contends that distrust caused by a lack of fairness 
should be attacked through public engagement, whereas if it is caused by 
perceived incompetence, greater involvement of experts in the decision may 
be required.
O’Neill (2002) argues that a well-placed trust grows out of active inquiry 
rather than blind acceptance. In other words, complete openness does not 
guarantee trust; rather it is built when specific elements of information can 
be traced to particular sources whose reliability can be ascertained. This 
suggests that in order to enhance or build trust, it is necessary to find ways 
in which people can actively check parliamentary claims. A deliberative 
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engagement process has to engender the confidence and competence that 
allows all participants to generate a common framing and understanding 
of the risks and the management options through an equal opportunity to 
express opinions which are open to challenge and debate.
Most theoretical discussions of trust stress its multidimensionality, 
with elements of Renn and Levine’s (1991) five dimensions – competence, 
objectivity, fairness, consistency, empathy – consistently. For building and 
maintaining trust (Kreitner and Kinicki, 2004) suggest six guidelines, namely, 
communication, support, respect, fairness, predictability, and competence. 
Trust needs to be earned; it cannot be demanded. They also have developed 
a measure of trustworthiness and provided norms for a trustworthiness 
scale. According to this norm, the level of trust could be “high,”“moderate,” 
or “low” depending on the score obtained, and the present study measures 
public trust in the institution of parliament based on this scale.
3. Research Methodology
3.1. Research Approach and Data Sources
The study employed a mixed-research approach to show the role that public 
engagement plays in strengthening the relationship between people and 
parliament in Ethiopia. Qualitative and quantitative research approaches 
were combined to triangulate information gathered from several sources. 
The primary reason for choosing the mixed research approach is that either 
the quantitative approach or qualitative approach alone is not sufficient to 
generate the relevant information pertinent to the relationship between 
people and parliament.
Both secondary sources and primary sources of data were collected to 
enrich the findings with ample evidence. Data from secondary sources were 
collected through document review. The documents reviewed were the 
constitutions, the ethics and procedural code of conduct of the Parliament, 
public wing participation strategy, annual plans and reports, the parliamen-
tary website, and other published materials. The primary sources of data 
were collected from the “people” and parliament. The “people” comprise 
representatives of civil society organizations, leaders of community groups, 
leaders of private sectors, representatives of media organizations, members 
of political parties, bloggers, academicians, activists and community leaders, 
and prominent individuals. Data were collected from this population through 
a questionnaire survey and Focus Group Discussion (FGD).
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From 120 questionnaires distributed to people, 100 were correctly filled 
in and returned and used in the analysis. Respondents were categorized in 
three age groups, wherein60.6 percent fall in the category of eighteen to thirty, 
31.3 percent fall in the age range between thirty-one and forty-three, and 
8.1 percent of respondents were in the age range between forty-four and sixty. 
No one was found to be above the age of sixty years, but one respondent did 
not want to indicate his age. In terms of gender: 90 percent of respondents were 
male, 8 percent were female, and the other2 percent were undisclosed. Similarly, 
respondents of the questionnaire were asked to which ethnic group they belong. 
Their responses show 35 percent of respondents were Oromo, 27 percent 
were Amhara, 12 percent were Gedio, 3 percent were Sidama, and 23 percent 
were from the rest of the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia. The 
highest level of education for largest group (58.8 percent) of respondents was 
first degree, while 17.5 had second degree or above, 10.3 percent had attained 
college diploma, and 13.4 had reached the high school level of education. 
Three individuals did not indicate their level of education. In terms of marital 
status, 57 percent of the respondents were single, 39 percent were married, and 
4 percent were divorced. The last question asked to differentiate the bio data of 
respondents was affiliation with political parties. In this regard, 87.9 percent 
of respondents had no affiliation with any party, while members of ruling 
party and members of opposition parties were found to be 6.1 percent each.
The second group studied here is members of parliament, of whom eighteen 
were involved in Key Informant Interviews. Among these key informants, two 
of them were parliamentarians; eight respondents were members of different 
parliamentary standing committees, two respondents were high-ranking 
officials at status of state minister, and six were officials of the secretariat 
office of the House of Peoples’ Representatives. Data gathering instruments 
are further described below.
3.2. Data Collection Instruments and Data Analysis
Document review: This involves identification of written or electronic 
documents containing information on the people and parliament. The research 
team kept track and cited the information retrieved from these documents. 
The trustworthiness of documents to be reviewed was carefully checked by 
the review team. Following full cross-checking of data to assure completeness, 
accuracy, and appropriateness to the research topic, it was further triangulated 
with other relevant data sources.
Key Informant Interview: KII were conducted on a face-to-face basis 
with eighteen members of the parliament. The interviews were unstructured.
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Focus Group Discussions: Three FGDs were conducted with people to 
generate diverse information. Respondents were made to choose to take part 
in one of the three FGDs on the basis of their convenience.
Questionnaire: Quantitative data were collected directly through the 
use of a self-administered questionnaire collected by a trained data collector. 
The main variables were engagement strategies and trust.
Observations were made by personal visits to the parliament call center, 
archives, and existing facilities. Finally, a validation workshop was conducted 
and further inputs were incorporated in the final research report.
Quantitative data were analyzed with the support of statistical packages 
for social science (SPSS). Descriptive statistics, nonparametric tests (Mann-
Whitney U test, Kruskal-Wallis Test), and Spearman correlation test were 
applied for analysis of quantitative data, while qualitative analyses were used 
to present the observation and understandings of the researchers on the 
topic through the use of text and narrative techniques. To ensure the ethical 
requirements of research, participants were informed of the purpose of the 
research and their consent was requested prior to their taking part in the 
study. In addition, the anonymity and confidentiality of all the participants 
in the research was strictly preserved. Also, the written consent of all the 
participants in the entire exercise was also sought.
4. Public Engagement and Participatory Democracy in 
Ethiopia
4.1. Introduction
This section presents analysis of data that were collected through KIIs, the 
questionnaire survey, FGDs, and document review. The data collected through 
these different methods were triangulated, analyzed, and discussed. The main 
themes of the findings related to institutional set-up for parliamentary public 
engagement, parliamentary public engagement strategies, public engagement 
practices in parliamentary functions, and public trust.
4.2. Institutional Set-up for Parliamentary Public Engagement
As per the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(FDRE) article 35 (6), 43 (2), (58), 89 (6) and 92 (3), the House of People’s 
Representatives has a constitutional responsibility to engage the public 
in undertaking its functions (law making, oversight, representation, and 
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parliamentary diplomacy). Conversely, people have the constitutional right to 
participate in decisions made by its representatives and to know the working 
of the parliament (FDRE, 1995). Article 58 of the FDRE constitution requires 
the meeting of the House to be public, except when close meeting is required. 
Where meetings are made public, the people will get information about the 
debates in the plenary session of the Parliament and of its acts, which will 
improve public awareness on the legislative process.
Article 35 of the constitution deals with provisions of the rights of women, 
in which the subarticle 6 provides “women have the right to full consulta-
tion, in the formulation of national development policies and the designing 
and execution of projects.” According to this provision, law making and 
oversight functions should ensure the participation of women. In the same 
way, subarticle 6 of article 89 requires that “government shall ensure the 
participation of women in equally with men in all economic and social 
development endeavors” (FDRE, 1995).
The provisions under article 43 of the constitution are concerned with the 
right to development. These group rights are recognized for each of the nations, 
nationalities, and people of Ethiopia. Accordingly, subarticle 2 of this provision 
states that “the nationals have the right to participate in national develop-
ment and, in particular, to be consulted with respect to policies and projects 
affecting their community.” This article safeguards the necessity of inclusive 
decision making in ethnically divided Ethiopia. In other words, the HoPRs 
has responsibility to ensure government decision is made after adequate 
consultation with the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia (FDRE, 
1995). Article 89 (6) provides that “government shall at all-time promote the 
participation of the people in the formulation of national development policies 
and programs; it shall also have the duty to support the initiatives of the 
people in their development endeavors.” Article 92 of the constitution, which 
deals with the cultural objectives of Ethiopia, also requires the participation 
of people in the policy-making process. Subarticle 3 of article 92 states that 
people have the right to full consultation and to the right to expression to 
enable the people to reflect their views in the planning and implementation 
of environmental policies and projects that affect them directly.
Regardless of these constitutional provisions, information obtained from 
key informants and FGD indicates that the HoPRs by itself is not active 
in the policy-making process, let alone in helping people to engage in the 
formulation of policies. Both research participants from people and parlia-
ment have similar thoughts, that the House is only active in ensuring the 
implementation of policies and programs and leaves policy formulation 
responsibility for the party central committees. In the norm of the ruling 
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party of Ethiopia, a party member is not allowed to argue against a centrally 
proposed policy or program. The failure by a parliamentarian to support the 
program proposed by the party leads to a loss of position both in government 
and in party structure. Therefore, members of the Parliament neither actively 
engage in policy formulation process by themselves nor encourage the people 
to engage in the policy-making process; rather, their focus is on oversight 
of how well the concerned bodies are committed to the implementation of 
policies.
Beside the FDRE constitution of Ethiopia, which has well recognized the 
importance of parliamentary public engagement, as provided in articles35 
(6), 43 (2), (58), 89 (6) and 92(3), and the Code of Ethics and Procedure of 
the HoPR Regulation number 6/2008, which gives little attention to public 
engagement, no other laws exist to enforce parliamentary public engage-
ment. Indeed, the HoPRs of Ethiopia does not have well-developed public 
engagement guidelines or strategy. It was only in 2018 that the HoPRs began 
developing a public engagement framework and strategy, which was not 
yet implemented at the time of data collection. The major objective of the 
framework is to facilitate and ensure regular parliamentary public engagement 
in an organized way in the wide areas of parliamentary functions such as law 
making, monitoring of enforcement of laws, budget ratification process, budget 
utilization, audit findings, preparation, implementation and monitoring of 
government policies and strategies, field visits during oversight and reporting 
of the findings, constituency questions and suggestions, planning and plan 
evaluation of the House, and research findings of the House.
As indicated in this engagement framework of the HoPRs, the parliament 
is expected to conduct regular meeting with people every three months. The 
responsibilities of the HoPRs according to this engagement framework are: 
increasing public awareness on parliamentary public engagement, facilitating 
participation in discussion of draft legislation, setting place, time, and agenda 
for discussion, announcing the agenda of the day, and conducting research on 
parliamentary public engagement. This activity is managed by the secretariat 
of the HoPRs.
The secretariat of the HoPRs has a program called the parliamentary 
public wing, which is a common forum for parliament and the people. The 
participants of the parliamentary public wings are chambers of commerce 
at the national level and the Addis Ababa chamber of commerce, the women 
association, the youth association, professional associations, political parties 
and their councils, religious organizations, universities, trade unions, the 
journalist association, policy research institutions, and others. According 
to our informants in both the FGD and KII, the parliamentary public wing 
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has not been effective in promoting participatory democracy due to various 
factors. One of the challenges of this forum is that the parliament controls the 
agenda. The agenda of discussion is unilaterally determined by the parliament, 
so the participants of the public wing come to the forum without information 
and without preparation to influence the discussion. In addition, most of 
the groups of the public wing are not independent of the government; and 
some of them are not well-organized to have influence in the parliamentary 
decision-making process. The most active civil and political organizations are 
systematically excluded from participation in the forum. Beside the problem 
of government control over participation, a low level of public awareness on 
the importance of participation also hinders the effectiveness of parliamentary 
public engagement by the so-called public wing.
Information obtained from KIIs indicates that there is no department or 
unit responsible for public engagement in the Parliament; instead the work of 
promoting public engagement is mainstreamed in the work of standing com-
mittees and parliamentary secretariat directorates, such as the law directorate 
and communication directorate. The absence of an organizational unit with 
full responsibility for management of parliamentary public engagement in 
the parliamentary structure blurs the responsible body for the failure of 
parliamentary public engagement.
The evidence from the document review and FGD shows that the constitu-
tion provided enabling condition for public engagement, but other laws 
give little attention to public engagement. Furthermore, the practice of 
parliamentary public engagement is restricted by institutional limitations. 
The failure of the HoPRs to develop engagement strategies and policies and 
procedural directives to guide public engagement, a lack of commitment 
to strengthen the parliamentary public wing, the absence of a specifically 
responsible body assigned to manage engagement, and the lack of a budget 
specifically allocated for public engagement have deterred the technical and 
infrastructural capacity of the Parliament for effective public engagement.
4.3. Usage of Common Parliamentary Public Engagement 
Strategies by the HoPRs of Ethiopia
Through the questionnaire survey, the study measured several variables using 
a five-point Likert scales that ranges from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
Four of these variables were: the usage of parliamentary public engagement 
strategies, that include strategies to inform, to consult, to deliberate, and 
to collaborate with the people. The other variable is public trust, which is 
presented in section 4.6 of this chapter.
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Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on the extent 
of public engagement along different engagement mechanisms and strategies. 
The views of the respondents show that the Ethiopian parliament’s use of 
different tools of securing public engagement was found unsatisfactory. As 
shown in table 2, the rating score of engagement strategies to inform, consult, 
deliberate, and collaborate were below the average point in the scale ranging 
between 1 and 5. The value below 3 implies that the number of people who 
did not agree with different level of parliamentary public engagement is 
higher than the number of people who did agree with the employment of 
parliamentary public engagement mechanisms.
Table 2: Opinion on public engagement and trust
Descriptive statistics Mean SD N
Public trust in HoPR 2.8034 1.00908 98
The strategies of HoPR to inform 2.9066 1.01035 98
The strategies of HoPR to consult 2.7781 1.07460 98
The strategies of HoPR to deliberate 2.6570 .98187 98
The strategies of HoPR to collaborate 2.8010 1.05212 98
Source: Computed from Questionnaire Survey, 2019
As far as parliamentary public engagement is concerned, the first thing ex-
pected from parliament is sharing information regarding its decisions, working 
procedures, functions, and services. From the outset, sharing information is 
a necessary step to ensure transparency and accountability to the electorate 
and to create a fertile ground for bringing the Parliament close to the people 
and enhancing democracy. Thus, five statements were used to assess the 
situation of sharing information (strategies of the HoPR to inform) regarding 
the parliamentary decisions and functions. These statements were: the avail-
ability of parliamentary publications in the form of posters, leaflets, guides, 
and research briefings to disseminate basic information; the availability 
and accessibility of records of committee meetings and plenary secessions; 
the supports of civic education in schools by the Parliament; the practice 
of tours to visit the Parliament; and the broadcasting of legislative sessions 
that can be viewed on television without edition. In the view of the majority 
of respondents (mean 2.9), the HoPRs did not sufficiently use the above 
strategies of sharing information.
Public EnGAGEmEnt 127
The score of the engagement with people for consultation was even lower 
than the score of engagement to share information (mean 2.78). The strate-
gies to consult the concerned people in decisions that affect them requires 
arrangement of face-to-face meetings, using traditional consultation forums, 
conducting workshops, conferences, or panel discussions with expert or focus 
groups, and aggressively seeking public inputs by means of public hearings. 
The data obtained from respondents through the questionnaire show that 
the efforts of the HoPRs to engage in consultation were not adequate to meet 
the demand for participation. The participants of interviews and FGD also 
unanimously agreed that the House did not establish any regular program for 
traditional consultation, for example with village councils, with tribal leaders 
and religious leaders, which is expected to play a crucial role in improving 
the relationship between people and parliament. Similarly, the House did 
not use common practices of consultation like citizen advisory councils 
and citizens cards, which are essential elements of participatory democracy.
Where the parliament fails to inform and to consult the people, it is not 
expected to meet the requirements to give people the chance to influence 
outcomes of parliamentary decisions. Our respondents confirm this fact 
by rating the performance of the House on deliberating the with the lowest 
score (mean 2.66) of all forms of engagement. The parliamentary public 
engagement strategies to deliberate, against which the views the respondents’ 
were collected, include timely response to public problems, people’s influence 
of the outcome of legislative decisions, involvement of people in designing 
and evaluation of programs, conducting deliberative polling, and working 
with advisory committee for deliberation. Data gathered from respondents 
in this respect show that the parliamentary public engagement in Ethiopia 
did not reach the level of deliberation and as a consequence, the people have 
insignificant influence on parliamentary decisions.
The final form of parliamentary public engagement is the parliamentary 
engagement strategy intended to collaborate with people in program design-
ing, implementation, and evaluation. Engagement strategies to collaborate 
include, but are not limited to, invitation to specified civil society organiza-
tions and social movements for working together; ongoing arrangements for 
collaboration between parliament and people; setting procedures for citizens’ 
initiatives and referendums; joint work with people in the active development 
of alternatives; and inviting public to actively engage in monitoring and 
evaluation of policies. Again, such collaboration strategies to engage with 
people have not applied by the HoPRs to a satisfactory level (mean 2.8) as 
per the view of the respondents. Comparison of data from interviews and 
FGD with data from the questionnaire shows the convergence of the views of 
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the respondents in both categories on the reluctance of the HoPRs to engage 
with people, both to deliberate and to collaborate.
Parliament is a political institution that is expected to engage men and 
women as well as majority and minority ethnic groups; therefore, it indispen-
sable to assess the inclusiveness in parliamentary public engagement along 
gender and ethnic aspects. Thus, by comparing the perception of respondents 
from different gender and ethnic groups on public engagement, the difference 
of opinion on engagement was assessed to measure inclusiveness. Accordingly, 
the Mann-Whitney U Test and Kruskal-Wallis Test were applied to examine 
if differences exist on perceptions on public engagement between male and 
female participants as well as among different ethnic groups.
A non-parametric Mann-Whitney U Test was conducted to see the dif-
ferences in the perception of female and male respondents with regards to 
the performance of public engagement strategies of the HoPRs to inform, 
to consult, to deliberate, and to collaborate. The result of the test statistics 
indicates that the p-value or Exact. sig. (2-tailed) in all forms of public engage-
ment strategies were above 5 percent. Thus, we could not reject the hypothesis 
that there is no significant difference between perceptions of female and male 
respondents in all levels of engagement. This result indicates that there is no 
significant difference in this respect between male and female at 5 percent 
level of significance. In other words, this test result implies gender does not 
influence the perception on parliamentary public engagement.
Table 3: Test of difference between the perception of female and male respondents 
on public engagement strategies
Test statisticsa
Strategies 
of HoPR to 
inform
Strategies 
of HoPR to 
consult
Strategies 
of HoPR to 
deliberate
Strategies 
of HoPR to 
collaborate
Mann-Whitney U 330.000 233.000 281.000 267.500
Wilcoxon W 4425.000 4328.000 4376.000 4362.500
Z -.390 -1.652 -1.028 -1.202
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .696 .099 .304 .229
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .704 .100 .312 .235
Point Probability .002 .001 .002 .001
a. Grouping Variable: Gender
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In addition to the Mann-Whitney U Test, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
Test was also conducted to see the difference in the perception of the re-
spondents on the same issues among the different ethnic groups. As it is 
shown in table 4, the result of the test statistics indicates that the p-value or 
Asymptotic. sig. (2-tailed) of all variables was greater than 0.05, which again 
indicates that there is no significant difference among the ethnic groups on 
the performance of public engagement strategies of the HoPR at a 5 percent 
level of significance.





of HoPR to 
inform
Strategies  
of HoPR to 
consult
Strategies 
of HoPR to 
deliberate
Strategies 
of HoPR to 
collaborate
Chi-Square 3.830 .870 .968 .122
Df 1 1 1 1
Asymp. Sig. .050 .351 .325 .727
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Ethnicity
4.4. The Practice of Public Engagement in the Law-Making 
Process
The procedure of law making in Ethiopia customarily begins by the initiation 
of the idea in the executive branch of government. The initiation for producing 
new law or amendment to existing proclamations is then first sent to the 
Council of Ministers, for endorsement, before it is sent to the Parliament for 
final ratification. The draft legislation being sent to the Parliament is seen in 
plenary session and referred to the legal affairs standing committee and in 
some cases to other additional concerned parliamentary standing committees 
for detailed review.
The committees responsible for review the draft legislation in detail 
conduct a public hearing, in which interested individuals and concerned 
stakeholders are invited to participate in the debate, and make a report to 
the plenary section, usually with a proposal for ratification. The arrangement 
for a public hearing is announced through mass media, mainly radio and TV, 
with information regarding the issue of discussion and the time and place 
of the public hearing, so that interested people may have the opportunity to 
130 chAllA AmdissA jiru, dEFFErEW KEbEbE tEssEmA, And AKlilu WubEt lEmA 
take part in the open discussions on draft legislation. If honestly utilized, this 
public hearing on draft legislation is a useful parliamentary public engagement 
mechanism of sharing information and consultation.
In addition to the public hearing, telephone and e-mail are alternatively 
used to collect inputs from those who cannot directly raise their concerns 
during public hearings. Recently, the Parliament has also started using the 
parliamentary call center, website, and social media for disseminating informa-
tion and collecting opinions from the people. At the time of data collection, 
the Parliament has introduced other public engagement mechanisms, such 
as video conference, free call service (8557), and was on the way to launching 
a new TV channel and digitizing archives. The objective of the digitization 
process was to save data from loss and to make parliamentary archives easily 
accessible.
The existence of a forum via the public wing, public hearings, and other 
means of communication for public engagement, however, did not promote 
direct democracy in Ethiopia at a significant level, because their existence 
reflects more form than reality. Our discussions and interviews indicate that 
the mechanisms employed by the HoPRs to disseminate information on 
draft law legislations have limitations in terms of accessibility, time, cover-
age, and language. The Parliament is ineffective in soliciting public input 
during the crafting of legislation, let alone in creating public awareness of 
the promulgation of new laws.
The print media used by the House is not widely accessible to the general 
public; the proclamation itself is not published timely; the website of the 
Parliament is at an infant stage and has been visited only by very few people. 
The data on the website is not updated regularly and it is not user friendly. 
A government report (2018) on the performance of parliamentary public 
engagement confirms the existence of wide gaps in creating a public forum 
to engage with the people in the process of law making. The report also shows 
the existence of weakness in the dissemination of information about the 
ratification of proclamations and the usual delay in publishing the ratified 
proclamation in the official legal notice.
The FGD discussants indicate that people living in regional towns/cities 
are disadvantaged when it comes to taking part in the discussion, as public 
hearings are always conducted only in Addis Ababa. The HoPRs does not 
monitor whether participants in the public hearing can represent various 
interest groups, regions, nationalities, and gender. The key informants dis-
closed that since all public hearings are conducted at Addis Ababa, people 
outside of Addis Ababa rarely take part in the public hearings. Moreover, 
time constraints are found to be another challenge for public engagement in 
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the legislation process. Information from key informants indicates that the 
HoPR has a tradition of endorsing new proclamations within twenty days, 
where possible. This tradition deters the opportunity to entertain enough 
engagement of the people with parliament. There is usually very limited time 
for the public to forward their suggestion on the draft legislation; for instance, 
the HoPRs ratified eighteen proclamations in its regular meeting conducted 
on February 6, 2018, where it is not imagined that member of the parliament 
themselves engage in sufficient discussion, let alone collecting inputs from the 
people. The informants believed that urgency in law making not only affects 
the public engagement but also puts constraints on the due process of law.
The language policy of the House is another challenge that hinders 
participation in the legislation process. All information is disclosed in one 
language, hearings are conducted only in one language, and information 
services on the website are provided only to people who can able speak this 
language of the Parliament. On the other hand, in Ethiopia, there is no single 
majority language (spoken by more than half) and as such the communication 
between the House and the people is visibly exclusive. If the HoPRs were able 
to disclose information in five languages, it could reach more than 75 percent 
of the people of Ethiopia, and if it were able to use ten languages, it could 
address about 90 percent of the population of the country (Central Statistical 
Agency, 2008). However, the Parliament prefers to use a single language and 
put a limit on its relation with people of different languages.
The other problem that challenged the effectiveness of parliamentary public 
engagement in Ethiopia is the fact that the incorporation of the public inputs 
depends only on the blessing of the ruling party, which controls all the seats 
of the Parliament and all its standing committees after the 2010 election and 
2015 election. Participants of the KIIs and FGD spoke convincingly that 
the views reflected in the public hearing are not systematically organized, 
analyzed, and interpreted. As there is no control over the Parliament to ensure 
people’s participation, there is also no way to ensure that views arising during 
public hearings are considered. In this regard, the Civil Society Law, which 
was promulgated at the time of data collection for this research report, can be 
taken as a good example of the case where the public inputs and suggestions 
were undermined and the participants were unable to make any influence the 
content of the final legislation. On the other hand, the inputs of the public 
in the Food and Drug Control proclamation were well acknowledged in 
final result. Both proclamations were passed in the same period and both 
attracted the highest level of public participation in public hearings; however, 
the Parliament approached the public’s views differently in these two cases.
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4.5. The Practice of Public Engagement in the Representation 
Function of the HoPRs
This research reveals the relationship between the parliamentarians and 
constituency at the current stage is not conducive to promoting either par-
ticipation or parliamentary democracy. According to our respondents, the 
failure of the parliament to effectively answer the constituency’s questions, 
which are particularly related to lack of good governance and the lagging of 
infrastructural projects, has eroded public trust in parliament.
Members of parliament have direct contact with the electorate twice each 
year, according to parliamentary procedure and the code of ethics. On these 
occasions, the MPs report the annual activities of the Parliament to their 
respective electorates and in return, listen to the people in the constituency to 
raise questions they have, to demand clarifications for various parliamentary 
activities, and raise problems in relation to their specific constituency. Such 
meetings with the constituency are expected to be reported by each MP 
to the Parliament, at which point related public questions reported by the 
parliamentarians are sorted and forwarded to the concerned executive bodies 
for action.
Even though this type of direct relationship between MPs and the constitu-
ency is a good option to combine participatory democracy with parliamentary 
democracy, in Ethiopia, the relationship between the Parliament and people 
is restrained by many factors. Government reports (2018/2019) shows that 
from all the activities of the House in the year 2017/18, the lowest performance 
was recorded in parliamentary constituency relations. One of the challenges 
is the absence of outreach services through which the people can have contact 
with their representative without time and space restrictions. The chance of 
meeting representative is restricted to only two occasions in a year, when 
parliament is closed in the summer and in February. It is unlikely many people 
will have contact with their representative, even in cases where the twice 
yearly schedule is respected, which it sometimes is not due to low coverage of 
visits. One of the informants among the MPs disclosed that his constituency 
has forty-two rural districts and two urban districts, out of which he usually 
makes it to meetings with two to three districts in one period. This implies that 
if he will have meeting with three districts in one period, six districts will be 
covered in a year and thirty districts will be covered in one term of election, 
while the remaining fourteen districts will be left out during his five years 
term of office. When direct face-to-face contact is difficult, technology-based 
information exchange is a good alternative for enhancing parliamentary public 
engagement. However, despite the importance of information technologies, 
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the representatives are not available via Twitter, Facebook, email and other 
technology-based channels.
In the worst cases, MPs do not visit their respective constituency, particu-
larly in a time of public protests. The other barrier to the relationship between 
people and parliament is the failure of members of parliament to make a 
report to the Parliament. As indicated in a government report (2018/2019), 
of those MPs who visited their constituency, some did not fully report the 
situation of their constituency to the Parliament. Therefore, public questions 
are suppressed due to failure of the representatives to report the concerns 
of the electorate.
When public questions are reported to the Parliament by a representative, 
they face other hurdles. The issues reported from different constituencies 
are combined to ease response by the executive but are also distorted in the 
process. Once public questions reach the Parliament, merged and forwarded 
to the executive for proper response, it is the end of the story. Most often, the 
executive bodies do not respond to issues forwarded since, the parliament 
does not follow-up on the actions taken by the executive; no one can give 
feedback to the constituency that brought the questions to the Parliament. As 
a result, the people lose hope in the capacity of the Parliament to solve their 
problems. The MPs indicate in their report to the Parliament that they are 
visiting their constituency year after year without any change in the agenda 
brought to them. Members of the Parliament are not able to answer questions 
repetitively asked by the communities in their constituency. Surprisingly, the 
executive is not made accountable for not responding to the public questions 
directed to it.
4.6. Public Trust in the Parliament
Respondents were asked to rank the overall public trust in the HoPRs of 
Ethiopia based on ten survey items. The aggregate response indicates that 
the public did not have such trust in their representatives (see table 2). This 
response is expected, because the Parliament performed poorly in engagement 
with the people. To test whether the low level of trust has any association with 
parliamentary public engagement, a non-parametric Spearman correlation 
coefficient test was conducted. The result of test statistics shows that there are 
positive and strong relationships among all variables: informing, consulting, 
deliberation, collaboration, and trust. Trust has a positive association with 
all forms of engagement (to inform 0.44, to consult 0.596, to deliberate 0.61, 
and to collaborate 0.66). The test result is shown in table 5. This result shows 
that improvement in engagement will have an association with improvement 
134 chAllA AmdissA jiru, dEFFErEW KEbEbE tEssEmA, And AKlilu WubEt lEmA 
in public trust in the HoPRs of Ethiopia. Furthermore, we can infer from the 
test result that a higher level of engagement has a stronger association with 
trust than lower levels of parliamentary public engagement.
Table 5: Association of public engagement and trust
Correlations Sharing 

















Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .
N 100 100 100




.439** .596** .608** .660**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 98 98 98 98
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
According to our interview respondents, the relationship between parlia-
ment and the public in Ethiopia needs improvement. The people have lost 
confidence in the Parliament by assuming that they have no capacity to address 
public issues. Participants of the FGD argue that most people do not know the 
work and responsibilities of the Parliament, due to limited efforts made by the 
Parliament at public engagement. According to respondents, the Parliament 
is perceived as a rubber-stamp to endorse all decision required by the party 
leaders. The people have developed a belief that suggestions do not make a 
difference. MPs are also criticized for having a “the party knows better than 
me” attitude. Informants also confirm that the Parliament fails to deliver 
on its promises to the people in terms of oversight of the budget utilization, 
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mega project performance, and combating corruption. The parliament has 
refrained from taking measures despite various suspected malpractices by 
the executive. As a result, people consider the Parliament as a “lion without 
teeth,” according to respondents.
5. Conclusions and Areas for Further Study
Although the HoPRs of Ethiopia has a constitutional responsibility to engage 
with people, in actual practice, the level of public engagement is low. Our 
findings show that the HoPRs has institutional limitations in understanding 
the role of public engagement and in designing the engagement strategies 
that enhance participatory democracy in a parliamentary system. The 
absence of a specifically responsible body, with a necessary staff, budget, 
and other infrastructure has hindered the capacity of the HoPRs to develop 
an engagement strategy, policy, and procedural directives that would guide 
public engagement. Participatory democracy is weakened by the restriction 
of participation to a handful people in public hearings on draft legislations 
and by systematic control of participation to handpicked public wing groups 
in the so-called public forum.
The mechanisms used by the HoPRs to inform and consult the people are 
challenged by a lack of accessibility to people outside of Addis Ababa, time 
constraints due to a hasty law-making process, low coverage of constitu-
ency visits by MPs, and the implicit one-language policy of the parliament. 
The Parliament’s low effort at engaging with people to deliberate and to 
collaborate creates a situation in which there is no way for the people to 
influence the parliamentary decisions, while for the Parliament there is little 
means of ensuring its decisions are consistent with the interest of the people it 
represents. The discussions in this chapter show that the parliamentary public 
engagement strategy of the HoPR is not effective in bringing the Parliament 
close to the people and thereby creating public trust. On the other hand the 
finding of this research indicates a strong and positive linkage between all 
forms of parliamentary public engagement and public trust.
Finally, on the basis of the delimitation of this research, we call for more 
research into public engagement, to include the House of Federation of 
Ethiopia and the regional councils.
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for Health Service Delivery in 
the Context of Developmental State: 
The Ethiopian Experience
Hiwot Amare Tadesse and Trui Steen
Box 1. Key points of the chapter 
 Policy direction, pressing health problems, the need for resources, in combination 
with the state’s developmental vision, facilitates the emergence of msPs that 
involve both state and nonactors in the Ethiopian health sector.
 msPs can involve both mutuality and power differences. the manifestation of the 
development state (ds) impacts the organization and functioning of msPs in both 
positive and negative ways. While ds contributes to enhancing the reciprocal 
relations between actors through shared purpose and commitment, it diminishes 
the opportunity for interaction and negotiation, developing more collaborative 
and trusting relationships, and msPs capacity for self-regulation.
Box 2: Reading this chapter will give you insights in
 how partnerships involving diverse sets of actors are organized and operate in a 
developmental state (ds) context.
 the manifestation of the ds in the Ethiopian health sector and its impact on the 
organization and functioning of msPs.
Box 3: Abbreviations
ccrdA = christian consortium relief development Agency 
cso = civil society organization
ds = developmental state
EPrdF = Ethiopian People revolutionary democratic Front 
Fmoh = Federal ministry of health 
GtP = Growth and transformation Plan 
hdA = health development Army 
hEW = health Extension Workers 
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hsdP = health sector development Programs 
mdGs = millennium development Goals
msPs = multi-stakeholder Partnerships 
nGo = non-Governmental organization
Phcu = Primary health care unit 
sdGs = sustainable development Goals
Introduction
In this day and age, societies are struggling with multidimensional problems that 
require bringing together resources and expertise from a diverse set of actors 
(Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Given the complexity of problems, governmental 
entities are increasingly challenged to horizontally coordinate their policy 
planning and production of services not only between each other but also with 
other actors (Kickert et al. 1997; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998). Although the 
need to engage in collaborative efforts between state and non-state actors might 
not be a new thing, it has taken on a particular form since the end of the 1980s 
and the beginning of the 1990s following the reforms in public administration. 
This has resulted in the evolution of our understanding the nature of policy 
making and implementation the monocentric to pluricentric. More specifically, 
the new public governance is presented as a framework recognizing
“the collaborative nature of modern efforts to meet human needs, the widespread 
use of tools of action that engage complex networks of public and private actors, 
and the resulting need for a different style of public management, and a different 
type of public sector, emphasizing collaboration and enablement rather than 
hierarchy and control” (Salamon 2002, vii).
Therefore, governments in many parts of the world are becoming more col-
laborative by engaging citizens, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
and private sector organizations in devising and implementing solutions to 
society’s challenges.
In the scholarly literature, the concept of partnership has emerged as a new 
form of governance arrangement that changes the traditional governance 
structure of states (Johnston, 2015; Lowndes & Skelcher 1998; Osborne 
2000; Sorensen & Torfing, 2005; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Subsequently, 
partnerships involving diverse sets of stakeholders have developed as a practi-
cal approach with which to address complex social problems (Benner et al., 
2004). These partnerships proceed from the basic need for sharing resources 
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and information in meeting collective goals as well as the individual goals 
of actors involved. However, approaches to partnerships vary greatly across 
and within nations. Different types of partnerships exist, and their share in 
the overall creation and production of public services differs too (Selsky & 
Parker, 2005). This is especially related to the fact that partnerships exist 
in a certain environment. For instance, Sørensen & Torfing (2005) argue 
that the level of political support and dependency on partnerships as a new 
governance mechanism differs between countries, scales, and policy sectors 
because of past national political cultures, traditions, and institutions. Pattberg 
& Widerberg (2014) confirm that “partnerships are embedded in a political 
and social context that will influence their chances to thrive” (p. 30).
The state and its agencies are not only important actors in partnerships, 
they also provide the ideological, legal, and institutional foundation based on 
which partnerships will emerge, evolve, and function (Batley, 2006). Hence, 
the overarching political philosophy of states can determine the nature and 
practice of partnerships. For instance, the kind of partnership that may exist in 
a liberal state with a huge role for the private sector is expected to be different 
from the kind of partnership that prevails in a centralized state that gives little 
space to the private sector. An example of the latter is the Developmental State, 
which is depicted as an ideology that encourages state intervention. States 
with DS ideology usually prefer to shape the direction and pace of economic 
and social development by intervening in the development process to check 
the uncoordinated influences of market forces (Johnson, 1982).
This chapter examines the overall functioning of three Multi-Stakeholder 
Partnerships (MSPs) organized for health service delivery in Ethiopia. The 
primary focus of this chapter is derived from the observation that there is 
a surge of working relationships among state and non-state actors in the 
Ethiopian health-care sector despite the government’s DS orientation. This 
study follows the growing body of public administration studies that stress 
the importance of the national and institutional context in shaping the public 
sectors reforms and the practice and outcome of such reform initiatives as 
partnerships (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Osborne, 2010; Røvik, 2002).
Ethiopia adopted a different politico-administrative structure following the 
declaration of the DS. Hence, the argument we want to make in this chapter is 
that studying the form and operation of partnerships should consider the na-
tional context wherein these partnerships take place. Two major perspectives, 
one common to public administration literature (the concept of governance) 
and the other concerning the DS, seem to offer promising directions from 
which to investigate this issue. Especially in a DS context, the relation between 
state and nonstate actors in collaborative settings is unclear. To increase 
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our understanding of how partnership arrangements work and to develop 
knowledge on the overall nature and operation of horizontal partnerships 
for the coproduction of public services in Ethiopia, this chapter focuses on 
answering the following main research question: What is the impact of the 
developmental state context on the functioning of multi-stakeholder 
partnerships for health service delivery in Ethiopia?
The chapter is divided as follows: first, we discuss some of the theoretical 
concepts and how these are used in framing the study: “governance,” “network 
governance,” “partnerships,” and “developmental state.” Second, we present 
a brief overview on the role of partnerships for health service provision in 
Ethiopia. The methods and data used in the process of the study are presented 
next. Fourth, the case analysis and findings in accordance with the network 
governance and developmental state frameworks are presented. In section five, 
we discuss and draw conclusions from the findings of the study. We present 
some of the implications that such a context has for public governance in 
general and for state and nonstate actor relationships in particular.
1. Governance, Network Governance, Partnerships, and 
Developmental State 
1.1. Governance
A wide-ranging use of the term governance indicates that scholars within 
the current public administration literature view governance from different 
perspectives. In his widely cited book Understanding Governance, Rhodes 
(1997) distinguished six ways in which the term governance is used in the 
literature: governance as the minimal state, as corporate governance, as the new 
public management, as good governance, as a socio-cybernetic system, and as 
self-organizing networks. Klijn (2008) also differentiates four main definitions 
that dominate the literature: governance as good governance or as corporate 
governance, governance as New Public Management (NPM) or as market gov-
ernance, governance as multilevel governance or inter-governmental relations, 
and governance as network governance (self-steering or non-self-steering).
Although the above definitions represent different conceptions of gov-
ernance, they have something that unites them. Many of them focus on 
mechanisms involved in solving societal problems rather than on what the 
government can do with its authority and predetermined structure. This is 
in line with the notion that governments are changing the way they govern 
society by focusing on the process that can best achieve outcomes rather than 
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concentrating on centralized power (Klijn, 2008). As is widely acknowledged, 
the shift from government to governance entails the establishment of new 
systems that stimulate different forms of cooperation between state and 
nonstate actors in formulating and implementing public policy (Noor et 
al. 2010). Hence, governance allows us to conceptualize the different processes, 
structures, and arrangements needed to embrace complex interactions wherein 
both state and nonstate actors engage together in dealing with societal issues.
The depiction of state and other societal actors’ relationship as the main 
emblem of the governance concept has pushed some scholars toward see-
ing governance from a network perspective only. This relational aspect of 
governance has stimulated many scholars “to use the term governance as 
a synonym for what others call ‘network governance’” (Meuleman, 2008; 
p. 15). Nevertheless, one can find different understandings of governance that 
are equally important as the network perspective (see Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992; Rhodes, 1997). In broader understanding, the concept can be used to 
describe a plethora of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, and 
process through which public policy is being formulated and implemented 
(Johnston, 2015; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Sorensen & Torfing, 2005). Stoker 
(1998) puts forward a definition that he thinks can form a baseline agreement 
in understanding governance. He refers to governance as “the development of 
governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private 
actors have become blurred” (p. 17). This chapter starts with a theoretical 
insight that there is a change from government to governance, namely, the 
increased focus on the involvement of a range of societal actors when ad-
dressing public issues. However, different governing styles can be involved 
in framing the relation between these actors, such as hierarchy or market, 
besides networks. Taking a broad perspective in understanding governance 
allows us to use a wide angle in capturing the interaction of state and nonstate 
actors. Following this broad perspective, we then use the term “governance” 
to describe “…[t]he totality of interactions, in which government, other public 
bodies, private sector and civil society participate, aiming at solving societal 
problems or creating societal opportunities” (Meuleman, 2008; p. 11).
1.2. Network Governance
Since the 1990s a vast amount of literature has been devoted to the develop-
ment of network governance, including work by Rhodes (1997, 2000); Pierre 
(2000); Klijn (2008); Klijn & Koppenjan (2000); Kooiman (2003); and 
Sørensen & Torfing (2007). In the governance literature, network governance 
relates to the configuration of relatively organized relations that involves 
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interdependent actors and their complex interaction (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2000; Klijn, 2008). The formation of these networks aims at resolving societal 
problems. Consequently, many scholars describe networks as the interplay of 
interdependent actors in society aimed at policy making and implementation 
(Kickert et al. 1997; Klijn, 2002; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). In line with 
this, we found Sorensen & Torfing’s definition of network governance most 
suitable in the context of this research. First, it captures the basic ideas that 
are commonly ascribed to networks governance. Second, it is in line with 
our argument about the relation between governance and network concepts. 
Sorensen & Torfing (2005) define network governance as:
“A relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally 
autonomous actors; Who interact through negotiations; Which take place 
within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework; That to 
a certain extent is self-regulating; and Which contributes to the production of 
public purpose within or across particular policy areas.” (p. 203)
This study considers this network governance model to frame the analysis 
of our cases. Most network governance scholarship focuses upon developed 
countries where there exist positive relations between state and civil society 
in an open and participatory governance system (Hudson, 2004; Huxhham 
& Vangen, 2005; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Sorensen & Torfing, 2007). In 
contrast, there is little knowledge as to whether network governance is possible 
in a developing context and to what extent the existing partnerships between 
state and nonstate actors resemble network governance. Since many develop-
ing countries, including Ethiopia, lack some of the features of developed 
countries’ political-administrative structure, it may be difficult to picture 
network governance in these countries. Yet we do not know if it has potential 
for world-wide application, how it takes shape and form, and what factors 
influence its creation and functioning. Thus, applying the network governance 
framework of analysis in a developing country context has the potential to 
extend its theoretical relevance and application: “Certainly theorization is 
strengthened by confirmatory analyses. But theorization is also strengthened 
by reflecting upon non-confirmatory cases” (Moloney, 2013, p. 3).
1.3. Partnerships in a network governance context
In a governance environment where pluricentric relations with network-like 
features dominate, partnership can provide a means of developing strategic 
direction and coordination (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; 
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Rees, et al., 2012). According to Lowndes & Skelcher (1998) partnerships are 
most affiliated with network governance in the market-hierarchy–network 
modes of governance as “the development of interdependent relationship based 
on trust, loyalty and reciprocity enables collaborative activity to be developed 
and maintained” (p. 319). Skelcher et al. (2005) argue that governance is well 
manifested through partnerships that are capable of engaging a variety of 
actors with their differing interests. Scholars like Rhodes (1997) and Stoker 
(1998) differentiate partnerships from other interorganizational relationships, 
such as contracts, by taking partnership as being identical with self-governing 
networks that exhibit high levels of trust among network member. However, 
the totality of interaction among a diverse set of actors may not completely 
rely on trust, which may give rise to different types of network forms and 
relationships (Davies, 2002; Thompson, 2003). Governance in general and 
partnerships in particular are contested by scholars who interpret the concepts 
differently. For instance, though Lowndes & Skelcher (1998) indicate that 
partnerships may resemble network governance, they denounce the idea 
that partnerships are identical with network as a mode of governance. Stoker 
(1998) determines different types of relations that may exist among actors in 
a network context through a classification of partnerships as principal-agent 
relations, interorganizational negotiation, and systematic coordination. While 
the first and second partnership types involve formal and less collaborative 
relationship, only the last one shows the characteristics of ideal network 
governance, which involves higher mutual understanding. In contrast, Davies 
(2002) views partnerships as analytically distinct from network governance 
and as a “… distinctive mode of governance characterized simultaneously by 
the diffusion and augmentation of State power” (p. 302).
Despite these differing arguments, the literature on partnerships tends to 
focus on elements that correspond with network governance (see Bode & 
Brandsen, 2014; Stewart & Gray, 2006). For instance, Brinkerhoff (2002) 
defines the ideal type of partnership as:
“A dynamic relationship among diverse actors, based on mutually agreed objec-
tives, pursued through a shared understanding of the most rational division of 
labour based on the respective comparative advantages of each partner. Partner-
ship encompasses mutual influence, with a careful balance between synergy and 
respective autonomy, which incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in 
decision making, mutual accountability and transparency.” (p. 21)
While acknowledging that there exist a number of dimensions for conceptual-
izing partnership, it is important to use insights from the network governance 
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literature, which suggest factors that can sustain the relationship between 
state and nonstate actors. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to question 
governance as a theory of state and nonstate actors’ relation in the delivery of 
public services through empirically examining MSPs in a network governance 
framework. In this respect, and following Sorensen & Torfing’s (2005) defin-
ing characteristics of network arrangements, outlined as interdependency 
among various actors, interaction through negotiation, institutionalized 
framework, ability to self-regulate, and production of public purpose, our 
main and focal point of analysis is to what extent the relations between actors 
in MSPs are conducted on the basis of the above-listed characteristics of a 
(ideal type) network mode of governance.
1.4. Developmental State
Usually, the concept of DS is viewed as distinct from both liberal and centrally 
planned economic models. The definition of DS and the elaboration of the 
concept followed the rapid economic growth of East Asian countries, since 
their growth is associated with state-led policies and intervention. Caldentey 
(2003) defines the DS as “a state that intervenes and guides the direction and 
pace of economic growth” (pp. 28). Hence, the DS is committed to bringing 
economic growth mainly through state guidance and interventions. According 
to Bolesta “[t]he introduction of developmental state theory into the state 
ideology means, in real terms, a departure from a neo-liberal economic ideol-
ogy and a drift towards state interventionism” (2007, p. 105). However, in a 
DS context state intervention focuses on promoting development rather than 
hindering the socioeconomic development as is the case in centrally planned 
economies (Bolesta, 2007; Ghebremusse, 2015). In reviewing DS related 
literature, it becomes apparent that states have a critical role in promoting 
development.
Various authors use one or more features as a central organizing concept for 
defining the DS. Developmental structures (state capacity) and developmental 
roles, for example, have been identified as two fundamental aspects of the 
DS (Routley, 2012). Vu (2007) refers to these as “structure and ideology” 
(p. 28). Similarly, Ghebremusse (2015) points out that the link between 
ideology and structure differentiates the DS from other states. Hence, a 
DS has to be defined considering both its objectives and structure. Routley 
(2012) provides a definition that takes the above concepts into account: “a 
developmental state has sufficient state capacity to be effective in its targeted 
areas and has a developmental vision such that it chooses to use this capacity 
to work towards economic development.” (p. 8).
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The fundamental institutional features of the DS related to state capacity 
are “autonomy” and “embeddedness.” These elements enable states to achieve 
their developmental goals (Routley, 2012). According to Edigheji (2005), 
autonomy is all about installing autonomous and competent public institutions 
that are capable of executing developmental goals. The literature argues 
that the purpose of building an autonomous bureaucracy is to free the state 
and its structure from being captured by forces outside the state (Edigheji, 
2005; Evans, 1995). The concept of embeddedness refers to the process of 
building collaborative relationships with various societal actors, including 
private actors, civil society organizations, and citizens (Evans, 1995). Scholars 
such as Johnson (1982) and Evans (1995) indicate that the presence of an 
independent and coherent state structure that is capable to plan and lead 
the developmental activities is an essential element in the overall success of 
a DS. The literature asserts that the value of state structure or bureaucracies 
enhances when they function independently (Evans 1995; Kohli 2004)
2. Health Service Provision and Partnerships in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia, being one of the world’s least developed countries, struggles in meet-
ing the basic health needs of its rapidly increasing population. With limited 
resources, severe poverty, and other pressing problems, the state remains an 
important actor in providing health services. Before the coming of the current 
regime, there was limited participation of NGOs and the private sector in public 
service provision (Clark, 2000; CRDA, 2006). However, following a change 
of government in 1991, the new regime developed a national health policy 
and reorganized the health services delivery system, among other things by 
encouraging partnerships with and participation of nongovernmental actors.
Since the 1990s there has been a governmental concern to involve private for 
profit and nonprofit partners and more recently community groups and citizens 
in health service delivery. The government has been radical in the development 
of its approach to public service delivery (particularly in health), with the 
promotion of partnerships involving new and expanded roles for Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) in almost all areas of health care and service delivery 
(Rahmato et al., 2008) and through decentralization of the health sector, with 
a devolution of rights and responsibilities from the center to the local level.
Simultaneously, Ethiopia has embraced the DS ideology. Unlike the free-
market orientation of neoliberalism, the DS heavily privileges a vanguard role 
for the state on various economic and social development fronts (Tadesse 
& Steen, 2019). With the introduction of the developmental principles, the 
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government’s drive to work with different societal actors has taken on its 
own form. In particular, interest in entering into collaboration with a diverse 
set of actors has been reinforced by the drive to meet both international 
and local strategic development plans, made more pressing by restricted 
resources. The international development goals such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and, later on, the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which trigger many low- and middle-income countries to 
develop aspiring health policies and strategies, complemented the Ethiopian 
government’s intention on health policy and development plans. As part of 
the international development goals and overall national health strategies, 
Ethiopia has implemented several health strategies of significant scale in the 
past two decades. Promoting partnership across sectors to improve health 
sector development and thereby to tackle the health service problems was a 
very prominent aspect of these efforts (El-Saharty et al., 2009).
3. Research Method and Data 
3.1. Research Design 
The aim of this study is to examine the existence and actual application of 
partnerships as a new form of governance in the Ethiopian context. The 
study is based on a qualitative approach using observations, semi structured 
interviews, focus group discussions, and a review of internal and published 
documents. As the topic in this study is fairly unexplored and highly related 
to its political, social, and cultural context, the collection of in-depth data 
in a natural setting sensitive to the people and place under study is highly 
valuable. Qualitative inquiry allows the researcher to conduct extensive 
collection of data; typically from multiple sources of information (Flick, 
2002).The study employs a multiple case study research design in which 
the units of analysis are three different MSPs organized for health service 
delivery in different parts of Ethiopia.
3.2. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s Health Sector
The choice of the Ethiopian health sector as the main study domain can 
be attributed to different reasons. First, following the 1991 government 
change in Ethiopia, the new government of Ethiopia developed the first 
national health policy to give a sound direction for the involvement of diverse 
sets of stakeholders in the health sector. In addition to the national policy 
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document, different policy and strategy documents (Health Sector Develop-
ment Programs [HSDP I, II, III & IV], and the Growth and Transformation 
Plan [GTP I & II]) encourage joint efforts of state and nonstate actors in the 
health sector.
Second, the Ethiopian health sector is characterized by the involvement of 
a wide variety of national and international donors, NGOs, CSOs, and other 
stakeholders. The participation and contribution of these diverse set of actors 
is well recognized: introducing new and innovative approaches working in 
collaboration with health offices at different levels of government; boosting 
health service coverage and utilization and providing complementary services 
to support government health policy and programs (CCRDA, 2014; FMOH, 
2014). Hence, the role and involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders in the 
health sector provides an opportunity to examine state and nonstate actors in 
a partnership setting. The available information on state and nonstate actors 
partnerships supported by both policy documents and information provided 
by local practitioners encouraged us to select the health sector as a critical 
case (Levy, 2008; Patton, 2001) that can produce sufficient information in 
addressing the research questions.
3.3. Case selection
Selecting three cases from the variety of health programs seems a difficult 
task. Therefore, we decided to have some minimum criteria that match the 
cases to our MSP definition:
– MSPs that are organized for health service delivery; more specifically 
working on maternal and child health;
– MSPs organized with private sector, not-for-profit (CSOs), public and 
citizens’ participation, preferably involving three types of actors – private, 
public and civil – with at least one public sector representative and at least 
one civil society representative. But we sought to select MSPs that involve 
a maximum of actors, as it gives a chance to see the complex interaction 
patterns and different perspectives on the issues that will be raised;
– MSPs that are initiated at the local, regional, or federal level, thus exclud-
ing partnerships that are initiated on a supra-national level;
– MSPs that are functioning for at least one year, before January 2016 (the 
starting time of the empirical research) and at least (planned to) continue 
until five months in the future.
On the basis of the above listed criteria and consultation with experts from 
FMOH, three cases were selected. Since the preliminary analysis provided the 
152 hiWot AmArE tAdEssE And trui stEEn
impression that partnerships are a newly emerging phenomenon in Ethiopia, 
it is difficult if not impossible to identify a well-developed MSP in the actual 
conceptual and theoretical sense of the term. Therefore, we made a careful 
analysis of each organization’s website, contacted the organizations in person 
and through phone and email to select cases with a maximum number of 
actors and that most resemble our definition of MSPs.
An additional criteria used to select the cases was convenience. While the 
data collection process proceeded, the ongoing protest in Ethiopia which 
started in 2016 intensified. Hence, we selected cases that were more conveni-
ent for data collection. In conducting the field works, avoiding conflict places 
was the major obstacle to the research. Using convenience as a sampling 
technique can be scrutinized for credibility since the most convenient sample 
may not be the best sample. However, in selecting cases from different places 
(conflict free), we made a careful attempt not to compromise the first criteria.
In the three MSPs, the project activities include among others strengthen-
ing the functional level of health facilities, building the capacity of the health 
system especially at the district level, building the capacity of health workers, 
and mobilizing community demand and ownership over maternal and child 
health care interventions. Most of these activities take place at the district and 
sub district levels, where health centers and health posts are located. The cases 
involve a diverse set of actors, including international donors, NGOs, local 
NGOs, state actors at different levels, and stakeholders from the community.
3.4. Data collection 
In total seventy semi structured interviews were conducted in person by 
the first author at the location of the interviewees’ workplace (health offices, 
health centers, government offices). In addition, five shorter interviews and 
follow-up talks over telephone and email were added to verify or discuss 
specific issues and in some cases to collect additional information. Of the 
seventy respondents, ten interviewees were key informants who represent 
the government at the federal and regional levels, within academic and policy 
institutions, yet were not directly part of the partnership. However, they 
were experts and knowledgeable in the area of partnerships and political 
conditions of the country. Respondents were asked about the organization 
of the partnerships, actors’ interaction, and decision-making processes. In 
addition, respondents were interviewed in order to gain insights on the DS 
orientations and its impact on the MSPs. Also, a total of seven focus group 
discussions were conducted. For each case, we conducted two focus group 
discussions on selected project sites at the local level, and one at federal 
multi-stAKEholdEr PArtnErshiP For hEAlth sErVicE dEliVErY 153
level. The data from these discussions have been used to provide a depth of 
interpretation unavailable from the interviews (cf. Small, 2011). Moreover, 
they helped to further explore the different perceptions or opinions of the 
different actors involved in the MSPs: partners, users, and local authorities. 
Moreover, observations and a review of documents added to the data.
4. Case Analysis and Findings1
4.1. Explaining MSPs from a Network Governance Perspective
In this section, we analyze the three MSPs in accordance with Sorensen & 
Torfing’s (2005) defining characteristics of network arrangements: inter-
dependency, interaction through negotiation, institutionalized framework, 
ability to self-regulate and production of public purpose.
The interdependency of various societal actors plays a significant role 
in establishing and continuing the operation of MSPs in the studied cases. 
MSPs for health service delivery are organized articulating a diverse set of 
actors with different competencies and resources that help the local state 
actors to provide health services that otherwise would be difficult to do. 
Studies find that interdependency that arises from the division of resources 
is a key element for networked relationships of actors to arise and to continue 
(Kickert et al. 1997; Mandell 2001; Rhodes 1997; Scharpf 1997). The study 
shows that two major issues reflect the interdependency of the actors in 
MSPs: exchange of resources and actors’ stakes in issues at hand. In all cases, 
the partnerships incorporate the community groups that have resources and 
stakes in the issues, which further reinforce the reciprocal relations of societal 
actors. We, therefore, argue that interdependency of various societal actors 
plays an important role in the establishment of the partnerships.
Negotiation lies at the heart of actors’ relationships as it gives a chance 
for the actors to interact through discussion and deliberation. The three 
cases show that actors execute the project activities through engaging in 
discussions and negotiations. For example, actors engage in discussion to 
determine specific roles in executing specific activities or when faced with 
problems. These discussions are conducted at different levels of government, 
resulting in a different negotiation process and output. We found that actors’ 
interaction at the local level is more framed by negotiation and interaction 
resulting in common decision-making as compared to similar interaction on 
the regional and federal levels. While at the federal and regional levels there 
is established a framework for negotiating with nonstate actors, this system 
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involves continues interaction and communication between the FMOH, 
Regional Health Bureau, and nonstate actors in the decision chain. However, 
these frameworks involve limited space for fully realizing negotiation capacity 
and alternatives. The cases indicate that these negotiation processes at the 
federal and regional levels are constrained by strict administrative formalities 
and predesigned frameworks despite the recognized need for common effort 
towards alleviating maternal and child health problems. This is not to say that 
the negotiations at the local level are perfect, which is not the case, but the 
day-to-day interaction of the actors and the development of trust through 
time at local level pave the way for smooth negotiation. Besides, state and 
nonstate actors at the local level are well aware of their scope of engagement, 
resulting in a more focused and productive negotiation within a determined 
policy and program framework.
In all three cases, there was an explicit institutional framework that ties the 
interaction between state and nonstate actors. Formal agreements and action 
plans frame the interaction of the actors in the MSP through establishing 
roles and procedures. Informal agreement through dialogue, strong bonds 
and shared common identity and ideology were found to be as important 
as the formal agreement in forming the institutional framework, positively 
affecting the operation of MSPs. Such informal agreement helps to establish 
values like trust, commitment, and cooperation, which further provide a 
normative and imaginary framework for the interaction.
The institutional setting in all MSPs is dominated by regulatory arrange-
ments. While in the first case the regulatory framework is relatively loosely 
bound by a memorandum of understanding, in the other two cases there exist 
formal contractual agreements. Rules are relevant as they facilitate interaction 
in networks, thus reducing transaction costs and influencing the performance 
of the networks (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). However, when the regulatory 
aspect dominates the overall institutional framework of the collaboration, it 
reflects on the overall nature of the collaboration as it leads the partnership 
into a more formal and contractual relationship. The literature indicates 
that networks may not possess the capacity for complete self-regulation as 
they operate in an environment filled with state agencies. In particular, the 
state, although a participant in networks, is found to play a dominant role 
in governance networks (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Johnston, 2015; Pierre & 
Peters, 2000). Based on this study, we add some evidence on the dominant role 
of the state in networks. For example, the operating environment at different 
levels is filled with state actors that regulate the partnership, and the state 
exerted effort to put into place a regulatory structure at different levels that 
sets strong accountability measures for collective actions.
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The production of a public purpose in MSPs to some extent helps to explain 
the organization and function of the MSPs. The collaboration effort can help 
the societal actors to develop new methods and techniques that can be scaled 
up to various areas and be an input in policy formulation. In accordance 
with their scope and objectives, through their interventions, strategies, and 
programs all three MSPs contribute something of value that can sum up to 
the national goal of improving maternal and child health. However, meeting 
short-term objectives and supporting immediate need seems more prominent 
in the cases studied as compared to the production of sustainable public 
purposes.
4.2. Analyzing MSPs in a DS context
The following section aims to understand which aspect of DS influence the 
relation between state and nonstate actors in Ethiopia. Therefore it studies 
developmental vision and role, state autonomy, and embeddedness.
Developmental Vision and Role
The results of the cases indicate that the state uses MSPs as a tool to achieve 
its national health objectives and goals. At the national level, health is now one 
of the very critical development endeavors of the Ethiopian state and various 
actions in the health sector prove the state’s developmentalist vision and 
role. First, the state reflects its developmental visions and goals through the 
articulation of various long-term national development plans and strategies 
that are aimed at bringing about social and economic development. The 
detailed articulation of health developmental goals and strategies both at the 
national and sectoral levels played a major role in stimulating the formation 
of MSPs as they were important in aligning a diverse set of actors into the 
health sector, including international and local NGOs, state agencies, and 
other community groups. This implies that the development of a national 
health plan serves as a tool in assembling and connecting a diverse set of 
stakeholders.
Besides stimulating the formation of MSPs, the articulation of health 
development plans impacts the functioning of MSPs. The analysis of the 
plan documents and our interviews show that some features of the health 
development plans contribute to the strengthening of a reciprocal relation 
and the production of public purpose in the studied MSPs. First, many of 
the development plans put forward strategies and directions that encour-
age reciprocal relations through resource mobilization in the health sector. 
Second, the plans were effective in clearly communicating national health 
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goals and priorities, which contributed to the formation of a common agenda 
that is shared among many stakeholders. These national health goals and 
priorities were important to convey similar messages to various sections of the 
society and helped to increase stakeholders’ stake on health issues. Interviews 
with community health workers and community volunteer revealed that they 
are committed to the current health plan and goals as these prioritize their 
community’s major problem:
When the government tells us no mother should die because of pregnancy and 
children should not die before 28 days, I take it seriously. My job makes me 
happy, and my reward is when I see a pregnant woman gives birth safely and 
when you vaccinate a child and walks, I am very happy with my work, because 
it is solves our major problem. Though our work is very hard, I am happy and 
I am committed (Interviewee SR 5, case 1)
With the developmental state ideology, EPRDF focuses on building the 
capacity of the state and asserts the need for taking ownership and leadership 
of the development process (Kelsall, 2013). The health sector has accordingly 
witnessed a massive presence and intervention of the state. Basically the health 
service delivery is monopolized by the state, which takes the leading role in 
providing health services through government structures and departments. 
This involves putting in place a structure that stretches to the grass root 
level and involves the network relations of all Primary Health Care Units 
(PHCUs), Health Extension Workers (HEWs), and the community network 
compromising women volunteers (Health Development Army: HDA). Despite 
the differences among the cases studied, the collaboration activities took 
place within this state structure, indicating that the organization of MSPs 
takes a similar format and design. Hence, in all cases studied, the MSPs are 
integrated in the wider administrative structure of the state. This includes 
among others applying the programs and activities at health centers and health 
posts which are a prominent element of the state structure and working with 
HEWs and HAD at grassroots level.
Regardless of the political ideology and state culture, in network literature 
one can find that networks are used as a means to achieve national goals (e.g., 
Davies, 2012). Hence, it is no surprise that these MSPs are used for the same 
purpose in a DS context. In particular the study indicates that to execute 
its developmental vision, government coexists with various societal actors 
while assuming the major responsibilities for shaping their orientations, 
coordinating their activities, and providing a structure to the fulfillment of 
developmental goals.
multi-stAKEholdEr PArtnErshiP For hEAlth sErVicE dEliVErY 157
State Autonomy
The presence of a competent and autonomous bureaucracy is presented as an 
essential element to promote better policy decisions and effective resource 
allocation (Burrier, 2016; Edigheji, 2005; Evans, 1995;). However, in the 
Ethiopian case, scholars like Lefort (2013) argue that the construction of 
the Ethiopian DS misses the basic imperatives of state autonomy, which is an 
autonomous and competent bureaucracy. Despite having installed a govern-
ment structure that stretches across different levels, it is often claimed that the 
Ethiopian public service has moved to neither an independent nor meritocratic 
bureaucracy arrangement (Di Nunzio 2014; Lefort, 2013). For instance, when 
reviewing the ideological book of EPRDF, which analyzes the Ethiopian DS, 
we find nothing about building a competent and autonomous bureaucracy. 
Rather, maintaining a strong social base was presented as a prerequisite for 
state autonomy in designing the Ethiopian DS, and this social base has been 
associated with the privileged and ideological links with the peasantry and 
their strong support in elections or other political activities (EPRDF, 2003). 
The controlling strategies consist of mechanisms such as monitoring and 
coordination: while some are intended for controlling individual nonstate 
actors, the others are for controlling collaborative activities of both state 
and nonstate actors. In creating a bureaucratic sphere, the government has 
mobilized significant portions of the grass-roots community toward its policies 
and strategies to the extent of making it an unofficial bureaucratic sphere to 
be confronted by private actors. These strategies bring their own effect on the 
organization and functioning of MSPs involving state and nonstate actors.
Monitoring and Coordination 
A number of actions are used by the state to monitor the activities of nonstate 
actors and their interaction with state actors, comprising central registration 
and monitoring, legal instruments and administrative measures that include 
periodic evaluation and reporting the collaborative efforts involving nonstate 
actors. At the national level, the government focuses on regulating the civil 
society sector by establishing a central registration system: the charities and 
societies proclamations that lasted from 2009 to 2018 and the new Civil 
Society Proclamation (2018) imposed registration and reporting requirements 
on both international and local CSOs that work in Ethiopia, including in the 
health sector. However, we found that the registration process can sometimes 
bring bureaucratic delay and impede the timely establishment of health 
partnerships. Beside compulsory registration and periodic reporting, the 
2009 proclamation laid restrictive articles on fundraising, engagement areas, 
and activities. Except for the Ethiopian-funded charities and societies, the 
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proclamation prevented international and other organizations addressing 
political and human right issues such as democracy, gender, or religion. These 
categorizations were used to avoid CSOs that have the potential to affect the 
political sphere of the state. Many of the nonstate respondents viewed the 
presence of restricting regulation on fundraising and administration as state 
coercive measures toward civil society: due to this, some of the NGOS are not 
able to address pressing health issues, though these issues require combined 
efforts and resources. One of the respondents noted:
“We want to support, but they restrict us in some ways. For example, they 
specifically tell you which area to engage and which areas not to engage; they 
discourage us from working on issues related to human right. These obstacles 
hinder us from supporting the government and the community in our full 
capacity.” (Interview NSR 4: case 1)
In our study, all MSPs were subject to periodic evaluation and reporting. 
Public authorities conduct field visits and evaluation by going to the project 
sites at the local level and usually demand reports on activities performed. The 
monitoring strategy impacts the functioning of the MSPs through decreasing 
the capacity of MSPs for self-regulation and creating a line of hierarchical 
accountability, including performance and financial accountability. An 
international NGO representative illustrates:
“With government we define the relation as partnership, our agreement also 
talks about partnership. In principle, we think we are in a partnership. But 
somehow when the process is going, somewhere, the state emerges dominant, 
this is mainly because the system is designed that way. Rather than assuming 
the partner role, the controlling role of state weights more. Generally, the system 
doesn’t allow us to be free.” (Interview NSR2: case 2)
In addition, the state uses coordination as a tool to direct the resources and 
contribution of societal actors toward the realization of state development 
plans. State agencies at different level are involved in coordinating health 
initiatives in accordance with the national health development plans and 
strategies. These agencies use a state-installed framework of administrative 
procedures to coordinate health initiatives.
Unofficial Bureaucratic Sphere
On top of these controlling mechanisms, the Ethiopian government relies on 
its social base at a grassroots level to maintain its autonomy. State agencies at 
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the local level take the responsibility to mobilize the grassroots community 
and organize it into different structure and networks. As our discussion with 
different public authorities at the local level indicated, these arrangements 
are considered as a basic tool by the state in the development process as they 
are key to mobilizing the society toward development goals and strategies. 
However, in mobilizing society, the line that differentiates development and 
politics becomes blurred, as the process involves luring the social base through 
party ideology. While some civil servants are required to be a party member 
and promote the party ideology, others should at least speak the same language 
with the party members. The interviews and document analysis indicated that 
these networks are stretched up to each household level, which allows the 
state to control the information flow on different political and social issues. 
Some respondents (Interviewee SR 5 and NSR 2, NSR 6) agree that on top of 
community mobilization, these structures and networks are instruments for 
ideological promotion and safeguarding the community from penetration of 
other alternative ideologies and views other than those of the leading party.
The party holds an antagonistic stance toward NGOs and other possible 
alternative power bases. In the handbook of the EPRDF (2003), NGOs are 
criticized as abusing foreign fund for personal use, being unaccountable, 
and promoting a neoliberal agenda. This ideological assumption drives the 
regime to hold a very restrictive relation with the (for-profit and not-for-profit) 
private sector. Some interviewees were positive about the contribution of 
NGOs and other nonstate actors and appreciated their good intention for 
supporting the health sector. However, some expressed the opinion that 
government’s trust in CSOs is influenced, among others, by the history of 
the organizations in misusing funds or in mixing a political agenda with 
their activities, and inefficient deliverables. In focus group discussions, state 
actors repeatedly mentioned words like “hidden agenda,” “political motive,” 
and “donor motives” that indicate their suspicion of CSOs.
Moreover, party affiliation erodes the neutrality of the public sector and 
forces many state actors at the local level to see nonstate actors with suspicion. 
This negatively impacts the trusting relationship between state and nonstate 
actors. For instance, in case 1, it took a long time for the participating interna-
tional NGO to develop a trustful relationship with the local state actors. The 
local state actors developed their trust and became more cooperative once they 
saw the contribution of the NGO. The state can lessen control if organizations 
deliver what they promised and prove that they are trustworthy. For instance, 
a respondent from district administration (Interviewee SR8) assured us that 
the commitment and experience of actors in the project ‘‘brings good results 
in our district.’’ Successful accomplishment of project activities creates a high 
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level of trust, which helps CSOs to develop and sustain strong relationships 
with state institutions at the district level, thereby easing the controlling role 
of the state. Though trust is important for building and sustaining network 
governance, in Ethiopia the past antagonizing history and the political orienta-
tion negatively impact the trusting relationship between state and nonstate 
actors. The cases indicate that it take a long time to develop trusting relations, 
undermining the collaborative process and outcome of MSPs.
Embeddedness
A key feature of embeddedness in DS literature is the state’s effort in de-
veloping and sustaining cooperative relations with societal actors. When a 
developmental state wants to embed its bureaucrats into society it focuses on 
building concrete social ties and institutionalized channels, which facilitates 
the interaction of state and society (Evans, 2010). EPRDF as a leading party 
in Ethiopia has always been fond of creating strong links with the peasants 
(Alemayehu, 2009; Bach, 2011). This is mainly because EPRDF maintains its 
ideological link with the revolutionary democracy which “favors a populist 
discourse claiming a direct connection between the leadership and the 
masses” (Gagliardone, 2014:287). Even in taking the developmental state 
ideology, the party dwells on the importance of creating strong social ties with 
the masses as one of the basic principles of the developmental state model. 
However, unlike with the grassroots community, the government takes 
precautions in creating social ties with the private sector and civil society. 
It mainly focuses on working with developmental elite that can support the 
economic development of the country (Di Nunzio, 2015).
However, the Ethiopian state is not self-sustained; it is highly funded by 
international donors and organizations that are even commonly known for 
prescribing the neoliberal ideology. Thus, the government works with many 
sections of civil society and private sector that can offer a more robust founda-
tion for implementing developmental policies. Based on this, we argue that 
the DS orientation in Ethiopia created a less responsive government, which 
allowed the public to put its influence more on public policy implementation 
than on public policy formulation. Besides the formal collaborative arrange-
ments in the health sector, the public sector is embedded into the society 
through different social ties methods, such as grassroots networking, public 
consultation, and institutionalized channels such as review meetings. These 
mechanisms have their own implication for the organization and functioning 
of partnerships across our three cases.
In each of the case studies’ districts, there were numerous social ties among 
state and society through grassroots networks, including HEWs and HDAs, 
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increasing the intensity of state society linkage. These societal networks 
integrated with the MSPs, with important implications for the number and 
type of stakeholders included in organizing the MSPs and widening horizontal 
state-society linkages. This in turn enhances the inclusivity of MSPs to the 
extent that it encompasses individual citizens.
The existence of concrete social ties not only increases the number and type 
of stakeholders, it impacts the functioning of MSPs in a variety ways. These 
social ties facilitate information exchange, the accomplishment of activities, 
and exchange of resources. At the very least, the link between state and citizen 
is important in enhancing the reciprocal relations in the MSPs through 
bringing together actors that possess resources. These networks facilitate 
and coordinate direct communication between the local people and state 
and nonstate actors. The communities’ network arrangements complement 
state and nonstate actors’ efforts in MSPs by providing information, local 
knowledge, experience, labor, and materials that could cost outsiders much 
time and effort to acquire.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
5.1. Mutuality and Power Asymmetry: Toward Establishing a 
Framework for State and Nonstate Relations in Ethiopia 
The discussion above provides answers on why and how networks work in 
Ethiopia. The policy determination, pressing health problems, and state devel-
opmental orientations set an opportunity for increasing the need for and the 
practice of collaborative relations in the health sector. There is an exchange of 
both material and nonmaterial resources between state and nonstate actors, 
contributing to growing interdependent relations in the MSPs. Besides, the 
participation of community groups and volunteers on many of the project 
programs and activities served to build consensus and commitment as commu-
nity stakeholders developed a sense of ownership. The MSPs reflect expanded 
horizontal relations with a high degree of interdependence among actors. The 
cases indicate that many of the program outcomes and successes are dependent 
on the joint participation and collective contribution of various societal actors.
It is evident from the cases that the state dominates the partnership initia-
tives and uses nonstate actors’ resources to achieve its developmental goals. 
However, this process has contributed to creating a common agenda for 
improving maternal and child health. The partnerships offer an opportunity 
for both state and nonstate actors to contribute something of value and affect 
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the policy implementation process. These interdependencies and mutual 
efforts were at least important in creating a common understanding and 
good working relationship. Though their integration can go to the extent 
of sharing vision and goals, however, this result should be seen carefully, as 
CSOs are working in a constrained environment where they are forced to 
align their goals without a chance to negotiate comprehensively. Despite 
state domination of policy space and agenda setting, there is some window 
of opportunity for negotiation and integration at the local level where actors 
engage in continues interaction, participatory planning and evaluation, shared 
decision making, and extensive integration of activities.
However, the interdependency and interaction of actors in the studied 
cases do not meet the ideal of network governance, as this would reflect more 
collaborative horizontal relations based on trust, autonomy, and self-regulating 
capacity. In contrast, the state utilizes a number of legal and institutional 
instruments to guide, coordinate, and control MSPs and there appears to be 
low autonomy in the partnership initiatives. This shows that in Ethiopia at 
least partnerships as a network form of governance are dominated by the state. 
The logical question would be what model exactly captures the relationship 
between state and nonstate actor’s relation in the Ethiopian health sector? 
Based on the analysis of the cases’ network governance dimensions, what 
concepts can be used to describe the Ethiopian state and nonstate actor 
relationship? As the above discussion indicates, the simple categorization of 
the relation between state and nonstate actors relation as an authority-based 
or hierarchal system doesn’t add up, yet the complete categorization of MSPs 
into the network governance category doesn’t add up either.
5.2. Implications for Public Governance Insights
One of the major goals of this chapter was to assess the value of network 
governance in accordance with a developmental state orientation. The most 
important theoretical contribution of this chapter is related to a criticism of 
governance theory, which posits that the theory is questionable when the 
state’s authoritative role creates asymmetries in governance networks and 
debates whether there exist state-centered governance or society-centered 
governance in reality (see Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). Because of the Ethiopian 
political context, we have built on a network-governance theory which to some 
extent considers the dominant role of the state in networks. Considering the 
DS, the study supports the argument that the state, although a participant in 
networks, maintains a central role in governance networks. In the case studies, 
the key insights of the network governance theory were used as a framework to 
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explain the formation and functioning of MSPs and we paid particular atten-
tion to the role of state actors/agencies at different levels of state structure. We 
believe this study contributes to the theoretical debate through addressing two 
major issues that are prominent in governance literature: which coordinating 
mechanisms dominate the governance arrangements and whether the role of 
state is expanding or restraining. Thus, in the following pages, the answers 
for these two fundamental questions are presented.
Coordinating Mechanisms in Governance Networks: The Extent of 
Self–Regulation
The adoption of governance schemes includes the complex interaction of a 
diverse set of actors within the governing process. However, the mechanisms 
used to coordinate the interaction of these actors in these governance ar-
rangements are different from hierarchical and market type governance. The 
organization of networks on negotiated principles rather than hierarchical 
command and rule mainly relates to the self-regulation capacity of the 
networks that rests on the autonomy of the networks. However, this study 
revealed networks that are not fully autonomous and self-governing. Rather, 
the MSPs are self-regulating to some extent, as they lie inside the hierarchi-
cal and bureaucratic supervision of state structure, which coincides with 
Scharpf ’s (1994) indication that networks operate in the “shadow of hierarchy.” 
This implies that government which is still the legitimate authority and the 
sole provider of health services does not lose its power in relation to the 
other societal actors. Government plays a prominent role by providing the 
legal context in which MSPs function. It also installs the mechanisms that 
monitor and control MSPs processes and outcomes in order to ensure proper 
utilization of resources and meeting the developmental goals. Nevertheless, 
the case studies also indicated there are opportunities for MSPs to function 
autonomously and not to completely lose their self-governing capacity by 
utilizing different mechanisms such as negotiation, trust, contract obligation, 
action plans, and mutual dependency. These are used for safeguarding the 
organizational autonomy of each actor in MSPs.
Hence, the overall operation of networks and its chance for surviving in a 
complex governance environment depends on ethical virtues that promote 
cooperative and collaborative relations (Jones et al., 1997; Thompson, 2003). 
This suggests that networks may lose their distinctiveness and importance 
or transform into an order-taking bureaucratic tools unless efforts are made 
to build trust-based collaborative relationships among participating actors. 
Despite the presence of other coordinating mechanisms, in much network 
literature trust is presented as the most important coordinating mechanism 
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(Huxham & Vangen, 2000; Thompson et al. 1991). However, trust may have 
received an overstated value as evidence indicates that networks may rely 
on other coordinating mechanisms. The MSPs in this study were subject to 
strict financial and administrative control by the regional and local officials. 
This may be related to the fact that state and nonstate actors, in particular 
civil society actors, had a prior antagonistic relationship characterized by 
low trust. In many instances they were unable to develop trust in each other, 
leading them to operate apart from each other.
The Role of State in Governance Context: Expanding or Retreating?
The cases in this study show that state agencies at different levels of govern-
ment play an important role in coordinating and supervising the MSPs. This 
is against the argument that public actors do not have a distinctive role or 
authority vis-à-vis private actors. Indeed our discussion goes beyond this 
argument and focuses on whether the role of state in the administrative 
and political setting is expanding or retreating following the change from 
government to governance.
In a large body of literature the process in which government changes to 
governance is presented as resulting in the decline of a state-dominant role in 
the governance of society (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Salamon, 2002; Stoker, 
1998). Nevertheless, the increasing role of other societal actors in the public 
sphere does not necessarily mean that the state becomes less important or 
that its role is completely eroded. Some scholars indicate that despite the 
increasing use of governance mechanisms, the state remains the key political 
actor in society (Newman, 2005; Pierre & Peters, 2000). On top of this, Bell 
& Hindmoor (2009) argue that
“The scope and scale of governance is actually expanding, and that state-based, 
hierarchical or top-down forms of governance are doing likewise. States are 
attempting to expand their governing capacities not only by strengthening 
central state institutions but by forging new governance partnerships with a 
range of social actors.”
Our findings indicate that state agencies in the Ethiopian health sector are 
actively building and managing new governance partnerships and other 
collaborative arrangements with a diverse set of societal actors. According 
to the DS ideology, the state’s capacity to achieve its developmental goals 
depends on two main institutional features: the state’s ability to maintain its 
autonomy from outside forces and its ability to build and maintain collabora-
tive relationships with societal actors. In this study, there are a number of 
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indications that the Ethiopian state attempts to enhance its capacity through 
building collaborative relationship with nonstate actors. This indicates that the 
state is purposely choosing its governance strategies to meet its developmental 
goals, which in turn shows the expanding role of the state in determining the 
governance and administrative issues of society.
In the Ethiopian health sector, the government prefers to experiment 
with strategies and popular initiatives to engage the community and create 
collaborative relations with NGOs. However, the extent to which there is a 
fundamental change in basic forms of governing society in the country and 
its health sector domain is small because the state is still utilizing top-down 
hierarchical governance mechanisms along with other governance mecha-
nisms. The cases indicate that public actors do not refrain themselves from 
using government authority in restructuring and managing the governance 
modes. The general finding in respect to the effect of the state’s DS ideology 
on MSPs typically matches with Bell & Hindmoor’s conclusion (2009) that
“States can extend their capacity to achieve their policy objectives by developing 
closer relations with non-state actors. But this cooperation with non-state 
actors will involve some loss of government flexibility, and governments will 
require a strong theoretical and policy compass with some strengthening of 
central policy control if it is to avoid capture by special interests and to retain 
its independence.” (p. 15)
In fact, the case studies showed that the Ethiopian government applies strate-
gies that can provide policy freedom through restricting the societal actors 
from affecting the policy domain and thereby avoiding being captured by 
the interests of societal actors.
Notes
1. Some of the analysis in this section is reproduced from the article published by the authors: 
Exploring the Impact of Political Context on State–Civil Society Relations: Actors’ Strate-
gies in a Developmental State, in Voluntas, 30(6), 1256-1269.
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7 
The Role of Participation in Development 
in Enhancing Local People Empowerment: 
The case of Bishoftu City Administration 
(BCA), Oromia
Bahiru Detti Heyi
Box 1: Key points of this chapter
 Participation in development relatively enhanced personal empowerment among 
local people.
 Participation in setting needs priorities and planning phases of the development 
process influences personal empowerment.
 Participation in development generated “power within,” “power to,” “power with” 
and “power over” forms of power among local people.
 Empowerment through participation was hindered by the extent of participation, 
a top-down approach of participation, elite domination, institutional factors, and 
corruption.
Box 2: After reading this chapter, you will be able to
 understand local people participation and empowerment in oromia/Ethiopia
 Articulate indicators of different forms of empowerment
 Explain the effect on participation in development on local people empowerment
 Grasp the gap between participation and empowerment rhetoric and practice
 realize policy implications of empowerment through participation
 comprehend the magnitudes of people empowerment through participation
Box 3: Abbreviations
AnoVA = Analysis of variance
bcA = bishoftu city Administration
cPE = community Participation Expert
FGd = Focus Group discussion
hh = household
onrs = oromia national regional state
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QuAl = Qualitative
QuAn = Quantitative
ViF = Variance inflation Factor
Box 4: Glossary
Akayi: fried cereals, especially barely
Budena: traditional food prepared from some sort of cereals
Ganda: administrative unit below central city Administration
Jarsuma: conciliation
Shane: an organization encompassing one to five residents.
1. Introduction
The role of participatory development in empowering people at the grass roots 
level has attracted the attention of development scholars, governments, and 
nongovernment organizations. Participation and empowerment have gained 
an extensive use in the policies, plans, and reports of development projects. 
Participatory development brings the people to the center of development and 
pays attention to empowerment that focused on local people, local context, and 
local forms of power and change (Freire, 1970). Though participation plays a 
crucial role in empowering local people, empowerment through participation 
in development has been impeded by lack of genuine participation (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001; Kesby, 2005); elites domination of decision-making process 
(Ali Shah and Baporikar, 2012; Chambers, 1997); and lack of commitment 
by the state to create a space for communities (Cooke and Kothari 2001; 
Kesby 2005). Therefore, this study tries to contribute to the endeavors to 
bridge the gap in analyzing the linkages between participatory development 
processes and empowerment.
Participation is an ideologically contested concept that has produced a 
range of competing meanings and applications (Pelling, 1998). The concepts 
of participation differed over the goals, processes, agents, effects, and value of 
participation (Crocker, 2003). For the purpose of this study participation is 
conceptualized as per the following definition. Hentschel & Lanjouw (1996: 
xi) pursue the transformational approach to define participation as “a process 
through which stakeholders influence and share control over development 
initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them.” Empowerment 
is a very complex concept, which is not easily defined (Craig and Mayo, 
1995; Rowlands, 1997). The complexity of the concept of empowerment 
arises from its root word “power,” giving rise to different interpretations and 
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contrasting views on the centrality of power for the development process. 
Despite competing views of empowerment among scholars, empowerment in 
this chapter is seen as a consequence of people participation in development 
projects and refers to improvement in social relations, personal conditions, 
and heightened awareness regarding political issues.
2. Theoretical Framework
The analysis of “empowerment is most effective when it draws on the full range 
of concepts and meanings of power…” (Pettit, 2012:5). Thus, Rowlands (1997) 
empowerment framework was used to evaluate the effect of participation on 
empowerment. Rowlands (1997) identified four types of power relations: 
power over, power to, power with, and power within.
Empowerment based on a view of power as “power over” emphasizes the 
need for participation in existing economic and political structures but does 
not involve changes to those structures (Luttrell et al., 2009). Conceptualiza-
tion of empowerment based on “power over” suggests that empowerment is 
more than participation in decision- making; it must also include the processes 
that lead people to perceive themselves as able and entitled to make decisions 
(Rowlands, 1997).
“Power to” refers to the unique potential of every person to shape, direct, 
and control his or her life in the world, and is also referred to as an individual’s 
generative or productive power (Chambers, 2005; Nelson & Wright, 1995). 
Empowerment based on “power to” refers to a power that includes the ability 
to make decisions, have authority, and find solutions to problems, and which 
can be creative and enabling. “Power with” is a collective form of power 
wherein people feel empowered by organizing and uniting around a common 
purpose or understanding. It involves a sense of the whole greater than the 
sum of individuals (Rowlands, 1995). “Power within” involves spiritual 
strength based on self-acceptance, self-respect, self-esteem, self-awareness, 
consciousness raising, self-confidence, and assertiveness. “Power within” is 
the capacity to imagine and have hope; it affirms the common human search 
for dignity and fulfillment (Veneklasen & Miller, 2002).
3. Legal and Policy Frameworks 
Proper government policies and legal provisions facilitate effective participa-
tion that favors the local situation and creates favorable ground for local people 
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empowerment. Hence, related government policies such as the Constitution 
of Oromia National Regional State (ONRS) and the Oromia Urban Local 
Government Proclamation were assessed.
3.1. Revised Constitution of (ONRS), Proclamation No. 46/2001
The ONRS Constitution stipulated a general provision about the rights of the 
people of the region to participate in development. The constitution granted the 
public the right to participate in developing and monitoring the environment, 
to improve their living standards, and to enhance and sustain development 
(article 43 [1]). These facts imply that the constitution recognized that participa-
tion is a means for the local people to manage their affairs. In other words, the 
Constitution recognized participation as a means of local people empowerment.
The ONRS Revised Constitution stipulated that “all the people of the Re-
gion have the right to participate in Regional development, and, in particular, 
to be consulted in respect to policies and projects affecting their community” 
(article 43 [2]). It endorsed participation at different levels. Public participa-
tion in grass roots or local development, which is the concern of this study, 
refers to the right of the public to participation at the development policy 
level and at the project level, which directly influences their life. However, 
this provision considered consultation as a form of participation, which is 
the lowest level of participation. Hence, the provision creates a loophole 
that allows power holders to manipulate the voice of the public. In fact, 
manipulation of public voice took place on the ground.
The constitution further stipulated that “the aim of development policies 
and programs shall be to enhance the capacity of residents of the Region for 
development and meet their basic needs” (article 43 [3]). The provision of 
this article advocates that public policies should create the condition that 
enhances empowerment. The provision emphasizes the role of public policies 
in fostering participation in development that boosts the empowerment of 
local people. The implication is that the constitution recognized participation 
as a means of local people empowerment that in turn prepares them for further 
participation in governance. Participation in governance further implicated 
people’s participation in decision-making.
3.2. Oromia Urban Local Government, Proclamation No. 65/2003 
According to the preamble of this Proclamation, one rationale for enacting the 
Proclamation was “to streamline the operation and organization of urban local 
governments on the basis of good governance and democratic principles so as to 
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enable them create huge development capacity for the development of the Region 
and improvement of the living standard of the residents” (ONRS, 2003:1).
A close look at this rationale suggests that the Proclamation is intended 
to create a conducive urban local government structure, which facilitates 
participation. Moreover, this provision implies that the urban local govern-
ment structure is a crucial institutional context for the empowerment of local 
people through participation. However, the results of document analysis and 
FGDs in fact suggest that the structure of the city government on the ground 
was not conducive to participation. This suggests that there is a gap in policy 
formulation and policy implementation regarding popular participation in 
development. Consequently, local people empowerment through participation 
has been hampered by the gap between policy formulation and implementation.
Proclamation No. 65/2003 enacted general provisions that directly related 
to participation as follows: “Residents, mass organizations and the private 
sector shall discuss, debate and express their views on the city annual work 
program, budget proposals, project ideas, performance as well as financial and 
audit reports” (article 32 [1]). This provision calls for public participation in 
all activities of government at all stages. A glance at the provision of this sub 
article suggests that the public has the exclusive right to participate at each 
stage of local development processes, from the initiation of local development 
project ideas to performance evaluation. However, the results of FGDs and 
Key Informant Interviews (KII) revealed that the public in Oromia does not 
in fact participate in performance evaluation. This finding implies that there 
is gap in implementing the provision, preventing it from fostering the public 
participation that enhances local popular empowerment.
4. Methodology
For the purpose of this study, a pragmatic research philosophy was adopted 
for guiding the overall process of the study over interpretive and positivist 
research paradigms. Pragmatism allows for flexibility in the research process 
(Morgan, 2007) and enables flexibility in investigate methods (Onwuegbuzie 
and Leech, 2005). Along with the selected research philosophy, a mixed 
methods research approach was adopted for this chapter. Mixed methods 
allows for the combination of quantitative and qualitative research techniques, 
methods, approaches, concepts, and language into a single study (Greene, 
2006; Johnson and Onuegbuzie, 2004; Johnson et al., 2007). In line with the 
research approach followed, a parallel triangulation design (Creswell & Clark, 
2007) was adopted, with equal attention to both QUAN and QUAL phases.
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Both primary and secondary data sources were employed to generate data 
that help to address the objectives of the study. Primary data were generated 
through interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), and a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire incorporated characteristics of the respondents, items regarding 
the practice of participation in phases of development, and empowerment 
in different forms. The main relevant characteristics of respondents, such 
as socioeconomic factors and demographic characteristics (sex, age, family 
size, educational status, occupational status, and employment categories 
and income) were incorporated in the questionnaire. The majority of the re-
spondents were males (62.7 percent). Respondents’ age distribution indicated 
that the majority of the respondents were younger people (64.8 percent). The 
distribution of family size indicated that more than half of the respondents 
(57.7 percent) had a family size of two and below. The occupational distribu-
tion of the respondents revealed that the highest proportion was skilled and 
unskilled labor (32.3 percent) followed by managerial, professional, and 
supervisory occupation groups (27.5 percent). The distribution of employment 
type revealed that higher proportions of the respondents are self-employed 
(31.1 percent) and civil servants (30.4 percent). The distribution of educa-
tion levels indicated that a high proportion of the respondents had attained 
secondary school education (27.8 percent). The distribution of monthly 
income of the respondents indicated a relatively high rate of those earning 
less than 1000 Birr per month (26 percent).
The items devised to measure each form of empowerment were drawn 
from literature and incorporated in the questionnaire. Detailed consultation 
of various literatures on empowerment was conducted to identify indicators 
of empowerments. The items about the process of participation were binary. 
However, to prepare the data for parametric analysis (regression analysis in 
the case of this study), dummies were developed for each item regarding the 
phases of participation process. Personal, social, and political empowerments 
were measured by ten, seven, and eight items respectively. These items were 
structured around a Likert scale response form in the questionnaire. The value 
of each response for these items in the questionnaire is as follows: 1 = strongly 
agree; 2 = agree; 3 = undecided; 4 = disagree; 5 = strongly disagree.
A concurrent/parallel mixed method sampling strategy was utilized to draw 
sample respondents. These sampling procedures occurred independently. A 
snowball sampling technique was used to select participants for FGDs and 
key informants. A judgmental sampling technique was used to draw samples 
for interviews. A multi-stage sampling technique was employed to draw 
questionnaire respondents. The sample size for questionnaire respondents was 
drawn using the Krejcie and Morgan (1970). Accordingly, using 85 percent 
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response rate a sample of 436 HHs were selected. This sample size was drawn 
from each ganda through proportional allocation. Hence, 173, 124, and 139 
respondents were selected from sample gandas 01, 05, and 09 in that order. 
Although 436 questionnaires were distributed to respondents, only 418 
complete questionnaires were returned. Thus, the analysis was conducted on 
returned questionnaires. Thematic analysis was applied to analyze qualita-
tive data. Item analysis and multiple liner regression were used to analyze 
quantitative data. A multiple linear regression model applied to determine 
the effect of participation in development on empowerments was developed 
as follows:
= βo + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + ε
Where:  Y = Outcome variable (empowerment) 
βo = Constant terms 
ε = Error term 
β1 – β6 = Regression coefficients 
X1 = Participation in needs identification 
X2 = Participation in setting priority of needs 
X3 = Participation in planning 
X4 = Participation in the implementation 
X5 = Participation in monitoring 
X6 = Participation in performance evaluation
To prepare the data for multiple regression analysis, a cumulative empower-
ment index (CEI) for three types of empowerment was developed adding the 
obtained scores of ten, seven, and eight empowerment indicators for personal, 
social, and political empowerments respectively. Dummies were developed 
for categorical predictors to run multiple regressions.
5. Findings of the Study
This part of the study examined the role of participation in personal, social, 
political, and economic empowerment. The effect of participation on local 
popular empowerment was determined based on quantitative and qualitative 
data. However, economic empowerment was assessed based on only qualita-
tive data. In order to determine the role of participation in empowering local 
people using multiple regression analysis, first the assumptions of multiple 
regressions were checked. As per the result of preliminary analysis all the 
assumptions of multiple regression analysis were satisfied.
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The output of preliminary multiple regression analysis, ANOVA Table, was 
used to test the statistical significance of the model. The result of the analysis 
revealed that the model is statistically significant in explaining personal 
empowerment (F [6, 353] = 4.12, p = 0.00) and social empowerment (F [6, 
353] = 2.10, p = 0.05) through participation in local development.
However, the model is not statistically significant in explaining political 
empowerment (F [6, 353] = 1.20, p = 0.31). This finding implies that participa-
tion did result in the political empowerment of local people in BCA. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis β = 0 (For all the independent variables Coefficient of 
determination is zero) was rejected, while the alternative hypothesis β ≠ 0 
(For all the independent variables Coefficient of determination is different 
from zero) was accepted in the case of personal and social empowerment. This 
means that at least one predictor has an influence on the outcome variable 
and determined variations in the dependent variable.
5.1. Personal Empowerment through Participation 
Personal empowerment is the foundation of the empowerment process. That 
means the transformation of the individual or the group and the circumstances 
encourage or inhibit the process of empowerment. Personal empowerment 
through participation was assessed by determining skill acquired and 
psychological improvements as the result of participation. The result of 
multiple regression analysis about the combined effect of all predictors and 
the influence of individual predictor variables on the dependent variable are 
depicted in table 1.
The results in table 1 revealed that all the independent variables included 
in the model explained approximately 7 percent (R square (0.07) x 100%) 
of the variance in dependent variable (personal empowerment through 
participation). Among the predictor variables, participation in setting the 
priority of needs (β = -.24, p = 0.00) and planning (β = .17, p = 0.03) were 
found to have an influence on personal empowerment in BCA. Thus, the 
model of multiple regression analysis is found to be:
 ̂  Y = 25.53 – 3.28X2 + 2.33X3
The finding indicated a negative relationship between participation in setting 
the priority of needs and personal empowerment. In other words, when 
participation in setting priority of needs increase by one standard deviation, 
personal empowerment decrease by .24 standard deviation. The results of 
FGDs pointed out that the negative relationship between the variables was 
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the result of low-level public participation in decisions regarding priority 
setting. There was a positive relationship between participation in the planning 
and personal empowerment. Accordingly, when participation in planning 
increased by one standard deviation, personal empowerment increased by 
.17 standard deviation.
Item Analysis of Personal Empowerment through Participation 
Item analysis of indicators of personal empowerment was conducted to 
determine the effect of participation on individual indicators of personal 
empowerment. Then, the mean of individual indicators were compared 
against the overall mean of personal empowerment in order to determine the 
degree to which participation influences individual indicators. The results 
of the analysis are illustrated in table 2.
As indicated in table 2, the overall mean score of item analysis of indicators 
of personal empowerment through participation was 2.34. The comparison 
of individual means and the overall mean score of item analysis indicated 
that participation influences indicators of personal empowerment to vari-
ous degrees. The means of strategic accumulation of practical experiences 
(M = 2.03); skills improvement (M = 2.19); development of self-esteem 
(M = 2.20); and enhancement of self-reliance to improve one’s life (M = 2.27) 
were lower than the overall mean. These findings imply that participation 
influences these indicators to relatively lesser degrees. However, participation 
still influences personal empowerment along these indicators. This can be 
observed from the frequency distribution of item analysis of these indicators. 
A glance at table 2 reveals that participation relatively enhanced the personal 
confidence that I could do things (M = 2.55); capacity to control over personal 
decision (M = 2.43); freedom of choice (M = 2.44); creativity that improves 
one’s life (M = 2.39); improvement of ability to analyze own situation and 
solve problems (M = 2.50); and creating the belief that my actions can have 
effects (M = 2.35) indicators of personal empowerment.
The results of Key Informant Interviews conducted with ganda managers 
and FGD at Ganda 05 also revealed personal empowerment along predic-
tors other than those hypothesized in the quantitative strand. Accordingly, 
participation enhanced the personal empowerment of local people through 
providing the chance to share problems and get support. The above results 
further suggest that participation also creates wider opportunities for interac-
tion. The individual has the chance to develop particular skills, both practical 
(such as literacy) and social (participation in meetings and discussions).
Using Rowlands (1997) framework, the above finding implies that par-
ticipation generated “power within” and “power to” forms of power among 
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the public. To recall, power within refers to the development of self-efficacy, 
freedom of choice, the belief that one’s action can have effect. “Power to” refers 
to the development of a capacity to control personal decisions, creativity that 
improves one’s life, and ability to analyze personal situations.
The above forms of empowerment developed through participation focus 
on the process to understand and conceptualize power. These powers are 
generative; the power people have of stimulating activity in others and raising 
their morale. More than participation in decision-making, personal empower-
ment through participation will have positive impact on people to perceive 
themselves as able and entitled to make decisions. Thus, participation in the 
case of our study gave scope to the full range of human abilities and potential 
(Rowlands, 1997). Although participation in decision-making was low, 
personal empowerment was developed as a result of participation. Because, 
“power within” needs experiential recognition and analysis of issues to do 
with one’s own subordination and how it is maintained. Such power cannot 
be given; it has to be self-generative (Kabeer, 1999a).
5.2. Social Empowerment through Participation 
People’s collective action on common matters creates opportunities that 
cultivate social empowerment. Collective action engenders favorable condi-
tions that enhance social relationships among the members of the public. It 
crafts a forum through which residents share their social values with each 
other. The interaction escalates the bond between members of the public. 
Based on these facts, we assessed social empowerment through participation. 
The results of multiple regression analysis performed to determine the effect 
of participation on social empowerment are portrayed in table 3.
A close look at table 3 suggests that all the independent variables included 
in the model explained approximately 3 percent (0.03 x 100%) of the variance 
in dependent variable (social empowerment). Of the six variables included 
in the model only participation in planning (β = .19, p = 0.02) significantly 
predicted social empowerment. Thus, the model of multiple regression analysis 
is found to be:
 ̂  Y = 16.45 +1.92X3
The result here indicates a positive relationship between participation in plan-
ning and social empowerment. In other words, when participation in planning 
increased by one standard deviation, social empowerment increased by .19 
standard deviation. The examination of the above findings clearly indicated 
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a very low level of social empowerment through participation in BCA. The 
result of FGD conducted in Ganda 09 attached this low degree of social 
empowerment to institutional problems. According to this result, the main 
challenge of social empowerment was the cooption of public participation by 
the formal top-down approach of the City Government structures, mainly 
involving loyal party members. The above results stress that the involuntary 
organizing of the public to one to five government structure fostered fear of 
each other among the public. This resulted in lack of trust among the public, 
which in turn hindered social empowerment through participation. Moreover, 
the result revealed that government officials’ lack of interest in working 
with the public also exacerbated the lack of closeness among the public. 
These findings imply that there was no conducive institutional environment 
to facilitate empowerment through public participation. That means the 
government facilitates public participation through structures that are not 
suitable for enhancing social empowerment through participation.
Furthermore, an institutional assessment indicated that the absence of 
people’s own organization through which they could participate was also a 
major reason of lower degrees of social empowerment. Rather than facilitating 
the creation of popular organizations that foster favorable ground for social 
empowerment, the government forced the public to participate along the 
government’s structures. This in turn hampered social empowerment through 
participation.
Item Analysis of Social Empowerment through Participation 
The result of multiple regression analysis indicated social empowerment 
through participation. Thus, it is imperative to determine the degree of 
social empowerment along the hypothesized indicators. The degree to which 
participation influences each indicator was determined through comparing 
the mean of individual items against the overall mean of social empowerment. 
The result of the analysis is illustrated in table 4.
A close look at table 4 indicates that participation influenced the forma-
tion of internal mechanisms for popular cohesion (M = 1.98); level of trust 
among the people (M = 2.03); group work or interaction among work groups 
(M = 2.17); and feeling of togetherness or closeness among people (M = 2.13) 
relatively to lesser degrees. Participation influenced relationship and coopera-
tion among the people (M = 2.31); the sense of helping each other among 
the people (M = 2.34); and social links among the people (M = 2.33) to a 
relatively higher degree.
Despite low level of social empowerment indicated by the result of quan-
titative analysis, the results of FGDs elucidated some emerging aspects of 
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social empowerment through participation. Participation improved conflict 
resolution capacity or the tendency to solve conflict between members of the 
public by recourse to the mediation of elders. The conflict resolution was done 
through Jarsuma (conciliation). This implies that participation enhanced the 
optimal utilization of local resources (local knowledge of the elders). Using 
Rowlands (1997) empowerment framework, this refers to “power with,” the 
capacity to solve its own problem by the public.
5.3. Political Empowerment through Participation 
Participation in development can result in public awareness about the public 
policy process. It also improves the relationship between government and 
the public. It can achieve these results through improving the capacity of the 
public to demand their rights, to negotiate with government, and to influence 
public policy process. Based on these general facts, the effects of participation 
on local people’s political empowerment were assessed in BCA. To this end 
both quantitative and qualitative data were corroborated. However, the result 
of multiple regression analysis revealed that participation had no statistically 
significant influence on political empowerment. The result of the analysis is 
presented in table 5.
The result of analysis in table 5 revealed that there is no statistically sig-
nificant relationship between all predictors and political empowerment. This 
finding implies that participation did not bring about political empowerment 
in BCA. Since none of the predictors had an effect on political empowerment, 
item analysis was not conducted. However, the result of quantitative analysis 
and qualitative analysis diverge regarding the influence of participation on 
political empowerment. Thus, this question needs further investigation.
Despite the above result of quantitative data analysis, which indicated the 
absence of political empowerment through participation, the results of FGDs 
in Ganda 05 and 09 highlighted the development of some aspects of political 
empowerment. These include: improvement in access to government services, 
improvement of public capacity for demanding that the government fill the 
gap in public service delivery, and an attempt to petition public officials and 
make them accountable for failure to discharge his/her responsibilities. There 
was also an improvement in recognizing the right to better public service and 
asking for its provision. This result suggests a divergence between qualitative 
and quantitative results.
Despite some aspects of political empowerment exhibited, participation did 
not create opportunities to influence decisions in the public policy process. 
Per the results of FGDs and interviews with Key Informants from the public, 
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different factors hindered political empowerment through participation 
in BCA. The factors include: (1) the approach of participation; (2) the 
involuntary aspect of participation; (3) the low extent of participation in 
decision-making; and (4) institutional contexts.
The above results indicate that channelling public participation through 
top-down governmental bureaucratic structures stands in the way of empow-
erment through participation. According to the above results, the involuntary 
participation also made the public develop a negative attitude toward the city 
government. The results further indicated that the public attitude toward 
the structure of the city government was also a major factor hindering the 
public-government relationship.
The results of interviews with key informants from the public and FGDs 
highlighted that decision-making regarding participatory development was 
controlled by government officials and experts without any real involvement 
from the public. As a result, little political empowerment of local people through 
participation was exhibited in BCA. Using Rowlands (1997) empowerment 
framework, the city government exercised “power over” in its negative defini-
tion, if one thinks of power as a “zero sum” (Chambers, 2007). This implies that 
the government exercises “power over,” the “ability to exert control and influence 
over others” (Friedmann, 1992) in facilitating participation in development, 
inevitably resulting in the loss of power by the public. As attested by the evidence 
from FGDs and Key informant interviews, this leads to the marginalization 
of the public from influencing the public policy making process. As a result, 
participation failed to create public access to political structures and formal 
decision-making processes in the economic, social, and political spheres.
Using “power over” in its positive sense (outside zero-sum commodity) 
(Chambers, 2007), the above problems restrict the power of the public over 
political decision-making. That means it failed to bring people who are outside 
the policy decision-making process into it. The institutional contexts failed 
to enable the public to maximize empowerment opportunities available to 
them through participation without constraints.
The results of key informant interviews with CPEs stressed that the absence 
of communities’ own development project was also a major factor holding 
back political empowerment. The above results pointed out that the public was 
not allowed to develop their own projects that would help them to develop 
the capacity to exercise political issues. They were forced to participate in 
government projects, which were top down in nature. This approach was not 
empowering by its nature. Using Rowlands (1997) empowerment framework, 
the lack of the public’s own project prohibited people from developing the 
“power to” influence the public policy process. These findings imply that the 
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failure to enhance political empowerment impedes the public’s opportunities 
to develop political capacity to influence government activities.
The results of FGDs and interviews with key informant from the public 
indicated that lack of access to government information hampered transpar-
ency, which in turn reduced the potential to empower the public politically. 
The above results further suggest that low levels of participation impeded 
political empowerment that could be acquired through evaluating the systems, 
interpreting the results of evaluation, and improving management. As a result, 
using Rowlands (1997) empowerment framework, the public lost “power to” 
influence government activities.
As stated elsewhere in this paper, the extent of participation in different 
phase of local development was very low. In many cases the public officials 
made decisions regarding participatory development and communicated them 
to the public through channels that did not allow much debate. As the result, 
the public did not get the chance to influence decision-making in a way that 
would help to develop the capacity to exercise political issues. This condition 
hampered the opportunity of the public to develop the power to influence the 
political process. Thus, elite dominance of decisions regarding participatory 
development hampered political empowerment through participation.
The structural arrangement of the city became the main actor rather than a 
facilitator of participation. Moreover, the base for determining the government 
structure was not created in a manner that enhances empowerment. For 
example shane (an organization encompassing one to five residents) were 
organized in ways that prohibited interaction among the large portion of the 
public, preventing the latter from acquiring empowering experience. Using 
Rowlands (1997) empowerment framework, the opportunity to develop 
capacity (“power to”) to negotiate with the government was not developed.
The results of FGDs and interviews conducted with government officials 
and experts indicated divergent views among government officials and the 
public regarding political empowerment through participation. Public officials 
and experts argued that political empowerment was enhanced as the result 
of participation, whereas the public argued on the contrary that political 
empowerment was at its lowest stage. The public further argued that political 
empowerment was set back due to public officials’ and experts’ domination 
of decision-making regarding participatory development. This fact implies 
that public officials considered empowerment as something to be provided 
by the government. However, by its nature empowerment is bottom up. 
Using Rowlands (1997) empowerment framework, this finding suggested 
that the city government exercised “power over” in its negative sense, that 
is, by controlling and influencing the public.
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The results of FGDs indicated that lack of accountability by public officials 
and lack of trust in them by the public hindered political empowerment 
through participation. Public officials were not made accountable for their 
failure to discharge their responsibility to enhance participation. They 
were only accountable for the failure to enforce the government’s political 
philosophy. Although the public complained about the failure of officials 
to listen to their demands, and that they abused government money, the 
government did not take any corrective measures. .
The result of FGDs revealed that the public had no trust in government 
officials, since they were not elected by them. They were assigned by the 
government from other places unknown to the public. Hence the public 
hesitated to believe that these officials serve their interests. This adversely 
affected interaction between the local government and the public, one form 
of political empowerment.
5.4. Economic Empowerment through Participation 
Determining actual economic gain as the result of participatory development 
was a difficult task. Thus, the role of participation in the economic empower-
ment of local people can be considered in terms of the actual economic gain 
or the opportunity to generate economic resources. For the purposes of this 
study, economic empowerment of local people through participation was 
assessed by determining the opportunities created as a result of participa-
tory development. I employed qualitative data to assess potential economic 
empowerment created as the result of participation. Accordingly, the analysis 
and interpretation were based on the data generated through interviews, Key 
Informant Interviews, and FGDs.
The results of interview with Government officials and FGDs pointed 
out that the improvements of crucial urban services, road networks and 
electric service, as the result of participation paved the way for economic 
empowerment of the public in various forms. Thus, the effect of participation 
in empowering local people was considered along three dimensions, namely, 
its role in creating business activities, increasing the value of existing assets, 
and creating employment opportunities.
The results of interview with key informant CPEs and FGDs disclosed 
that participation resulted in actual and potential business activities. 
These business activities include: the opening of new shops, cafeterias, 
greenhouses, clinics, kindergarten, primary schools, butchery, and petty 
trades like pot coffee and selling budena (traditional food prepared from 
some sort of cereals), bread, and akayi (fried cereals, especially barely). 
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This situation has double edged benefits. In one hand, participation here 
improved the life of those engaged in business activities; on the other 
hand it created a market for those living through renting houses. Using 
Alsop et al.’s (2006) empowerment framework, the widening of economic 
activities enables the public to develop “agency,” the capacity to make 
purposive choice. Using Rowland’s (1997) empowerment framework, 
participation developed “power to” among the public, the capacity to 
improve living conditions and “power over,” which is the power over the 
means of livelihood.
The results of FGDs and interviews with ganda managers and CPEs pointed 
out that the improvements in road conditions through participation, in turn, 
improved transportation services, thereby contributing to residents’ potential 
economic empowerment. For example, cobble stone roads constructed 
through participation in Ganda 05 from Libenedingle to Millennium Schools 
may be mentioned. The results of FGD in Ganda 05 revealed that prior to 
the construction of cobble stone in this area, horse carts were the means of 
transportation on this road. As a result, there was serious transportation 
problem in the absence of carts. The construction of cobble stone transformed 
the means of transportation from cart to bajaj. This condition played two 
important roles: (1) the transformation of means of transportation from a 
traditional to modern one; and (2) reducing the distance of the road from 
500 meters to 100 meters. Using Alsop et al (2006) empowerment frame-
work, improvement in the transportation service enhanced opportunity 
structure, paving the way for the development of “agency.” Furthermore, it 
saved time that could be invested on the performance of other living activities 
performance.
Petty economic activities like mini shops, pot coffee, and selling budena 
flourished as the result of road renewal through participation. Per the result 
of FGD at Ganda 05, the flourishing of these petty business activities at 
Berhan Mender and Sefere Misale in Ganda 05 were the best example of 
such activities flourishing as the result of cobble stone construction in 
the area.
The above findings imply that the flourishing of new shops and cafeteria 
services, in addition to improving the economic wellbeing of those engaged 
in these activities, also helped to improve the provision of service for the 
residents. It also created simple access to services for the public in their 
vicinity. Similarly, the opening of clinics on the one hand enhanced the 
economic empowerment of the service providers; on the other hand it 
improved social service and access to services in the city. As the result, it 
contributed to the production of a healthy work force. Using Rowland’s 
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(1997) empowerment framework, this finding implies that participation 
created “power over” economic resources. Using the Alsop et al. (2006) 
empowerment framework, it created agency, via a potential work force that 
contributed to further economic development of the nation in general and 
the city in particular.
The results of FGDs and interviews with CPEs show that improvements 
in the road network contributed to the development of greeneries along the 
roads. The development of green areas in turn played great roles in improving 
the environmental conditions and beautification of the city. The improvement 
of environmental conditions, in turn, contributed to economic empower-
ment through creating a healthy work force. The FDGs and interview results 
further pointed out that the development of green areas along the newly 
opened roads enhanced economic empowerment for young people in the city 
through creating employment opportunities. Using the Alsop et al. (2006) 
empowerment framework, this finding implies that participation created an 
opportunity structure, which facilitated the development “agency.”
The result of interviews with CPEs and FGDs conducted at Babogaya 
and Ganda 01 indicated that participation created both temporary and 
relatively permanent employment opportunities in cobble stone and other 
road constructions. Using Rowland’s (1997) the creation of employment 
suggested the development of “power to,” the capacity to improve living 
conditions. Based on the Alsop et al. (2006) empowerment framework, job 
opportunities enhance the development of “agency,” the ability to make 
purposeful choices in one’s life.
The results of FGDs and interviews with key informant from the public 
revealed that participation increased the value of assets through improving 
the quality and quantity of roads and security in the area. The security of the 
area was improved as the result of streetlight provision through participation. 
Participation increased the value of assets through increasing land values 
and raising demand for housing and rent prices. Moreover, the above data 
indicated that the increase in value of assets was indebted to improvement 
in environmental conditions, which played a great role in making the area 
attractive and livable. The results of an interview with the CPE of Ganda 09 
highlighted Village 15 of Ganda 09 as a prominent example, where increases 
in house rent came about as a result of participation. Using Rowland’s (1997) 
empowerment framework, these findings imply the development of “power to,” 
the capacity to generate assets. Using the Alsop et al. (2006) empowerment 
framework, the above findings suggests that participation created “agency,” 
the resource for making purposeful choices to improve living conditions.
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5.5. Corruption: An Impediment to Economic Empowerment 
Corruption emerged as a serious challenge to economic empowerment 
through participation in BCA. The results of FGDs attested that multifaceted 
corruption practices hampered empowerment through participation. The 
above results further pointed out that corruption practices impeded participa-
tion from creating employment opportunities for poor people (especially 
youth) and access to economic resources.
The results of FGD conducted at Ganda 05 exclusively indicated that 
the residents were not benefiting from employment opportunities created 
by participatory development activities. The above results revealed that 
government officials bring their relatives from other areas to capitalize on 
the opportunities created by participatory projects. As a result, the residents 
of the city were excluded from the job opportunities created by participatory 
development projects. The FGD’s results conducted at different places further 
revealed that the residents are employed only and only if they have a relative 
in the city administration. Respondents stressed that this unfair employment 
practice is deeply rooted in the city. The FGD results further indicated that this 
problem is exacerbated from time to time as previous officials give behavioral 
lessons to incoming experts and officials. This finding implies that corruption 
is a systematic practice in relation to participatory development.
The results of FGDs showed that as a result of corruption, participation 
has failed to play its role in reducing poverty through the elimination of 
unemployment and creating access to economic resources. According to 
the above results, contributing factors included a lack of fair employment 
opportunities and failure to provide equitable and quality infrastructure. 
Hence, the corrupt practices related to participatory development hamper 
the spillover effects of participatory development on the achievement of 
other policy goals. Among these, the major one is the role of participation in 
development in alleviating poverty through economic empowerment. Thus, 
using Rowlands (1997) empowerment framework, corruption has hindered 
the abilities of participation to develop “power to” and “power over” resources.
The results of FGDs and interviews with key informants from the public 
suggest that only those who have close relationships with officials and experts 
have access to the benefits of participatory development. The above results 
further stressed that this was intentionally done to grasp the benefit derived 
from participatory development activities. These finding imply that there 
was an absence of fair distribution of benefits of development among the 
public in BCA. This systematic alienation of the local people from access to 
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benefits of participatory development has hampered economic empowerment 
through participation.
As indicated by the results of the FDGs, major forms of corruption 
prevailing in relation to participatory development include: giving cobble 
stone construction and red ash paving contracts to relatives; and organizing 
pseudo MSEs and winning auctions by government officials and experts. As 
an example, the FDGs highlighted the assignment of inappropriate persons 
to responsible positions in managing the cobble stone project. The FGD 
results and interview with key informants from the public revealed that 
government official and experts played a dual role in corruption activities. 
On the one hand, they committed corruption themselves; on the other hand, 
they created favorable grounds for others to commit corruption. The result 
of the FGD conducted at Ganda 05 elaborated the corruption practices as 
follows: “The previous officials give lessons on the corruption to the successor 
and aggravated corrupt behavior in the society.” This highlights the fact that 
corruption has become a systematic problem in BCA. Moreover, it contributes 
to the sustenance of corruption over time in the process of participatory 
development. This finding implies that government officials and experts have 
utilized official power for their personal interests.
It was learned from the assessment of documents that the absence of a 
legal framework that would guide local development benefit sharing has also 
created a favorable ground for corruption practices related to participation. 
This implies that the gap in legal and policy framework is also one of the 
factors contributing to the proliferation of corruption related to participatory 
development.
6. Conclusions 
The general objective of this chapter was to explore the effect of participation 
in local development on empowerment. Participation and empowerment are 
considered as buzz words among different scholars and practitioners. Whether 
participation and empowerment are means or ends is the subject of an ongoing 
debate. Hence, this chapter tested whether participation is rhetoric or practice 
and sought to address the debate on participation and empowerment as end 
or means. This chapter concluded that participation and empowerment are, in 
fact, practice. Moreover, this chapter highlighted that participation is a means 
for empowerment. If properly handled, participation in the development 
process plays a fundamental role in enabling local people to manage their 
affairs. However, participation in local development contributed less to enable 
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ordinary people to take charge of their lives, to make communities more 
responsible for their development, and to make governments listen to their 
people in BCA. Participation relatively enhances the personal empowerment 
of local people. However, participation did not significantly enhance local 
people’s political empowerment. Thus, participation generates “power within,” 
“power to,” “power with,” and “power over” forms of power among local people. 
Participation in different phases of development did not equally contribute 
to local popular empowerment. Participation in setting the priority of needs 
and planning phases of development played a great role in empowering local 
people. Context and the extent of participation highly constrain the role of 
participation in empowering local people. The approach of participation 
(whether top-down or bottom-up), elite domination, institutional factors, 
some aspects of participation, and corruption highly hampered empowerment 
through participation in development. The chapter was limited in developing 
and testing hypothesis regarding the effect of participation in each phase 
development on local people empowerment, instead dealing with a general 
hypothesis related to the effect of participation on empowerment.
7. Theoretical, Methodological, and Policy Implications
The findings of the chapter enhance the development of participation and em-
powerment theory. The findings of this study advance our understanding of the 
participatory approach to development in several ways. The chapter contributes 
to the ongoing debate regarding the empowering effect of participation by 
investigating their relationship at grassroots level. It contributes to bridging 
the gap between participation and empowerment rhetoric and practice. It also 
contributes to knowledge about participation and empowerment through 
showing how these buzz/catch-all words can be operationalized and studied 
in particular situations and settings. The findings contribute to the debate 
on whether participation is a means or an end by arguing that participation 
can be both instrumental and transformational. The chapter does so through 
relating the instrumental value of participation (as a means to enhance local 
development) to its transformative value (empowerment through participa-
tion in development). It contributes to the advancement of the literature of 
empowerment through indicating how theory and concept are integrated. 
To this end, the author attempted to integrate the concept of empowerment 
with appropriate theory in order to explain the actual situation on the ground.
The chapter has various methodological contributions to the discipline 
of public administration. It contributes to the advancement of public 
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administration research through the application of mixed methods on the 
catch-all concepts of participation and empowerment. Hence, it emphasized 
the appropriateness of mixed methods in dealing with fluid public problems, 
helping to shift the bias of public administration research toward the qualita-
tive approach.
The chapter has different policy contributions, enhancing the development 
of public capacity to influence policy process. Participatory development 
enhances the development of policy capacity through empowering the 
public to negotiate with institutions and bureaucracies, allowing the public 
to influence public policy and providing a check on the power of government. 
Furthermore, the results of this paper contribute to community capacity 
building. Participation in development builds community capacity through 
empowering the local people economically, socially, and psychologically. 
Empowerment increases the capacity of local people to initiate actions of 
their own or to negotiate with powerful actors.
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8 
Glass Ceiling and Glass Wall , and Women 
in Local Governments: Evidence from 
West Shoa Zone, Oromia National 
Regional State, Ethiopia
Bacha Kebede Debela
Box 1: Key Points of this chapter
 many ssA are not on track to meet the aspirations of the un and Au in political 
and managerial jobs.
 increasing the number of women legislators may not increase the number of 
women political leaders and managers.
 A lot must be done to shatter the glass ceiling and glass walls in political and 
managerial jobs.
Box 2: Reading this chapter will give you insights in 
 Gender inequality is caused by multiple national, institutional, and political 
contexts.
 Gender inequality on political and managerial jobs varies across countries, by 
sectors and by leadership and managerial levels.
 Feminist theorists provide different solutions for gender inequality.
 the deep-seated sociocultural and politico-administrative occupational 
segregation has significant implications for the un’s sustainable development 
Goal (sdGs) and African union (Au) Agenda 2063.
Box 3: Abbreviations
Au = African union
ds = developmental state
sdGs = sustainable development Goals
ssA = sub-saharan Africa
un = united nation
un-EcA = united nation Economic commission for Africa
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1. Introduction 
The UN in Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 5, has made a bold commit-
ment to “ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportuni-
ties for leadership and managerial positions at all levels of decision-making 
in political, economic and public life” (UN, 2015: 22). Similarly, the African 
Union (AU) aspires to ensure “gender parity at all levels of decision-making 
positions, women to hold at least 30% of all elected officials at national, 
regional, and local levels and in judicial institutions, and end all forms of 
political, legal or administrative discrimination against women and girls by 
2023” (AU et al., 2017: 67-68). Ethiopia has also emphasized gender equal-
ity and equity in legal and policy frameworks and development programs. 
For example, since the appointment of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the 
Ethiopian government has ensured gender parity in ministerial positions 
and has appointed women to key ministerial positions (for example to the 
Ministry of Revenue) and seen the rise of a female national president and 
president of the Federal Supreme Court (Ayenew, 2019).
At the global level, the proportion of national women parliamentarians 
has increased from 12 percent (1997) to 24 percent (2017) (see https://
datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gender-statistics). However, there are 
cross country variations. In 2017, Rwanda and Bolivia were the only countries 
with more than 50 percent of women in the national parliament, while the 
national parliament of countries such as Qatar and the Yemen Republic was 
constituted only by men. Wirth (2001) claims the progress is attributed to 
a change in perception of men and women due to institutional and legal 
reforms. A World Bank (2016) study shows over 40 percent of countries 
have reserved quotas for women parliamentarians in national and local 
governments.
The number of women ministers and presidents, and the proportion of 
women managers, however, remains very low; women constituted only 
18 percent of ministerial positions (out of 149 countries), 34 percent of global 
managerial positions, and only 17 countries had a female president (World 
Economic Forum, 2018). In 2001, Wirth found that women managers held 
less than 20 percent of managerial positions, meaning a nearly 14 percent 
increase by 2018.
Wirth (2001) distinguishes two barriers that preventing women from hold-
ing managerial and political positions: a glass ceiling (vertical) and a glass wall 
(horizontal). Wirth defines the glass ceiling as the invisible artificial barriers 
created by attitudinal and organizational prejudices that block women from 
holding senior organizational positions. The glass wall denotes occupational 
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segregation patterns that concentrate women managers and politicians in 
less strategic areas (Wirth, 2001).
Despite the encouraging progress, much remains to be done to shatter 
the glass ceiling and glass walls, all over the world (World Economic Forum, 
2018; Wirth, 2001). The World Bank (2016) notes that many economies (155 
out of 173 countries) have at least one law that differentiates between women 
and men in public and private spheres. The Bank also observes gender-based 
job restrictions in 100 economies out of 173 countries. The literature on 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) illustrates the magnitude of gender inequality, 
as levels of job segregation remains high, despite significant cross-country 
variation (see for example Odusola et al., 2017; AU et al., 2017), reflecting 
the fact that gender inequality is shaped by multiple national, institutional, 
and political contexts (Wirth, 2001).
Global data on women politicians and managers at the local government 
level are seldom available (World Economic Forum, 2018). Research on 
the effect of politico-administrative reform on the share of female political 
leadership and managerial positions are scarce, particularly in the context 
of developing countries (Ethiopia). This chapter contributes to the literature 
and to the debate on gender inequality in political and managerial jobs. To 
reach a broader perspective, the chapter examines the proportion of women 
in the national parliaments in SSA. The research aims to answer: what is the 
trend of women parliamentarians in the national parliament in SSA countries? 
To what extent do the quota system, government effectiveness, the rule of 
law, and the female harmonized human capital index explain the variations 
in the proportion of women parliamentarians at the national parliament in 
the SSA countries? What is the percentage of women parliamentarians in 
the Ethiopian National and Oromia National Regional state parliaments 
and what is the proportion of women in political and managerial jobs in the 
West Shoa local governments, in Oromia National Reginal State?
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents feminist 
theories. Following this section, the research method will be presented. The 
fourth section focuses on the study’s results. The last section will offer some 
concluding remarks.
2. Feminist Theories: Literature Review
Feminist theories primarily focus on exploring the role of expectations, status, 
power relations, and subordination of women due to social, political, and 
economic structures (Turner & Maschi, 2015; Hayes & Franklin, 2017). The 
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most common feminists theories are Liberal Feminism, Radical Feminism, 
Marxist and Socialist Feminism, Black Feminism, and Post-structural 
Feminism (Saulnier, 2000).
2.1. Liberal Feminism 
The liberal feminists emphasize equal access to basic services, such as educa-
tion and health, equal opportunity and recognition in the workplace, and 
individual female power and rights (Turner & Maschi, 2015). The proponents 
maintain the division between public and private domains (Saulnier, 2000).
Therefore, liberal feminists are closely related to organizational sociologists, 
as both argue organization and personal responsibilities should not converge 
at work (Bandarage, 1984). They also adhere to the ideas of human capital 
theorists, who focus on building individual knowledge and skills (Judiesch 
& Lyness, 1992) and emphasize equal opportunity and the rule of law and 
effective enforcement (Kantola, 2006; Saulnier, 2000). The proponents are 
less interested in sociopolitical transformation (Dominelli, 2002). The World 
Bank reports on gender equality appear to be driven by the liberal feminism 
perspective (see for example World Bank 2016).
2.2. Radical Feminism 
Radical feminism focuses on problematizing patriarchy. Proponents argue 
patriarchy allows men to dominate the social organization to subordinate 
women, including using violence (Dominelli, 2002; Kantola, 2006). To 
correct gender power imbalances, unlike the liberal feminists, they draw 
much attention to the interaction between private and public issues and seek 
fundamental sociopolitical structural transformation (Turner & Maschi, 
2015). Scholars have found that some radical feminists do not have confidence 
in legal reforms (Saulnier, 2000). As such, some radical feminists claim women 
should exclude themselves from male circles (Dominelli, 2002).
2.3. Marxist and Socialist Feminists 
Both Marxist and socialist feminists focus on economic forms of power, the 
capitalist mode of social relations, and the resulting inequalities (Turner 
& Maschi, 2015). They argue that simply putting women in occupations 
held by men will not necessarily liberate women from oppression; they 
seek fundamental change in society (Dominelli, 2002). However, while 
socialist feminists focus on problematizing masculinity, Marxist feminists 
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problematize the capitalist mode of production (Dominelli, 2002). To correct 
historical injustice, the Marxist feminists urge women to struggle against 
capitalism as part of the female proletariat (not just as women), while the 
socialist feminists focus on unpaid domestic labor and seek economic justice 
for women (Kantola, 2006).
2.4. Black Feminism (Womanism) 
The black feminists focus on race and contend that race plays a decisive role in 
people’s lives (Turner & Maschi, 2015, Saulnier, 2000). They critique studies 
that focus on white middle-class women and have broadened the span of 
analysis by concentrating on the oppression of women due to the intersection 
of race, gender, and class in time and space (Dominelli, 2002). Dominelli 
observes that, unlike radical feminists, black feminists do not accept that all 
men have benefited from patriarchy. Instead, they accentuate the importance 
of family and other relationships to survive in the women-unfriendly world 
and overcome the exploitation of black women by white women, without 
ignoring the patriarchal culture of black men.
2.5. Cultural Feminism 
The cultural feminists acknowledge the difference between women and men 
and value the unique behavior of women and focus on women-centered personal 
values, such as close a connection with natural forces and spirituality (Saulnier, 
2000). Unlike black feminists, they do not accept difference among women on 
any criteria, including race, and concentrate on strengthening women-to-women 
bonds (Saulnier, 2000). The cultural feminists appear to echo the egalitarian 
way; they maintain the importance of self-management, mutual control, and 
maximum connectivity and accountability (Hood, 2000; Verge et al., 2018).
2.6. Post-Structural Feminism 
The post-structural feminists (also called postmodernist feminists) focus on 
the micro-state; they argue that the oppression of women differs among and 
within the state: “the states are not inherently patriarchal, but the patriarchal 
state is historically constructed through the political process, languages, and 
discourses” (Kantola, 2006:125; Saulnier, 2000). They acknowledge the 
dynamic and multidimensional interaction between the state and female 
oppression and regard institutions as the effects of the process (Kantola, 
2006). Unlike socialist feminists, advocates focus on individuals and the role 
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of individual actors in agenda-setting and related discourse; they pay little 
attention to the role of individuals in social relations and collective identity 
(Dominelli, 2002). Feminist post-structuralist does not accept the dichotomy 
between micro and macro practice and seeks change in social, political, and 
economic structures (Turner & Maschi, 2015).
3. Research Methods
To analyse gender-based inequality at the global and SSA level, an extensive 
body of literature and reports were reviewed. Data were collected from various 
sources, including the World Bank Database (women in national parliaments), 
World Governance Indicators, and the Human Capital Index (female human 
capital index). Data on the quotas for women in national parliament were 
collected from the World Bank report on Women Business and the Law (2016). 
In addition, the UN’s agenda 2030, the AU’s agenda 2063, the UNDP’s reports 
on gender inequalities, and feminist theories were reviewed.
To examine the position of women in management and political jobs on 
the level of local government, data were obtained from West Shoa Zone 
Districts, with the support of the West Shoa Zone’s Public Service and Hu-
man Resource Development Office and Zonal Oromo Democratic Party 
(ODP) office. The Zonal Public Service and Human Resource Development 
Office requested each district line office to submit staff data from all sectors 
(thirty-two sectors)1, following new job placement, in soft copy, within two 
weeks. Data on the number of appointed political leaders (top executives) 
in the twenty-two zonal districts in public organization was obtained from 
the Zonal ODP office. The data set excluded top political leaders in the local 
government ODP offices and local government councils.
Concerning the human resources placement in the twenty-two districts’ 
public sector, despite the personal follow-up to obtain data in time, only 
three districts were able to submit complete data after more than four weeks. 
The data sets obtained from the three districts were used to analyze the 
proportion of women managers in lower-level management. The data, among 
others, include the name of the employee, gender, field and level of educa-
tion, employee performance result, and employee job position (placement). 
Following the official classification, the organizations were stratified into the 
administrative sector, economic sector, and social sector.
To parallel the analysis, data on the number of district councillors (thirteen 
districts), by gender, were obtained from the Zonal Gender, Children, and 
Youth Office. It was not possible to obtain data from nine districts.
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To provide easily understandable information, the collected data were 
analysed descriptively, using percentages and graphs.
4. Results 
4.1. Women in National Parliament in SSA
Table 1 reports the proportion and trend of women parliamentarians in the 
national parliaments in forty-eight SSA countries, in 2017. The table also 
presents countries that adopt a gender quota system. The results reveal that 
the proportion of female seats substantially varies across countries. Women 
parliamentarians held less than 10 percent of seats in nine countries,2 (the 
lowest in Nigeria [5.6 percent]), between 10 percent and 20 percent of seats 
in seventeen countries,3 between 20 percent and 30 percent seats in nine 
countries,4 and between 30 percent and 40 percent of seats in nine economies.5 
Only four countries had more than 40 percent of women parliamentarians: 
Rwanda (61 percent), Namibia (41.3 percent), Senegal (41.8 percent), and 
South Africa (42 percent).
There are also cross-country differences in the trend of women parlia-
mentarians. The numbers of female legislators showed an upward trend in 
twelve economies. Botswana, Mali, and Sierra Leone had dwindling trends. 
Mauritius, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
and Zambia had a fluctuating “N”-shaped trend. Seychelles had an “M”-shaped 
trend. Despite small differences, seven countries had a stable trend.
The trend of women parliamentarians does not depend on national income. 
The proportion of women parliamentarians in nine low-income nations6 
was more than 30 percent. Only in Cameroon, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Sudan (upper income and lower-middle-income countries) women held over 
30 percent of seats. Strikingly, the percentage of women parliamentarians is 
low in better-off countries, such as Seychelles (HI-21.2 percent), Botswana 
(UI-9.5 percent), and Mauritius (UI-11.6 percent).
The pattern also depends less than one would think on quotas system. 
While ten countries have adopted a quota system, the percentage of women 
in the national parliament is better in many countries that do not have a quota 
system. Rwanda is an exception. Kenya provides an interesting example 
demonstrating that the quota system is not sufficient on its own to increase 
the number of women parliamentarians.
However, the importance of the quota system cannot be dismissed; all 
countries with quotas (except Kenya) have achieved their target. Wirth 
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(2004:26) notes that without the quota system “the number of women party 
candidates would be much lower.”
Table 1: Income, quotas and women parliamentarians in national parliaments (% 2017)
Country (income) Quotas? (Women 2017%) Trend (2000-2017)
1. Angola (LI) No 38.2 +-+
2. Benin (LI) No 7.2 + Stable
3. Botswana (UMI) No 9.5 -
4. Burkina Faso (LI) No 11 +-?
5. Burundi (LI) 30 36.4 +
6. Cabo Verde (LI) N/A 23.6 +
7. Cameroon (LMI) No 31.1 +
8. Central African Republic (LI) N/A 8.6 N/A
9. Chad (LI) No 12.8
10. Comoros (LI) N/A 6.1 +?
11. Congo, Dem.(LI) No 8.9 Stable +
12. Congo, Rep (LMI) No 11.3 +?
13. Cote d’Ivoire (LMI) No 10.6 Stable +
14. Equatorial Guinea (LI) No 24 +-+
15. Eritrea (LI) N/A 22 + stable
16. Ethiopia (LI) No 38.8 +
17. Gabon (UMI) No 17.1 +-+
18. Gambia, The (LI) N/A 10.3 +-+
19. Ghana (LMI) No 12.7 +-?+
20. Guinea (LI) No 21.9 N/A
21. Guinea-Bissau (LI) N/A 13.7 +-+
22. Kenya (LMI) 33 21.8 +
23. Lesotho (LMI) No 22.9 +-
24. Liberia (LI) No 12.3 +-
25. Madagascar (LI) No 19.2 +?
26. Malawi (LI) No 16.7 +-
27. Mauritania (LMI) >0 25.2 +?
28. Mauritius (UMI) No 11.6 +-
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Country (income) Quotas? (Women 2017%) Trend (2000-2017)
29. Mozambique (LI) No 39.6 +
30. Namibia (UMI) No 41.3 Stable?
31. Niger (LI) 15 17 +?
32. Nigeria (LMI) No 5.6 Stable
33. Rwanda (LI) 30 61.3 +
34. Sao Tome and Principe (LI) No 18.2 -+
35. Senegal (LI) No 41.8 +
36. Seychelles (HI) No 21.2 +-+-
37. Mali (LI) No 8.8 -
38. Sierra Leone (LI) No 12.4 -
39. Somalia (LI) N/A 24.4 +
40. South Africa (UMI) No 42 + stable
41. South Sudan (LI) 25 28.5 +
42. Sudan (LMI) 30 30.5 +
43. Swaziland (LMI) No 6.2 +-
44. Tanzania (LI) 30 36.4 +
45. Togo (LI) No 17.6 +
46. Uganda (LI) 29 34.3 +
47. Zambia (LMI) No 18 +-+
48. Zimbabwe (LI) 22 32.6 +
Source: Quota compiled from World Bank report on Women, Business and the Law (2016); Seats 
extracted from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gender-statistics; Trend computed 
from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gender-statistics.
4.2. Female Harmonized Test Score and Women in National 
Parliament in SSA 
Figure 1 compares women in the national parliaments and the female har-
monized test score in SSA, in 2017. The results show that increasing females’ 
harmonized test score is necessary but inadequate to increase the share of 
women in the national parliament. For instance, while the female harmonized 
test score is relatively better in Gabon, Botswana, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, 
women do not hold a comparable number of seats in the national parliament. 
Senegal was an exception. Conversely, women held higher numbers of seats in 
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Rwanda, South Africa, and Ethiopia. Indeed, caution is important here. The 
female harmonized test score and the percentage of women in the national 
parliament are not directly related. However, all things remaining constant, 




































































































































































Source: Compiled from World Bank Database (Gender and Human Capital), 2017
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closing the human capital gap is important (World Economic Forum, 2018; 
Wirth, 2001).
4.3. Government Effectiveness and Women in National 
Parliament in SSA 
Government effectiveness is one of the six7 broad worldwide dimensions 
(indicators) of governance and it measures the perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service, the degree of its independ-
ence from political pressures, and the quality of policy on a scale between 
-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) performances. One might expect government 
effectiveness and the percentage of women parliamentarians to be related. This 
assumption, however, is not confirmed (see figure 2). Mauritius, Botswana, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Rwanda, Namibia, and Cabo Verde had a positive 
score on government effectiveness. However, while there was a higher percent-
age of women parliamentarians in Rwanda, South Africa, and Namibia, the 
percentage of women parliamentarian were much lower in Botswana (9.5%), 
Mauritius (11.6%) and Cabo Verde (23.6%). Many countries with negative 
government effectiveness scores, such as South Sudan and Somalia (with 
nearly -2.5 score), had higher percentages of women parliamentarian than 
Botswana, and Mauritius; the African developmental states (DS) often used as 
an example to resist the neoliberal ideology in Africa (Seshamani & Ndhlovu, 
2016). The pro-DS scholars and practitioners emphasize the relevance of DS 
to address socio-economic inequalities (Joshi, 2012; Edigheji; 2010). The 
UN-ECA also promotes the DS doctrine (UN ECA, 2011).
4.4. Rule of Law and Women in National Parliament in SSA
Out of seven countries in SSA that had a positive score on the rule of law, 
women parliamentarians hold better seats only in Rwanda and Namibia (See 
figure 3). In many countries, the percentage of women parliamentarians and 
the score on the rule of law are negatively correlated. For example, Somalia 
and South Sudan scored worse on the rule of law, respectively -2.31 and -1.94, 
but had much higher percentage of women parliamentarians than Mauritius, 
Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ghana, and Seychelles (all having a positive score). 
Namibia and Zimbabwe, the only two SSA countries that have adopted all 
six gender-egalitarian laws (AU et al., 2017), had more than 30 percent of of 
women politicians in the national parliament. Zimbabwe is an interesting 
case; it scored negative (-1.38) on the rule of law.
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Women in National Parliament in SSA (%), 2017 Government effectiveness in SSA, 2017 (Estimate)
Source: Compiled from World Bank Database (2017) and Worldwide Governance indicators 
(www.govindicators.org)
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Figure 3: Rule of law and women parliamentarians in SSA







































































































































































































Women in National Parliament in SSA (%), 2017
Source: Compiled from World Bank Database (2017) and Worldwide Governance indicators 
(www.govindicators.org)
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4.5. Women in Federal and Oromia National Regional State 
Parliament, Ethiopia 
The proportion of seats held by women in the National and the Oromia 
National Regional State parliament has drastically increased (see figure 4). 
While there were only 3.4 percent (Oromia) and 2 percent (national) of 
women parliamentarians in the first election, the percentage of women quad-
rupled respectively in the second election. In the relatively competitive but 
contested 2005 election, the share of women parliamentarians was 36.5 perent 
(Oromia) and 21.9 percent (national). In the fourth election, in which the 
opposition parties held only two seats in the national parliament, women held 
27.8 percent of seats (Oromia) and 28.8 percent of seats (national). Compared 
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Source: National (World Bank Database) and Oromia (Cafee Oromia Report)
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to the third election, Oromia had a nearly 8 percent drop in female legislators 
in the fourth election. In the fifth election, in which the national parliament 
is filled only by the ruling party, women hold 38.8 percent of seats (national) 
and 46.7 percent of seats (Oromia).
4.6. Women in Local Government Politics in West Shoa Zone, 
Oromia National Regional State
Notwithstanding the existence of a one-party state (including at the local 
governments) since the first election, and the variations in the number of local 
government councils, women hold relatively high numbers of seats in the West 
Shoa Zone local governments (see figure 5). Gender parity is maintained in 
the councils of the Meta Wolkite, Chobi, and Ginda Beret districts. The dif-
ference between female and male councilors is insignificant in the Dano, Iluu 
Gelan, and Ilfeta districts. In other districts, the local government councils 









































Female and male District Council Members in 13
Districts, West Shoa Zone
Male Female
Source: Compiled from West Shoa Zone Women, Children and Youth Office Dataset
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Table 2: The number of top women and men managers in West Shoa Zone local 
governments (2019) 
District Name
Head and vice head 
Which sectors are led/ managed by women?
Men Women
Abuna G/ Beret 28 4 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), Work-
ers and Social Affairs (soc), TEVT, and Culture 
and Tourism (soc)
Adea Berega 28 4 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), Work-
ers and Social Affairs (soc), TEVT, and Culture 
and Tourism (soc)
Ambo 27 5 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), 
Workers and Social Affairs (soc), TEVT (soc), 
Investment (eco), and Market Development (eco) 
Bako Tibe 28 4 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), 
Workers and Social affairs (soc), Agriculture & 
Natural Resource Protection (eco), and Culture 
and Tourism (soc)
Chaliya 28 4 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), Sport 
(soc), City Administration (adm) and Culture and 
Tourism (soc)
Dano 29 3 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), 
Environment, Forest & Climate Change Author-
ity (eco), and Culture and Tourism (soc)
Dendi 31 1 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc)
Dire Inchin 30 2 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), and 
Market Development Office (eco) 
Egree 27 5 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), Work-
ers and Social affairs (soc), Sport (soc), Govern-
ment Communication (soc), and Investment(eco) 
Gende Beret 28 4 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), 
Workers and Social Affairs (soc), Public Service 
and Human Resource Development (adm), and 
Vital Event Registration (adm)
Iifata 29 3 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), 
Disaster Prevention (adm), and Education (soc) 
Iluu Gelan 30 2 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), and 
Water, Energy and Mineral(eco) 
Jelduu 30 2 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), and 
Water, Energy and Mineral(eco)
Jibat 31 1 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc)
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were dominated by men. Bako Tibe, Dendi, and Midea Kengne are outliers 
in this cluster. Furthermore, due to family responsibilities and other factors, 
women councilors’ participation in council meetings may be low, suggesting 
that in practice women councilors may be subordinate to men in all districts. 
Even if their participation is higher, due to power relations and other factors, 
popular womens’ issues may not be systematically on the agenda. Yet, strong 
politicians can impact change in time and space (Wirth, 2004).
4.7. Top Women Political Leaders in West Shoa Zone Local 
Governments: The Glass Ceiling and Glass Wall
Table 2 reveals top executive women political leaders (office heads and deputy 
office heads) in twenty-two local governments’ the public sectors, in the (West 
Shoa Zone), were critically underrepresented. This holds true including in 
those districts which ensured gender parity in the district council: Meta 
Wolkite, Chobi, and Ginda Beret. In addition, almost the top women political 
leaders were leading/managing predominantly nonstrategic sectors – the 
administration and social sectors – sectors that are perceived to be suitable for 
women, confirming that both the glass ceiling and glass wall are significantly 
Meta Robi 30 2 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), and 
Livestock and Fishery Agency (eco)
Meda Kegne 31 1 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc)
Nanoo 30 2 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), and 
Workers and Social affairs (soc)
Toke Kutaye 30 2 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), and 
Workers and Social affairs (soc)
Liban Jawi 29 3 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), TEVT 
(soc), Culture and Tourism (soc)
Cobi 30 2 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), and 
Urban Development (eco) 
Meta Wolkite 29 3 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), Work-
ers and Social Affairs (soc), and Government 
Communication (adm) 
Egersa Lefo 26 6 Women, Children and Youth Affairs (soc), Work-
ers and Social Affairs (soc), Revenue (adm), Sport 
(soc), Environment, Forest & Climate Change 
Authority (eco), and Culture and Tourism (soc) 
Total (22) 639 65
Source: West Shoa Zone ODP Office Report (2019)
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strong. The results also show that increasing the number of district women 
councilors and female education cannot guarantee gender parity in top 
leadership and managerial positions. Yet, article 79 of the Oromia National 
Regional State Constitution sets out that top local political leaders (heads 
and vice heads) are appointed by the district council (ONRS, 2001).
4.8. Lower Managers in West Shoa Zone Local Governments 
and the Glass Wall
The new employee placement directive, issued by the Oromia Public Service 
and Human Resource Development Bureau (2019), emphasizes the merit prin-
ciple in appointments to the lower-level managerial positions. The directive 
gives due attention to qualification and fields of study, employee performance 
appraisal results, direct work experiences in managerial jobs, and gender in 
the assessment of applications for lower-level managerial positions. It sets out 
that women applicants and physically challenged persons should get three 
and four additional points, respectively. Figure 6 presents the proportion of 
women and men by level of education (top left figure), by sector (top right 
figure), and women and men managers by sectors (the bottom figure) in three 
rural local governments in West Shoa Zone, Oromia National Regional State.
The left figure shows the majority of male and female civil servants, in 
the three districts at least, have BA/ BSc degrees. Yet, the proportion of 
men is higher than of women. While females with BA/BSc comprise of 
civil servants in Chalia 59 (56 percent), Toke Kutaye 91 (60 percent), Adea 
Berga 83 (56 percent), men respectively account for 209 (69 percent), 232 
(66 percent) and 223 (71 percent).
The top right figure shows that female civil servants were underrepresented 
in all districts and in all sectors. The other important observation is that 
the majority of male civil servants were working in the economic sector in 
Chalia and Toke Kutaye districts, followed by the administration sector. For 
the Adea Berga district the opposite is the case. The number of female and 
male civil servants is proportionally low in the social sector in all districts.
The bottom figure reveals an interesting perspective. First, women lower-
level managers were underrepresented in all sectors. Second, when all districts 
are combined, the proportion of women managers in the administration and 
economic sectors is equivalent, but there are variations between districts. The 
majority of women mangers in Adea Berga District were in the administration 
sector. Men lower-level managers constitute the majority in the administration 
sector in Chalia district. In contrast, the proportion of men managers in 
economic sector (a strategic sector) was higher than in the administration 
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sector in Toke Kutay district. Interestingly, when the three districts are 
combined, men managers comprise a higher majority in the economic sector 
than in the administration sector.
How can we explain the glass ceiling and glass wall? The first important 
factor could be the field of study, the academic qualifications. Female applicant 
may lack the appropriate educational profile outlined by the job specifica-
tions. The second important factor could be the difference in managerial jobs 
experience. The placement directive pays attention to direct work experience, 
which female applicant more likely to lack, thus despite the additional points 
they could not compete with men. Third, the effect of “think manager think 
men perception” could be very significant, restricting female civil servants 
from applying for managerial jobs. If they do apply, women may prefer 
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managerial jobs in the administrative and social sectors. The proportion of 
women managers in the administration sector in the Adea Begra district is 
a good example of this. The underrepresentation of female civil servants in 
public administration could have also played a role. The combination of these 
factors provides a fairly clear explanation for the glass ceiling and the glass wall.
5. Discussion, Conclusions, and Implications 
This chapter reviews the feminist theories and provides an empirical ac-
count of women in politics in SSA countries and women in top political 
leadership and lower-level managerial positions in West Shoa Zone local 
governments. It is apparent that each feminist theory frames the problem of 
gender inequality from a different perspective and offers different solution 
thereof. Liberal feminists claim that the problem resides in the lack of legal 
rights and prescribes legal reforms and equal opportunities. Radical feminists 
have no confidence in legal reforms and focus on dismantling patriarchy. 
The Marxist and socialist feminists promote changing the capitalist mode of 
production (Marxist) and challenging masculinity (socialist). Black feminists 
focus on changing gender inequality due to race and class. Cultural feminists 
emphasize women-to-women networks, collective action, and accountability. 
Post-structural feminists concentrate on state-women interactions at the 
micro level and the role of individuals in framing ideas (agenda) and discourse.
Empirical results show that many SSA countries are not on track to meet the 
aspirations of the UN, which has set out to end gender-based discrimination 
in political and managerial jobs; neither are they on track to meet AU goals 
of ensuring that women to hold least 30 percent of political and managerial 
positions at all levels. Equally, the evidence from West Shoa Zone local 
governments shows that increasing the number of women politicians may 
not increase the number of top women political leaders and lower managers. 
Women were extremely underrepresented in both top political leadership 
and lower managerial positions, including in districts where women hold 
50 percent of local government council seats. The results also reveal that the 
proportion of women politicians and managers did not correlate with the 
democratic developmental state doctrine promoted by UN-ECA and AU to 
decrease socio-economic structural inequality.
The findings disclose that policy and legal reforms, which are promoted 
by liberal feminists, are important but insufficient on their own. Strikingly, 
women’s share of seats in the national parliament, in many SSA countries, did 
not correlate with the score on rule of law and government effectiveness, or 
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with the female harmonized test score, which is the core measure according to 
liberal feminists. This paradox clarifies the gap in enforcing the legal frameworks 
and policies (Wirth, 2001) on the one hand and the importance of the radical 
feminist perspective in time and space on the other. The World Bank (2016:5) 
asserts that gender law “on paper not necessarily reflect gender legal realities.” 
Going further, the UNDP (2017) claims that legal equality is not enough in its 
self to ensure gender equality. In extreme cases gender reforms can reinforce 
the deep-seated norms and practice; alternatively, due to resistance from 
privileged actors, the reforms may not be implemented at all (Verge et al., 2018).
The results highlight the need to understand the political economy of the 
nation. It is apparent that increased economic growth is insufficient to explain-
ing women’s share of parliamentarian seats in SSA. Neither is the quota system 
sufficient. Understanding the politics of the day and state-society interaction 
in time and space is therefore crucial. Here the Marxist and socialist feminists’ 
perspectives have relevance, although the prescription of Marxist feminism 
is questionable particularly in the context of Africa, where class formation is 
unconsolidated and indigenous institutions remain powerful.
Evidence supports the relevance of cultural feminists to address gender 
inequality in political and managerial jobs. Despite the variation, it appears 
that “think politics and management think men mentality” remains strong in 
many SSA countries. The underrepresentation of top women political leaders 
and lower managers in West Shoa Zone local government also confirms the 
existence of this phenomenon.
One may ask why the local government councils, in West Shoa Zone, could 
not nominate and appoint many women political leaders? This draws our 
attention to concerns about how policies and legal frameworks are formulated. 
It also draws our attention to issues of numerical majority and power majority. 
This in turn leads to a number of key questions: Who were/are the actors and 
who are the gatekeepers? What were/are the nature of power relations among 
actors and whose interest/s prevailed? and What were/are the rules of the 
game? The gatekeepers control access to power and resources. As Dominelli 
(2002) observes, globally, critical legal frameworks, including gender policies, 
are usually formulated by men. Akanle et al. (2018) maintain the problem 
could be worse in Africa due to the results of colonial legacy and the ruthless 
authoritarianism of post-independence African leaders, which institutionalized 
the male as breadwinners and women’s complementary role. This raises the 
importance of women-to-women networks and collective action to deflect the 
ingrained institutional culture. Buranajaroenkij et al. (2018) find the women’s 
social movement in Thailand has increased their political competence and 
engagement in politics and hence acceptance by different actors.
220 bAchA KEbEdE dEbElA
The underrepresentation of top women political leaders and managers in 
the executive offices of the West Shoa Zone’s local governments discloses 
the importance of post-structural feminists’ perspective. The proportion of 
women political leaders and managers does not correspond with the decision 
of PM Abiy Ahemed to maintain gender parity in ministerial positions, which 
clarifies the role of individuals in agenda setting and the enforcement thereof.
Finally, ethnicity rather than race may be also a relevant factor in some 
SSA countries. In general, women’s participation in political and manage-
rial jobs appears to depend on multiple national, structural-institutional, 
socio-cultural, and political contexts, reflecting “more is more” only when 
there are more model women political leaders and managers, which in turn 
depends on enabling politico-administrative contexts. That is to say, although 
important, a high number of women parliamentarians does not necessarily 
reflect a strong democratic system, nor does it produce strong gender laws and 
policies, particularly in single-party authoritarian regimes such as Ethiopia, 
where the executive and legislative power are considerably fused and the 
executive is dominant, and where there is strong party discipline (Ayenew, 
2019). This suggests the relevance of pragmatism to shattering the glass ceiling 
and the glass wall. Yet the limitation of the research presented here should 
be noted. The study relied on secondary data: the perception and actual 
situation of women politicians, political leaders (top), and lower managers 
was not investigated. This could be the focus area for future research.
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Notes
1. Staff data of all sectors are organized into pools: the civil service pool, and the administra-
tion pool.
2. Benin, Botswana, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Dem, Nigeria, Mali, and 
Swaziland
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3. Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo, Rep, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, The, Ghana, Guinea-Bis-
sau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, 
Togo, and Zambia.
4. Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Seychelles, Somalia, 
South Sudan
5. Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe
6. Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe
7. The indicators are Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/
Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption.
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Institutional Change and Reform 
in Oromia’s Public Sector : 
Challenges and Prospects
Hirko Wakgari Amanta
Box 1: Key messages of this chapter
 Ethiopia’s civil service system has never been politically neutral, professional, and 
stable.
 nPm-inspired public sector reforms in oromia have largely failed, mainly because 
of incompatibility with historical and politico-administrative contexts.
 historically, nPm presumes the existence of a longstanding, professional, and 
rule-bound bureaucratic system, which has never been the case in oromia.
 lack of political settlements has been a major challenge to institutional reforms in 
oromia.
 inclusive political settlements, customized (re)-bureaucratization, and meritocracy 
will provide good prospects for future reform efforts in the region/country.
Box 2: Key lessons of this chapter
reading this chapter will give you insights in:
 the concepts of institutions and contemporary institutional change theories;
 the key precepts of nPm and its role as a paradigm of public sector reform in 
Ethiopia;
 the institutional evolution of Ethiopia’s/oromia’s civil service and reform waves 
since the 1990s and
 the politico-administrative contexts of (and challenges to) reforms in oromia 
since the 1990s.
Box 3: Abbreviations
bPr = business Process reengineering
bsc = balanced score card
csrP = civil service reform Program 
EPlF = Eritrean People’s liberation Front
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EPrdF = Ethiopian People’s revolutionary democratic Front
FdrE = Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia
GoE = Government of Ethiopia
mcb = ministry of capacity building
mocs = ministry of civil service
nPm = new Public management
olF = oromo liberation Front
oPdo = oromo People’s democratic organization
PEA = Political Economy Analysis
PscAP = Public sector capacity building Program
Psr = Public sector reform
tPlF = tigray People’s liberation Front
1. Introduction
The view that the contemporary varying level of countries’ development 
has been heavily influenced by their institutional histories has become a 
well-established line of argument in both the administrative and development 
literatures (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Evans, 2004; Shand, 2015; Todaro 
& Smith, 2015). As a corollary to this basic argument, Acemoglu & Robinson 
(2012) further emphasize that the prospect of a country to embark upon a path 
to sustainable development depends highly on its ability to seize opportunities 
provided during critical junctures to reform its governance institutions.
Seen from the above perspective, and as has been suggested by several 
scholars (Asefa, 2001; Bedasso, 2017; Moges, 2013; Zawude, 2000), the 
present-day general underdevelopment and poverty in Ethiopia has primarily 
been a problem of institutional failure. In relation to this, Zawude (2000) 
categorizes the turbulent institutional evolution of the Ethiopian state into 
three historically distinct periods: 1941-1974 (the period of institutional 
building), 1974-1991 (the period of distress), and the years since 1991 (the 
period of restructuring). He, like several other scholarly observers (Hassen, 
2009; Lata, 1999), also notes that the beginning of each period was marked 
by critical junctures and missed historic opportunities for effecting desirable 
institutional changes.
Particularly, the 1991 change of government was widely expected to serve as 
a critical turning point for addressing a mass of both old and new institutional 
challenges in the country (Hassen, 2009; Miruts & Daba, 2016; Terefe, 2016). 
Supposedly consistent with those expectations, the EPRDF-led GoE soon 
embarked upon a series of public sector institutional reforms that broadly 
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fall under three major phases (1992-1996, 1996-2000, and 2001-onwards)1 
(Mengesha & Common, 2007). The last reform phase, in particular, involved 
the adoption of a plethora of NPM-inspired reform initiatives, including 
district level decentralization, BPR, BSC, and the Citizens’ Charter, all of 
which have since been under implementation (Fida, 2016; Araya et al., 2017).
However, implementation of those reforms was seriously hindered by 
several problems and challenges that rendered their practical contributions 
very much questionable. For example, the results of numerous past stud-
ies and official assessments (Beyene, 2009; Fida, 2016; Kacho et al., 2016; 
World Bank, 2013; PSCO, 2015; Wakgari, 2016) identified competency and 
attitudinal gaps among civil servants and their organizational managers, lack 
of sustained leadership commitment, and inadequate incentives as major 
challenges to the successful implementation of reforms in the country in 
general and in Oromia National Regional State in particular. Some of the 
studies (Kacho et al., 2016; Wakgari, 2016) also reported lack of meritocracy 
and professionalism and prevalence of political partisanship in the civil 
service as being among the critical challenges that constrained effective 
implementation of PSRs in Oromia’s public sector.
Nevertheless, most of the existing studies on the public sector institutional 
reform in Ethiopia/Oromia have focused mainly on the operational challenges 
and immediate causes of ineffectiveness in reform implementations rather 
than looking into the contextual root causes of those challenges. In particular, 
this author is unaware of any study that has explicitly treated challenges posed 
by historical and broader political contexts to effective implementation of 
public sector institutional reforms in Oromia National Regional State. On the 
other hand, the currently unfolding political and socioeconomic conditions 
(beginning with the coming into power of a new administration in April 2018) 
in the aftermath of several years of popular protests has heralded the arrival of 
yet another critical juncture in the country’s institutional history. This further 
necessitates a proper understanding of the forces that shape implementation 
of institutional reforms within specific local/regional historical and political 
contexts, which are currently lacking in the institutional change literature 
in general (Batley et al., 2011; Shand, 2015) and in the Ethiopian context in 
particular (as highlighted above). It is thus against this background that the 
author set out to explore the topic with the general objective of analyzing 
past challenges and future prospects for undertaking effective reforms for 
sustainable institutional change in Oromia’s public sector.
In view of its stated objective, the study attempts to critically examine a 
series of research questions that have not yet been addressed, to the best of my 
knowledge. The key questions to be addressed are: how compatible was the 
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institutional heritage in Oromia’s public sector with the main assumptions 
behind the PSRs in general and the NPM-inspired reforms in particular? 
Were the political economy contexts in the country/region favorable for 
introducing those reform measures? If they were not, what repercussions 
have they had in the process of reform implementations? The ultimate goal 
in trying to answer these questions is to explore possible mechanisms for 
getting around similar problems in future reform efforts in general and during 
the currently unfolding critical juncture in particular.
Attempts shall be made to provide answers to the basic research questions 
through analysis of theoretical and empirical evidence drawn from diverse 
sources. The main sources of evidence include: reform-related country policy 
documents, reviews of the institutional change and reform literature, past 
scholarly researches, official government agency reports, independent evalu-
ation reports by international (donor) agencies, and empirical data from a 
2016 survey of over five hundred civil servants and managers across Oromia’s 
public sector as part of my past research work on a related topic. This shall 
further be supplemented by insights drawn from my firsthand experience as a 
practitioner in providing technical support for implementation of reforms in 
the region’s public sector for close to a decade and several rounds of in-depth 
discussions with over a dozen senior public sector experts and past and present 
members of the political leadership in the region.
Nonetheless, one possible methodological limitation that needs to be 
admitted from the outset is that the discussions here shall focus on macro-level 
analysis of the issue at hand without delving into sectoral and micro-level 
investigations. This is so mainly because of the lack of relevant empirical 
data at those levels, which in turn has been dictated by constraints related 
to lack of research funds.
The rest of this chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section 
begins with a conceptualization of institutions, institutional change, and 
reforms followed by a brief account of institutional change and reform theories 
and paradigms. The second section examines the evolution and practice of 
public sector reforms and institutional change in Oromia/Ethiopia’s public 
sector. The third section examines the historical and political contexts of those 
reforms and the challenges posed thereby to reform implementation. This is 
followed by empirical discussions to demonstrate how over-politicization of 
the civil service sector deprived it of the human resource capacity necessary 
for effective execution of reforms. The fourth section highlights the need 
for inclusive political settlements, which it argues would open the door for 
positive and sustainable institutional change. The final section provides brief 
conclusions and implications.
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There is a considerable literature dealing with the question of how best to define 
institutions (Hodgson, 2006; Leftwich, 2009; Kingston & Caballero, 2008; 
North, 1990). However, there has not yet appeared a universally accepted 
definition across the literature. Instead, the different theories (which shall be 
briefly discussed below) define institutions variously and authors use different 
definitions,2 which vary depending on the theoretical perspectives they adopt.
Among others, one relatively common definition of institutions considers 
them as the rules of the game in a society (Herrera et al., 2005; Lindegaard, 
2013). However, according to Leftwich (2009), institutions are best under-
stood in broadly Northian terms (North, 1991), which define institutions as 
the humanly devised constraints and/or enabling mechanisms that structure 
political, economic, and social interactions. The constraints and enabling 
mechanisms as stated in the latter definition can further take the form of either 
formal or informal institutions. Formal institutions exist in the form of laws, 
acts, regulations, constitutions etc., which are enacted and (usually) written. 
Informal institutions, on the other hand, are the unwritten but socially shared 
norms and codes of behavior enforced outside official channels (Leftwich, 
2009; Lindegaard, 2013; Shand, 2015).
Institutional Change 
Since institutions are humanly devised, they exist only as far as a sufficiently 
high number of individuals believe they exist and act accordingly (Olsen, 
2009). In other words, dissent can lead to collective actions that may result 
in changing existing institutions or the establishment of new ones. Institu-
tional change thus refers to changes in formal and informal rules of behavior 
both between agents and between agents and organizations (Wegerich, 
2001). The changes so defined may further take the form of either a de-
institutionalization, where existing institutions become discontinued, or a 
re-institutionalization, which implies either a retrogression or a transformation 
from one set to another (new) set of institutions (Olsen, 2009; Peters, 2000).
In short, every institution is vulnerable to influences and hence to change, 
which means that formally organized public sector institutions that maintain a 
certain kind of order are nonetheless liable to change under certain conditions. 
These conditions for change can arise from deliberate reforms embarked upon 
230 hirKo WAKGAri AmAntA
by governments or from collective dissent and revolutionary movements 
against incumbent governments that may contribute as much as peaceful 
reform to the change of existing institutions or the establishment of new 
ones (Olsen, 2009; Wegerich, 2001).
Public Sector Institutional Reforms 
Reform implies a deliberate action taken toward a change for the better as 
a way of correcting wrongdoing or defects in a system (Omoyefa, 2008). 
The change so implied may range from minor adjustments to management 
arrangements to fundamental changes in governance and management 
arrangements (EU, 2009). Given the diverse scope of the concept of reform 
itself, it is no wonder that there also exist numerous definitions of public sector 
reforms, depending on the scope and context of the reform one is dealing with.
One of the definitions that goes with the theme of this study is the one 
provided by Ayee (2008), which describes public sector administrative reform 
as deliberately designed efforts to induce fundamental changes in a public 
administrative system through system-wide change (of institutional arrange-
ments) or at least through measures for improvement of one or more of its key 
elements in terms of their scope, modus operandi, and implications. Another 
related definition, suggested by Omoyefa (2008), also considers public sector 
reform as deliberate policy measures and administrative actions taken by a 
government (or a government agency) to change existing institutional arrange-
ments (organizational structures, processes, and people’s behavior) in an attempt 
to improve its administrative machinery for performance at optimal level.
Recent PSR measures, in particular, have focused on the need for reforms 
toward a private-style management for achieving better results (especially 
in terms of efficiency) in the public sector (Olsen, 2008; Peters 2003). The 
presupposition is that things are not properly managed in the public sector, 
that unnecessary wastage has crept into the ways the public sector is being 
run, and that too many people are doing poorly what fewer people can do 
efficiently (Omoyefa, 2008). These kinds of approaches towards PSR have 
generally come to be labeled under the umbrella term of the “New Public 
Management,” which is the subject of the discussion in the next section.
The New Public Management (NPM) as a Paradigm of Public Sector 
Reform 
NPM is a model of public administration that has developed in opposition to 
the bureaucratic model (Charbonneau, 2012). It assumes that bureaucracy 
inhibits adaptation and thus advocates for the replacement of the traditional 
model of public administration based on the principles of bureaucracy by 
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market-based public service management (ECA, 2004; Olsen, 2008). 
Moreover, proponents of NPM claim that the kind of governments that 
developed during the industrial era, with sluggish centralized bureaucracies, 
preoccupation with rules, and hierarchical chains of command simply no 
longer work very well (Peters, 2003).
The fundamental logic of proponents of NPM is that management in the 
public sector is not in any meaningful way different from management in 
the private sector, and that the public sector has not paid sufficient attention 
to management and to the role of the manager. They further maintain that 
if managers and their organizations are released from the constraints that 
politics places on them, then the system will perform better (Charbonneau, 
2012; Peters, 2003).
With the aforementioned theoretical assumptions, the NPM perspec-
tive also developed positive, action-oriented phrases, such as: reinventing 
government, re-engineering, transformation, downsizing and “rightsizing,” 
and the likes (Ayee, 2008). In regard to the historical evolution of such NPM 
thinking, Peters (2003) suggests that, like many changes in the political and 
social life, it is difficult to assign it an exact date. Rather, according to Peters 
(2003), there was the growing sense during the 1970s and into the 1980s that 
something was wrong with the way in which government worked and that 
change was necessary. For some authors (Charbonneau, 2012; ECA, 2004), 
however, the event consecrating the emergence of NPM was the reform of 
Britain’s administration, launched in the wake of nascent neoliberalism and 
coinciding with the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. What 
is evident, in either case, is that the percepts of NPM have dominated the 
public administration reform agenda of most OECD countries from the late 
1970s (Charbonneau, 2012; Peters 2003; ECA, 2004).
Moreover, NPM has since served as an umbrella term for a variety of ap-
proaches going under different names. One common typology of approaches 
seen in the evolution of NPM practices has been provided by Ferlie et al. 
(1996). According to these authors, the first NPM model is characterized by 
an efficiency drive in public administration, wherein improvements are sought 
through tight hierarchical control of work processes. The second model seeks 
to introduce flexibility into organizational structures through downsizing and 
decentralization. The third model seeks to develop a culture of excellence within 
public administration through an emphasis on innovation. The fourth model 
accords customers/service users a greater role and voice in decision-making 
(Ferlie et al., 1996). The NPM models thus developed have become the source 
of the principal impetus for reform across many countries in Africa (ECA, 
2004), including Ethiopia, as shall further be demonstrated in a later section.
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2.2. Institutional Change Theories: Towards a Theoretical 
Framework 
The New Institutionalism 
Analyses of institutional change in recent decades have been set within what 
has been collectively termed as “New Institutionalism,” which embraces 
rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological 
institutionalism (Lindegaard, 2013; Peters, 2005).
Rational choice institutionalism draws heavily on neoclassical micro-
economics and political economy and emphasizes the function of institutions 
through systems of rules and incentives as individuals maximize self-interest 
(Lindegaard, 2013; Shand, 2015). Its underlying logic is that institutions are 
arrangements of rules and incentives and that the members of the institutions 
behave in response to those basic components of institutional structure 
(Peters, 2000). Rational choice institutionalism also presumes that individuals 
(or groups) are rational and calculating in making choices within constraints 
to obtain their desired ends and that their decisions rest on an assessment 
of the probable actions of others (Leftwich, 2007). Given its emphasis on 
actors’ rational, strategic behavior to fulfill their preferences, rational choice 
institutionalism explains the creation of (and changes in) certain institutional 
structures in terms of their benefit to pertinent actors and thus generally relies 
on exogenous bases for change (Lindegaard, 2013; Shand, 2015).
On the other hand, sociological institutionalism considers institutions in 
the context of more informal, cultural practices (Lindegaard, 2013). It argues 
that culture, not just efficiency, shapes institutions, and considers institutional 
forms and practices in light of the cognitive scripts and moral templates that 
provide the “frames of meaning” guiding human action (ibid). Central to this 
perspective is also the view that institutional conditions are malleable and, 
while there may be strong forces that work to preserve particular arrangements 
where these favor elite interests, institutions can change as a result of the 
“friction” between rules and the effects of their application on social actors. It 
thus emphasizes the importance of social interaction in forming and changing 
institutions (Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Shand, 2015).
In contrast, historical institutionalism defines institutions largely 
as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions 
embedded in the organizational structure of a polity or political economy 
(Lindegaard, 2013). Nonetheless, this perspective often focuses on formal 
aspects of institutions and the asymmetric power relations they propagate 
(ibid). With regard to change, historical institutionalism holds that institu-
tional function is governed by precedents and emphasizes the persistence 
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of rules along a “path” until affected by exogenous shocks (Shand, 2015). 
Thus, while maintaining an implicit focus on the role of power in explaining 
institutional change, the historical institutionalism perspective generally 
considers institutional trajectories as being “path dependent,” or prone to 
continuing along an established trajectory. It presumes that change occurs 
sporadically when institutional trajectories are punctuated by points of sudden 
and substantial changes leading to a new trajectory, referred to as “critical 
junctures” (Lindegaard, 2013). The overall implication of this perspective is 
that the policy and structural choices made at the inception of institutions 
will have a persistent influence over their behavior for the remainder of their 
existence (Peters, 2000).
Incidentally, it is to be stressed here that the central theme of this paper is 
to analyze challenges to past institutional change and reform efforts in Oro-
mia’s public sector from historical and political perspectives and to map out 
future prospects for such changes. The foregoing descriptions of institutional 
change theories has thus been made in search of the most relevant theoretical 
framework that best accommodates the underlying objectives of this study. In 
relation to this, despite some advances in historical institutionalism in terms 
of engaging the role of power relations in explaining institutional change, 
the new institutionalisms in general have not yet grappled seriously with the 
critical role of political factors in explaining how domestically legitimate 
and appropriate institutions might be set up, reformed, or maintained 
(Combarnous & Rougier, 2010; Hudson & Leftwich, 2014;). On the other 
hand, over the last two decades, the variety of scholarly works analyzing the 
role of political factors in explaining such changes have together come to be 
loosely labeled as political economy analysis (PEA) (DFID, 2009; Hudson 
& Leftwich, 2014), which shall be briefly discussed below.
The Political Economy Approach to Institutional Change 
The political economy approach to institutional change focuses on how 
political power and resources are distributed and contested in different 
contexts. It also emphasizes the role of political settlement for facilitating 
effective PSRs (DFID, 2009; Jones, 2015; Khemani, 2017).
According to DFID (2009), political economy analysis is concerned 
with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the 
distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals 
and the processes that create, sustain, and transform these relationships. 
DFID (2009)’s definition draws particular attention to politics, understood in 
terms of contestation and bargaining between interest groups with competing 
claims over rights and resources.
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Similarly, a framework for assessing the political economy of reform sug-
gested by the World Bank (2008) stresses the need to look particularly at 
the reform context in terms of political contexts and the related social and 
ethnic cleavages affecting the reform under consideration. With regard to 
conceptualization, the standard definition of an institution used in most 
PEA studies considers institutions as the rules of the game that determine 
the limits of choice and structure incentives, wherein incentives determine 
whether or not players follow the rules of the game (Hudson & Leftwich, 
2014; North 1990).
Finally, in light of the foregoing discussions, this study shall draw on the 
historical institutionalism theory (a strand of the new institutionalism) 
along with a political economy analysis approach to understand the chal-
lenges posed by the historical and political contexts of reforms in Ethiopia in 
general and in Oromia National Regional State in particular to the effective 
implementation of PSR since the 1990s. In view of this, the study adopts an 
operational definition of institutions that considers them as the formal and 
informal structural properties of social groups within an organization, which 
are constituted by the rules and procedures that constrain some forms of 
behavior while enabling other forms of behavior between people and groups 
across public sector organizational domains.
3. Public Sector Reforms and Institutional Change in 
Oromia/Ethiopia
3.1. Overview of Reform Waves since the 1990s (PSRs under the 
EPRDF Regime)
The EPRDF-led Ethiopian government embarked on multiple administrative 
reforms that have generally evolved over three phases beginning from early 
1990s (1992-1996, 1996-2000, and 2001 onwards) (Mengesha & Common, 
2007). In the first reform phase (1991 to 1996) the focus was essentially on 
structural adjustment, with economic liberalization and structural reforms 
in the public sector. Accordingly, among the main objectives of this phase of 
reforms was to reassign the civil service employees hitherto organized under 
the unitary state to the newly emerging regional states and to improve the 
efficiency of public service delivery (Debela & Hagos, 2012).
However, public sector services did not improve much; consequently, the 
government attempted to systematically articulate the problems of the civil 
service by establishing a task force (TF) that was supposed to produce a new 
institutionAl chAnGE And rEForm in oromiA’s Public sEc tor 235
reform program suited to the needs of the country. The TF made assessment 
of the existing system and made reform recommendations, based on which 
the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) was prepared (Araya et al., 2017; 
Mengesha & Common, 2007).
The CSRP was thus designed in 1996 as the second reform phase consisting 
of five sub-programs: top management system, human resource management, 
service delivery, expenditure management and control, and ethics (FDRE, 
2001; Mesfin, 2008). Moreover, the CSRP also involved the introduction of 
new policy and legal frameworks as well as operating systems and procedures 
into the civil service. Among others, institutional reform initiatives such 
as amending civil service laws and codes of ethics, setting up complaints-
handling procedures, and the adoption of a new service delivery policy in 
2001 were undertaken as part of the reform measure packaged under the 
CSRP (Beyene, 2009; Fida, 2016).
In the meantime, the occurrence of internal dissent within the EPRDF 
in 2001 and the resulting renewal scheme undertaken by the front provided 
yet another milestone in setting the government’s subsequent reform direc-
tion. Among other initiatives, the front ventured into a new ideological 
terrain in favor of the “developmental state” in the aftermath of concluding 
its renewal process in 2001 (Araya et al., 2017). Following the decision to 
adopt a developmental state model and by drawing on the success factors of 
earlier developmental states in East Asia, the government also apparently felt 
the need for further reforms to build a professional and capable civil service 
system (World Bank, 2013). Consequently, the EPRDF-led GoE commenced 
the third phase of its reform agenda in 2003 in the form of a five-year Public 
Service Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) by establishing a Ministry of 
Capacity Building as a new super ministry in charge of coordinating all civil 
service reform initiatives (Araya et al., 2017).
Subsequently, the PSCAP arranged its intervention by repackaging the 
CSRP into seven areas: strengthening the capacity of the civil service reform 
coordinating structures at the federal, regional, and local levels, improving 
expenditure management and control activities, improving governance of 
human resource management, improving public service delivery, improving 
accountability and transparency, strengthening top-management systems, 
and building the capacity of emerging regions (Mesfin, 2008).
Moreover, following the adoption the developmental state as an important 
ideological model in 2001 and as part of the third reform wave, the EPRDF-led 
GoE also moved on to a second phase of decentralization, which was ostensibly 
meant to devolve service delivery to districts (woredas) (Araya et al., 2017). 
Theoretically, Ethiopia’s system of decentralization had multiple dimensions 
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that included political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization (World 
Bank, 2013). However, despite the outward commitment to such decen-
tralization initiatives, the actual practice has been severely constrained. For 
example, it has been reported by several studies that parallel to the professed 
processes of decentralization, the EPEDF government in practice developed 
structures of top-down rule, particularly through its party apparatus that 
was used to dwarf local initiatives and autonomy (Harald, et al., 2018; Kena, 
2016; Pausewang et al., 2002).
Besides, and in particular, the Ethiopian government also launched a range 
of other reform initiatives that broadly fall under the umbrella of the “New 
Public Management” paradigm as part of its third reform wave (Araya et al., 
2017). Such NPM-inspired reforms implemented in Ethiopia as part of the 
third reform wave under EPRDF included Business Process Re-engineering 
(BPR), Balanced Score Card (BSC), and the Citizens Charter (Fida, 2016), 
which shall be described in the next section.
3.2. The New Public Management as a Paradigm for Reform in 
Ethiopia/Oromia: Selected Cases of NPM Inspired Reform 
Initiatives
It has been widely attested that the initiation of many reforms in Africa 
since the 1990s have been inspired by the concept of NPM (ECA, 2004; 
UNDP, 2009). Likewise, conceptual descriptions of the NPM and the range 
of reforms inspired by the paradigm (as described earlier under section 2.1.4 
of this chapter) also capture well most of the structural, organizational, and 
managerial changes taking place in the public services of Ethiopia.
For example, beginning from 2003 (and with the rather flawed assump-
tion, as shall be argued in the next section, that the Ethiopian civil service 
had grown into an overly hierarchical bureaucratic system), the GoE made 
a sweeping decision to initiate BPR across all government agencies (Araya 
et al., 2017). According to Hammer & Champy (1993), BPR focuses on 
changing four components of an organization, namely; business processes, 
job and structure (which involves changing a hierarchical organizational 
structure to a flat one), management and measurement, and values and 
beliefs.
In relation to NPM, the focus on work processes and flexibility in organi-
zational structures through downsizing as described in the first two models 
provided by Ferlie et al. (1996) (discussed under section 2.1.4) have been 
well taken up through the adoption of the BPR reform initiative in Ethiopia. 
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Moreover, BPR also shares with the NPM reform paradigm such core issues 
as restructuring to reduce cost, de-bureaucratizing hierarchical organizational 
structures for greater efficiency, enhancing outcome measurement for better 
performance management, and increasing customer satisfaction by placing 
customers at the center of business decision-making. Furthermore, Pollit 
and Bouckaert (2011) describe BPR as being at the more “radical” end of 
NPM initiatives, pursued by countries especially interested in importing 
private sector practices into the civil service and in reducing the distinctions 
between the two, such as New Zealand, Australia, and the UK (cited in Araya 
et al., 2017).
Similarly, the emphasis on innovation and a culture of excellence within 
public administration in the third model and the centrality of customers in 
decision-making emphasized in the fourth model following Ferlie et al. (1996) 
perfectly aligns with the BSC and Citizen Charter reform initiatives that have 
been under implementation in Ethiopia as components of the third reform 
wave under the EPRDF regime. For example, BSC is commonly described 
as a management, communication, and measurement system for translating 
an organization’s strategic objectives into a set of performance indicators 
distributed among four perspectives: Financial, Customer, Internal Business 
Process, and Learning and Growth (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). BSC is thus 
an essentially NPM-inspired reform tool with a customer focus as one of its 
four pillars and an emphasis on innovation through its learning and growth 
perspective. Moreover, its emphasis on performance management based on 
clear and explicit managerial targets combined with managerial autonomy 
and incentives to perform is also at the core of the NPM (ECA, 2004). In 
the same way, the Citizen Charter, which has been under implementation 
in Ethiopia since 2012, incorporates the concept of perceiving the citizen 
as a “customer” of public services, which is a key feature of the NPM as well 
(Ayee, 2008).
Overall, the discussion in this section has attempted to provide a quick 
overview of the three broad waves of reform initiatives undertaken in 
EPRDF-led Ethiopia since the early 1990s. The final parts of this section in 
particular described how reform tools such as BPR, BSC, and Citizen Charter 
implemented in Ethiopia over the last decades relate to the NPM paradigm 
of de-bureaucratized and private-style management. The following section 
examines particular challenges encountered in the implementation of reforms 
in Oromia National Regional State since the 1990s in general and the third 
wave NPM-inspired reform measures in particular from the historical and 
political points of view.
238 hirKo WAKGAri AmAntA
4. Challenges to Institutional Change and Reform in 
Oromia/Ethiopia 
4.1. Historical Challenges: De-bureaucratization before 
Bureaucratization
As discussed earlier (see section 2.1.4), the NPM paradigm is based on a num-
ber of fundamental assumptions about the existing civil service systems that 
determine the viability of its reform recommendations. The most important of 
these assumptions is that there is already a well-established system of public 
administration in place to be reformed and that this system is generally infused 
with the values of the traditional hierarchical and rule-bound bureaucratic 
system of state administration (Olsen, 2008; Peters, 2003). With this note of 
caution in mind, the following paragraphs highlight the historical evolution 
of Ethiopia’s civil service system in general, and the genesis of Oromia’s public 
administration system in particular, to discern whether it meets the stated 
fundamental assumptions of the NPM.
To begin with, the establishment of modern civil service in Ethiopia dates 
back to 1907, when Emperor Menelik II initiated the formation of a few 
ministries (Kacho et al., 2016). Later, Emperor Haileselassie introduced some 
measures to modernize public administration by appointing salaried and 
educated personnel in the civil service (Beyene, 2009). However, given the 
high regard to political loyalty and the level of political interference affecting 
standard operating procedures, the civil service repeatedly failed to deliver 
the intended service to the public. This contributed to public discontent that 
finally resulted in overthrow of the imperial regime by the Dergue military 
junta in 1974 (Kacho et al., 2016; Mengesha & Common, 2007).
The Dergue regime, in its move to establish a socialist state, took extensive 
nationalization measures accompanied by the proliferation of new govern-
ment institutions, parallel party structures, and the appointment of party 
functionaries to key decision-making civil service positions. Such measures 
resulted in a tremendous expansion along with the overlapping of roles in 
the public sector, which created a mix of military-bureaucratic dictatorship 
(Ayenew, 1997, Clapham, 2002). The subsequent years were characterized 
by the centralization of administration, duplication and fragmentation of 
public functions, utter downplaying of merit and professionalism, and inef-
ficiency in service delivery until the Dergue too was finally ousted in 1991 
by a coalition of several rebel groups, including the EPRDF/TPLF, EPLF, 
and OLF (Gebresslase & Berhutesfa, 2016; Mengesha & Common, 2007; 
Pausewang, 2009).
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The Post Dergue Period: Genesis of the Existing Oromia’s Public Sector 
Institutions
It has been argued in the literature of institutional change that periods 
of institutional genesis correspond to critical junctures that place insti-
tutional arrangements on trajectories that are difficult to alter (Hogan, 
2006; Pierson, 2004). This is mainly because of the fact that institutions 
express the ideas, interests, purpose, and power of those who designed 
and supervise them (Leftwich, 2007). Understanding the origins of 
institutions thus requires knowledge of the “all-important matter of the 
material and ideological conditions on which they are founded and of 
the political leadership and their ideas” (Grindle, 2001; Leftwich, 2007). 
Taking this fact into consideration, the subsequent discussions examine 
the ideological conditions on which Oromia National Regional State public 
institutions were founded, starting from the period of their genesis, which 
also corresponds with the critical juncture marked by Ethiopia’s political 
transition in the early 1990s.
From the outset, several rebel groups were involved in actively fighting 
the Dergue regime before its final demise in 1991 (Smith, 2007). However, 
toward the end of the military dictatorship, around 1989, when TPLF together 
with EPRDF and several other liberation movements (among them the OLF) 
was on the verge of winning the resistance war, TPLF organized Oromo 
prisoners of war into the OPDO with the intent of preparing it in its image 
for controlling the political arena in the future Oromia regional state. On the 
eve of the final ousting of the Dergue in May 1991, OLF was invited together 
with TPLF and EPLF to a conference in London, where the future structure 
for Ethiopia was discussed and a Transitional Charter was proposed in lieu 
of a constitution for a transitional period. And OLF leaders were reported 
to be the key players in the subsequent drafting of the proposed Transitional 
Charter (Hassen, 2009; Lata, 1999; Pausewang, 2009).
As a follow-up to the London Conference, the Addis Ababa Conference 
of July 1999 was organized in which a total of thirty-one parties (including 
the OLF, OPDO and three other Oromo political parties) met to discuss the 
future of Ethiopia and agreed upon a Transitional Charter (Hassen, 2009). 
The conference established these representatives as a transitional parliament, 
adopted the Transitional Charter, and called on TPLF and their leader, Meles 
Zenawi, to form a central transitional government (Pausewang, 2009). The 
transitional government thus assumed power in 1991 and subsequently passed 
several proclamations in accordance with the spirit of the Transitional Charter. 
This included Proclamation No 7/1992, which provided for the setting up of 
regional state governments (TGE; 1992; Terefe, 2016).
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Accordingly, the Oromia National Regional State was set up with its own 
organs of government (with legislative councils, executive committees, and 
judicial bodies) adapted to its own newly adopted regional constitution. The 
government of the Oromia National Regional State, now under the exclusive 
leadership of the OPDO3 (a member of the TPLF-led EPRDF coalition which 
was leading the central transitional government) also created regional public 
sector agencies (bureaus) and built up administrative structures at zonal, 
district, and village levels to replace the structures of the now defunct military 
regime (Harald, et al., 2018; Pausewang, 2009). In short, the genesis of the 
existing Oromia National Regional State public sector institutions, which 
were exclusively managed by the OPDO, traces its origins back to this period 
of the transitional government of Ethiopia (early 1990s).
The overall implication of the foregoing description of the evolution of the 
public administration system in Ethiopia in general and that of the Oromia 
National Regional State in particular is that the country has never had a 
politically neutral, professional, and stable bureaucracy throughout its history 
of modern public administration. In other words, the country has never had a 
well-bureaucratized and longstanding system of public administration whose 
ills needed to be cured through the de-bureaucratization remedy prescribed 
by the NPM-inspired reforms. Given this, it needed to be clear from the outset 
that the proposals for institutional change through de-bureaucratization inher-
ent in the NPM reform measures were poorly suited to the actual problems 
and reform needs of the Ethiopian civil service systems in general and to 
the even much younger administrative system of Oromia’s public sector in 
particular. Even worse, some scholars (Olsen, 2008; Peters, 2003) have long 
warned that if there is not such a system in place, the loosening of hierarchical 
controls inherent in NPM can become a recipe for mismanagement, as has 
been the case in Oromia/Ethiopia.4
4.2. Political Challenges: Institutional Reforms without Political 
Settlement
Existing political accounts of the transitional period (Hassen, 2009; Lata, 
1999; Pausewang, 2009) during which the Oromia National Regional State’s 
public sector institutions were founded indicate that the period (1991-1995) 
was characterized by political polarization between EPRDF/TPLF/OPDO 
and the other Oromo political parties. Among the five political parties that 
represented the interests of Oromia in the TGE, OLF was given four ministe-
rial posts in the central government, against three for OPDO. On the other 
hand, the OPDO, under the direct leadership and guidance of the TPLF/
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EPRDF, was put in charge of singlehandedly building up the region’s system 
of public administration. It thus controlled organization and recruitment into 
all of the region’s public sector agencies across the regional, zonal, district, 
and village levels (Pausewang, 2009).
Moreover, by forcing out key political groups such as the OLF from the 
TGE, the EPRDF later came to control and monopolize the political process 
(Smith, 2007). After the OLF and all other Oromo political parties were forced 
to withdraw from the TGE in 1992, the OPDO continued to administer in 
Oromia on behalf of the EPRDF (Pausewang, 2009). Nonetheless, because 
of its origin and ideological dependence on the TPLF/EPRDF, the OPDO 
did not have any meaningful support or legitimacy among the Oromo people 
(Harald et al., 2018; Vaughan 2011). As a result, it turned out that OPDO 
found it difficult to find qualified people locally. It thus went on recruiting 
school dropouts and a few other unemployed and merely literate opportunist 
individuals who, having seen their chance for secure jobs and positions in be-
ing recruited for the party, acted swiftly to take advantage of the opportunity. 
Among these elements, OPDO recruited a corps of unconditionally loyal 
administrators who knew that their positions, their newly won social roles, 
and their power were owed to and depended on their loyalty to the party 
(Lata 1999; Pausewang, 2009).
Consequently, what emerged in subsequent years was the domination of the 
region’s public administrative sector by one political party (the OPDO), which 
itself was a member of a larger governing coalition of political parties (EPRDF) 
dominated by another party/front (TPLF), thereby leading to two layers of 
domination in the region’s public sector institutions. One clear testimony to 
this phenomena is a remark made by Lemma Megersa, the president of the 
Oromia National Regional State from 2016-2019, in a televised speech during 
the massive protests in the region in 2017, in which he noted that the region’s 
administrative institutions were designed and run for the purpose of serving 
“God fathers,” a situation that he stressed must come to an end. Similarly, in 
the words of Hassen Ali, the first President of Oromia (from 1992-1995): “The 
government of Oromia is autonomous according to the Ethiopian Constitution, 
[but] the Federal Government and [the EPRDF] soldiers interfere in all matters 
of the Oromia regional state” (cited in Hassen, 2009).
Such practices arising from lack of political settlements have particularly 
hampered the effectiveness of decentralization reform initiatives. According 
to the World Bank (2013), the predominance of a single party has been the 
principal factor constraining decentralization in Ethiopia. As a result of the 
centralization of power in the dominant party, hierarchical party discipline 
and top-down management have substituted upward accountability for the 
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desired downward accountability of sub-national officials and civil servants 
to the citizens (World Bank, 2013).
Similarly, a study report by Kena (2016) notes that, despite the rhetoric of 
decentralization, regional and local level government units and their institu-
tions of public administration remained instruments of political control 
by the central government throughout the EPRDF’s rule. This and other 
related institutional violations of human, political, and socioeconomic rights 
generated a chain of unrelenting public protests over the course of several 
years (Kena, 2016). Other commentators have gone even further to suggest 
that the federal state under the EPRDF rule – which at the formal level may 
appear highly decentralized – has had a stronger administrative and political 
presence in the periphery compared to any other previous regime (Lie & 
Mesfin, 2018; Pausewang et al. 2002).
In conclusion, the lack of inclusive political settlements resulted in a 
weak base of human resource capacity and a lack of ideological diversity 
and inclusiveness that were important for effective execution of reforms for 
a meaningful institutional change that would maintain professionalism and 
impartiality in the region’s civil service. Likewise, as shall be empirically 
demonstrated in the following section, it paved the way for over-politicization 
of the civil service, which resulted in fomenting a complex set of clintelism 
and political patronage across the regions public sector that curtailed any 
meaningful reform efforts.
4.3. Civil Service Politicization and Capacity Challenges 
As already indicated, the lack of amicable political settlement in the formation 
and maintenance of the regional state’s public sector institutions undermined 
public sector neutrality and professionalism. For example, in my own 2016 
survey of over five hundred civil servants across Oromia’s public sector, more 
than half said they did not perceive the region’s civil service system to be 
politically neutral; meanwhile, around three quarter of respondents believed 
that the public sector in Oromia does not provide equal opportunity for 
staff members for promotion to management positions. Moreover, empirical 
evidence from the survey also showed that close to two thirds of respondents 
believed that individuals come to public sector leadership positions in Oromia 
mainly through their client-patron relationships with individuals holding 
political leadership positions. Similarly, the majority of the surveyed civil 
servants also believed that political loyalty and support from external political 
power networks are the major routes to public sector leadership positions in 
the regional state (Wakgari, 2016).
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Overall, the results of my 2016 survey indicated that there is little distinc-
tion between the bureaucratic and political arena in the region’s public sector 
and that the practice of applying the merit principle has been overridden 
by political patronage. These obstacles to meritocracy and the consequent 
predominance of patronage over merit-based selection, promotion, and 
appointment practices were considered to have weakened the region’s 
public sector human resource capacity, which in turn constrained effective 
implementation of reform measures for institutional change in Oromia’s 
public sector over the past two decades (ibid).
In relation to this, a study by World Bank (2013) also reported that capac-
ity for critical tasks such as management, planning, administration, and 
service delivery is constrained by low levels of professional competence 
and preparedness among many staff and officials at the sub-national level. 
Likewise, several other studies and official assessments (Fida, 2016; Kacho 
et al., 2016; ONRS, 2011; PSCO, 2015) have reported that competency gaps 
among civil servants and public sector managers as well as the prevalence of 
political partisanship in the civil service have been major challenges to the 
successful implementation of reforms in Oromia National Regional State.
5. Prospects for Institutional Change: The Ongoing 
Critical Juncture as a New Window of Opportunity 
for Political Settlement
Critical junctures are major events that disrupt the existing political and 
economic balance in one or many societies (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
The concept of the “critical juncture” is thus used to identify moments when 
institutional innovation or change may be initiated or, at least, which create 
the opportunity for it to occur. It is marked by the occurrence of contingent 
events that call into question existing institutional arrangements or allow 
the chance for them to be changed, for good or for bad (Leftwich, 2009).
In this regard, the occurrence of a new inter-coalition settlement among 
EPRDF member parties in late March 2018 could certainly be considered as 
yet another critical juncture in the history of Ethiopia’s political evolution. 
Although many complex and worrisome roadblocks remain, it has opened a 
new window of opportunity for a long overdue inclusive political settlement, 
which is much needed for the realization of effective reforms towards posi-
tive and sustainable institutional change that is necessary for the country’s 
sustainable development. It is, hence, highly imperative for all stakeholders 
to seize the opportunity, first to forge inclusive political settlements, and then 
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to initiate contextually relevant reform measures toward building inclusive 
and sustainable institutions in the region’s public sector.
6. Conclusions and Implications
This chapter examined the challenges to institutional change through PSR 
in general and the NPM-inspired reform measure in particular in Oromia’s 
public sector by drawing on historical institutionalism theory and the political 
economy analysis approach to institutional change as a theoretical framework. 
In view of this, first, NPM assumes that civil service systems to which its 
reform initiatives are applied are overly bureaucratized and hence prescribes 
de-bureaucratization as a desirable reform measure for bringing about positive 
institutional change. This chapter argued that Ethiopia’s civil service in 
general and Oromia’s public administration in particular has never been 
adequately bureaucratized and as such did not need the de-bureaucratization 
prescriptions of NPM reforms for realizing positive institutional change in the 
first palace. Second and even then, NPM reforms also assume the adequate 
autonomy of managers from political interference. On the contrary, this 
chapter has demonstrated that Oromia’s public sector has remained highly 
politicized and civil service neutrality has been an almost alien concept to 
the region’s administrative system.
In a nutshell, historical, political, and capacity constraints have posed strong 
challenges to any meaningful institutional change through NPM reforms 
in the region’s public sector over the past two decades. The chapter also 
highlighted the ongoing critical juncture as a new window of opportunity for 
realizing the long overdue political settlements which it argued shall provide 
a new opportunity for institutional change in the region’s public sector.
The main implications that can be distilled from the analysis and conclu-
sions provided in this chapter for future reform efforts in the region’s public 
sector include the need for:
– Political settlement: Depoliticizing the civil service by forging po-
litical consensus through inclusive political settlements to establish a 
merit-based career civil service as part of the ongoing transitional reform 
measures.
– (Re)bureaucratization: Designing and implementing a customized 
civil service reform package that reinvigorates desirable principles of the 
traditional bureaucratic model, such as impartiality, meritocracy, rule of 
law and professionalism, while at the same time espousing relevant NPM 
reform elements, such as innovations and efficiency improvements.
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– Meritocracy: Strengthening merit-based public sector employment, 
promotion, and appointment through legislative amendments.
– Further research: Undertaking further comprehensive and micro-level 
research to identify the likely lingering cultural effects of past malpractices in 
the region’s/country’s civil service system, particularly by using sociological 
institutionalism as a key theoretical framework. Future reform efforts should 
also be informed and shaped by inputs from the result of such research.
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Notes
1. Detailed treatment of each reform phase shall follow in a later section.
2. Operational definition of institutions used in this study shall be provided in a later section.
3. The OLF and the other Oromo political parties were later forced out of the TGE.
4. This has been highlighted in the introduction section and shall be discussed further in the 
next sections.
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New Public Management and Path 
Dependence in Public Organizations 
in Ethiopia: A Multiple Case Study
Tewelde Mezgobo Ghrmay
Box 1: Key Points of this chapter
Key findings of the study show that in Ethiopia:
 nPm reforms have been introduced following a system-wide approach 
for all government organizations, obstructing their clear articulation and 
communication thereof.
 the levels of performance in design, implementation, output in terms of service 
delivery, and social outcomes vary among enterprises.
 leadership commitment, persistence, necessary work in the reward system, and 
human resource policies (soft s’s), institutional development, autonomy and 
accountability, and benchmarking and contextualization are some of the factors 
for effective adoption of nPm reforms.
Box 2: Learning objectives
reading this chapter will give you insights in:
 the effect of path dependency in reform implementation in Ethiopia.
 how do managers in public organizations in Ethiopia describe path-breaking 
interventions for the effective adoption of new public management (nPm) in 
order to improve public services for low-income populations?
 how do managers in public organizations in Ethiopia describe how path-breaking 
interventions for the effective adoption of nPm can be implemented in order to 
improve social outcomes for low-income populations?
Box 3: Abbreviations
AWWcE = Afar Water Works and construction Enterprise
bA = bachelor of Arts
bsc = bachelor of science
FdrE = Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia
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GG = Good Governance
llm = master of laws
mbA = master of business Administration
mcom = master of commerce
nPm = new Public management
PEm = Public Enterprise manager
Psr = Public sector reform
smE = subject matter Expert
1. Introduction
The problem this study addressed is that while considerable resources 
and attention have been allocated to recent good governance (GG) pub-
lic administration reform in low-income and fragile states, there is little 
evidence as to what degree this agenda has been implemented, or if it has 
led to improved services and social outcomes for low-income populations 
(Goldfinch, DeRouen, & Pospieszna, 2013; Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). 
Understanding how NPM reforms can be effectively implemented in public 
organizations requires broad knowledge of the path dependencies that create 
barriers in implementing the reforms (Stuteville & Jumara, 2010). Although 
the views of different writers are in support of the path dependency theory 
on why reform in the public sector is hampered, it is realistic to expect that 
organizations should not be stuck in the past if they are to respond to the 
realities prevailing in the world today (Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). Hence, to 
effectively implement NPM programs, public managers must know the social 
and political contexts and develop new paradigms that direct their strategic 
thinking and actions (Stuteville & Jumara, 2010). In this regard, extending 
organizational path dependence research into the public sector is helpful.
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to document 
how managers in public organizations in Ethiopia describe the nature and 
implementation of path-breaking interventions for the effective adoption 
of NPM in order to improve services and social outcomes for low-income 
populations. Therefore, the unit of analysis in this study was the manager 
in a public organization in Ethiopia. Data collection was achieved with a 
purposeful sample using a snowball and chain sampling strategy (Yin, 2014). 
A structured but open-ended interview process was used in order to elicit the 
ten identified participants’ perceptions regarding the issues raised in the study 
(Yin, 2014). The method, scope, and number of interviews for this descriptive 
case study were similar to other studies relying upon in-depth interviews 
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(Griffin, Maloney, Price, Sim, & Vojak, 2009; Stanko, Molina-Castillo, & 
Bohlmann, 2011). Data was also collected through observational field notes 
(Katz, 2014) and a quality audit through SME examination and reflection 
on the data (Yin, 2014).
2. Background
NPM embraces a wide range of approaches. Each approach draws on various 
tools used by the private sector and later adopted by public sector (Hope, 
2012). The first criticism of NPM has to do with the paradox of centralization 
through decentralization (Mongkol, 2011). This situation may arise when 
more authority is given to public managers in order to appropriately discharge 
their projects, which may lead to a concentration of power, contrary to the 
initial claim of decentralization in decision-making. The second criticism 
is concerned with applying private sector management techniques to the 
public sector. As the public and private sectors exist in different contexts, it is 
difficult to directly transplant the management techniques that have proven 
to be successful in the private sector into the different contexts in the public 
sector. The third criticism is that although NPM enhances transparency in 
the public sector, it can lead to the prevalence of corruption. Finally, NPM 
has become controversial in terms its results, as seen in Western countries. 
Applying this reform strategy in the contexts of developing countries is 
certain to create additional levels of complexities.
Hence, Pollitt (2003), looking at the transferability of NPM, argued for 
the importance of context by raising serious concerns and questions about 
existing knowledge in the transferability of NPM and other reform initiatives 
between countries and contexts. In this regard, Pollitt (2003) contended 
that the success or failure in transferring management techniques is heavily 
context dependent. The fact that is there is no general management innovation 
that can work throughout the world and at every time means we have to look 
carefully at contexts and at the “terms of trade each time we are thinking of 
borrowing a good management idea from somewhere else” (Pollitt, 2003:122). 
The author contended that the transfer of management technologies should 
not be considered as simple transactional relations, as in the purchase of a 
car. In this regard he claimed that “in short, the analogy of acquiring a car 
or other mainly mechanical technology does not fit” (p. 126). He further 
said: “It is not just a question of the complexity of the import, but also one 
of the complexities of the task and context into which the new management 
technology is being introduced” (p. 126).
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Additionally, the belief that the implementation of management techniques 
is straightforward and can be undertaken quickly is erroneous. Rather, imple-
mentation is a process that demands significant time. In other words, there 
are debates about the management techniques, but little action. In this regard, 
the same author maintained that “there can be a formal decision to adopt, but 
implementation may be unenthusiastic or incompetent” (Pollitt, 2003:127-128).
In explaining the paradox of managerialism, Hood (2000) maintained 
that although public sector management movements were aimed at making 
public sector management more businesslike and less politicized, in practice 
the result has been the opposite. This was supported by Maor’s (1999, cited 
in Hood, 2000) argument that the images of depoliticized public service 
management conjured up by advocates of managerial reform in fact produce 
the opposite result. On the basis of observation of changes in six parliamentary 
regimes between 1980 and 1996, he argued that politicians fear loss of control 
over policy implementation following managerial reforms and that senior 
public service positions thus become more, not less, “political” (and insecure) 
as a result. (Hood, 2000:6).
The same findings have also been seen in the application of specific elements 
of NPM packages, like decentralization. For example, Smoke (2015), looking at 
empirical findings on the issue at hand, maintains that while many researchers 
have been conducting studies on different aspects of decentralization reforms, 
their findings are not conclusive and generalizable. He notes that the reasons for 
the failure of robust generalizations may, first of all, be attributed to variations 
“on political, institutional, and socioeconomic context and how reform is 
approached, but in rather idiosyncratic ways” (Smoke, 2015:106). He goes on 
to say that those seeking success or failure will both be able to find evidence to 
support their view, and those with no preconceived expectations may be left 
confused. Second, instances of relatively good performance exist, but many 
empirical studies reveal more problems than achievements. (Smoke, 2015:106).
Discussing the concept of path dependence, Pierson (2000) maintained 
that there is no clear understanding of the concept. According to the author, 
“in the broader version, path dependence refers to the causal relevance of 
proceeding stages in a temporal sequence” (Pierson, 2000:252). This defini-
tion generally means that “history matters.” This is a loose definition of the 
concept. In this regard, Sydow, Schreyogg, and Koch (2009) contended that
if we base path dependence explanations on the “history matters” argu-
ment only, the notion is likely to become indistinct. All human activity and 
organizational processes are imprinted by their history in a way, so we would 
end up by concluding that all organizational decisions and actions are path 
dependent. (Sydow et al., 2009:690).
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Accordingly, in order to get the advantage of greater clarity, Pierson 
(2000) proposed a more narrow definition, noting that the concept of path 
dependence, in which preceding steps in a particular direction induce further 
movement in the same direction, is well captured by the idea of the increasing 
returns process, in which the probability of further steps along the same path 
increases with each move down that path. (Pierson, 2000:252).
Based on the economists’ application of increasing returns, North’s (1990) 
research on institutional emergence enabled him to provide a prominent 
argument on the divergence of economic performance and increasing re-
turns. More recent research has highlighted that “up to now, studies of path 
dependence (in this specified sense) neither addressed the persistence of 
organizations nor explored the logic and dynamics of internal organizational 
processes leading to a lock-in” (Sydow et al., 2009:690). Beyond that, Not-
teboom, De Langen, and Jacobs (2013) have applied the concept of path 
dependence and lock-in in seaports through the research lens of institutional 
economics, evolutional economics, and the role of geography and place.
Institutions are the humanly devised and/or socially constructed sets of 
rules that constrain and enable human interaction (North, 1990), or “formal 
and informal rules guiding actors’ perceptions and activities” (Strambach, 2010: 
408). Scott (2001) distinguishes three pillars of institutions: the regulative, the 
normative, and the cultural-cognitive, each with their own unique sets of logic, 
mechanisms of enforcement, and bases of compliance and legitimacy. Com-
mon to all three pillars is that institutions both constrain and enable human 
behavior. While economic historians have focused on regulative institutions at 
the macro level in the form of constitutions and rule of law governing capitalist 
societies, transaction cost economists look at firm-level structures, or what is 
referred to as governance systems (Notteboom et al., 2013). A critical source 
of regional path dependence as distinguished by Martin and Sunley (2006) 
is region-specific institutions or regulatory frameworks, social conventions, 
and cultural traditions, which can make firms and organizations located in a 
region become ”socially embedded” (Granovetter, 1985).
3. Statement of the Problem
The problem is that while considerable resources and attention have been 
allocated to recent “good governance” (GG) public administration reform 
in low-income and fragile states, there is little evidence regarding to what 
degree path-breaking interventions have been implemented or if they have 
led to improved services and social outcomes for low-income populations 
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(Goldfinch, DeRouen, & Pospieszna, 2013; Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). 
Previous research indicates mixed results regarding NPM performance in 
developing countries (e.g., Larbi, 2003; Smoke, 2015).
Although there are instances of relatively good performances in some 
countries, there are many failure stories. This implies that it is imperative 
to fill the research gap on how to effectively implement reform initiatives 
of NPM in the public sector and the reasons for the mixed performance. 
Additionally, many important aspects of path dependence and lock-in and how 
to implement NPM are identified in the extant literature as place-dependent 
processes, and as such require geographical explanation (Boschma, 2014; 
Martin & Sunley, 2006). Although many sub-Saharan African countries 
introduced NPM in reforming their public sector, evidence shows that there 
is a mismatch between the reform initiatives and their intended outcome of 
enhancing service delivery and poverty alleviation (Goldfinch et al., 2013).
Public sector reform (PSR) initiatives as currently designed in sub-Saharan 
countries consistently fall short of their intended targets, with much less 
significant outcomes than expected in terms of service delivery or poverty 
reduction (Goldfinch et al., 2013; Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). The different 
lines of research undertaken to explain these phenomena includes research 
by dependence theorists. However, most of the theorists in this vein follow a 
retrospective approach and emphasize the constraints of NPM resulting from 
past decisions on present actions. Kelman and Hong (2013) have indicated 
the need for a new approach to path dependence in public administration 
that strives to look beyond the identification of constraints as advocated by 
most research on path dependence, which takes a retrospective approach. In 
this regard, they “propose a different theoretical stance as a path forward for 
public administration research to make a contribution to path dependence 
literature” (Kelman & Hong, 2013: 14). Accordingly, this study seeks to make 
an original contribution to path dependence theory, by taking a prospective 
approach on how to break the path in the effective implementation of NPM.
After the fall of the Dergue through military defeat by the EPRDF in 1991, 
the new government undertook numerous different reform endeavors in order 
to solve the socio-political and economic problems of Ethiopia. The process 
of bureaucratic reform in Ethiopia is a chain effect of whatbegan in 1991. 
These reforms can be categorized in to the following phases: The first phase 
of the reform was from 1991 to 1995, and took place in three interrelated areas, 
namely, economic, political and constitutional reforms. In terms of economic 
reform, the old form of central planning was replaced by a market economy. The 
adoption of federalism and power and fiscal decentralization was also one of 
the breakthroughs in political reforms. In terms of constitutional reform, a new 
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constitutionwas enacted to accommodate the new state structure. The question 
was, however, whether Ethiopia had a bureaucracy capable of carrying out these 
reforms. The Ethiopian bureaucracy of the time was quite hierarchical, and 
characterized by many non-value adding works/positions/staffs, nepotism and 
lack of transparency and accountability, corruption, lack of leadership capacity, 
and an input-based (as opposed to output-based) orientation (Berihu, 2000).
As this the system was not prepared to implement change, the government 
established a new institution called The “Ministry of Capacity Building” with 
the mandate of undertaking reforms in all public institutions (Proclamation 
No. 256/2001: 1630-1632). This ministry was the leading institution to 
implement the civil service reform programs throughout the country, with 
the objective of creating a modern civil service staffed with high human 
resource capacity. Simultaneously, the government established an “Anti-
corruption Commission” with the mandate of eradicating unaccountable 
and nontransparent procedures in public institutions.
Subsequently, the second phase of public sector management reform was 
initiated with the launch of the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) in 1996. 
The CSRP was designed to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and transpar-
ency of public institutions, while seeking to build on the bureaucracy’s reputa-
tion for discipline and compliance. It included as the following components: 
(i) expenditure management and control (ii) human resource management, 
(iii) top management systems, (iv) ethics, and (v) service delivery.
This reform effort tried to address issues like improving governance of 
human resource management and control, improving performance and service 
delivery in the entire civil service, improving transparency and accountability 
in civil service, and strengthening the top management system of the federal 
civil service. Yet, even with all the above efforts, the bureaucratic system was 
still too archaic and nonresponsive to the technological and social changes 
that had already been taking place for a number of years.
Following the prescriptions of International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank, the Ethiopian government implemented reform tools in order to im-
prove the performance of government institutions in their service delivery 
in the beginning of 1990s. The reform tools (based on NPM) included BPR, 
BSC, Change Army, Citizens Charter, and deliverology. These change tools 
were implemented across all government organizations in the country.The 
problems in effective implementation of NPM in the Ethiopian context 
have been identified in the process, contents, contexts, and outcomes of 
the reform initiatives implemented in the country (Assefa, 1996; Assefa & 
Gebre-Egziabher, 2007; Getachew & Common, 2006; Merera, 2007; Paulos, 
2001). However, there is no single study that specifically addresses path 
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dependence as an impediment in implementing NPM in public organizations 
in Ethiopia and what interventions are needed to break the barriers of effective 
implementation of NPM.
4. Research Questions
In line with the proposed research problem and purpose of the study, the 
research questions are as follows:
RQ1: How do managers in public organizations in Ethiopia describe path-
breaking interventions for the effective adoption of NPM in order to improve 
public services for low-income populations?
RQ2: How do managers in public organizations in Ethiopia describe how 
path-breaking interventions for the effective adoption of NPM can be im-
plemented in order to improve social outcomes for low-income populations?
5. Theoretical Framework
From the literature review there are many research studies on NPM reforms 
that either consider specific elements like decentralization or that follow a 
holistic approach. In both cases, although there are many findings regarding 
the success or failures in implementing NPM programs in different parts of 
the world, there are no robust findings. Regarding path dependence theory 
in public organizations, there are many findings that explain how path de-
pendence can be a constraint for effective implementation of NPM reforms. 
Looking at areas of future research on path dependence, Kasabov (2010) 
contended that there is a lack of research on demand-side determinants like 
informal institutions in explaining path dependence in the public sector. 
Beyond that, there are few attempts that follow a prescriptive approach to 
the study of public organizations.
Accordingly, rather than attributing contextual factors as reasons for 
failures in NPM implementatio, this study sought to identify path dependence 
in public organizations in Ethiopia and what can be done to break the path. 
As such, this study sought out the opinions of different managers in different 
public organizations and researchers on the issue to gain insights as to what 
makes these organizations path dependent and what interventions are needed 
to change their trajectories.
The concept of path dependency is broadly defined as “history matters” 
(Pierson, 2000). For analytical purposes, he recommended even more narrow 
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definitions, suggesting that path dependence can be characterized as an 
increasing returns, positive feedback, or self-reinforcing process. The concept 
of increasing returns points to two important features of path dependence: 
“First, they pinpoint how the costs of switching from one alternative to another 
will, in certain social contexts, increases markedly over time. Second, and 
related, they draw attention to issues of timing and, distinguishing formative 
events” (Pierson, 2000, p. 251). Stuteville and Jumara (2010) have also cited 
Pierson (2000), noting: “Early events matter more than later ones in an 
‘increasing returns,’ path-dependent process” (Stuteville & Jumara, 2010: 5).
Path dependence theory is significant in comprehending the challenges 
of formal and intentional reform programs emanating from institutional 
inertia (Torfing, 2009, cited in Stuteville & Jumara, 2010). Beyond that, the 
present study employed Sydow et al.’s (2009) framework of path dependence, 
which offers insights into the possibilities and limitations of breaking out 
of organizational path dependence. In particular, path breaking requires a 
thorough understanding of the social mechanisms driving the path process. 
Understanding these mechanisms in turn provides a platform for developing 
path-breaking interventions. (Sydow et al., 2009: 704)
Thus, this research aimed at providing an original contribution to path 
dependence theory.
6. Literature Review
The transfer of NPM has engendered mixed results, and elicited both praise and 
criticism from outside observers. While some have concluded that such transfers 
are futile (Hood & Jackson, 1991; Metcalfe & Richards, 1991; Osborne, 2006, cit-
ing Farnham & Horton, 1996), others enthusiastically advocate NPM initiatives 
(Flynn, 2002; Hughes 2002). Similarly, research findings in developing countries 
show mixed results on the application of NPM (Bhatta, 2003; Samaratunge, 
Alam, & Teicher, 2009). In developing nations, an attempt to transfer NPM 
can create further complications due to variations in levels of development, 
capacity, culture, and other related context differences. This view is supported 
by different institutional theories (Thoenig, 2011) that propose context variation 
as a challenge. Other institutional theories consider how successful institutional 
change may be accomplished (Kingston & Caballero, 2009).
The implication is that contextualization and adaptation to institutional 
variation is crucial. On the other hand, context variations are identified as 
reasons for failures in reform. Therefore, it was deemed imperative to conduct 
case studies on how NPM is adopted in developing countries and to develop 
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theories and a hypothesis to explore the reason why NPM philosophies cannot 
work in the specific cases (Smoke, 2015).
From the different lines of research on path dependency, this study selected 
Kelman and Hong’s (2013) approach to path dependence in public administra-
tion, which strives to look beyond the identification of constraints as advocated 
by most research on path dependence that takes a retrospective approach. In 
this regard, they “propose a different theoretical stance as a path forward for 
public administration research to make a contribution to path dependence 
literature” (Kelman & Hong, 2013:14). On top of that, “governments need 
to accompany their reform proposals with a strategy to manage change” 
(Melchor, 2008: 4). As many PSR initiatives are related to the politics of the 
public sector, the literature review discussed the role of the state in develop-
ment. In this connection, Dang and Pheng (2015) maintained that the early 
views concerning the role of the state were characterized by extreme debates 
of communism (Smith, 1976) and capitalism (Marx, 1933). This ideological 
debate was explained by the historical developments surrounding PSR in 
developing countries (Ayee, 2015; Bukenya & Yanguas, 2013). Despite the 
differences in the focus of the PSR in developing countries, there has been a 
general agreement as to the role of the state in development.
However, there is less clarity on the concept of state. Despite continuing 
disagreements about the issue at hand, the developmental role of state capacity 
is well recognized.
According to Barkey and Sunita (1991), generally state capacity means 
the capability to implement policy, enforce legislation, and deliver services. 
“State capacity provides a powerful tool for the study of development” (vom 
Hau, 2012:4). Approaching state capacity from bureaucratic or administrative 
capacity is appropriate to address the capability of government organizations 
to effectively manage and implement public policies (Barkey & Sunita, 1991; 
Evans & Rauch, 1999; Fukuyama, 2013). This is also supported by policy re-
searchers emphasizing institutional deterrents in the effective implementation 
of NPM designs and policies (Andrews, 2013; Booth, 2012b; Grindle, 2007). 
However, according to Yanguas and Bukenya (2016), the major challenge in 
PSR is related to incorrect assumptions about the state capacity in developing 
countries. Looking at the prevailing realities in developing countries, these 
authors maintain that the political and moral economy of PSR is challenged 
by administrative patrimonialism, public corruption, and political capture. 
From these bold analytical critiques of the underlying assumptions of public 
service reform new PSR agendas have emerged, advocated by development 
communities: leadership, social accountability, and policy adaptation.
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7. Research Method
This study employed a multiple-case study approach (Yin, 2014) to address 
the topic “New Public Management and Path Dependence in Public Organiza-
tions in Ethiopia.” The study’s research problem was that while considerable 
resources and attention have been allocated to recent GG public administra-
tion reform in low-income and fragile states, there is little evidence as to what 
degree this agenda has been implemented, or if it has led to improved services 
and social outcomes for low-income populations (Goldfinch et al., 2013; 
Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). In order to answer this question, data for the 
study was gathered from interviews withten managers of public enterprises 
in Ethiopia (the following table provides a brief summary of the ten cases).
Table 1: Summary of the ten cases






1 F 55 LLM 21 Ethiopian Airlines 
2 M 40 MBA 20 Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia
3 M 34 MSc 8 AWWCE
4 M 36 MBA 8 Adamitulu Pesticides 
Development Co
5 M 42 MCom 6 Ethiopian Insurance 
Company
6 M 51 MSc 17 Ethiopian Shipping and 
Logistics Enterprise
7 M 39 MBA 8 Bahir Dar Textile Factory
8 M 32 BSc Electrical 
Engineering
7 Ethiotelecom
9 M 35 BA 5 Tendaho Sugar Factory
10 M 56 Post Graduate 
Diploma in 
Hydropower
23 Ethiopian Electric Power 
Corporation/EEP
In selecting the sample respondents, both purposeful and network/snowball 
sampling (Hatch, 2002) was used. Specifically, the sampling procedure began 
with random sampling to minimize the total population into a manageable 
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size that guaranteed an equal chance for all public enterprises to be included 
in the sample (Zikmund, Babin, & Carr, 2012). After that, and in line with 
the selection criteria, the typical cases of the sample were chosen (Seawright 
& Gerring, 2008).
To fulfill the purpose of this descriptive case study, a multiple-case study 
research design (Yin, 2014) was employed. The data sources and evidence 
included ten in-depth, face-to-face, semistructured interviews with PEMs, field 
notes (Katz 2014), and SME review and reflection on the data collected (Patton, 
2002). The recorded interviews were transcribed. For coding and analysis, 
NVivo for Microsoft was employed. To reinforce data security, the data has been 
stored and coded anonymously and confidentially (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014).
As the research topic was complex, the researcher had (almost) no control 
over the observed phenomenon, and the issue at hand was dynamic and could 
not be isolated in a laboratory experiment, a multiple-case study research 
design was selected as the best fit (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The design was 
further justified because PEMs’ (unit of analysis) perceptions and opinions 
were inseparable from the context of the study, and NPM in the public sector 
is a contemporary issue (Yin, 2014). To analyze the content of the qualitative 
interview data, a thematic analysis was applied, using the cross-case synthesis 
analytical technique.. Accordingly, each individual case was treated as a 
separate case, but synthesis of the data of each case strengthened the overall 
case study data. In other words, research data was collected on individual 
cases and compared to determine consistency and variance between cases 
(Yin, 2014). To ensure validity and reliability, data triangulation was applied. 
The use of multiple sources of evidence and different data collection strategies 
enhanced construct validity (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). Additionally, 
the careful sampling of the ten cases enhanced the validity and reliability of 
this multiple-case study research.
8. Findings
Based on the key insights emerging from the in-depth interviews, an overarch-
ing theme was that there is no one criteria or variable that makes one public 
enterprise effective in adopting the NPM reforms and enhances the services 
and outcomes for the low-income population. PEMs suggested that the factors 
for success in NPM reforms were different for every public enterprise and 
depended on that organization’s specific situation and external influences. 
However, a number of themes were identified that relate to effective adoption 
of the NPM reforms in public enterprises in Ethiopia.
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The first research question revealed twelve themes. These include the 
types of NPM tools introduced, the rationale or intentions of the NPM tools, 
the initiator of the reform tools, the appropriateness of the NPM tools, the 
pressure for the NPM tools, the rhetoric on NPM, by whom the rhetoric 
was communicated or announced, the way it was communicated, the design 
process, level of contextualization, responsibility for the design process, 
challenges in the design process, and extent of success from rhetoric to actual 
design.
The second research question revealed twenty-one themes. These include 
the process, contextualization, challenges, level of success, the level of 
customer service, specific changes for the level of performance, challenges 
faced, system of evaluation, the impact of the reform, employment, social 
responsibility, local business development, accessibility of the services to low-
income populations, capacity building, leadership commitment, persistence, 
soft S’s, institutional development, about the NPM reform tools, autonomy 
and accountability, and benchmarking and contextualization.
The evaluation of findings based on the literature used for this multiple-case 
study research indicates that there is no single answer on how NPM reforms 
can be effectively implemented in public organizations in Ethiopia and lead 
to service improvements and impact the socioeconomic outcomes of the 
population in general and the low-income society in particular. This is because 
understanding how NPM reforms can be effectively implemented in public 
organizations requires broad knowledge of the path dependencies that create 
barriers in implementing the reforms (Stuteville & Jumara, 2010). Hence, to 
effectively implement NPM programs, public managers must know the social 
and political contexts and develop new paradigms that direct their strategic 
thinking and actions (Stuteville & Jumara, 2010; Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016).
In this regard, NPM reform initiatives should begin with proper analysis of 
the existing situation and the rationale of the reform should be well articulated 
and clearly defined (Goldfinch et al., 2013). As the different NPM technologies 
have their own particular emphasis and application (Goldfinch et al., 2013), 
it is imperative for reformers to clearly define the rationale that the NPM 
technologies are going to address (EuropAid, 2009; Goldfinch et al., 2013).
For the NPM reform to be successful, the management of the organiza-
tions should have a clear understanding of the pressures and intentions in 
introducing the different NPM tools (EuropAid, 2009; Goldfinch et al., 2013). 
Then, they should clearly communicate the rhetoric of the NPM reform both 
internally and externally (Goldfinch et al., 2013). Scholars have underscored 
the importance of context on how reforms should be designed (Mongkol, 
2011; Pollitt, 2003; Smoke, 2015). Regarding the level of success in the actual 
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design of the NPM tools in comparison with the rhetoric, there were mixed 
findings (Larbi, 2003; Smoke, 2015).
Related to the extent to which NPM reforms moved from design to actual 
action, the first conclusion concerns the care that must be exercised in the 
process (Andrews, 2013; Pollitt, 2003; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Yanguas & 
Bukenya, 2016). The need for contextualization is the second (Pollitt, 2003; 
Smoke, 2015). The third concerns the challenges in implementing the NPM 
designs into actual action, identified by almost all of the interview participants 
(EuropAid, 2009; Kelman & Hong, 2013; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). The 
fourth concerns the extent of success in the actual implementation, which 
was described by the PEMs as mixed (Larbi, 2003; Smoke, 2015).
When it comes to the factors identified by PEMs as necessary for effective 
adoption of NPM reform, the first is leadership commitment (Bhatta, 2003; 
Samaratunge et al., 2009; Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). The second factor is 
persistence (Pollitt, 2003). The third is related to soft S’s (EuropAid, 2009; 
Galbraith, 2002; Goldfinch et al., 2013; Paulos, 2001; Yanguas & Bukenya, 
2016). The fourth factor is institutional development (Bhatta, 2003; Stuteville 
& Jumara, 2010; Thoenig, 2011; Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). The fifth concerns 
the suitability of NPM tools (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Yanguas & Bukenya, 
2016). The sixth is related to the availability of autonomy and accountability 
(Smoke, 2015; Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). The seventh and final factor is 
the need for benchmarking and contextualization (Booth, 2012; Mongkol, 
2011; Smoke, 2015).
9. Conclusions, Implications, Limitations, and 
Recommendations
9.1. Conclusions
To achieve the purpose of the study a multiple case study was applied to 
compare and contrast the divergent opinions of mangers working in different 
government organizations. In this regard, Yin (2014) contended that multiple 
case studies are selected to follow а replication logic: each case study should 
be selected to establish either similar results (literal prediction) or contrasting 
results (theoretical replication). Accordingly, this study used a multiple-case 
study design in order to compare and contrast results. This was also helpful in 
achieving the goals of objectivity and rigor in the research design (Yin 2014).
The unit of analysis in this study was the manager in a public organization 
in Ethiopia. Qualitative data was based on insights derived from in-depth 
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interviews from the identified participants. Data collection was achieved with 
a purposeful sample using a snowball and chain sampling strategy (Yin, 2011). 
A structured but open-ended interview process was used in order to elicit the 
ten identified participants’ perceptions regarding the issues raised by the study 
(Yin, 2011). The method, scope, and number of interviews for this descriptive 
case study were similar to other studies relying upon in-depth interviews 
(Griffin et al., 2009; Stanko et al., 2011). Data was also collected through 
observational field notes (Katz, 2014), and a quality audit was conducted 
through SME examination and reflection on the data (Yin, 2011).
The section on findings presented the implications from the research 
findings and compared these to the literature review. Discoveries and implica-
tions were analyzed in response to the study’s statement of the problem and 
alignment with the research purpose and its significance. Recommendations 
for future research conducive to path-breaking interventions on the effective 
adoption of NPM reforms in order to enhance services and outcomes for the 
population in general and low-income populations in particular were also 
discussed. Additionally, findings and implications that were identified during 
the research phase that relate to the effective adoption of NPM reforms were 
presented. PEMs, SMEs, and policymakers will be able to reference this study 
as they attempt to understand the key criteria for the successful adoptation 
of NPM reform tools aimed at enhancing service delivery and outcomes 
related to the socioeconomic development of the population in general and 
low-income populations in particular.
Additional opportunities for research include expanding the scope of this 
research through qualitative analysis of PEMs living and working in different 
global regions as well as quantitative analysis of PEMs. The research can also be 
expanded to SMEs of public enterprises and other government organizations to 
determine the extent to which there is convergence or divergence on the find-
ings between these groups. There is also an opportunity to find and develop case 
studies that support each of the main research questions as a way to highlight 
successful organizations that have implemented the suggested findings. Finally, 
qualitative and quantitative research can be completed on current and historic 
NPM reform trends to test assumptions stated by PEMs as essential for the 
effective adoption and performance of NPM reform technologies.
9.2. Implications of the Study
The implications of the study findings are discussed in this section and are 
organized by research question. In relation to the first research question, the 
first implication is that there is a gap in clearly articulating the rationale for the 
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reform at national level (EuropAid, 2009; Goldfinch et al., 2013). This is because 
the Ethiopian government announced the NPM reforms for all government 
organizations without a clear specification of which tool should be used for 
which public enterprise, which is a serious deficiency given that there is variation 
in emphasis and application across enterprises (Goldfinch et al., 2013).
According to EuropAid (2009), NPM reforms can follow either a system-
wide approach or reforms targeted to specific public organizations. To decide 
on the level of the reform, it is imperative to decide on the level of change 
required. If there is a need for cultural change in the whole public sector, 
it is logical to do something at a system-wide level. On the other hand, as 
different government organizations have different socio-technical systems, 
each organization should select from the bundles of NPM tools for its own 
purposes. However, the NPM reform in Ethiopia followed a system-wide 
prescription of bundles of NPM technologies for all government organizations 
despite variations in the socio-technical systems. Hence, there is no clear 
decision on the level of change intended by the NPM reforms (EuropAid, 
2009; Goldfinch et al., 2013).
Another implication is that whatever the specific targets of the NPM tools, 
the general move in introducing private sector technologies into the public 
sector has created some positive changes. Having a clear understanding of the 
pressure that forced governments to introduce NPM reform is a fundamental 
prerequisite before prescribing the specific reform designs (EuropAid, 2009). 
This implies that the PEMs are trying to employ the NPM tools to address 
the specific organizational pressure, even though the national pressure for 
the reform is not clearly articulated.
In relation to the national rhetoric, the fact that interviewed PEMs had 
divergent opinions on the latter suggests it is not clearly articulated and 
communicated to the specific PEMs. Evidently, the PEMs were not clear 
about the intended outcome of the NPM reforms in relation to the general 
public. This clearly shows a gap in cascading the national rhetoric down to 
each enterprise.
Concerning the way the rhetoric was transferred to actual design, the 
implication is that as each enterprise follows its own process, there is no 
clear guidance by the higher government agencies in charge of the reform. In 
relation to contextualization, the implication is that there is a gap in how the 
reform designs should be applied in the specific circumstances and contexts 
of the different enterprises.
A further finding concerns responsibility in the design process. In this regard, 
the implication is that the gap in NPM transfer and implementation could be 
filled by combining technical and functional knowledge and taking into account 
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the local context. Hence, to address the knowledge gap, both practitioners and 
experts in the NPM tools have been involved in the design process.
Furthermore, our study revealed challenges in the design process. The 
implication in this connection is that necessary preconditions in breaking 
the learning curve, attitudinal problem, and awareness creation about the 
NPM tools have not been realized. The second implication is that the level 
of knowledge of the PEMs about the NPM tools was not enhanced, required 
resources for the NPM technologies were not in place, and necessary work in 
breaking the past bureaucratic procedures was not accomplished.
We further found that there were mixed results regarding the level of 
success in the actual design of the NPM tools in line with the rhetoric. Hence, 
PEMs need to study the specific factors necessary for effective performance 
in the adoption of NPM tools.
In relation to research question two, analysis of the data from the semi-
structured PEM interviews revealed twenty-one themes. Of these, one subset 
is related to the extent to which NPM reforms moved from design to actual 
action, and addressed the thematic areas of: process, contextualization, 
challenges, and level of success. In this connection, the implication is that the 
way the design was implemented into actual action varies from enterprise to 
enterprise, to the extent that in some enterprises there was no persistence and 
full follow-up of the implementation process. The other implication is that 
there was a general tendency to accept what the higher officials said without 
considering the objective realities on the ground.
Regarding contextualization, in six out of the PEMs, there was a tendency 
not to consider contextual situations of the enterprises in turning design 
into actual action. In relation to the reform technologies, the implication is 
that there was confusion on how the intentions of the reform tools should 
be reconciled with the objectives of the enterprises, contradictions in the 
different NPM tools, a lack of awareness of the objectives of the NPM tools, 
diverse interpretations of the NPM tools, and lack of persistence or full 
follow-up and support in full-scale implementations of the NPM tools. These 
problems clearly show that the reform process lacked a proper strategic change 
management process (Melchor, 2008). Similarly, strategic leadership in the 
NPM reform process was lacking (Melchor, 2008).
Concerning the extent of success in the actual implementation of the NPM 
reform designs, the implication is that there is a need for detailed investigation 
by PEMs on the factors contributing to the successful implementation of 
NPM tools.
After the implementation of the NPM tools, even though in most cases 
there was an increase in the level of customer service, there were also negative 
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evaluations of the issue at hand. Hence, detailed investigation of the issue at 
hand is imperative in order to understand the factors for effective performance 
in customer service improvements.
In relation to the specific changes necessary to reach a satisfactory level of 
performance, the first implication is that whatever the level of performance 
in enhancing the level of customer service, the introduction of the NPM 
tools made PEMs think about the customer service orientation and they 
devised some mechanisms to measure the level of performance in that regard. 
Moreover, there is a lot that needs to be done for the NPM tools to deliver 
positive performance in enhancing customer service.
A further finding is related to the challenges inherent in the actual imple-
mentation of the NPM tools. In this regard, according to North (1990, cited 
in Pierson, 2000), “Established institutions generate powerful inducements 
that reinforce their own stability and further development” (Pierson, 2000: 
225). Hence, without changing these institutional frameworks into a type that 
would favor the requirements of the NPM tools, the effective implementation 
of the reform tools will be a futile endeavor. This implies that the NPM 
reform process was implemented without the required preconditions of 
institutional change.
Regarding the system of evaluation, the implication is that the level of 
success of the reform initiatives was not linked with the outcome in socio-
economic aspects of the population in general and the low-income society 
in particular.
Another subset of themes from data related to question two concerns the 
outcome of the reform. Here the thematic areas are: impact of the reform, 
employment, social responsibility, local business development, accessibility 
of the services to low-income populations, and capacity building.
In regard to the impact of the reform, the implication is that although it 
is very difficult to specifically measure the outcome of the NPM reforms, it 
is clear that after the introduction of these tools there are positive changes 
in outcomes to the population. In the same way, the impacts in terms of 
employment and social responsibility are positive. Similarly, when it comes 
to business development for the MSEs and local businesses the implication 
is that there is a positive impact in local business development.
In relation to the accessibility of services to low-income populations and 
capacity building there were positive impacts. In other words, the implication 
is that there is a positive impact in terms of accessibility of services and 
capacity building to low-income populations.
Finally, a subset of themes in data from question two dealt with the ef-
fective adoption of NPM reform. The themes are: leadership commitment, 
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persistence, soft S’s, institutional development, about the NPM reform tools, 
autonomy and accountability, and benchmarking and contextualization.
Looking at NPM in Asia, Samaratunge et al. (2009) concluded that 
“countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, where strong leadership and ap-
propriate accountability systems are not in place, could not expect successful 
outcomes from their NPM reform agenda” (Samaratunge et al., 2009:42). On 
the other hand, countries with strong leadership and effective accountability 
mechanisms experience success in their efforts. In other words, Bhatta (2003) 
concluded that “while different countries will focus on different aspects of 
NPM, the key to any success in public sector governance will remain the level 
of political will” (Bhatta, 2003:13). Likewise, strengthening the capability 
of top-level executives to spearhead the nucleus of PSR initiatives comes 
out as a new reform agenda (Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). This implies that 
for NPM reforms to be effectively implemented leadership commitment is 
a very crucial factor.
A further finding here is that the crucial factor for effective adoption of 
the NPM technologies is persistence. This implies that on top of leadership 
commitment to the issue at hand, the existence of persistence and follow-up 
from start to finish is critical for effective adoption of NPM reform tools.
In introducing new management technologies like NPM, many organiza-
tions emphasize the changes to their structures and operational procedures. 
However, it is equally important is to change the soft S’s related to human 
resources (Galbraith, 2002; Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). Similarly, according 
to Paulos (2001), the absence of a well-developed bureaucratic structure with 
competent personnel was identified as a major challenge in Ethiopian PSR.
Regarding the soft S’s, the implication is that if the NPM reform initiatives 
are to be successfully implemented there is a need to work on the soft S’s.
In connection to the preconditions of effective NPM reform the implication 
is that there should be a proper governance environment and institutional 
development (Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016). In the same way, for effective 
adoption of NPM reforms, proper governance structure and institutional 
development is a critical factor.
Yet another finding is related to the NPM tools introduced by the Federal 
Government of Ethiopia for all government organizations. This implies that 
in relation to the NPM tools prescribed by the government for all government 
organizations, there is no clear understanding about the philosophy behind 
these new technologies and the difference and similarities behind the different 
bundles prescribed by the general name NPM reform; moreover, there is no 
credible governmental agency at national level with a capacity to alleviate 
these confusions and concerns.
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Another finding concerned autonomy and accountability. In this regard, 
the implication is that rather than ordering PEMs to follow this or that tool, 
it is better to give them autonomy to select which NPM tool is appropriate 
for their enterprise’s context and, in fact, make them accountable for their 
independent decisions.
The final finding is related to benchmarking and contextualization. In this 
connection, the implication is that the NPM reform tools should be internally 
motivated and be applied based on the given context of the different govern-
ment organizations; additionally, there is a need for the benchmarking of 
successful adopters in the effective implementation of the NPM technologies.
9.3. Limitations of the Study
This research has several limitations. The first limitation is the broadness of the 
concept of NPM. Second, because empirical studies on path dependence in the 
adoption of NPM in public enterprises in Ethiopia are rare, the current study 
will significantly depend on the primary sources and office documents. Third, 
this multiple case study research is based on a sample of ten PE managers, 
which represents a case study of public organizations that have both public 
and enterprise objectives. A sample of other category of public organizations 
like ministries, and various types of specialized or executive agencies (Ayee, 
2015) might come up with different findings. Fourth, geography and location 
are important considerations in path dependence and lock-in (Martin & 
Sunley 2006; Notteboom, DeLangen, & Jabobs, 2013).
In this study only PEs in Ethiopia are considered. Accordingly, the findings 
of this study are mainly relevant for PEs in Ethiopia. Consequently, further 
research is required in order to judge the generalizability and transferability 
of this research to PEs in other countries and places (Hancock, Ockleford, & 
Windridge, 2009). The final limitation of this study is related to the source of 
evidence. This study mainly uses semi-structured personal interviews rather 
than actual observation in the workplace. In this regard, Yin (2014) maintained 
that the major problem of the interview as a source of evidence is the problem 
of question and answer bias. Thus this problem is also a limitation of this study.
9.4. Recommendations
Recommendations for Management Practice
The first recommendation is that rather than prescribing the same NPM 
tools for all public enterprises, the specific NPM tools prescribed should take 
into account the specific context and problem of each enterprise (EuropAid, 
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2009). This is because of the fact that each NPM tool has its own emphasis 
and application (Goldfinch et al., 2013).
The second recommendation is that before introducing these NPM tools 
the government should clearly define and articulate the rationale of the reform 
at the national level (EuropAid, 2009). Then, to address the rationale at the 
national level the government should make strategic decisions on the logical 
link between the specific NPM tools and the rationale. This is because of the 
fact that the emphasis and application of the NPM tools differ from one tool 
to another (Goldfinch et al., 2013).
The third recommendation is that instead of introducing the NPM reform 
at the national level as a campaign, the government should first become 
clear on the level of change required (EuropAid, 2009). Then, among the 
different reform tools, the government should first make a policy decision in 
connection with the NPM tools that should be system-wide and the NPM 
tools that should be internally motivated and selected by the different public 
enterprises, given context variations and the specific problems they face.
The fourth recommendation is that although the general NPM reform as 
applied in the government enterprises in Ethiopia has created positive changes, 
further achievements and positive changes could be realized if the government 
clearly specifies which NPM tools are to be used for which enterprise and 
decides on the specific target of each NPM tool given contextual difference 
and variations in the problems faced by each enterprise.
The fifth recommendation is that for effective adoption of the NPM tools 
in the context of public enterprises, the government should make concerted 
efforts in effectively communicating the national pressure for introducing 
the NPM reforms at the national level, and allow the PEMs to make a logical 
link with their respective enterprises.
The sixth recommendation is that the national rhetoric should be clearly 
communicated to the specific PEMs for the effective adoption of the NPM 
reforms.
The seventh recommendation is that to justify the investment in the 
introduction of NPM tools, PEMs should develop their strategic plan by 
incorporating specific and measurable targets regarding the level of change 
in the outcome to the society and measure the level of change after the 
introduction of the NPM reform tools.
Concerning the way the rhetoric was transferred to actual design, the 
first recommendation is that rather than leave each enterprise to design and 
implement the NPM reforms prescribed by the government based on their 
own interpretations, which results in variation in the process, the government 
should establish an agency at the national level with the capacity, knowledge, 
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resources, and the mandate of providing effective guidance in the specific 
reform processes for each enterprise. The other alternative is to give each 
enterprise’s managers the autonomy and resources to select specific reform 
tools that are appropriate in their specific context and to follow their own 
reform process by employing international consultants who are well-versed 
and experienced in guiding the effective adoption of reform processes.
A corollary recommendation is that rather than giving the reform design 
and implementation process solely to the PEMs or consultant experts, involv-
ing both practitioners and experts is appropriate for an effective reform process 
as each participant has complementary knowledge of the issue at hand.
We further recommend that for effective design and implementation of 
the NPM reforms, required interventions should be devised in breaking the 
learning curve, past bureaucratic procedures, and attitudinal problems. On top 
of that, enhancing the knowledge and understanding about the reform tools 
and providing required resources for the NPM technologies are necessary 
preconditions for success. Additionally, for effective adoption and performance 
of the NPM tools, the PEMs should undertake detailed investigation into the 
factors most conducive to effective performance and adoption.
Regarding the extent to which NPM reforms moved from design to 
actual action, the first recommendation is that rather than simply accepting 
what higher officials said, in turning the NPM reform designs into actual 
action, there should be some flexibility in relation to the objective realities 
on the ground. On top of that, there should be persistent follow-up in the 
implementation process. Concerning the level of contextualization on actual 
implementation of the NPM reform tools, four out of the ten participants 
emphasized the need for contextualization (PEM 4, PEM 5, PEM 8, and 
PEM 10). On the other hand, the remaining PEMs did not mention the 
need for contextualization, which is advocated by writers like Smoke (2015) 
and Pollitt (2003). In this connection, a second recommendation is that, for 
the effective adoption of NPM tools, PEMs should take into account the 
contextual situations of their enterprises. The third recommendation is that, 
for effective implementation of the NPM reforms, PEMs should accompany 
their reform initiatives with a proper strategic change management process 
(Melchor, 2008).
Related to the level of performance in customer service improvements, the 
recommendation is that had the NPM reform tools been prescribed based on 
the specific conditions of the enterprises and implemented accordingly, its 
output in enhancing service delivery could have been more than the current 
level of performance. A second corrolary is that there should be concerted 
efforts to develop the preconditions for institutional development. A third 
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recommendation here is that the level of success of the reform initiatives 
should be linked with the outcome in socioeconomic aspects of the population 
in general and the low-income society in particular.
Regarding the outcome of the reform, it is recommended that the PEMs 
should develop mechanisms on how the specific impact of the reform should 
be measured if the investments related to the introduction of the NPM reforms 
are to be justified.
In relation to the effective adoption of NPM reforms, the final recom-
mendation is that leadership commitment, persistence, required work on 
a reward system and human resource policies (soft S’s) (Galbraith, 2002), 
and institutional development be recognized as the crucial path-breaking 
interventions required for the effective adoption of NPM reforms. Addi-
tionally, in relation to the NPM tools prescribed by the government for all 
government organizations, there should be clear understanding about the 
philosophy behind these new technologies and the difference and similarities 
behind the different bundles prescribed under the general name NPM reform. 
Furthermore, there should be a credible governmental agency at the national 
level with the capacity to alleviate these confusions and concerns. Beyond 
that, rather than ordering PEMs to follow this or that tool, it is better to give 
them autonomy to select which NPM tool is appropriate for their enterprise’s 
context and, in fact, make them accountable for their independent decisions. 
Finally, the NPM reform tools should be internally motivated and be ap-
plied based on the given context of the different government organizations, 
and there should be a benchmarking of successful adopters in the effective 
implementation of NPM technologies.
Recommendations for Further Research
This qualitative multiple-case study research has several limitations that can 
offer new ideas for future research. Additional opportunities for research 
include expanding the scope of this research through qualitative analysis of 
PEMs living and working in different global regions as well as quantitative 
analysis of PEMs. The research can also be expanded to SMEs of public 
enterprises and other government organizations to determine the extent 
to which there is convergence or divergence on the findings between these 
groups. There is also an opportunity to find and develop case studies that 
support each of the main research questions as a way to highlight successful 
organizations that have implemented the suggested findings. Finally, qualita-
tive and quantitative research can be completed on current and historic NPM 
reform trends to test assumptions stated by PEMs about the factors necessary 
for the effective adoption and performance of NPM reform technologies.
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11 
The Analysis of the Gadaa System in 
Comparison to Western Democracy 
Moti Mosisa Gutema
Box 1: Key points of the chapter
 Apart from the Western model of democracy, there are other indigenous models 
of democracy in different communities with their own unique qualities and 
achievements, one of which is the Gadaa system.
 the Gadaa system is more egalitarian than the Western model of democracy in 
terms of the quality of the decision-making process, accountability, inclusiveness, 
participation, political game, and the leadership development process.
 the government should support the development of indigenous governance 
systems through the provision of policy and other structural adjustments.
Box 2: Key Insights of this chapter 
reading this chapter will give you insight in
 indigenous governance system and its dynamics
 convergence and divergence between the Gadaa system and Western democracy
 basic qualities of the Gadaa system and its comparison with the Western model of 
democracy.
Box 3: Abbreviations
mPs = member of Parliaments
ccEFd = conclusions of the council of Europe Forum for the Future of democracy
1. Introduction 
Since 1980s several scholars and international institutions such as the World 
Bank have recognized indigenous knowledge as a significant resource for 
sustainable development (Zelalem, 2015). Particularly, indigenous knowledge 
of governance is defined as using indigenous institutions and practices for the 
exercising of economic, political, and administrative authorities to manage 
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a country’s affairs at all levels (Sithole & Mbele, 2008; Warren, 1991). In 
Africa, many ethnic groups have thier own (indigenous) forms of govern-
ance characterized by remarkable qualities (Ayittey, 1991). Even though in 
contemporary Africa, the mode of governance is undoubtedly influenced 
by Western values and ideals, the majority of African citizens value their 
indigenous system as it influences their daily life, including the food they 
eat, the languages they speak, the way they dress, etc. (Kojo, 2017).
Similarly, the Oromos are one of the indigneous peoples living in Ethiopia 
having their own indigenous governance system. Prior to their colonization by 
the alliance of European imperialism and Ethiopian colonialism the Oromos 
were independently organized both culturally and politically using their 
own governance system, called “Sirna Gadaa,” or the Gadaa sytem (Aseffa, 
2012; 2005; Holcomb and Sisai, 1990;). The term “Gadaa” has no single and 
unanimously accepted definition and has been defined differently in different 
disciplines by different scholars (Zelalem, 2012). This reveals that the Gadaa 
system is a comprehensive and multidimensional indigenous system that can be 
conceptualized from diverse but complementary perspectives (Debela, 2017).
The system has been defined from political, philosophical, sociological, 
anthropological, legal, theological, astronomical, and other point of views 
(Asmarom, 1973). For instance, etymologically, Tsegaye Gebremedihn 
conceptualized Gadaa as coined from the combination of two terms ka (God 
or Creator) and aada (norms), which taken together mean the norms of God 
(Tsegaye, 1964). Further, Asmarom (1973) defined the Gadaa system as an age 
grade system, wherein a class of people assumes politico-ritual leadership for 
a period of eight years, via an electoral mechanism. According to Asmarom, 
the system enabled the Oromos to unite their people both militarily and 
organizationally so that they were able to expand or to recover their territories 
and accommodate their increased population and stock.
Vis-à-vis its emergence, Aseffa (2012) has stated that nobody knows when 
and how the Gadaa system emerged as a system of governance. Nontheless, 
Aseffa has argued that, irrespective of the absence of adequate knowledge of 
Oromo history before the sixteenth century, it is reasonable to think that the 
Oromo people did not invent the system only at the moment they consolidated 
as a group through the defensive and offensive wars that took place during the 
sixteenth century. Additionally, Baissa (2004) confirms that the Oromos were 
already under the governance of the Gadaa system by the sixteenth century; 
at the same time, a special publication of Guji Culture and Tourism Bureau 
(2016) contends that the system was already in existence in the fifteenth 
century. Thus, regardless of the varying conceptions of what the Gadaa system 
is and when it emerged, the system has been organizing the Oromo people 
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around political, economic, social, cultural, and religious institutions for at 
least the last five hundred years (Asmarom, 1973; Baissa 2004).
2. The Context of the Problem
The Gadaa system has been investigated by both domestic and expatriate 
scholars from different perspectives. For instance, in a series of publications, 
the prominent scholar Asmarom (1973, 1980, 2006) has mainly focused on 
the nature of the system and how it operates among the Oromos. Similarly, 
scholars like Zelalem (2012, 2015, 2018), Baissa (1994), Aseffa (2011), and 
Dirribi (2011) have conducted different studies of the system. Their analysis 
has focused on the characterization of the system and on the question of its 
suitability to different contexts, in particular that of present-day Ethiopia.
Other scholars have also studied the system from the point of view of 
its contribution to conflict resolution and its grand philosophies regarding 
women’s empowerment. For instance, Kuwe (1997) stressed the role of the 
Siiqqee (women’s organization) institution in promoting women into the 
decision-making process under the Gadaa system. Meanwhile, Debela (2017) 
analyzed system’s suitability and feasibility to be used as an alternative system 
to the one presently in place in Ethiopia and argued that it should be consid-
ered as one of the recognized means of Afsol (the so-called Africa Solution), 
focusing in particular on the role of the system in resolving local conflicts and 
empowering women. But all the above studies mainly focused on describing 
the nature and structural setup of the system, while considering its values 
from different perspectives. Only a very few of them have conducted a critical 
analysis of the system in comparison with the Western model of democracy. 
To address this gap, this chapter means to identify the values of the Gadaa 
system and to compare it with the values of the Western model of democracy.
3. Indigenous Governance System and Western 
Democracy
In parallel to the old and indigenous system of governance, the so-called 
modern governance system (Western democracy) is often defined as “the rule 
of the people where rules are determined by the people who are to obey those 
rules.” Thus, as the system (Western democracy) has a positive connotations, 
many governments of the world connect themselves with it and claim to belong 
to it even if their society is characterized by little or no communal participation.1 
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For instance, among the 193 countries of the world that are recognized by the 
United Nations, 123 are said to have modern system of governance with the 
connotation of Western democracy (www.freedomhouse.org). More than half 
of those states claim that they have already set up the form of government that 
is characterized by communal participation, no matter what forms (legal or 
illegal) they are in fact operating under (Paula & Jean-Aime, 2008).
Despite its popularity, the modern model of governance is never perfect 
and never complete, and it was with this mind that Karl Popper said, “De-
mocracy is the word for something that does not exist.”2 Moreover, it should 
be understood that democratic society is more than a democratically elected 
government. There is even a universal concern about the status of Western 
democracy, and political discontents and skepticisms toward the system 
are becoming widespread. Due to this, citizens often feel powerless and are 
discouraged from taking a more active role in their society (ibid).
Consequently, given this need for an alternative governance system, 
particularly an indigenous governance system that would meet the needs 
of non-Western societies3 has led to advocates of indigenous governance 
celebrating it as the single largest knowledge resource not yet mobilized in the 
development enterprise (Paul, cited in Warren et al. 1996). Accordingly, policy 
makers have recognized the importance of indigenous knowledge systems 
and developed funding mechanisms, legislations, and policy frameworks to 
identify and protect them (Tshwane University, 2013).
Particularly in Africa, the indigenous governance system plays a significant 
role in the thinking, behavior, and welfare of the community. For instance, in 
Ethiopia, the Oromo4 people have their own indigenous governance system 
called the Gadaa system, which has been described as an autonomous, egalitar-
ian, and inclusive system of governance covering all sections of the society. 
Thus, it is the main objective of this chapter to analyze the fundamental 
principles of the “Gadaa system” and compare it with the fundamental princi-
ples of Western democracy in terms of its governance and power transferring 
procedures/practices.
4. Methodology 
In answering the research questions and achieving the objectives set, the 
study utilized both primary and secondary data sources, while taking a 
fully qualitative approach. Primary data was gathered through an observa-
tion check lists by visiting all the ceremonies and events involved in the 
power transferring process under the Gadaa system at a place called Mi’ee 
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Boku, a place where this process is undertaken every eight years. In addition 
observation, Abbaa Gadaas, Hayyuus, elders, and key informants from local 
communities were selected using snowball sampling, and in-depth interviews 
were intensively employed. Finally, secondary data sources were collected 
from books, journals, bulletins, newspapers, and official publications.
5. Oromo’s Governance System before the Gadaa System 
In order to analyze the governance system of the Oromo people before the 
development of the Gadaa system, the study used both primary and secondary 
sources, in which the kings (Abbaa Gadaas) and senior law makers (Hayyuus) 
were interviewed intensively and publications perused thoroughly. Accord-
ingly, the study found that the Oromos experienced two phases of governance 
systems before the establishment of the Gadaa system. Firstly, there was a 
period of multiple kingships, wherein each family tree and clan used to govern 
themselves by appointing their own kings. However, there is no concrete data 
for how many years this multiple kingships system functione, although the 
oral tradition of the Abba Gadaas and Hayyuus asserts that it persisted for 
many centuries (Jiloo Mandhoo, March, 2015; Guyo, March, 2015)
The second stage was a period of single kingship and queenship, in which 
men and women ruled as a king and a queen one after another respectively.
This period was marked by many social problems, which forced the then-
rulers governors to consider a different system of governance. As a result of 
these deliberations, which evolved over a period of time during which they 
considered the concept of dual administration, they came to consider a system 
of team leadership.5 Then, they devised a system of governance for their own 
social, cultural, political, economic problems and named it the Gadaa system 
(Guji Zone Culture and Tourism Bureau, 2016). Although some scholars 
argue that the system emerged fully-fledged rather than evolved, the Guji 
Zone’s Culture and Tourism Bureau confirms that the system has reached 
its present status through evolution.
6. The Leading Laws under the Gadaa System 
Like any other society, the Oromos have been conscious of their cultural identity, 
their relationship with nature, and the existence of a powerful force that regulates 
the connection between nature and society. Accordingly, their knowledge of 
society and the world is classified into two categories: a) cultural and customary 
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knowledge known as Beekumsa Aadaa, and b) knowledge of laws, known as 
Beekumsa Seera. The knowledge of laws is further subdivided into the laws of 
God (Seera Waaqa), and the laws of human beings (Seera nama). While the 
laws of God are immutable, the laws of human beings may be changed through 
consensus and democratic means. Oromo customary knowledge is a public 
and common knowledge that guides and regulates the activities of members of 
society; some elements of this customary knowledge could be developed into 
rules or laws, depending on the interest of society (Gemetchu, 1993).
The Oromos‘ political, social, economic, and cultural traits are highly deter-
mined by the values of the Gadaa system. There cannot be development (finna), 
peace, social justice, freedom (kao), prosperity, success, happiness, and moral 
values (safu) without the Gadaa system (Assefa, 2012).In an interview, Abbaa 
Gadaa Waqo Duubee affirmed that “Gadaa is our system of governance with 
age; grade and party descriptions and we use it for all of our spiritual, cultural, 
political, economic and social matters” (Waaqoo Duubee, 2015). Abbaa Gadaa 
Jiloo Mandhoo strengthened the argument by saying, “Gadaa system is all in 
all for us, and it is a means of governing each other, preserving our culture, 
and protecting our boundary, our peace and security” (Jiloo Mandhoo, 2015).
7. Structural Set Up of the Gadaa Sytem
As will become clear below, the Gadaa system has its own governance struc-
ture that depicts the relationship between different actors. Under the system, 
out of the two fundamental laws (the laws of God and the laws of human 
beings), the law of God is the guiding principle of the overall governance 
system. Thus, the Gadaa and its officials are more accountable to the guiding 
laws of God than to the people. This means the fear of God and His values 
are the guiding and leading rules. Likewise, under God/next to God, the 
general public is the most respected and the most influential stakeholder 
in any kind of decision-making. Then, the assembly (gumi gayo) occuppies 
the decision-making sphere, and the Abbaa Gadaa and his team are highly 
accountable to the general public. Most importantly, the assembly acts and 
works in the interest of the people. The seven cabinets are: Abbaa Torbiis 
(monitors of the implementation of any decisions and laws delivered during 
sessions of the gumi gayo), Hayyuus (formulators of rules, regulations, and 
laws), Fagaa (spiritual counselors/advisors and supporters of Luba /Abba 
Gadaa), Jalkeenya (the protocol officers of Abba Gadaa, and facilitators of 
the cases), Jaldhaaba (protectors of the laws of the land), and the Waamuras 
(facilitators of the meetings/assemblies and supporters of Abbaa Gadaa).
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8. Gadaa System’s Party Structure
Under the Gadaa system (particularly Guji’s Gadaa system) there are five 
parties (Harmuufa, Roobalee, Muudana, Haalchisa, and Dhallana) that 
govern/rule as a government one after the other. One party rules for eight 
years and waits the other four parties to rule and come back to power after 
forty years. For instance, the party governing up to November 2015 was 
Dhallana, and the Harmuufa party came to powerin January 2016. Hence, the 
Harmufaa will govern for the coming eight years, and then will pass power on 
to Roobale in January 2024. The last year’s outgoing Gadaa will come back after 
forty years. Despite their peacefull power transfer and peaceful preparation 
of candidates, there is tough competition among them. The parties compete 
with each other, and want their period of governance to be more powerful 
and fruitful than that of the outgoing and the incoming party.
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9. Comparative Analysis of the Modern Approach with 
Gadaa System
Based on the data gathered through a review of literatures on both the Gadaa 
system and the modern/Western model/approach of democracy, field visits 
(observation), and the key informant interviews, the researcher identified the 
basic elements and features of the Gadaa system and compared it with the 
Western approach/model of democracy. Accordingly, the below table shows 
the comparison made, and the argument arising out of it.
Table 1: Gadaa system Vs Modern/Western democracy
Areas of comparison Gadaa system Modern/Western democracy 
1 Leadership values God’s Value approach Law’s value approach 
2 Base of decision-making Truth-based Evidence-based
3 Sovereignty God’s Sovereignty and 
then popular 
Popular sovereignty and then 
elites 
4 Center of leadership In the community Out of the community 
5 Result of political game Win-win approach Win-lose approach 
6 Inclusiveness/ 
participation 
Inclusive Exclusion-Limited inclusive 




8 Competition Socially and spiritually 
guided 
Personally or group interests 
based





Majority (end justify means)
11 Tests of leadership Based on excellence Based on laws 
– Leadership values: Leadership values are the governing morals and beliefs 
guiding the practices and procedures of a leadership system. Under the 
Western model of democracy, the guiding values and principles are the 
laws formulated by higher decision-makers/MPs. In contrast, under the 
Gadaa system priority is given to the values and principles of God (Waaqa), 
and these Godly values serve as the general frameworks for all laws and 
principles. Thus, the fear of God and His values comes first, and respecting 
the laws of the land takes the second priority. This does not mean that 
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the system resembles a theocratic system, where the divinely appointed 
officials and priests claiming to know the will of God rule the people or 
where the state’s legal system is based on religious law. It is a system with 
two foundations. The first foundation is that Oromo’s philosophy, culture, 
governance, and politics build themselves on the fear of a supernatural 
God and do not engage in any evil acts. The Oromos believe that doing 
evil is moving against the will of the supernatural God, and they do have 
fixed norms defining evil. Secondly, under the Gadaa system, a Qaallu 
(spiritual father and counsellor) is very much autonomous and powerful in 
overseeing the performance, excellence, and the decisions of leaders (Abbaa 
Gadaa and his councils). Therefore, in contrast to the Western model of 
democracy, where the fear of God and His powerful laws are overridden 
and separated from politics and governance in the name of secularism, 
the Gadaa system prioritizes the fear of the supernatural God in every 
action and decision and –delegates to Qalluu great power in overseeing 
the leadership and leading some ritual and ceremonial activities. That is 
why any blessings and proclamations under the Gadaa system starts with 
“Waaqa hin Wayyu,”which means “God shall not be better?”
– Bases of DecisionMaking: It is apparent that any decision-making 
process needs a base for its validity. For instance, under the Western liberal 
approach to democracy, any decision-making process bases itself on the 
existence of evidence, and the evidence at hand determines the result of 
the decision. In the absence of evidence either there is no decision or an 
incorrect decision. In contrast, under the Gadaa system, as the governance 
system is highly attached to spiritual values and principles, priority is 
given to searching for the truth, rather than the evidence. For instance, 
under the Western model, if someone is accused of sexual harassment 
and there is no evidence for it, a person would be free, even if he had 
committed the crime. Under the Gadaa system, the spiritual values are 
the most respected elements and there is a belief that the result of lying is 
very harmful. Thus, even in the absence of evidence, the accused person 
would speak the truth to the court.
– Sovereignty: In the Western model of democracy, the principle of popular 
sovereignty is prioritized and praised publically. But in practice, elites’ 
sovereignty is highly appreciated. However, under the Gadaa System, 
God’s values are the sovereign and highly valued principles and receive 
the highest consideration, while popular sovereignty is valued as the 
second most important priority.
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– Center of Leadership: By its very nature, the Western model of leadership 
spotlights the headquarters leadership model, where the higher decision-
makers live and work at the capital city of the nation or the country so that 
leadership is by distance, and laws and procedures are propogated down 
to the people. This system is called off-the community leadership, wherein 
leadership is located far from the populace. But under the Gadaa system, 
the leadership takes power and immediately starts its journey within the 
community. For their eight years of leadership, the officials move within 
the community so that they can treat all local community problems in 
person. This leadership is called in the community leadership, in which 
the life and living of leadership bases itself in and with the community.
– The Result of Political Game: Politics is a game where the outcome 
of competing actors results in either lose-lose or win-win or win-lose 
scenarios. Hence, in a democracy of the Western model, political games 
mostly result in a win-lose outcome, in which the incoming party would 
win the game of politics and the outgoing one is always the loser, and 
election is the instrument of the game. Under the Gadaa system, as a rule 
of politics there are five political parties, and age set generations with 
different stages. Both the incoming and the outgoing Abba Gadaas are 
winners in the game. This is because when the incoming Abba Gadaa 
holds the position, his team moves one step forward with in Gadaa class; 
likewise, the outgoing Abba Gadaa also joins the Baatu class, or one step 
forward within the class. Then, with his team, the outgoing Abba Gadaa 
becomes a senior advisor and part of the highest decision-making class. 
Thus, the power transferring system always results in a win-win outcome 
where both the incoming and outgoing Abbaa Gadaas wait for the day 
of power transfer with a lovely gift in kind for each other. Finally, they 
discuss and consult each other on how to go forward together in the 
future.
– Inclusiveness/Participation: Basically in a Western model of democracy, 
politics is dominated by those who can and are capable of running the af-
fairs of the state. It implicitly excludes children, the young, and the elderly 
from the stadium of political affairs. But as the political participation 
under Gadaa system is based on age set, anyone joins the age set structure 
based on the age class, and the system is inclusive of all the age sets. On 
the other hand, the system is partly criticized by its lower concern to 
women’s representation, particularly in the age-set of the Gadaa class. The 
research conducted for this chapter confirmed the concerns of critics in 
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two ways. Firstly, the system excludes women from the age-set leadership 
development process. Secondly, the system also puts zero probability for 
women to compete with men and hold leadership positions, particularly 
the Abba Gadaaship.
 Nevertheless the system includes the following two main ground rules 
to validate women’s participation in various arenas. Firstly, under the 
Gadaa system there is an assumption that there are two types of power: 
positional power and influencing power. The men have positional power 
and the women have influencing power in the decision-making process. 
In other words, the women do influence the system of decision-making 
either through direct or indirect consultation. Secondly, the system 
provides an indirect mechanism for engaging women into political and 
leadership positions. For instance, to protect their rights and to ensure 
that their interests are included in any spheres of decision-making, the 
women have their own institution, called Siiqqee. This institution is a 
means through which women influence the processes and the structures 
of decision-making under the Gadaa system. Debela (2017) and Aseffa 
(2011) also confirm that the Gadaa system promotes women’s participa-
tion in all cases and that the women are the pillars of the Gadaa system.
– Leadership Development: The Western model of democracy is well-
known for its competitive nature. The one who is the fittest will gain 
of all the chances, and the survival of the fittest approach is the guiding 
principle of leadership. With this value, an opportunistic approach to 
leadership is the most widely visible one, and chances and opportunities 
play an important role in helping people to engage in a leadership and 
political environment. In contrast, under the Gadaa system, mentorship 
of leadership starts from early childhood, and leadership development is 
progressive by its very nature. Thus, leadership development is the main 
value of the system, wherein all people attach themselves to their respec-
tive leadership development categories and a junior-senior hierarchy and 
mentorship process is arranged within the system.
– System of Political Competition: Under both systems there is competi-
tion for different reasons, especially for power and political representa-
tions. Under the Western model of democracy, the culture of political 
competition is based on hate, personal decisions, and determinations, 
which exacerbates conflicts, hates, and hatred. In contrast, under the 
Gadaa system, the competition is very peaceful where it is based on 
performance and excellence; keeping social and spiritual values as it is. 
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Any competition which runs out of the social values would be condemned 
publically.
– Accountability: Regarding the level of accountability, in the so-called 
Western democracy, elected and appointed officials are responsible for 
their actions and are accountable to the people. Officials must make 
decisions and perform their duties according to the wishes of the people 
they represent. Thus, irrespective of the interests and claims (good or 
bad) of the people, officials’ leadership is supposed to be guided by the 
values of the people they represent, which is why homosexuality, rac-
ism, and immorality are re-emerging globally. But, as we have already 
mentioned, currently the system is criticized in many ways, and citizens 
often feel powerless and discouraged from taking active role in their 
society (CEFFD, 2007). As a result, the reality shows the reverse of 
the proclaimed vision, where a party’s accountability is the dominating 
concern over popular accountability. But, under the Gadaa system, the 
first and foremost accountability is the supernatural God (Waaqa), where 
all leaders believe that God is the master of everything, and the provider 
of any authority. Thus, not only elitits’ and party superiority but even 
popular accountability comes aftera God’s accountability.
– Means – Ends Correlation: In the Western model of governance, the 
fundamental principle guiding any actions and efforts is the fact that 
ends justify the means. In contrast, the reverse works under the Gadaa 
system. For instance, under the Western model of governance, despite 
the intentions and the reasons behind a given act, if the majority agrees 
with the act, it will be valid. But, under the Gadaa system, it is not the 
majority which matters but that which t doesn’t contradict God’s and 
social values, tbenefits the people, and does not contradict cultural laws 
and the philosophies of the community.
– Tests of Leadership: Under the Western model of democracy there is 
no specific term of leadership for all countries: different countries use 
different periods (terms) of leadership. Leaders stay in power for the term 
of leadership given to them either by periodic election or by constitutional 
provision. In contrast, under the Gadaa system, firstly, the term of leader-
ship is fixed, always eight years by its very nature. Secondly, the term of 
leadership is not a guarantee of remaining in power. Though the term is 
eight years, if the leading Gadaa class is not functioning well, evaluation 
will be carried out in the middle of the term (four years) and the leadership 
will continue leading based on the result of mid-term evaluation.
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10. Conclusion
In Africa, many ethnic groups have their own (indigenous) forms of govern-
ance characterized by remarkable qualities. In Ethiopia, the Oromos are one of 
the indigenous peoples with their own indigenous governance system, called 
the Gadaa System. The main objective of the study was to assess the basic 
qualities of the Gadaa system and to compare it with the Western model of 
democracy. The comparison was made based on eleven identified values, like 
leadership values, base of decision-making, sovereignty, center of leadership, 
result of political game, inclusiveness/participation, leadership development, 
competition means and ends correlation, and tests of leadership. Finally the 
study found that the Gadaa system is imbedded in the heart and soul of the 
people and is superior to the Western model of democracy in terms of the 
above values. Finally, the study suggests that the government should support 
indigenous knowledge, particularly the indigenous governance system in 
terms of policy provision and structural setup.
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Notes
1. www.google.nl/search?q Org iities of Abya Yala: of Citizens (ATTAC): Iipftaa. Org/ the 
Principles of Democracy.
2. www.google.nl/search?q Org iities of Abya Yala: of Citizens (ATTAC): Iipftaa. Org/ the 
Principles of Democracy.
3. is defined as the cumulative body of strategies, practices, techniques, tools, intellectual 
resources, explanations, beliefs, and values accumulated over time in a particular locality, 
without the interference and impositions of external hegemonic forces (Gloria and George 
2004).
4. Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group living in central and southern Ethiopia.
5. The Gadaa system took its present-day structure only during the fifteenth century; previ-
ously, the system was very complex and not as strong as of today’s.
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Among existing managerial functions and resources, human resources are a 
key leverage function for a performing public sector. This part consists of four 
complementary chapters. The first chapter (chapter 12) discusses meritocracy, 
career development, and promotion in the Ethiopian civil service. One of the 
prime messages of the chapter is that, despite the human resource management 
legal frameworks and directives, the recruitment, promotion, and career 
development in the federal civil service combines elements of meritocracy 
and patronage. The latter appears to be more significant, particularly for top 
and strategic positions. The next chapter (chapter 13) explores the continui-
ties and changes in human resource management in the Oromia National 
Regional State, the largest region in Ethiopia. It reveals that, notwithstanding 
the changes, the politico-administrative reforms were predominantly used 
to enhance the loyalty of the civil servants to the political executives at the 
expense of improving their well-being and serving the citizens. Chapter 14 
focuses on identifying the role of middle-level managers in Ethiopian civil 
service organizations. One of the key findings of the chapter is that middle-
level managers are systematically balancing competing roles, but the balance 
shifts. They do tend to give higher priorities to certain roles over others. 
Chapter 15 explores the Ethiopian civil service system and its implications 
for leadership roles. All authors have presented key conclusions and insights 




Meritocracy, Career Development, and 
Promotion in Ethiopian Civil Service 
Henok Seyoum Assefa
Box 1: Key Points of this chapter
 A system that guides the process of recruitment and selection in civil service 
institutions does exist.
 there is a gap with regard to its proper implementation.
 the Ethiopian civil service is basically a position-based civil service system.
 in practice, Ethiopian civil service is characterized by “mixed” recruitment patterns: 
competitive written examinations and comparison of the paper qualifications 
already possessed by the candidate.
 Personal connections and nepotism are prevalent in recruitment processes.
 recruitment and appointment of senior civil servants is loosely regulated.
Box 2: Key Insights of this chapter
this chapter intends to discuss meritocracy within the Ethiopian bureaucracy based 
on empirical data so as to answer the questions to what extent is the Ethiopian civil 
service characterized by meritocratic recruitment; does it predictable, rewarding 
long-term careers; and what factors influence meritocratic recruitments and career 
development.
Box 3: Abbreviations
ds = developmental state
FdrE = Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia
hr = human resource
nGos = non-Governmental organizations
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1. Introduction
Ethiopia is a federal state with civil service systems at the central, state, and 
local government levels. Therefore, the Ethiopian bureaucracy comprises 
many local governments’ “civil services,” nine regional state civil services, 
two city administrations, a federal civil service and several federal and state 
government agencies, parastatals, and corporations. An examination of 
bureaucracy in this study shall primarily focuses on the federal civil service. 
It is, however, pertinent to point out that the character of bureaucracy at the 
central level to some extent gives a general picture of at the situation in the 
different states of the federation.
Ethiopia has officially been branding itself as a developmental state since 
the early 2000s. In the context of the developmental state, the basic frame-
work of the public administration might be expected to incorporate a highly 
competitive, extensive, relatively efficient, and effective public bureaucracy.
In this light, it is pertinent to argue that Ethiopia needs to have a public 
service that is competent, professional, autonomous, and strong, among 
other qualities,; if it desires to use the state as a crucial vehicle to realize its 
developmental objectives. However, Ethiopian public service is said, by the 
government and others, to be weak, and daily government reports (i.e., many 
parliamentary reports and higher government officials’ press releases) indicate 
that implementation failure is the major problem of the government. By the 
same token, studies of the Ethiopian developmental state (Desta Asayehgn, 
2012; Fantini, 2013; UNDP, 2012) criticize the current public service as 
dysfunctional and unable to implement policies and carry out the ideals of 
the developmental state (DS).
Thus, the creation of a meritocratic bureaucracy and extensive state capacity 
is imperative
Meritocratic bureaucracy depends, among other things, on the organiza-
tion and management of career development. Civil servants should have 
opportunities to realize their full potential. They should be able to attain 
higher positions commensurate with their capabilities and demonstrated 
achievements. In other words, apart from the meritocratic recruitment into the 
public service, it is essential to consider merit in the promotion of personnel. 
This is accepted universally as a general principle. By the same token, since 
civil servants at top management positions have major impact on government 
policy implementation, they need to be selected and/or promoted carefully.
In order to address these issues the chapter is organized into five sections. 
The first section is an introduction that gives an overview of the chapter, 
including the objective, statement of the problem, and the main question. 
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This study questions whether Ethiopian civil service is meritocratic or not. 
To this end, meritocracy in the Ethiopian civil service is evaluated in terms of 
the legal environment, recruitment, promotion, performance appraisal, and 
transfer. In section 2, the relevant literature (books, journals, and research 
proceedings) related to the topic under discussion is reviewed. The third 
section presents the methodology by which the research was guided and 
data were collected and analyzed. Data presentation and discussions are 
entertained in the fourth section. Section five presents conclusions and 
possible recommendations.
2. Literature Review
2.1. The Concept of Meritocracy 
Meritocracy, or government by those with talent, seems self-evidently a good 
idea. The most able people will produce the best possible results and therefore 
the public welfare of the whole population will be optimized. Meritocracy, 
therefore, offers a fair system that result in better outcomes for both the 
individual and society. Meritocracy provides talented and hard-working 
people from all walks of life with a means of advancement and the opportunity 
to contribute to the well-being of the larger society. It can be a powerful 
vehicle for social mobility and incentivize people to do their best and reach 
their fullest potential (UNDP, 2015:4).
Meritocratic recruitment and career progression is one of the key features 
of Weber’s ideal type bureaucracy. Meritocratic civil service emphasizes 
talent and education. It is a system of governance based on ability rather than 
on wealth, race, or other determinants of induction. The literature tells us 
that bureaucracies in successful developmental states are characterized by 
meritocratic recruitment, provision of promotion incentives, rationality, and 
guarantees of high levels of prestige and legitimacy to bureaucratic officials 
(Johnson, 1982).
An important study by Evans and Rauch (1999) considered whether state 
bureaucracies characterized by meritocratic recruitment and predictable, 
rewarding career ladders are associated with higher growth rates (Evans 
and Rauch, 1999:760).
Furthermore, the highly influential 1997 World Development Report 
asserted that “making a meritocracy of the civil service helps bring in high-
quality staff, confers prestige on civil service positions, and can do a great 
deal to motivate good performance” (World Bank, 1997: 92). Where instead 
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promotions are personalized or politicized, civil servants worry more about 
pleasing their superiors among influential politicians, and efforts to build 
prestige through tough recruitment standards are undercut (World Bank, 
1997:93).
Meritocratic bureaucracies typically attract the best graduates in a country, 
who upon entering public administration are able to follow long-term career 
paths and work according to the rules and established norms within the 
bureaucracy (Dasandi, 2014).The absence of meritocracy in the bureaucracy, 
on the other hand, is generally seen to produce public administrations that 
are inflated, inefficient, dishonest, and lacking in autonomy from political 
leaders (Fritzen and Menocal, 2007).
In the context of the civil service, meritocracy is commonly discussed in 
connection with recruitment and promotion practices. Evans and Rauch 
underline that the importance of meritocratic recruitment, which ideally 
is based on some combination of education and examination, needs to be 
considered with a second characteristic: a predictable career ladder, which 
provides long-term tangible and intangible rewards for those recruited into 
the bureaucracy (Evans and Rauch, 1999:751).
As far as promotion is concerned, two systems are popular in many coun-
tries: career-based and position-based. Countries with a career-based system 
tend to have a relatively high degree of mobility and sophisticated promotion 
mechanisms. As a result, they also usually have a definition of senior civil 
servants which includes a large number and goes relatively low in the hierarchy. 
However, one of the main drawbacks of such systems lies in the difficulty 
of maintaining a good degree of competition between candidates to senior 
positions over time, resulting, to various degrees, in weaker performance 
criteria for promotion (OECD, 2003:15).
Therefore, meritocracy, basically, includes: meritocratic recruitment, an 
objective performance evaluation system accompanied by incentives and 
punishments, and merit based promotion.
2.2. Bureaucracies in Developmental States
The civil service is the major facilitator for implementing the will of the 
state as expressed through public policy; and it is a professional body of 
officials, permanent, paid, and skilled (Finer, cited in Briggs, 2007). It is a 
system that offers equal opportunities to all citizens to enter the government 
service, equal pay to all employees doing work requiring the same degree 
of intelligence and capacity, equal opportunities for advancement, equal 
favorable conditions, and equal participation in retirement allowances, and 
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equal demands upon the employees (Willoughby cited in Briggs, 2007). It is 
indispensable to the functioning of the modern state, which is why the fate 
of a society is largely determined by the performance of the public service 
(Basu, cited in Briggs, 2007).
The major requirements of meritocratic civil service are that it should 
be impartially selected, administratively competent, politically neutral, 
and imbued with the spirit of service to the community (Gladden, 1948). 
Hence, human resource management and development processes in effec-
tive bureaucracies are required to abide by competence-based recruitment, 
promotion, appraisal, remuneration, etc. based on merit principles.
The literature tells us that bureaucracies in successful developmental 
states are characterized by meritocratic recruitment, provision of promotion 
incentives, rationality, and guarantees of high levels of prestige and legitimacy 
to bureaucratic officials (Johnson, 1982). This has also been identified as a key 
factor distinguishing developmental states from the neo-patrimonial: while 
in the former recruitment and promotions in the bureaucracy are merito-
cratic, they are more personalized in the latter (Leftwich, 1995). Meritocratic 
bureaucracies, in successful developmental states, typically attract the best 
graduates in a country, who upon entering public administration are able to 
follow long-term career paths and work according to the rules and established 
norms within the bureaucracy (Dasandi, 2014).
In Korea, for example, a major reform took place within the bureaucracy in 
the 1960s. The government reintroduced a highly competitive and open exam 
system for the higher and lower echelons of the civil service,which attracted 
the best Korean students from the country’s two universities due to the social 
prestige usually associated with administrative positions. What is more, a 
strong policy of internal promotion and reducing the share of appointees also 
contributed to bureaucratic competence in the Korean developmental state 
(Mah, 2011). Similarly, the public administration in Singapore is probably 
the most educated professional body among public servants in the world and 
constitutes a major explanatory factor in the meteoric rise of that country 
(Adei, 2008). The absence of meritocratic bureaucracy, on the other hand, is 
generally seen to produce public administrations that are inflated, inefficient, 
dishonest, and lacking autonomy from political leaders (Smith, 2009).
In the early 2000s, the developmental state rhetoric surfaced in Ethiopian 
politics. A policy discussion document titled “Democratic Developmental 
State” was produced in 2003 by the government. A series of seminars and 
conferences were organized around this issue. Hence, taking the claim made 
by Ethiopian government to be developmental state into consideration, it 
is imperative to evaluate the civil service and ask whether it is in alignment 
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with the requirements of the developmental state, inter alia, with meritocratic 
bureaucracy.
2.3. Historical Overview of Ethiopian Civil Service 
Early Stage
The Ethiopian civil service is a century old. Yet, the establishment of modern 
state organizations in Ethiopia took place very late relative to Europe and 
other parts of the world. The early years of the twentieth century witnessed 
the beginning of modern public administration and the emergence of civil 
servants in Ethiopia (Adebabay, 2011). In 1907 nine ministries were estab-
lished, with the aim of ensuring an orderly and efficient arrangement for the 
workings of government (MoCSGG, 2012). The ministries were: Ministry 
of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Commerce and Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture and Industry, Ministry of Public 
Works, Ministry of War, Ministry of Pen, and Ministry of Palace (Bahiru, 
1991; MoCSGG, 2012; Pankhurst, 1997).
Initially, the ministries were organized in the crude form of the 20th-
century European civil service model. As Perham, cited in Paulos (2001:83) 
states, in 1907-1908 the ministries of justice, war, the interior, commerce 
and foreign affairs, finance and agriculture, and public works were created 
and in 1911 a ministry for posts and telegraphs were added while foreign 
affairs became a separate ministry. The ministries were housed in buildings 
set up within the palace enclosure (Ibid., 2001:84). The same source states 
that the ministers were not salaried and appointment was based on loyalty 
and the number of followers that they could mobilize during wartime. The 
civil servants were also small in number and were primarily engaged in 
maintaining law and order.
This formal framework of government under “a Western-inspired” ad-
ministrative system brought Ethiopia into the twentieth century (Adebabay, 
2011:7). Prior to this period, the country was under traditional administra-
tion and the different Ethiopian monarchs had failed to build any kind of 
administrative framework through which they could exercise their absolute 
power (Paulos, 2001:83).
The attempt to establish modern government organizations was made 
before the introduction of any formal education, in a sense, putting the horse 
before the cart. As a result, these ministries were run by feudal lords and 
priests, with a slight of knowledge reading and writing obtained from church 
education. Hence, the establishment of the modern administration was not 
accompanied by the promulgation of personnel rules and regulations. Indeed, 
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the initial years were characterized by inadequate structures, inefficient 
services, corruption, and the interference of the nobility in the due process 
of law in public matters (MoCSGG, 2012). The government officials’ prime 
objective was to promote the personal interest of the clergy and the nobility. 
This situation prevailed for about half a century, leading to mass dissatisfaction 
and frustration (Getachew and Richard, 2006).
Civil Service during Emperor Hailesellassie I
Emperor Hailesellassie I had the best claim of instituting modern public 
administration. It was during his reign that the process of centralizing and 
modernizing the state reached a relatively advanced stage.
The emperor, during his early days in power, created further ministries for 
industry, education and fine arts, justice, and public works and Communica-
tions (Perham cited in Paulos, 2001:84). From 1930-1935 many important 
attempts at reform were taken, including: new measures for training the army, 
the inauguration of a parliament, the development of education, judicial 
reform, the engagement of foreign advisors, and measures for the abolition 
of slavery (Ibid).
The implementation of reforms was discontinued as a result of the Ital-
ian occupation of 1935-1941. But, after its end and the emperor‘s return to 
power, many reforms were carried out and the whole ministerial system was 
completely reorganized and greatly extended (Bahru, 1991). Later on in 
his reign, Emperor Hailesellassie undertook a series of institutionalization 
and restructuring measures in the hope of bringing about an effective and 
efficient civil service governed by specified rules and procedures of a uniform 
nature. These included:
a) The Administrative Regulation Decree No. 1 of 1942: Among other 
things, the decree instituted the appointment by the center of governors-
general, directors, governors, principal secretaries, meslanes,1 and police 
to each province.
b) An Order to Define the Powers and Duties of the Ministries, No. 1 of 
1943 and An Order to Amend the Ministers (Definition of Powers) 
Order, 1943, No. 2 of 1943: Through these two orders, the Council of 
Ministers was created. Twelve ministers were listed, their powers and 
relations were defined, and the Office of the Prime Minister was estab-
lished. The Office of the Prime Minster was made head of all ministries 
and was responsible for the good administration of all the work in the 
ministries, harmonizing their duties and transmitting the emperor’s 
orders (Perham, cited inPaulos, 2001:84). The ministers, among other 
duties and responsibilities, were charged with the duty of preparing draft 
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laws – except those reserved for the emperor. They were also empowered 
to appoint their staff and prepare budget estimates.
c) The revised constitution of 1955: This constitution made a clear distinc-
tion between posts of confidence and career posts. In Article 66, it states 
that the emperor has the right to select, appoint, and dismiss the prime 
minister and all other ministers and vice-ministers. The appointment, 
promotion, transfer, suspension, retirement, dismissal, and discipline 
of all other government officials and employees was to be governed 
by regulations made by the Council of Ministers, to be approved and 
proclaimed by the emperor.
d) The establishment of the Imperial Institute of Public Administration 
in 1952: this was a significant development for the administration of the 
country. Its objectives included the training of civil servants, consultation, 
and research.
The 1960s were a remarkable period in Ethiopian civil service history. During 
this time modern personnel orders, policies, and directives were introduced. 
The Central Personnel Agency was established in the same period. The 
purpose of all these reforms was to establish uniform and rule-driven civil 
service across Ethiopia. Almost all orders and directives were adopted from 
the Western personnel management systems, mainly from the United States. 
The reforms had the following effects: a uniform personnel management 
system was established throughout the nation; Western-type merit principles 
were introduced for the first time in the nation’s history; the principle of equal 
pay for equal value of work was introduced with the position classification 
job evaluation method; and the Central Personnel Agency was established 
(Adebabay, 2011:7).
As a result, some very important tasks were attached to the agency. First, 
it was entrusted with the responsibility of establishing a homogeneous public 
service governed by uniform rules and principles. Second, it was assigned the 
responsibility to recruit for both classified and unclassified positions, based 
on open competitive examination. In other words, merit as a criterion for 
appointment was introduced, replacing the old method, which was based on 
favoritism or ascription. Likewise, the agency had the power and responsibility of 
all appointments exceptto ministerial ranks. The grading and the salary structure 
were to be based on the position classification system. Finally, a pension scheme 
for public servants was instituted (Asmelash, cited in Paulos, 2001:86).
However, despite these administrative and institutional arrangements, the 
high regard given to political loyalty in assigning civil service posts and the 
level of political interference negatively affected standard operating procedures 
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(Getachew and Richard, 2006). For example, people were employed through 
personal acquaintance and relationships withthe nobility. Anyone who did not 
have some kind of relationships, no matter how intelligent, was refused any 
kind of service or employment. It was, therefore, a widely established culture 
among the people to pay tribute and bribes to the nobility in order to get any 
kind of service from the public office. Judges and local officials were under the 
influence of the nobility (MoCSGG, 2012). As a result, the Ethiopian civil 
service repeatedly failed to deliver intended services to the public.
Paulos (2001:86) also discussed some other problems of the then civil 
service as:
… the absence of strict adherence to the civil service rules and regulations, and 
political interference in administrative affairs were seen as chronic problems 
of the time. However, generally speaking, during the period, the foundation 
of the modern bureaucracy was laid down and the importance of an efficient 
administrative system was recognized. Consequently, the civil service seemed 
to be accepted as the chief instrument available to governments for promoting 
economic and social development.
Civil Service during Dergue
The political economy system of this regime favored central economic plan-
ning and banned private ownership. As a result, the nationalization measures, 
along with the proliferation of new government institutions and corporations, 
led to a tremendous expansion of the public sector (Getachew and Richard, 
2006). At the same time, the government converted the civil service into an 
instrument for promoting its communist ideology and ruling the people.
There were two confusing structures at this time (Paulos, cited in Adebabay, 
2011): the political and the functional. All the decisions in the civil service 
institutions were made through the political structures by political cadres. 
There was virtually no place for apolitical professionals. In other words, under 
the military regime, the civil service was highly politicized and most top- and 
middle-ranking civil servants were members of the military regime’s party, 
known as the Ethiopian Workers Party.
Therefore, as described by Hiwet, (cited in Getachew and Richard, 2006) 
the regime was a combined “military/bureaucratic dictatorship.” In connec-
tion with this, the military administration issued many instructions, rules, 
and regulations to control the civil service institutions within the boundary 
of its ideology (Debela, nd).
During this period there were no fundamental reform measures prom-
ulgated to alter or modify the functioning and management of the civil 
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service. Except for the introduction of a few reform measures, the civil 
service operated under the different orders and decrees issued during the 
reign of Hailesellassie (Paulos, 2001:86). Of course, some new ministries, 
commissions, agencies, and authorities were created, while others were 
merged or dissolved. Many were also renamed. A case in point is the Central 
Personnel Agency, which was renamed the Public Service Commission. The 
Dergue also took some reform measures with regard to the salary scale of 
the civil service. The major ones were: the increase in the starting salary 
of the civil service from Br. 25 to Br. 50 (in 1975) and a shift in the ceiling 
from Br. 285 to Br. 636 for eligibility of periodic salary increment (in 1982) 
(Paulos, 2001:86).
However, despite such attempts of organizational and administrative 
reforms, the civil service remained problematic. According to Meheret (cited 
in Getachew and Richard, 2006), the Dergue regime was put in disarray by the 
fusion of the institutions of party, state, and government. It also encouraged 
the proliferation of parallel structures by appointing party functionaries 
to key decision-making civil service positions (Paulos, 2001:87) Hence 
duplication and fragmentation of public functions and the downplaying of 
merit and professionalism became the order of the day. The subsequent years 
were characterized by the centralization of administration in addition to 
increases in corruption, inefficient service delivery, and the routine neglect of 
the due process of law in matters of public concern (Getachew and Richard, 
2006). As a result, the civil service inherited by the succeeding government 
was seriously weak in its capacity to implement government policies and to 
deliver public services.
2.4. The Legal Framework Governing the Ethiopian Civil Service 
The currently effective rule under implementation for the Ethiopian civil 
service is the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 1064/2017, which 
was issued to address the problems identified during the implementation 
of proclamation No. 515/2007. Every aspect of the Ethiopian civil service 
is supposed to function in accordance with this proclamation and the then-
FDRE public service commission follows up if every civil service institution 
implements the proclamation accordingly.
In the context of Ethiopia, the public service is broadly defined as those 
employees of the state who are covered by national and civil service laws. 
Accordingly, civil servants are government employees governed by the Federal 
Civil Servants’ Proclamation number 1064/2017. According to Proclamation 
No 1064/2017, article 1: A civil servant means a person employed permanently 
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by a federal government institution; provided, however, it shall not include 
the following:
a) Government officials with the rank of state minister, deputy director 
general, and their equivalent and above;
b) Members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of 
Federation;
c) Federal judges and prosecutors;
d) Members of the armed forces and the federal police, including other 
employees governed by the regulations of the armed forces and the federal 
police; and
e) Employees who are excluded from the coverage of this proclamation by 
other appropriate laws.
Thus the proclamation excludes from the civil service elected officials, legisla-
tors, the judiciary, the armed forces, and the federal police. The civil service 
therefore denotes the nonpolitical or permanent executives recruited to serve 
the government in the implementation of policies through the management 
and conduct of governmental affairs.
The Ethiopian civil service applies a “career-based system” of employment 
for civil servants in several sectors, like teachers and health professionals, 
and a “position-based” system for others. Many of the merit principles in 
setting up career structures from recruitment to promotion are adapted to 
the Proclamation. Typically, civil servants are recruited at various services 
and grades within the public service. Entry grades may be at junior level 
or at senior level. “A vacant position shall be filled only by a person who 
meets a qualification required for the position and scores higher than any 
other candidates” (Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 1064/2017, 
article 13). This shows that civil service institutions make an effort to match 
the competencies of new recruits to specific classified positions. Thus, in 
general, staffs are expected to successfully meet the position requirements 
and there are no specialist career paths. Basically, therefore, it is more of a 
position-based civil service system.
The Federal Civil Service Proclamation lays down requirements for entry 
into the public service. Concerning selection and recruitment of new staff, 
the human resource planning of each civil service organization is expected 
to enable a government institution to take measure to meet the objective 
specified in the strategic plan and to forecast its human resource demand. The 
Proclamation declares that while filling vacancies in the civil service, there 
shall be no discrimination among job seekers or civil servants because of their 
ethnic origin, sex, religion, political outlook, disability, HIV/AIDS status, 
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or any other ground. Similarly, the HRM reform program has recognized 
that greater use of open recruitment and improved competitive promotions 
are fundamental to the development of a “modern” civil service (MoCSGG, 
2012). Thus, at least legally public service positions are supposed to be filled 
on the basis of merit.
As stipulated in the FDRE constitution article 74/2 the prime minister 
appoints ministers for ministerial posts (FDRE, 1995). Similarly regional 
governments appoint the heads of various institutions under their jurisdiction. 
It is, therefore, both at national and regional levels that ministers and bureau 
heads are expected to lead their respective offices, including HR activities. 
In many government institutions HR activity is located within a specific 
HR unit within the ministry or bureau. Responsibility for examining and 
recommending a candidate for a post lies with the human resource/personnel 
department of the respective institution. Accordingly, civil service can recruit 
at the department and service head levels. In the higher service the successful 
candidate is appointed to office by the concerned minister. The middle and 
lower staff are appointed to office by the director of the service concerned 
or the head of the personnel department of the ministry. Hence, despite the 
fact that the civil service is centrally controlled, staff management in the 
Ethiopian civil service is still relatively decentralized.
According to the federal civil servants’ Proclamation (No. 1064/2017) 
promotion shall be given for the purpose of enhancing the performance 
of government institutions with an intention of motivating the employees. 
Similarly, transfer in the civil service system, whenever necessary, is based on 
a transparent procedure. A government institution may transfer a civil servant 
to another similar position of an equal grade and salary or to another place 
of work within the government institution. This can happen among other 
government institutions also, whenever necessary and when the recipient 
and sender government institutions as well as the civil servant agree. Once 
the consent of the aforementioned parties isgained, transferring a civil serv-
ant to a similar position of equal grade and salary from other government 
institution can be done by notifying the ministry (ibid). According to this 
proclamation, the purpose of promotion and transfer is to enable civil servants 
to discharge their duties effectively in accordance with the expected level, 
quality standards, time, and expense.
Concerning remunerations, the Ethiopian civil service proclamation states 
that any newly appointed civil servant shall be paid the base salary as fixed 
by the civil service salary scale for the position to which he/she is appointed. 
According to the proclamation, the civil service minister prepares a salary 
scale to be applicable to the civil service in general, submits the same to 
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the Council of Ministers, and supervises its proper implementation upon 
approval. The ministry, also upon permission of the Council of Ministers 
and based on the specific nature of thegovernment institution concerned, 
shall study salary scales and submit the same to the council. Upon approval, it 
supervises their proper implementation and when necessary, shall undertake 
periodical revisions of salary scales based on economic changes and other 
relevant conditions and submit these revisions to for approval by the Council 
of Ministers.
The proclamation also states that all positions of equal value shall have 
equal base salary and that periodical salary increases to civil servants shall 
be based on their performance evaluation results. That is, if a civil servant 
obtains an evaluation result of satisfactory or above satisfactory, he/she 
shall be entitled to a salary increase to be made every two years (FDRE 
Proclamation No. 1064/2017).
Generally speaking, the country has good policy frameworks that promote 
meritocratic recruitment practices. However, empirical evidence in this 
study reveals that guidelines for recruitment and other human resource 
functions mostly do not adhere to the legal frameworks. Thus, it can be argued 
that the problem is not the absence of legislative framework, but rather the 
implementation of the legislation.
3. Theoretical Framework and Methodology
The theoretical framework used to analyze the meritocracy in the Ethiopian 
civil service is institutional theory. Generally speaking, institutional theory is 
a theoretical framework for analyzing social phenomena that views the social 
world as significantly comprised of institutions – enduring rules, practices, 
and structures that set conditions for action. Institutions are fundamental in 
explaining the social world because they are built into the social order and 
direct the flow of social life.
Thus, the main argument of institutional theory is that institutional factors 
play a major role in defining and underpinning state capacity. The key to 
state/bureaucratic capacity is, therefore, “finding the right institutional 
framework” or rules of the game (Andrews, 2013:4).The theory also tries to 
explain how and why this is so. As a result, institutions become the key ex-
planatory variables for state capacity, including bureaucratic capacity. Hence, 
institutional theory becomes relevant to the study of public administration 
and its institutions because government organizations are institutional in 
many ways.
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The research approach is basically a qualitative case study. The actual data 
collection covered three institutions: The Public Service Commission, the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, which are purposely, selected for their strong relevance vis-à-vis the 
issue under study. The instruments used for collecting data wherein-depth 
interview with key informants; focus group discussions; and document 
analysis. A total of sixty-three personnel, including all levels of officers, 
participated in interviews and focus group discussions.
4. Discussions
4.1. Assessment of Recruitment Practices in the Ethiopian Civil 
Service 
Recruitment and selection are important components of the human resource 
management reform of Ethiopia. It was introduced to bring about a merit-
based system in civil service institutions throughout the country. The reform is 
meant to solve the problems that were identified in the process of recruitment 
and selection that hindered the achievement of a merit-based system in the 
civil service. Hence, issues related to recruitment and selection procedures, 
definition of job requirements, and human resource planning were given due 
emphasis to properly consider the process of recruitment and selection in a 
way that supports the achievement of a merit-based system in the civil service.
However, the findings of various studies show that the intended result 
of such programs has not been achieved. For example, a study by Tesfaye 
and Atakilt (2012) reveals the human resource capacity gap as a critical 
challenge adversely affecting organizational efficiency, effectiveness, and good 
governance in Ethiopian public organizations. Their assertion resonates with 
frequent reports of federal institutions as well as other concerned government 
officials. In their consecutive annual implementation reports, almost all the 
ministries have admitted their inability to attract qualified personnel from 
the market. The shortage of skilled human resource across the civil service 
is further aggravated by insufficient recruitment practices. The public sector 
recruits employees from universities, colleges, technical and vocational 
schools, as well as from other sectors. In most cases, the usual difficulty is that 
of attracting adequate numbers of civil servants with sufficient specialized 
training to enable them to carry out developmental state ideals.
The literature on the East Asian developmental states stipulates that 
though the bureaucracy in those countries was challenged by geographical 
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affiliation, school connections, and kinship networks, it usually introduced 
a meritocracy, united and coherent. For example, in Korea, “the bureaucracy 
was indeed selected according to a highly competitive entrance examination 
that has usually attracted the countries’ best students” (ibid: 7). What is more, 
public servants were recruited through a closed-career merit system. In other 
words, appointments were made on the basis of university qualifications and 
a selection examination.
In the case of Ethiopia, article 13, and sub-article 2 of the FDRE Civil 
Servants Proclamation states that a vacant position shall be filled only by 
a person who meets the qualification required for the position and who 
scores higher than other candidates (FDRE, Civil Servants Proclamation, 
2007). There is also an implementation manual that indicates the procedure 
of recruitment and selection to be followed uniformly by all civil service 
institutions. The manual covers the issues of merit principles, like qualifica-
tions, work experience, knowledge, and skills as well as other capabilities 
and the overall procedure to achieve fair and open competition. Thus, it can 
be argued that at the policy level, except for being a position-based system, 
the recruitment procedures and considerations are similar to those of other 
developmental states. However, in practice various reasons account for the 
non-meritocratic recruitment into the Ethiopian public services.
The first issue examined by this study was how merit is considered; and 
whether non-meritocratic parameters influence the recruitment process in 
selecting candidates at the entry level. The purpose was to know civil servants’ 
perceptions regarding the criteria for recruitment at the entry level.
Results show that, primarily at the entry level, employees are recruited 
based on their qualification, experience, and performance. Similarly, the 
implementation of job specifications seems encouraging, with some limita-
tions. However, job descriptions are not utilized at the expected level to 
support the implementation of recruitment and selection. It seems also that 
even entry level recruitment does not exclude the possibility of political 
affiliation in recruiting and promoting employees in the civil service. In fact 
managerial positions, especially middle and higher ones, are reported to be 
exclusively reserved for politically loyal personnel with ethnic background 
as a supplementary qualification.
Empirical data also disclosed that there are violations of merit principles, 
exacerbated by poor attention to human resource planning and definitions 
of job requirements in the recruitment and selection process. The guidelines 
are violated to the extent that individuals are selected and assigned without 
competition and on the basis of personal connections and sometimes with 
political interference. The overall sentiment appears to indicate that the 
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guidelines are not strictly considered as required in a way that convinces 
and satisfies most of the civil servants.
The related issue is written examination in the recruitment process. In this 
regard, the federal civil servants’ recruitment manual states that civil service 
institutions shall set examinations to screen the most eligible candidates 
depending on the nature of respective organizations. In practice, however, 
recruitment under this provision has been negligible. Instead, Ethiopian civil 
service is characterized by “mixed” recruitment patterns that fall into two 
categories: those which recruit personnel by competitive written examinations 
and those which recruit them by comparison of the paper qualifications 
already possessed by the candidate.
The most common recruitment practice in the institutions under study does 
not apply formal examinations in screening the most eligible candidates. The 
most common practice is that of screening candidates based on educational 
credentials and relevant work experience produced by the candidates. In such 
institutions, the procedure for entry to the civil service requires the candidate 
to apply to an individual government institution in writing, stating his/her 
qualifications. Because the civil service may recruit at department and service 
head levels most of the time, it is highly prone to nepotism.
Therefore, the abandonment of the guidelines for recruitment into public 
service inadvertently opens the gate of entry into the service for incompetent 
persons. As a result of de facto recruitment procedures and conditions, merit is 
compromised. This, to a large extent, affects the performance of the Ethiopian 
bureaucracy in the area of policy articulation, implementation, and evalua-
tion. It is worthy of note that the inadequacy of personnel, particularly as it 
relates to expertise and skilled manpower, results in part from the personnel 
recruitment practices, which are essentially based on non-meritocratic criteria 
that contrast with objectively measurable criteria like qualification and 
professional competence.
In addition to malpractices regarding recruitment, lack of proper and 
attractive incentives is also mentioned as a factor affecting the competence 
and effectiveness of the civil service.
4.2. Practice of Promotion in Ethiopian Civil Service
The Ethiopian civil service system, in terms of recruitment and promotion, 
resembles the position-based system. However, such a system is less favorable 
to civil services in other developmental states (DS). Civil services in DS 
require, among other things, that the political and permanent executives in 
the civil service share common culture and goals. Such a civil service also 
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needs to be merit-based. Alas, as discussed in the literature review and also 
in the above section, while a position-based civil service system facilitates 
high mobility among civil servants, it results in the lack of a common culture 
among top executives. What is more, such a system tends to undermine 
merit-based promotion. Because of this, unlike Ethiopia, many developmental 
states prefer a career-based civil service system to one that is position-based.
Empirical data from the institutes researched for this study show that the 
promotion of civil servants is determined more by the interests of political 
officials and personnel officers than by their merit. In an interview with a 
state minister for the Ministry of Public service and Human Resources, he 
explained how promotions are made and the role of party affiliation regarding 
promotion as follows:
De jure, Ethiopian Civil Service is apolitical and professional. However, 
in practice there may be some deviations from the rule. Civil Service 
promotes professional achievements and merit as requirements for entry 
into and promotion within the Service. But political backing may be an 
important factor for promotion to senior ranks. Of course, senior civil 
servants (directors) must first meet professional requirements, but support 
for the government’s ideologies and policies may also be important for an 
appointment.
As reflected in different documents, procedures for assessing the suitability of 
candidates for internal promotion vary somewhat across ministries. In recent 
years, there have been attempts to make the promotion process relatively 
competitive. In this regard, the tradition of promotion, which used to be 
based on consistory approach (based only upon seniority and suitability), 
has been supplemented by competitive processes, though the practice varies 
among ministries and also among departments within a ministry. In general, 
a combination of interview performance, manager assessment, and success 
in meeting the requirements of the candidate’s current job are all taken into 
consideration to varying degrees.
There is no or little hope for the civil servants to be promoted to the next 
position. So, they are co-opted to remain hopeless in terms of civil service 
career progression. As a result, they are obliged to search for other options 
outside the civil service or join some networks within the service which may 
help them rise up the ladder.
For those who are outside the given ministry, political party officials have 
the power to make and unmake higher officials. They may recommend persons 
for holding higher posts in a given ministry and also can recall personnel 
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they are not comfortable with. As a result, in these ministries the promotion 
of civil servants without the necessary political affiliation is slow or absent.
Therefore, in addition to the malpractices and abuses of the existing system, 
the civil service system which Ethiopian civil service prefers to practice 
does match the requirements of a developmental state’s bureaucracy. This 
lack of fit, as discussed here, causes problems in the Ethiopian civil service 
in relation to promotion. Another area of challenge in the civil service is the 
transfer and mobility of civil servants within and outside the civil service. 
Related to this, respondents identified as problematic the subjective transfer 
and posting of civil servants.
4.3. Transfer and Mobility
A feature of a wide range of developmental contexts concerns the movement 
of high-level bureaucrats into political office, and vice-versa. This can be seen 
by the high number of important cabinet ministers who are former senior 
civil servants in many developmental governments (Leftwich, 1995).In many 
developmental states, a significant proportion of the country’shigh-level 
politicians are former civil servants. For example, in Botswana, the ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) actively encourages civil servants identi-
fied as being politically smart to enter politics at both the local and national 
level (Charlton, 1991).
For such movement between civil servants and political executives to be 
realized, however, there is a need to establish a system of promotion, transfer, 
and appointment that allows it. The Ethiopian civil service, because its system 
resembles a position- based system, does potentially allow mobility.
At the very least, a significant majority of civil servants doubt or do not 
expect that positions are filled by civil servants within their own institution. 
It seems that transferees are more privileged when it comes to positions at 
higher levels. This practice obviously demoralizes senior civil servants who 
have served their respective ministries for long years but are ignored when 
it comes to assuming higher positions.
Here, it is important to note that transfer is useful if managed properly and 
used for matching skills with the relevant positions. The Ministry of Public 
Service and Human Resources has prepared a manual that should, in principle, 
be abided by all federal civil service organizations in Ethiopia. However, 
existing malpractices related to transfer combine to undermine the manual. 
The net result of abusing the transfer scheme is a prevalence of transferees 
within the civil service whose competence is put in doubt, not to mention its 
instrumentality for politicians’ will. When the senior management of the civil 
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service is dominated by transferee politicians instead of by the brightest and 
the best in its system, ministries and other government institutions cannot 
function at their best as the capacity of higher civil servants to support them 
in carrying out their functions is largely impaired.
As a result, the civil service does not give due attention to internal mobility. 
This, in turn, leads to neglecting the processes of proper staff appraisal, which, 
of course, should be used properly, as it is a useful tool for proper promotion 
decisions. Indeed there is a gap in this regard.
Generally speaking, there are two other consequences of the uncertainty 
that arises from tenure that is not mandated or merit based. The incumbent 
is not sure of how long he/she will stay on the job, as political winds change. 
This has an adverse effect on his/her attention to detail, his/her capacity to 
master the situation, and his/her confidence that his/her judgment will be 
respected. Unsure or unwilling to make difficult but necessary decisions, he/
she opts for the tried and tested, or to second guess the preferences of his/her 
political masters. He/she may ignore, neglect, or discard worthwhile changes 
made by his/her predecessor. His/her staff may assume that reforms will 
not stick and avoid the commitment necessary to effect long term change.
Hence, it is in this context that it is crucial and critical to remove uncer-
tainty and imbue the officers with a certain security of tenure in every post, 
assuming it is merited by proven competence. Stable tenures will motivate 
senior officers to provide credible leadership and improve organizational 
performance. A healthy personnel tenure policy should reduce the overall 
incidence of transfers, and eliminate the emergence of a “transfer industry” 
or politicized transfers.
4.4. Performance Appraisal to Promotion
Among other things, meritocratic bureaucracy needs merit-based reward, i.e., 
rewarding civil servants based on their real performance. Career development 
based on the principle of rewarding merit constitutes the central element 
for professionalizing the civil service and motivating its officials. In order to 
reward merit, it is first necessary to put in place an evaluation system that 
makes possible decisions related to career development. The evaluation system 
needs to be based on a fair assessment of qualifications and performance, 
thereby ensuring the promotion of those officials whose competencies can 
be objectively recognized.
In this regard, the experience of East Asian developmental states is that 
bureaucrats were given the assurance that if they achieve the performance 
goals set at the top, they would be promoted to a more prestigious positions, 
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“all the way up that of minister”(Mah, 2011:17).Similarly, merit-based ap-
pointments and promotion of technocrats and bureaucrats, their training, and 
the reward system have remained crucial in achieving techno-bureaucratic 
governance in the developmental state of Botswana (Adamolekun, 1999). 
The other important point is that in many developmental states, the trend 
regarding ministerial position has been the selection of domestic-oriented 
ministers with patronage appointments while guarantying the professionalism 
of the economic ministers, such as for finance, trade, industry, agriculture, 
etc. (Mah, 2011:17).
In the FDRE civil service, career development is based on two factors 
taken into account simultaneously: seniority on the one hand and assessment 
of professional skills on the other. However, while seniority does not pose 
any question, setting objective criteria for performance appraisals poses 
problems, despite the provisions in legislative texts, which in some cases lay 
down precise procedures. In practice, in the Ethiopian civil service, non-
parametric standards are dominant in evaluating civil servants and thereby 
promotion related to performance. Hence, a lack of proper evaluation criteria 
is one of the challenges of the civil service in practicing performance-based 
promotion. In order to reward merit, therefore, it is first necessary to put in 
place an evaluation system that makes it possible for decisions relating to 
career development to be based on a fair assessment of qualifications and 
performance.
Cognizant of this, Ethiopia has undertaken a civil service reform program 
with the objective of implementing “result based performance evaluation” 
throughout the service. A results-based performance evaluation needs a 
transparent system, accountable management, and measurable performance 
standards. The intention was that promotion based on merit would to a large 
degree increase the level of commitment of the bureaucrats and also ensures 
that competent people are promoted to relevant positions. Any movements 
within the career space must be based on merits: that is, a demonstrated 
contribution to the furthering of the organization’s goals, possession of 
competencies, or potential for development.
In this regard, the civil servants who participated in the research com-
plained that though promotion in principle is by merit, there is no objective 
and functioning standard of performance appraisal:“Rules for promotion 
fail to differentiate between productive and non-productive workers.”This 
diminishes the value of the evaluation.
Thus, the promotion scheme prevents senior civil service positions 
from being held by competent career civil servants. In the absence of strict 
implementation of results-based evaluation systems, rewards have been 
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seen as being less objective and unable to discriminate hard-working and 
effective people from those who are. Many respondents complaint of cases 
where less hard-working and corrupt people are rewarded and promoted 
based on some other unethical yardsticks, such as loyalty to the supervisor, 
favoritism, nepotism and so on. This implies thatfor the vast majority of civil 
servants there is no hope of promotion to the highest levels, and therefore 
no motivation to properly execute one’s duty, let alone work overtime. By 
implication, it seems that in practice, performance appraisal has nothing to 
do with rewarding civil servants in Ethiopia.
5. Findings and Implications
Given the findings of this study, one of the key challenges in the development 
of Ethiopian federal civil service capacities is to establish and safeguard the 
merit principle of recruitment and promotion.
To achieve short- or long-term organizational goals, there is a need for an 
efficient workforce, which can only be attained by recruiting people with ap-
propriate skills, qualifications, and experiences. Strengthening appointments 
based on merit requires that the human resources employed by government 
to execute its policies become efficient and effective. The findings in this 
research indicate that there indeed exists a system that guides the process of 
recruitment and selection in Ethiopian civil service institutions, but there is a 
gap in terms of its proper implementation. In this regard, various reasons ac-
count for the non-meritocratic recruitment into the Ethiopian public services.
First, the Ethiopian civil service basically follows a position-based system. 
In practice, civil servants are recruited at various services and grades within 
the public service. In general, staffs are expected to successfully meet the 
position requirements and there are no specialist career paths. In most cases, 
the usual difficulty is that of attracting adequate numbers of civil servants with 
sufficient specialized training to enable them to carry out the developmental 
objectives of the state.
Second, in practice, the Ethiopian civil service is characterized by “mixed” 
recruitment patterns that fall into two categories: those which recruit person-
nel by competitive written examinations and those which recruit them by 
comparison of the paper qualifications already possessed by the candidate. 
The most common recruitment practice in the institutions under study does 
not apply formal examinations in screening the most eligible candidates.
Third, the ministries, primarily at the entry level, recruit employees based 
on their qualification, experience, and performance. Though the role of 
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political interference, at least at entry level, is insignificant, personal connec-
tions and by implication nepotism are prevalent in recruitment processes. Of 
course, this does not exclude the possibility of political affiliation in recruiting 
and promoting employees in the civil service.
Fourth, practice demonstrates that that basis for recruitment into the 
Ethiopian public sector has largely shifted from the principles of meritocracy 
(educational qualification and experience) toward factors such as nepotism, 
political patronage, (God-fatherism), and ethnicity.
Fifth, the study finds that recruitment and appointment of senior civil 
servants is loosely regulated. Loose recruitment practices make senior civil 
service positions a subject of inter-party bargaining. This suggests that there 
are informal party quotas for distribution of top posts in state administration. 
In fact, managerial positions, especially middle and higher ones, are found to 
be exclusively reserved for politically loyal personnel with ethnic background 
as a supplementary characteristic. Many senior civil servants are at the same 
time members of the main bodies of the ruling parties, signifying that lines 
between state and politics are still blurred. Hence, this lack of a system of 
publicly known and acknowledged political appointment at all levels of the 
civil service has been undermining the career structure. It prevents senior 
civil service positions from being held by competent career civil servants. 
Furthermore, there is no awareness of the need for the appointments of 
senior civil servants to be merit-driven. This is clearly against the principle 
of merit-based recruitment in state administration.
Generally, the abandonment of the guidelines for recruitment into public 
service inadvertently opens the gate for entry into the service for incompetent 
persons. Therefore, merit is compromised, and as a result, real recruitment 
procedures and conditions represent major problem in the ministries studied. 
This, to a large extent, affects the performance of the Ethiopian bureaucracy 
in the area of policy articulation, implementation, and evaluation. It is worthy 
of note that the inadequacy of personnel, particularly as it relates to expertise 
and skilled manpower, results in part from the personnel recruitment prac-
tices essentially based on non-meritocratic criteria that stand in contrast to 
objectively measurable criteria like qualification and professional competence.
A proper and reasonable incentive package is a crucial factor in attracting 
and retaining competent and effective civil servants. However, in this regard, 
the studied institutions have been facing critical challenges. In relation to 
this, the study reveals that:
First, the Ethiopian civil service faces critical shortage of skills resulting 
from lack of the civil service competitiveness in recruiting and retaining 
competent employees compared to other sectors like the private sector, 
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government enterprises, and NGOs. While the challenge to recruit and 
retain employees with competent skills is apparent, it is a more daunting 
task to acquire professionals, like IT specialists, research and training staff, 
and officials in finance.
Second, the lack of a connection between rewards and civil servants’ 
performance is another challenge. Unlike other developmental states’ civil 
services, rewards to encourage good performance are not common in the 
Ethiopian civil service. There is no recognition and punishment attached to 
discipline and –working hard. This means outstanding performance is not 
recognized and rewarded. Instead, remuneration in the civil service is based 
on job grade and length of service. This is partly related to an inflexible pay 
structure, which hinders rewarding performance. Similarly, resolving the 
critical skills shortage also remains a serious problem in the public sector.
Generally, due to the government‘s limited competence to create a decent 
and attractive work environment, the civil service faces a major challenge in 
attracting and retaining quality staff. This is attributed mainly to low incentive 
schemes, with large erosion in real salary income having a crucial bearing on 
low morale, low levels of productivity, and efficiency.
6. Recommendations
Reduce scope for nepotism: To prevent nepotism, it is necessary to select 
managers based on merit, using transparent criteria communicated across 
and even outside the administration. The decision-making must be shared in 
such a way that the immediate superior should not be the only one to take the 
final decision on selection. There should either be collective decision-making, 
e.g., through commissions of some kind, or the “grandfather principle” should 
be introduced. This principle for balancing powers means that decision on 
selection or recruitment is formally taken at the level above the immediate 
superior. Subsequently, the highest civil servants or managers should formally 
be appointed by a decision of the Council of Ministers or the prime minister.
Establish an assessment centre: In order to improve the recruitment and 
selection system, establishing an assessment centre is critically important. 
The centre would enable the combination of more selective methods, which 
would be very useful. Thus, it would enhance the competitiveness of the public 
employer and enable it to cope with the critical skills shortage. Such a system 
has been proven successful in many countries, not only for the selection of 
personnel to be employed in public administration but also for the career 
progression of employees who are already part of it.
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Improving professional continuity and development within public 
institutions: Selecting the right staff in the first place is an absolute precondi-
tion for subsequent performance. Recruitment situations should also give 
employers the opportunity to explain career prospects. To make career path 
opportunities clearer, strategic actions are needed at several stages. In this 
regard, issues needing to be considered include: how to incorporate career 
planning in regular performance and career discussions; and how to create 
pay and other HRM systems that promote both kind of careers: one leading 
to leadership positions and one leading to expert positions.
Increasing mobility is closely related to this issue. However, since there is no 
established design regarding mobility, both horizontal and vertical, mobility 
is a random action. In this sense, the federal civil service faces difficulty in 
maximally utilizing the mobility of civil servants across departments and 
in keeping senior civil servants over time. Therefore, in order to make the 
mobility of civil servants more effective, there is a need to establish central 
databases of civil servants and potential future senior civil servants with full 
information on their careers. Of course, the database needs to be public. By 
doing this, potential appropriate candidates for every position can be easily 
identified. Such a system would give special attention to civil servants’ career 
development, while at the same time allowing them to remain in competition 
with potential future staff coming from outside their group.
Design and establish rational and functional appraisal system: All state 
administration authorities should consistently implement the performance 
appraisal of senior managerial staff, as it is already envisaged by the existing 
appraisal manual.
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Notes
1. Mesläné refers to a sub district governor during the feudal regimes (till the coming to power 
of the Dergue in 1974).
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Continuities and Changes in Human 
Resource Management in Oromia 
National Regional State: The Post 1991 
Bacha Kebede Debela, Geert Bouckaert, and Steve Troupin
Box 1: Key Points of this chapter
 the responsibilities of the institution mandated for civil service and hrm has 
increased.
 there is an insufficient link between nPm-inspired result-oriented performance 
management and pay in hrm.
 the reforms/tools were used to strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination 
and control and to enhance the allegiance of civil servants to political executives.
 the influence of historical factors on hrm is significant.
Box 2: Reading this chapter will give you insights in
 the Ethiopian politico-administrative reforms and its effect on hrm.
 the key features of hrm organizational structure, legal frameworks, and directives 
in oromia national regional state.
 the effect of administrative reform tools and legal frameworks and directives on 
hrm.
 the potential negative consequences of the hrm-related challenges on the un’s 




bsc = balanced score card
csrP = civil service reform Program
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PscAP = Public sector capacity-building Program
sdGs = sustainable development Goals
un = united nations
1. Introduction 
From the 1980s to the 1990s, the neoliberal ideal known as the New Public 
Management (NPM) was used as a received model to reform the public 
sector, including human resource management (HRM), all over the world 
(Ongaro & Ferlie, 2019; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Advocates argue the public 
sector should adopt the market principle and a decentralized, customer- and 
result-oriented approach (Lægreid et al., 2008; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). 
In consequence, much attention was given to performance management 
and improving public servant quality through training and development 
and quality circles (Pollitt, Bouckaert, & Löffler, 2004; Steen et al., 2017), 
and staff tenure was conceived as depending on performance (Brans, 1997).
However, in the early 1990s the private sector approach to the public sector 
was attacked, among other reasons, for reducing trust in government (Bovaird 
& Löffler, 2001) and for privileging the short-term perspective (Lampropoulou 
& Oikonomou, 2018). To deal with unintended consequences, the West has 
shifted attention to the new public governance, new public service, and the 
neo-Weberian models, yet without dismissing the elements of neoliberal 
ideals (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). The trajectory of politico-administrative 
reforms, however, varies, which is partly explained by the differences in 
politico-administrative culture (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Schwab et al., 
2017).
Since the 1990s, Ethiopia has introduced a series of reforms. The Civil 
Service Reform Program (CSRP), which has an NPM element and five sub-
programs,1 was introduced in 1996 (Mengesha & Common, 2006). The 
country has also introduced five reform tools: Business Process Reengineering 
(BPR), Balanced Score Card (BSC), Change Army, Citizen Charter, and 
Kaizen, at all government levels and in all public institutions. Moreover, 
the executive agencies were restructured many times, with consequences 
for HRM. The trajectories of the reforms and their consequences, however, 
have not been well studied. A few Ethiopian studies exist but have limitations. 
Using an institutional perspective, Mitiku (2018) studied the Ethiopian 
public sector leadership profile in the federal civil service organizations. 
However, he did not analyze the effect of executive agency restructuring 
and HRM-related instruments on HRM in time and space. The World Bank 
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(2019) studied the implementation of reform tools; Daba (2016) studied the 
trends and challenges of HR dynamics in Oromia Regional State; Assefa 
(2017) examined professionalism in the federal institutions; and Kacho et 
al. (2016) investigated the implementation of HRM reform in five Ethiopian 
cities. However, these researches have not explored the effect of politico-
administrative reform on HRM. A study by Tadesse (2019) generically 
focuses on public service reform.
Drawing on the historical neo-institutionalist perspective and relying on 
a secondary dataset, this chapter explores the continuities and changes in 
human resource management (HRM) in the Oromia National Regional 
State and the consequences of the HRM reforms.
The chapter unfolds as follows. The next section establishes the theoretical 
framework and research design. The third section systematically discusses 
the results. The last section provides conclusions and implications.
2. Historical Neo-Institutionalism and Research Design 
The chapter draws on the historical neo-institutionalist perspective, for 
three major reasons. First, the advocates of historical neo-institutionalism 
focus on the structures and power relations among actors (Hall & Taylor, 
1996; Schmidt, 2006). The structural-instrumentalist perspective allows 
exploring continuity and change, over long periods, due to administrative 
reforms (Christensen et al., 2019; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Second, the 
historical neo-institutionalist perspective contends that institutions are path-
dependent; that administrative structures, historical factors, and memories 
inform the present politico-administrative contexts, including historical 
injustice (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2009; Schmidt, 2006). Third, the historical 
neo-institutionalist framework maintains that institutions provide a frame 
of reference for interpretation and action (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2009), allowing for the explanation of the influence of administra-
tive reforms on HRM, civil servants’ well-being, and their decision-making 
behavior (Christensen et al., 2019; Pollitt, 2005).
The study is primarily empirical and descriptive in nature. We relied 
extensively on a secondary dataset, including relevant legal frameworks, 
directives, guidelines, executive agencies’ establishing proclamations, and 
the Federal Civil Service Commission (HR database). We also reviewed 
published academic resources and conference proceedings. The data were 
obtained through web searches and personal contact with relevant people 
in the Federal Civil Service Commission. Furthermore, to track the effect 
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of structural reforms, we analyzed the career path of a civil servant working 
in local government in the Oromia National Regional State. We closely 
looked at his placement letters, and the first author conducted an exploratory 
unstructured interview for clarifications. The first author also conducted an 
exploratory semi-structured interview with a senior staff member at Oromia 
State University, previously called the Public Service College of Oromia. The 
interviewee participated greatly in regional reform programs since 2008. 
The thirty-five-minute interview focused on exploring major challenges 
encountered by the regional technical reform team and was conducted by 
phone.
3. The Scope of the Civil Service and HRM
Civil servants include all employees (permanent and temporary) except bu-
reau/office heads and deputy heads (regions, zones, and districts), members of 
regional, district, and Kebele council, judges and public prosecutors, members 
of the prison administration, the police commission, and other employees 
excluded by law (Oromia Regional State [ORS], 2002). The bureau and office 
heads and vice heads are appointed by the regional and local government 
administrative council. All newly hired civil servants are subjected to a six-
month probation period to become a permanent civil servant, and permanent 
appointment depends on performance evaluation results (a minimum of a 
satisfactory performance).
A removed political executive, who was a civil servant before the ap-
pointment, can be assigned as a civil servant, allowing such individuals 
the privilege of wearing a double coat with the potential to be reappointed 
to a political executive position at another time. The other paradox is that 
appointed officials who were not civil servants may also be directly placed 
as a civil servant, to relevant positions, when they are removed from office 
(ORS, 2010). Surprisingly, the salary of a removed political leader who 
served for at least one year (2006-2016) and at least two years (since 2016) 
remains unaffected (CSC, 2006). Appointees who were civil servants and 
are removed before serving for one year, will be placed in their position 
or an equivalent position. Moreover, while they were running the office, 
all the removed heads were extremely privileged; they were entitled to 
special allowance and benefits, and per diem, which is significantly differ-
ent from the civil servants (World Bank, 2019). The Oromia Civil Servant 
Proclamation and directives specify open vacancies, competitive selection, 
and performance-based placement.
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4. Federal and Regional Structural Reforms 
Three major types of structural reforms that affect HRM could be distin-
guished: The first decentralisation wave, the second decentralization wave, 
and executive agency restructuring.
The first decentralization wave occurred during the Transitional Govern-
ment (TG) of Ethiopia (1991-1995) and continued until 2001. After outing 
the Dergue in 1991, the EPRDF implemented a regionalization policy, which 
was largely driven by political interest (Mengesha & Common, 2006). The TG 
of Ethiopia established fourteen ethno-linguistic regional governments (TG, 
1992). The 1993 Act of the TG, among others, transferred the responsibility 
for personal administration to the regional governments (TG, 1993). In con-
sequence, regional public servants administration bureaus were established.
In 1995 the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was established, 
comprising nine ethnolinguistic regional states and two city administrations, 
implying that civil servants are expected to be proficient in the regional 
official language. The 1995 constitution grants regions the right to self-
administration, including the right to secession.
After the 2000 national election and the devastating Ethio-Eritrean war 
(1989-2000) and the resulting internal EPRDF party crises, the second 
decentralization wave occurred, in 2001, leading to extensive public sec-
tor restructuring (Mengesha & Common, 2006). In 2001, the Ministry 
of Capacity Building (MOC) was established and mandated to supervise, 
coordinate, and guide the implementation of national capacity building and 
reform initiatives. There were also regional level equivalents, since 2002. Next, 
in 2003, the government developed the Public Sector Capacity-Building 
Program (PSCAP) consisting of five interrelated reform programs,2 all 
focusing on result-oriented performance management, decentralized service 
delivery, capacity building, and increased local fiscal capacity (World Bank, 
2013). The federal government also forced regions to transfer 65percent of 
the resources obtained from the federal government to local governments 
(Peterson, 2015), allowing the federal government to systematically disperse 
the threat from regional governments by transferring the responsibility for 
service to local governments.
In 2005 another big official change occurred. In the aftermath of the 
relatively fair but contested 2005 election (Abbink, 2006), the government 
officially adopted the Democratic Developmental State (DDS) doctrine 
(World Bank, 2013) and committed to strengthening vertical and horizontal 
coordination, including controlling the society at the grass-root level (Debela 
& Troupin, 2016; Peterson, 2015).
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Another noticeable change is the continuous restructuring of executive agen-
cies. Since 1995 the institution responsible for HR administration management 
in Oromia saw seven structural changes. Table 1 summarizes the responsibilities 
of the institutions mandated with HR administration/management.









personnel/HR? What are the key responsibilities?




– Personnel administration and legal and 
technical
– Policy design and implementation




the Civil Service 
Commission 
(CSC)
– CBSO – Policy design and implementation, 
coordination, and capacity building
– CSC – all responsibilities specified by 
Proclamation No. 7/1195, create enabling 
environment for women employment and 
supervise the implementation of perfor-
mance appraisal 




the Civil Service 
Commission 
(CSC)
– ECBB – Policy design and implementation, 
coordination, education, and capacity 
building
– CSC – all responsibilities specified by 
Proclamation No. 50/2002 and develop and 
implement HR training and development 
programs and take corrective measures 
on personnel matters attributed to illegal 
documents 
105/2005 30 Capacity Building 
Bureau (CBB) 
(2005-2010) and 
the Civil Service 
Commission 
(CSC)
– CBB – Policy design and implementation, 
coordination, and capacity building
– CSC – all responsibilities specified by CS 
Proclamations
132/2007 30 CBB (2005-2010) 
and the Civil 
Service Commis-
sion (CSC)
– CBB – Policy design and implementation, 
coordination, and capacity building
– CSC – all responsibilities specified by CS 
Proclamations, and conduct study on 
government offices with special works 
that deserve special salary scale, prepare 
domestic and foreign training policy, and 
issue directives on how the public sector 
organizations are organized and determine 
their HR needs









personnel/HR? What are the key responsibilities?





– Policy design and implementation, and 
coordination
– All responsibilities specified by CS 
Proclamations and three major functions
– (A) Institutional capacity functions
– (B) HR functions
– (C) Civil service and good governance 
functions 






– All responsibilities entrusted to the CSGGB 
and undertake studies on reform programs, 
strengthen leadership capacity and improve 
public service, ensure correct placement, 
and study the organizations of government 
institutions and recommend (merge, 
dissolve, or establish new)
Source: Authors Compilation (2020)
There are three crucial issues worth discussing. First, the number of regional 
executive agencies has frequently changed. For instance, there were nineteen 
(in 1995) and forty-two (in 2016) regional level executive agencies (see 
table 1). The changes were due to the establishment of new agencies and the 
merger and separation of existing institutions, with implications for HRM. 
For example, the regional government established the Oromia Capacity 
Building Supreme Office and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in 2002. 
In 2004 the Education Bureau and the Capacity Building Supreme Office were 
merged and constituted the Education and Capacity Building Bureau, which 
a year later (2005) was divided into two independent agencies, the Education 
Bureau and the Capacity Building Bureau. The 2007 Act did not change the 
number of regional executive agencies but redefined their responsibilities 
(ORS, 2007). The 2011 and the 2016 regional executive agency Acts, among 
others, respectively created the Oromia Civil Service and Good Governance 
Bureau and the Oromia Public Service and Human Resource Development 
Bureau. Interestingly, except 1995, 2004, and 2007 all Acts establishing 
regional executive agencies were issued after national elections.
Second, the power relationships between the institution responsible for 
civil service and HRM and the regional administrative council have changed 
over time. The Public Servants Administration Bureau was a member of the 
regional administrative council (1995-2002).The Civil Service Commission 
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(CSC) was accountable to the Capacity Building Supreme Office,3 to the 
Education and Capacity Building Bureau,4 and to the Capacity Building 
Bureau.5 Between 2011 and 2015 and since 2016, at the time of the writing 
this chapter, the CSGGB and the OPSHRDB were responsible for HRM and 
both bureaus were members of the regional administrative council.
Third, the responsibilities of the institution responsible for HRM have 
increased over time, particularly since 2011. As revealed in table 1, three 
noticeable and interrelated functions were entrusted to CSGGB. The 
institutional capacity dimension consists, among others, of initiating and 
coordinating institutional capacity-building programs and preparing special 
capacity-building programs for disadvantaged districts. HR functions among 
others comprise ensuring competency-based HRM, preparing and imple-
menting HR policies and directives, and studying different types of benefits 
and special salary scale government offices, ensuring uniform HRM (ORS, 
2011). The civil service and good governance dimension focus on ensuring 
the efficiency and effectiveness of civil services, preparing and implement-
ing a good governance package, sustaining and ensuring effective reform 
programs implementation, benchmarking and organizing a public forum 
to achieve good governance, and institutionalizing the implementation of 
service delivery standards and a complaint handling system. Table 1 reveals 
that responsibilities of OPSHRDB have increased over time.
5. Instrumental-Managerial Reform 
5.1. The Reform Approach 
A systematic but top-down approach to administrative and civil service reform 
was started in the mid-1990s. In 1994, a special task force established in Prime 
Minister’s Office distinguished several weaknesses and bottlenecks in the 
civil service (World Bank, 2013; 2019). In response, in 1996, the country 
rolled out the CSRP, which is inspired by NPM doctrine, at all government 
levels. HRM is one component of the CSRP. The objective of the CSRP was 
to create an effective and efficient, fair, ethical, transparent, accountable, and 
performance-oriented civil service, accompanied by client-oriented service 
delivery (World Bank, 2019).
The full-scale implementation of the CSRP rolled out in 2002. To facilitate 
the implementation and follow-up and institutionalize the reform, special 
civil reform offices were established at the federal and regional government 
levels and a reform unit was created in each public institution.
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5.2. The Reform Tools 
To institutionalize the ongoing reform programs, and to promote the DS 
model, the ruling party introduced five reform tools: BPR, BSC, Change 
Army, Citizen Charter, and Kaizen, at all government levels and in all public 
sectors (World Bank, 2019), each affecting HRM-related activities. Table 2 
presents the reform tools, their focus and key purpose, and key supporting 
institution.
The implementation of reform tools differs by type of reform tools, by 
government levels and by sectors, with apparent greater success at the federal 
level institutions (OPSHRDB, 2016; OPSHRDB, 2017; World Bank, 2019). 
This could be due to a relatively better administrative and coordination 
capacity at the federal level. While Change Army is widely implemented at 
all levels and in all sectors, Citizen Charter was unsuccessful at all levels of 
governments (OPSHRDB, 2016; World Bank, 2019). The implementation 
of Kaizen in the public sector has not been well studied.
The inter-sectorial variation in reform tools implementation could be 
explained by the nature of the task (Pollitt, 2005). The unsuccessful implemen-
tation of Citizen Charter is most likely explained by a deep-seated top-down 
politico-administrative and upward accountability tradition reinforced 
by socioeconomic and structural inequalities in public service delivery 
(Debela, 2017). In addition, the interviewee distinguished nine challenges 
in implementing reform:
– Inadequate understanding of reforms/tools by implementing organiza-
tions;
– One-size-fits-all reform across all sectors and functions (lack of contex-
tualization);
– Lack of continuous evaluation and documentation;
– Lack of continuous engagement (considering reform as a one-time 
activity);
– Externalization of reforms, including by political leadership;
– High leadership turnover;
– Absence of performance-based reward and incentive;
– Misuse of reforms, including overly advancing political interests; and
– Inadequate resources and infrastructure for implementation.
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Table 2: Reform tools, focus, key purpose, and supporting institution
Reform tools and 
other supports When introduced? What are the focus and key purpose/s?
BPR 2005-2006
In many organizations in 
2007 (Peterson, 2015)
– Radically change the job and 
structure, public service delivery 
process, measurement and manage-
ment, and values and beliefs of 
public sector.
BSC 2008 – Institutionalize strategic planning, 
performance measurement, 
management, and reporting 
(Markos, 2013; Tadesse, 2019).
Change Army Rural areas in 2011 (World 
Bank, 2019) and all public 
sectors in 2014 (Miruts & 
Daba, 2016)
– Learning, performance, and 
strengthening vertical and 
horizontal coordination and control 
Citizen Charter 2011 (World Bank, 2019) – Improve accountability to citizens 
and reinforce the standards set by 
BPR
Kaizen Pilot project (2010) and 
full-scale implementation 
since 2011 (Kitaw, 2011)
– Incremental reform tool








reform support center 
(2008), University branch 
since 2009 (Finfine/ Addis 
Ababa) 
– Support reforms implementation
– Research, training, and consultancy 
services
Source: Author’s compilation (2020)
5.3. Civil Service Legal Frameworks and Directives 
The Oromia regional government issued a Civil Servant Proclamation in 2002 
(ORS, 2002) and amended the proclamation three times: in 2004, 2005, and 
2006. In addition, four directives and one guideline were issued. Table 3 
reports the civil servant legal frameworks/directives and their key features.
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Table 3: Civil servant legal frameworks/Directives and key features 
Legal frameworks/directives What are the key features?
Civil Servant Proclamation (ORS, 
2002)
– CSC is responsible for HR and related functions
– Defines the responsibility of public organizations6 
Civil Servants Revised Proclama-
tion (ORS, 2004). 
– Focuses on CSRP implementation and individual 
performance evaluation criteria7 
Civil Servants Revised Proclama-
tion (ORS, 2005).
– Focuses on external transfer and distinguishes 
four causes8 
Civil Servants Revised Proclama-
tion (ORS, 2006).
– Focuses on incentive schemes for district 
employees and specifies the responsibility of 
CSC9 
Civil servants directive (CSO, 
2006)
– Recruitment (open vacancies) and competitive 
selection, promotion and placement, and transfer
– Focus on merit rather than seniority
– Inclusiveness10
– Internal transfer11
Performance evaluation and 
reward system directive (OP-
SHRD, 2012)
– Focuses on the implementation of results-
oriented performance management
– Distinguishes sources of information for 
individual and organizational performance 
evaluation12
Reform Tools Implementation 
Guideline (OPSHRD, 2016) 
– Focuses on BPR, BSC, Change and Citizen 
Charter implementation
– Five implementation rating scales and modified 
scale set by performance evaluation and reward 
system directive13 
Job evaluation, standardization, 
and reward implementation 
directive (OPSHRDB, 2017).
– Distinguished sources organizational14 and 
individual information performance15
Employee Placement directive 
(OPSHRDB, 2017)
– Performance, academic relevance and compe-
tency, experience, and inclusiveness
– Individual performance criteria16
– External and internal transfer (placement)
Employee Placement directive 
(OPSHRDB, 2019)
– Implement the point rating job classification
– Performance, academic relevance and compe-
tency, experience, and inclusiveness
– More attention to direct work experience
– Restriction on promotion level
– Modified the placement assessment criteria17
– External and internal transfer (placement) 
Source: Author’s compilation (2020)
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The legal frameworks, directives, and guidelines have implications for HRM. 
For example, the Civil Servants Proclamations could open windows for 
political executives to arbitrarily transfer (2004) and dismiss civil servants 
(2005). The continuous modification of the source of performance information 
and performance evaluation scale may increase performance gaming and 
affect employee decision-making behavior.
The 2017 Job Evaluation and Grading assessment by OPSHRD Bureau 
brought to light some realities and brought about a change in HRM. The 
assessment, among others, showed massive pay discrepancies for similar jobs 
and misplacement of civil servants. Consequently, the long-lived position-
based job classification (in existence since the 1960s) was changed into a 
point-rating classification method, ranging from level one to level twenty. 
The aim was to calibrate civil servants’ salaries and ensure competency-based 
correct placement. The placement of civil servants was completed in 2018.
Nevertheless, due to huge financial implications, the government was 
unable to implement the salary adjustment, at a time of writing this chapter. 
A new civil servants’ placement was made, based on the 2019 directive that 
set a limit on promotion levels. While an employee with a sub-professional 
science occupational standard and its equivalent and less can be promoted to 
a maximum of three higher levels, an employee with a professional sciences 
occupational standard can be only promoted to two higher levels. Employees 
who are working in special salary organizations can be promoted to only 
one higher level. This means that performance results and competency have 
limited effect; promotion based on remarkable performance is impossible.
Both in 2018 and 2019 those civil servants who did not have the required 
competencies and were thereby suspended, and those who were out-competed, 
were assigned by the placement committee or the higher political executives to 
the same (internal transfer) or other public organizations (external transfer).
6. The Effects of Structural-Instrumental Reforms 
The structural changes had four major consequences for HRM. First, based 
on ethno-linguistic criteria, the civil servants under the Dergue regime 
were transferred to the regional states, resulting in profound civil servants’ 
mobility. Surprisingly, despite significant staffing shortages and challenges 
in each region, the unwanted civil servants were removed (Mitiku, 2018; 
World Bank, 2019). The regional parties appeared to play a significant role 
in facilitating the civil servants’ mobility. Second, following the second wave 
of decentralization, the size of HR at the local level changed drastically and 
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was converted into a pyramid structure, with more number at the local than 
regional levels. Third, the continuous restructuring of the executive agencies 
has not only significantly increased the responsibilities of the institutions 
responsible for HRM but also the mobility of civil servants. Fourth, the 
creation of special public organizations having a special salary pay scale, 
since 2013, allowed civil servants who were working in special organizations 
to earn a relatively better salary than others.
The managerial-instrumental reforms (reform tools) have also affected 
HRM. The BPR organized HRM into a support function – not as a core 
function – and dismissed the seniority principle, shifted attention to merit 
and qualification and abandoned the behavioral elements in employee per-
formance evaluation. As a result, qualified young civil servants were assigned 
to higher positions previously held by experienced but academically less 
qualified or unqualified civil servants (Peterson, 2015). At the levels of zonal 
administration and local government, the civil service pool and administration 
pool are responsible for HR functions.
The government also used BPR as an instrument to systematically remove 
senior civil servants. The 2004 Public Servants’ Pension Amendment Act 
was also used to remove senior civil servants. The Act reduced the retirement 
age from fifty-five years to forty-five years; and civil servants aged forty-five 
who had served for at least twenty years were entitled to receive a retirement 
pension for life (FDRE, 2004).
The BSC has linked strategic planning, performance measurement, and 
performance evaluation and reporting. Individual and team targets were 
linked to organizational targets since 2012 (World Bank, 2019). Individual 
performance accounted for two dimensions: performance (60 performance) 
and behavioral aspects (40 percent) (World Bank, 2019), implying the 
behavioral dimension has come back. However, the civil servants have a 
profound concern about the lack of meritocracy and objectivity in employee 
performance evaluation and performance-based rewards and incentives (ibid).
Change Army has a peer learning and performance improvement perspec-
tive comparable to the so-called quality circle, which according to a World 
Bank (2019) study of civil servants, is perceived as the most effective tool to 
discussing and finding solutions to corrupt practices in the civil services. Here, 
civil servants were organized into one to five arrangements (one group leader 
[model civil servant, preferably ruling party member] and other followers) and 
were responsible for evaluating team performance on daily/weekly bases and 
reporting to the lower level leadership, which in turn reports to middle-level 
leadership (directors) and ultimately to the top political leadership to be 
discussed at least once a month (Tadesse, 2019; World Bank, 2019).
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However, the Change Army allowed a one-party regime to considerably 
fuse the party and the state (the civil service) and ultimately increased the 
allegiance of civil servants to political executives, allowing them to become 
an instrument of the arbitrary power center. Therefore, one could argue that 
the election result of 2015, to some extent, may be attributed to the influence 
of the Change Army, because all national parliamentarian seats were held 
by EPRDF (Abbink; 2017), leading to increased political centralism and 
authoritarianism (Gudina, 2007). This is in sharp contrast to the goals of 
NPM-inspired reform, which aims to split politics and public administration. 
The effect of Citizen Charter and Kaizen is not explored. Figure 1 summarizes 
HRM organizational structure and reform tools.
7. Combined Effects of Structural-Instrumental Reforms. 
7.1. The Number of Civil Servants and Education Profile 
Table 4 reports the change in the number and educational profile of civil 
servants.
The results in table 4 show that the number of civil servants, in Oromia, has 
increased drastically from 108,410 in 2001 to 515,624 in 2018. This is contrary 
to the trend in OECD countries (see Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017:89). Moreover, 
female civil servants are underrepresented in the regional public administra-
tion. Of the total civil servants, females constituted only 27.4 percent in 2001 
and increased to 34.2 percent in 2018, suggesting the feminization of public 
administration has shown an upsurge of 7 percent.
The educational profile of civil servants has also changed. In 2001 most 
men (79.62 percent) and women (91.26 percent) were certificate holders 
had completed less than twelve grades. Conversely, in 2018, 68.2 percent 
of male and 58.7 percent of female civil servants held college diplomas and 
undergraduate degrees, suggesting remarkable progress in female civil serv-
ants’ academic qualification. As mentioned above, the reforms emphasized 
academic qualification, which in turn triggered the civil servants to invest in 
better academic certificates. Increased access to higher education also appears 
to play a role. On the downside, the push for better academic qualification 
has allegedly increased the number of civil servants and political executives 
having false academic and work experience credentials. This problem seems 
to have triggered the OPSHRDB to issue the False Academic and Professional 
Competency Certificate Investigation Directive in 2017 (OPSHRDB, 2017). 
The directive imposes serious penalties, including dismissal, if civil servants and 
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officials are found to have false credentials. However, against the civil service 
ethos, guilty civil servants and officials who officially declare themselves within 
one month of the directive’s issuance (mid-July 2017 to mid-August 2017) were 
excused from dismissal. Such individuals were reassigned to relevant posts. 
This is reportedly the case in Oromia; however, full data were unavailable.
7.2. Civil Servants Age Structure 
Table 5 reveals that the majority of civil servants in the Oromia National Re-
gional State public administration are young; female civil servants are relatively 
younger. The change in the age structure for male and female civil servants was 
Table 4: Civil servants number and education
Educaion level 
2001 2018
Male Female Male Female
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Less and eqaul to 
12 grade 
22737 28,91 11939 40,13 45414 13,4 26411 15
Certifcate 39884 50,71 15211 51,13 2116 0,6 1393 0,8
Diploma(Voc/Tech) 2679 3,41 1028 3,46 0 0 0 0
Level 1-5 46847 13,8 40872 23,2
1st-4th year 
(University)
689 0,88 75 0,25 5751 1,7 3186 1,8
College Diploma 
(college (10+3)
9028 11,48 1292 4,34 103490 30,5 60724 34,4
B.A./B.Sc./L.L.B 2874 3,65 136 0,46 127936 37,7 42930 24,3
M.D/D.V.M 323 0,41 35 0,12 1959 0,6 278 0,2
M.A./M.Sc./L.L.M 466 0,59 35 0,12 5642 1,7 621 0,4
Ph,D. 10 0,01 0 0 53 0 1 0















Source: Compiled from Federal Civil Service Commission Database
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also significant. In 2018, the proportion of male civil servants aged less than 
thirty-three changed from 67.67 percent to 57.85 percent, a drop in 12 percent. 
The percentage of female civil servants, in the same age group, dwindled from 
80.75 percent to 66.07 percent, a decrease of 26 percent. The decreasing rate 
of the civil servants’ recruitments explains the change in age structure.
Table 5: Civil Servants Age
Age
2008 2018
Male Female Male Female
No. % No. % No. % No. %
18-22 52917 36,03 26471 46,22 27230 8,03 22142 12,55
23-27 27933 19,02 11279 19,7 82335 24,27 52174 29,57
28-32 21473 14,62 8490 14,83 86663 25,55 42260 23,95
33-37 15004 10,22 4342 7,58 55786 16,45 25863 14,66
38-42 12746 8,68 3454 6,03 34578 10,19 15892 9,01
43-47 9429 6,42 2252 3,93 23712 6,99 9135 5,18
48-52 5249 3,57 790 1,38 15589 4,6 4831 2,74
53-57 211 1,44 189 0,33 7745 2,28 2452 1,39
58-60 0 0 0 0 5412 1,6 1643 0,93
Above 60 0 0 0 0 158 0,05 24 0,01
Male 146862 (71.9%) 100 339208 (65.8%) 100
Female 57267 (28.1%) 100 176416 (34.2%) 100
Total 204129 515624
Source: Compiled from Federal Civil Service Commission Database
The age structures have implications for the civil service. The minimum official 
employment age, in Ethiopia, is eighteen years and the official retirement age, 
since 2011, is sixty years. However, a civil servant can request an extended 
retirement, currently, for a maximum of six years, that has to be approved by 
the mandated institution, presently the OPSHRDB. In 2018 there were 158 
male and 24 female civil servants aged over sixty years (table 5). Given the 
low life expectancy, a sixty-year retirement age suggests many civil servants 
could die while working, and that only the survivors will receive a pension 
benefit payment.
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On the other hand, there is a huge unemployment problem in Ethiopia, 
which has both economic and political implications. Freezing employment 
opportunities in the public sector and increasing the retirement age to control 
the number of civil servants, with a consequent increasing expenditure in 
civil service, may not be feasible. In Oromia, the public sector is the biggest 
sector providing employment opportunity.
7.3. Civil Servants and Job Structure 
Table 6 reports civil servants by occupation in Oromia (2012-2018).
Table 6: Civil Servants by occupation (2012-2018)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Professional 
Science (PS) (M)
14.1% 18.1% 18.1% 17% 16.0% 17.0% 8.0%
Professional 
Science (PS) (F)
8.7% 11.7% 11.7% 12% 11.0% 12.0% 6.0%
Administrative 
(AD) (M)
2.8% 3.2% 3.3% 3% 3.0% 3.0% 2.0%
Administrative 
(AD) (F)
3.6% 4.3% 3.9% - 4.0% 4.0% 2.0%
Sub Professional 
(SP) (M)
8.9% 9.2% 8.2% 7.0% 6.0% 6.0% 4.0%
Sub Professional 
(SP) (F)
6.0% 7.0% 6.5% 7.0% 5.0% 6.0% 4.0%
Clerical and 
Fiscal (CF) (M)
1.5% 2.6% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.0%
Clerical and 
Fiscal (CF) (F)
6.9% 7.6% 8.4% 8.0% 7.0% 7.0% 4.0%
Trades and 
Crafts (TC) (M)
1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0%
Trades and 
Crafts (TC) (F)
0.7% 0.3% 0.5% 1.0% 0.4% 1.0% 1.0%
Custodial & 
Manual (CM) (M)
3.2% 3.2% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 3.0%
Custodial & 
Manual (CM) (F)
4.0% 4.4% 7.6% 8.0% 7.0% 6.0% 5.0%
Teachers (M) 38.7% 39.4% 39.5% 38% 37.0% 36.0% 37.0%
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2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Teachers (F) 36.9% 37.5% 35.7% 37% 35.0% 33.0% 36.0%
Health Profes-
sionals (M)
8.2 6.4% 6.5% 11% 8.0% 6.0% 6.0%
Health Profes-
sionals (F)
21% 17.2 17.4% 20% 18.0% 14.0% 13.0%
Appointment (M) 4.9% 5.3% 4.8% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%




3.9% 0.7% 7.0% 9.0% 11.0% 14.0% 31.0%
Special Clas-
sification (SC) (F)
3.7% 0.2% 4.5% 6.0% 8.0% 12.0% 27.0%
Not Stated (NS) 
(M)
11.7% 10.9% 2.7% 0 0 0 0
Not Stated (NS) 
(F)
5.8% 7.4% 1.2% 0 0 0 0
Agricultural 
professionals (M)
0 0 0.9% 0.4% 5.0% 5.0% 0.4%
Agricultural 
professionals (F)































Total (M+F) 336934 350803 385096 413488 452118 487457 515624
Source: Compiled from Federal Civil Service Commission Database
Until 2018, excluding teachers, health professionals, and special classifica-
tion jobs, in Oromia, civil servants jobs are structured into five horizontal 
grades each having different levels (vertical grades): Custodial and Manual 
(five levels), Trade and Crafts (ten levels), Clerical and Fiscal (12 levels), 
Administration (9 levels), Sub Professionals (12 levels) and Professional 
Sciences (9 levels).
Table 6 clarifies three important issues. First, the proportion of civil 
servants’ occupation substantially differs by gender. Female civil servants 
encounter both vertical (glass ceiling) and horizontal (glass wall) occu-
pational segregation. In terms of the glass ceiling, female civil servants are 
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underrepresented in professional sciences and sub-professional jobs, though 
there is an upward trend. Concerning the glass wall, the majority of females 
are working in the custodial and manual, clerical and fiscal, and health sectors 
jobs that are stereotypically and socially defined as suitable for females. 
The proportion of female civil servants that were appointed is also low. The 
general implication is that the influence of administrative reforms to reduce 
gender-based occupational inequality is modest.
Second, a substantial majority of civil servants (female and male) are 
working in the health and education sector. Teachers show an increasing 
trend, but female teachers comprise less than half their male counterparts. 
The third crucial observation is that the proportion of civil servants (male 
and female) in special classification jobs is increasing.
7.4. Civil Servants Pay Scale
Since 1996, civil servants in Oromia have seen several job placement and 
salary adjustments. For example, a civil servant whose document was reviewed 
during this study, was serving as a socioeconomic expert (with a monthly 
salary of 420 Ethiopian Birr [ETB]), in 1996. In 2005, the civil servant was 
serving as a head of personnel administration earning 895 ETB monthly. Next, 
in the year 2006, he had changed his position to record and documentation 
expert (salary 1040 ETB).
As a result of the BSC initiative, the civil servant became a mining license 
and documentation expert; his salary was 1617 ETB. The 2012 job restruc-
turing changed the civil servant’s position to a planning, monitoring, and 
evaluation expert earning 2249 (ETB), which was increased to 2934 ETB 
in 2013, due to a civil servants’ salary adjustment initiative. In 2016, the 
civil servant under consideration was earning 3909 (ETB) working as a 
socio-economic expert. The 2017 salary adjustment initiative increased his 
salary to 7346 ETB. In Ethiopia/ Oromia, the government is using salary 
adjustment to respond to an inflation problem; it has stopped issuing bian-
nual civil servant’s salary increment specified as a right in the civil service 
proclamation of 2003 (World Bank, 2019). Table 7 presents the pay scale 
and the proportion of civil servants in each pay structure for selected years.
The results in table 7 reveal that civil servants saw three salary adjustments 
between 2008 and 2018. While the lower pay scale in 2008 was 235 ETB, 
it was nearly 1000 ETB in 2017. A significant majority of male civil serv-
ants (79 percent in 2008 and 72 percent in 2010) and female civil servants 
(88 percent in 2008 and 83% in 2010) were earning a monthly salary between 
400 ETB to 1500 ETB. In 2013, gender-based pay inequality remained 
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significant; 77 of men percent and 88 percent of women earned between 400 
ETB to 1500 ETB. However, in 2015 the pay gap between male and female 
civil servants was relatively reduced. Contrarily, in 2016, gender-based pay 
inequality relatively increased; 52 percent of male and 64.4 percent of female 
civil servants were receiving monthly salary between 1000 to 3000 ETB. In 





M % F% M % F% M % F% M % F%
235-399 6,5 8,1 4 5,4 400-499 5,6 7,2 0,3 0,3
400-999 55,3 71,8 47,2 61,7 500-999 49,3 64,9 7,4 10,5
1000-1499 24,1 16,4 25,5 21 1000-1499 27,4 22,6 8,4 11,2
1500-1999 9,5 2,6 10,2 3,5 1500-1999 10,9 3,7 18,1 27,6
2000-2499 3,6 0,9 4,9 1,2 2000-2499 5,3 1,3 18,9 17
2500-2999 0,7 0,1 0,7 0,1 2500-2999 0,8 0,1 12,7 12,6
>3000 0,3 0,1 0,6 0,1 >3000 0,7 0,1 34,3 20,7





M % F% M % F% M % F%
500-599 0,5 1,7 <1000 0,8 0,9 0,7 1,1
600-999 7,4 8,9 1000-1999 11,5 15,1 11,2 14,3
1000-1499 5,4 7,6 2000-2999 18,9 27,8 19,6 28,3
1500-1999 16,8 26,7 3000-3999 20,2 22,3 18,8 20,6
2000-2499 16,6 16,1 4000-4999 18 15,6 17,1 16,6
2500-2999 13,2 14 5000-5999 13,1 9,2 12,7 8,9
3000-3499 12,9 10,5 6000-6999 11,6 6,7 12,3 7,1
3500-3999 12 7,4 7000-7999 3,1 1,5 3,8 1,7
> 4000 15,1 7,2 8000-8999 1,4 0,5 1,6 0,6
9000-9999 0,7 0,3 1 0,3
>10000 0,9 0,2 1,2 0,4
Source: Complied from Federal Civil Service Commission Database
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2017 and 2018 the pay gap between males and females earning a monthly 
salary between 1000 to 3000 ETB was relatively reduced.
But pay inequality is not necessarily due solely to performance results 
and academic qualification and gender. As already discussed, it may also be 
due to the presence privileged and removed political executives who were 
assigned as civil servants, and due to the creation of a special organization. 
Overall this contradicts the Civil Servant Proclamation, which mandates equal 
pay for equal work and competitive promotion (a minimum of satisfactory 
performance, all things remaining constant) (ORS, 2002).
7.5. Civil Servants Separation 
According to the Federal Civil Service Commission database, between 2008 
and 2018, in Oromia National Regional State, a total of 87,997 (male) and 
35,760 (female) civil servants were separated from their positions. Table 8 
reports the cause of civil servants’ separation for selected years.
The table reveals a great number of civil servants were separated due to 
transfer and voluntary departure, followed by separations due to appoint-
ments, retirement, and structural change (see table 8). Separation due to 
performance (inefficiency) and disciplinary cases was scant, suggesting 
these factors have limited effect on civil servants’ tenure. Concerning gender, 
the vast majority of female civil servants were separated due to transfer 
and voluntary resignation, while a relatively higher percentage of male civil 
servants were detached due to retirement and appointment.
8. Conclusions and Implications 
Empirical analysis reveals that the changing politico-administrative contexts, 
the structural-instrumental reforms by a single-party state since the 1990s, 
increased the responsibilities of the institution mandated for civil service and 
HRM. There were also other official changes. Among others, we observed a 
shift from centralized HRM to a decentralized system, a shift from seniority 
to merit and qualification, and a shift from position-based job classification 
to a points-rating job classification method.
We found that the reforms reinforce the NPM-inspired customer- and 
result-oriented performance management rhetoric. However, we have not 
found a linkage between meritocracy, result-oriented performance, and 
competence and the separation of civil servants due to incompetence (per-
formance). Excellent performance results and competency do not warranty 
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spectacular promotion and increased pay. Periodic nominal salary adjustment 
apply to all civil servants and pay is inadequate for civil servants’ well-being. 
In 2018, the vast majority of civil servants were earning monthly less than or 
equal to 3000 ETB. There are also high rates of gender-based occupational 
segregation, contributing to pay inequality. Moreover, the reform privileged 
ex-political executives and civil servants working in special salary organiza-
tions. And also, unlike the trend in OECD countries, the number of civil 
servants has spectacularly increased.
We also observed four major continuities. First, a government institution 
responsible for civil service is also responsible for HRM. Second, the reforms/
tools were used to strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination and control 
(see also Gudina, 2007). Third, they were also used to increasingly politicize 
the civil service, particularly top civil servants – a feature common to all 
Ethiopian regimes – and to remove unwanted civil servants (Mitiku, 2018). 
Table 8: Civil Servants Separation
Item
2012 2014 2016 2018
M(%) F(%) M(%) F(%) M(%) F(%) M(%) F(%)
Retirement 5,4 1,2 6 3 8,5 6,9 8,3 5,6
Illness 2,4 1,2 0,4 0,6 2,2 1,6 0,8 1,4
Death 3,8 3,3 2,3 2,2 3 3,4 3 3,7
Discipline Case 1,3 0,3 1 0,2 1,1 0,9 1 0,6
Inefficiency 
(performance)
0,5 0,9 0,5 0,5 1,1 0,9 0,4 0,5
Personal Case 
(Voluntarily)
24,7 19,2 34,9 37,8 26,8 30 18,6 18,9
Transfer 31,4 24,5 37,6 43,9 39,6 44,9 39,3 44,9
Appointment 9,6 4,3 7,2 3,3 10,7 6,7 13,9 9,4
Order 1,4 7,7 2,5 1,7 0 0 0 0
Other (Due to 
Structural Change)
16,9 17,5 4,8 3,6 4,6 4 0 0
Not Stated 2,7 19,8 2,9 3,2 2,4 0,6 14,7 15,2
Total 8194 4623 12552 5322 11390 4628 10036 4000
Total(M+F) 12817 17874 16018 14036
Source: Compiled from Federal Civil Service Commission Database
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Political interference in HRM also appears to be significant (Kacho et al., 
2016). Fourth, fundamentally, rather than primarily serving the public and 
improving public sector performance, the reforms were used as an instrument 
to enhance the allegiance of civil servants to political executives, particularly 
in the aftermath of the 2005 national election. This appears to be partly 
due to the deep-seated, top-down and discriminatory neo-patrimonialism 
and authoritarian administrative tradition (Abbink, 2006; Gudina, 2007), 
as well as to the lessons learned from the self- and group-evaluation and 
compliance culturecharacteristic of the EPRDF party (Abbink, 2006; Mitiku, 
2018). Similarly, during Emperor Hailesellassie’s regime, public servants held 
extraordinary loyalty to the emperor (Emperor Hailesellassie, 1961). Overall, 
the HRM and civil service trajectories are explained by path dependency 
and the diffusions of NPM ideas.
Two major implications could be made. First, notwithstanding positive 
gains, frequent, excessive, and improper HRM reform has a significant nega-
tive effect on the sustainability of public administration and civil service. 
Improper work-related relationships and actions can increasingly affect the 
behavior of civil servants (Perry & Van de Walle, 2008) and imperil their 
public service motivation (Paarlberg et al., 2008). They may also disrupt the 
institutional memory of the public sector. Second, the inadequate salary 
and increasing pay gap in general, and the underrepresentation of female 
civil servants and gender-based occupational segregation, in particular, 
have a negative consequence on Ethiopia’s to meet the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, which put 
citizens at the center in public administration and aim to ensure inclusiveness, 
gender parity in public administration, and justice for all at all levels (AU, 
2014; UN, 2015).
Finally, given the deep-seated top-down public policymaking approach, 
wherein regions and local governments are responsible for public policy 
implementation (Debela, 2017), we assume the results of this study can be 
fairly generalized to other Ethiopian regions and city administrations. How-
ever, since there is inter-regional politico-administrative cultural variation 
(Peterson, 2015), we suggest comparative research for the future. In addition, 
future research should use secondary and primary data and investigate the 
overall impacts of HRM instruments combining theory and practice.
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Notes
1. HRM, Expenditure Management and Control, Top Management Systems, Service Delivery 
and Quality service, and Civil Service Ethics.
2. Civil Service Reform, District Level Decentralized Service Delivery, Information and 
Communications Technology, Justice System Reform, Tax System Reform and Urban 
Management.
3. member of the regional administrative council (2002-04)
4. member of the regional administrative council (2004)
5. member of the regional administrative council (2005-10)
6. The public organizations were responsible for preparing their organizational structure, 
with detailed duties and responsibilities for each position, and the CSC was mandated to 
approve it.
7. (a) Preparedness to implement government policies and development plans, (b) perfor-
mance results, (c) free from corruption, (d) free from participation in anti-peace and affilia-
tion to unlawful political parties, and (5) readiness to accept structural change and practice. 
A civil servant can be dismissed on the grounds of failing to meet of one of the criteria or 
combination thereof.
8. (a) when mutual agreement is maintained between the office with which the civil servants 
is working and to which the civil servant is to be transferred, (b) when the civil servant 
agrees to transfer, (c) when the CSC approves the transfer, and (d) when the regional 
government causes the transfer on the grounds of the necessity of work.
9. The CSC is responsible for undertaking studies on the incentive schemes for district 
employees working in harsh conditions and implementing it upon approval by the regional 
administrative council.
10. The directive gives three and four additional points for female and physically challenged 
applicants in job competition.
11. A civil servant who has a personal problem, on good faith and based on mutual consent, 
can be internally transferred to a horizontal position (without reducing his/her salary) or 
lower position (reduced salary).
350 bAchA KEbEdE dEbElA, GEErt boucK AErt, And stEVE trouPin
12. Organizational BCS based-performance results (50 percent), supervisor’s evaluation 
(30 percent), customers’ and stakeholders’ evaluation (10 percent), and immediate 
leaders’ group evaluation (10 percent); and individual performance evaluation: Supervi-
sor evaluation (30 percent), peer evaluation (20 percent), customers’ and stakeholders’ 
evaluation (40 percent), and self-evaluation (10%). Both are rated on four performance 
levels (>90 percent [excellent], 75 percent-89 percent [very good], 60 percent-74 percent 
[satisfactory], and <59% [low]).
13. >90 percent (excellent), 80 percent-89 percent (very good), 65 percent-79 percent (good), 
50 percent-64 percent (satisfactory), <50 percent (low).
14. BSC-based performance results (70 percent), supervisor evaluation (10 percent), custom-
ers’ and stakeholders’ evaluation (10 percent), and immediate leader group evaluation 
(10 percent).
15. BSC-based performance results (50 percent), peer evaluation (20 percent), customers’ and 
stakeholders’ evaluation (20 percent), and self-evaluation (10 percent).
16. Performance results (70 percent), willingness and commitment to implement government 
policies and plans (10 percent), personal record (file) quality related to disciplinary cases 
(10 percent), and service at higher position (10 percent).
17. Individual performance result (35 percent), competence in discharging duties and respon-
sibilities (30 percent, assessed by employee’s head/processor), professionalism in service 
delivery (30 percent, assessed by employee’s head/processor), and personal file quality 
related to disciplinary case (5 percent).
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Strategic Contribution of Middle 
Managers in the Ethiopian Civil 
Service Organization 
Alebachew Asfaw Yimer
Box 1: Key conclusions
 middle managers in the Ethiopian civil service context are managers who 
are placed between the top layers of executives (heads and deputies) and 
the operating staff (supervisory level managers and frontline workers) in the 
organization.
 middle managers presently contribute a great deal in the overall strategic 
management of civil service organizations.
 the key role middle managers play in the Ethiopian civil service falls in the fourth 
quadrant of the competing value framework (cVF), where an emphasis is given to 
facilitation and mentoring activities.
 middle managers serve as an information hub in the organization due their 
unique place in the organizational hierarchy.
 middle managers manage both human and physical resources to achieve 
organizational objectives.
Box 2: Middle managers’ contribution in organizations
reading this chapter will give insights in:
 defining middle managers in civil service organizations;
 articulating the strategic contributions of middle managers in the Ethiopian civil 
service at present;
 understanding the competing roles middle managers play in Ethiopian politic-
administrative contexts.
Box 3: Abbreviations used in this chapter
csos = civil service organizations
chAnFoc = change Focused
cVF = competing Value Framework
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hrFoc = human relation Focused
mm/s = middle manager/s
ProdFoc = Production/result Focused
rulFoc = rule Focused
1. Introduction 
Middle managers (MMs) occupy a unique position that enables them to medi-
ate between an organization’s top-level executives and lower-level employees. 
They are responsible for planning, coordinating, leading, and controlling 
staff and other resources in the execution of tasks. Recent literature in the 
field (Balogun, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Huy, 2001; Kaiser, Craig, 
Overfield, & Yarborough, 2011; Mintzberg, 2009; Wooldridge, Schmid, & 
Floyd, 2008) asserts that middle managers are active in the entire strategy 
process of organizations, from formulation to implementation and evaluation. 
Yet, there are also scholars like Kealy (2013) who consider middle managers as 
order recipients from the organization’s leadership. This topic is an uncharted 
area in the Ethiopian public sector case. Consequently, this chapter aims at 
contributing to the understanding of middle managers’ strategic contributions 
in civil service organizations in Ethiopia. A document review on how the civil 
service works toward strategy development and execution was conducted. The 
theoretical foundation used in analyzing the strategic roles middle managers 
play in the Ethiopian civil service was the competing value framework (CVF) 
initially developed by Quinn, Faerman, Thompson, and McGrath (2003) in 
the 1980s. 368 middle managers and 12 senior officials participated in this 
research project. This study contributes toward the scant literature regarding 
middle managers in the Ethiopian context.
2. The Problem
Significant work in the area of public managers has been made across the globe; 
yet, there is a paucity of literature concerning middle managers in relation to 
the Ethiopian context (Mitiku, Hondeghem, & Troupin, 2017). In addition 
to this, researches of public management are more focused on senior public 
managers engaged in political decision-making than those working to interface 
decisions with actions in the public sector (Kellerman & Webster, 2001).
The government of Ethiopia has introduced various change initiatives to 
ensure efficient and effective service delivery. The BPR, BSC, Kaizen, Citizen’s 
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Charter, Change Army, and similar other outside-tested tools have been intro-
duced in this respect (Araya, 2019; Ethiopian Civil Service University, 2016). 
BPR was used to reorganize government institutions in early 2000, while the 
introduction of BSC was an immediate follow-up to the BPR. Kaizen was also 
introduced in many of the state-owned enterprises to reduce waste and improve 
efficiency. The application of the Change Army concept was a recent effort by the 
government in building teams at the organizational level to streamline efforts 
by the different actors, including the public (Araya, 2019). Although middle 
managers are the center in all these initiatives, no special attention was given 
to them. Little was done to learn about their influence in the change process.
Examining the Ethiopian civil service, this study highlights the strategic 
engagement of middle managers in general and their inclination at present 
in executing their tasks in particular. The study utilizes the competing value 
framework (CVF) to conceptualize the current experiences of organizations’ 
middle managers.
Professional middle managers play a vital role in connecting the entire 
workforce with the top executives of the civil service. That is why it is im-
portant to deal with the definition, roles, and responsibilities of middle-level 
public managers in civil service organizations at present. We rely on a literature 
review, observations of practical situations, and findings from interviews to 
arrive at a clear framework describing middle managers in the Ethiopian civil 
service. This research set out to explore who middle managers are in civil 
service organizations and identify the most dominant roles they are playing 
at present. Through the use of cross-sectional data, this chapter examines 
the following two research questions:
1. Who are the middle managers in the Ethiopian civil service?
2. What managerial roles are most emphasized by middle managers in 
Ethiopian civil services at present?
3. Review of Literature
3.1. Managerial Jobs in the Public Sector
Managers are individuals responsible for the work of other people (Drucker, 
2008; McIntosh & Luecke, 2010) to achieve an organization’s objectives. Manag-
ers are expected to be rational (Clegg, Kornberger, & Pitsis, 2015) and predict-
able by making sense of things around them. They are expected to demonstrate 
a steady focus in times of confusion, ambiguity, and puzzle by making sense of 
their environment (Clegg et al., 2015; Weick, 1995). Being the representative of 
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their organization, managers interact with different stakeholders from within 
and outside the organization. Stakeholders’ need for information, assistance, 
direction, and authorization requires the attention organization managers (Yukl, 
2010). The degree of managerial activities, skills required, and roles played are 
different at different hierarchal levels (Hales & Mustapha, 2000). Managers 
influence systems, conditions, and environments as they strive for success in 
their unit or organization. Consequently, the functions of management carried 
out by managers depend on the hierarchical level, functional specialization, and 
jobs given to them at a given time (Hales & Mustapha, 2000).
Managers engage in a variety of activities that are brief in duration, 
fragmented, and varied in nature (Mintzberg, 1971, 2009). They encounter 
frequent interruptions (Daft, 2008; Mintzberg, 2009; Yukl, 2010). Due to 
the voluminous and fragmented nature of activities and an overload of trivial 
activities, managers devote little time to reflective planning (Daft, 2008; 
Mintzberg, 2009; Yukl, 2010). Public managers differentiate among issues 
to be resolved based on pressure from subordinates, superiors, peers, staff, 
and people from government agencies (HBR, 2011; Yukl, 2010).
Managerial work is defined by the functions of management, such as 
planning, staffing, coordinating, supervising, negotiating, representing, and 
evaluating (Mahoney, Jerdee & Carroll, as cited in Allan, 1981). For Mintzberg 
(1990), managerial work involves performing regular duties that link the 
organization with its external environment. Exploring managerial work carried 
out by public managers in city governments, Allan (1981) found that they are 
highly engaged in task dimensions that include supervision of employees, 
harmonizing or integrating work activities, information handling, analyzing 
and evaluating, change-initiating, and monitoring regardless of title or agency.
Managers play different roles in organizations, from showing how to oper-
ate a machine to making decisions about where to invest scarce company 
resources. Clegg et al. (2015) concludes that managers’ jobs:
… involve interpreting, understanding, directing, cajoling, communicating, 
leading, empowering, training, politicking, negotiating, enthusing, encouraging, 
focusing, explaining, excusing, obfuscating, communicating – a job full of action 
words that are all to do with the manager as a speaking subject, a person who 
manages to shape and express directions, in writing and in speech. (Clegg et 
al., 2015:9)
Using an importance rating, Kraut, Pedigo, McKenna, and Dunnette (1989) 
conducted research to find out the difference in managerial roles and activities 
across different levels and functions in organizations. Based on their research, 
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they identified seven major factors or groups of management tasks, including: 
managing individual performance, instructing subordinates, planning and 
allocating resources, coordinating interdependent groups, managing group 
performance, monitoring the business environment, and representing one’s 
staff. Therefore, managerial work in an organization is full of activities that 
are not as limited to specific engagement as one would think.
3.2. Strategy Process and Public Managers
Public managers formulate and execute strategies with many actors, including 
elected officials, legislative bodies, the courts, interest groups, the media, and 
the general public (Feldman, 1980; Nutt & Backoff, 1995). Consequently, 
public managers have constrained capacity over different issues in formulating 
and executing government strategies. Though constrained by internal and 
external factors, public managers are expected to work and deliver results 
for their organization. Public managers execute a plan with scarce resources, 
pressures from within and outside the organization, and poorly coordinated 
teams. Weak cross-functional cooperation, time pressures, the poorly defined 
nature of tasks, and lack of incentive and support from above add to the 
challenge they face in their journey (Noble, 1999a).
Strategy development in the public sector must consider government poli-
cies, direction and objectives based on its place in the governance structure. 
The institutional mission or purpose and basic goals of public organizations 
are determined externally by the legislature and hence, the freedom of public 
managers in setting goals, amending missions, or adjusting the methods is 
far less than that of their private sector counterparts (Tompkins, 2005). The 
growing complexity of societal demand for better goods and services (in 
education, health, transportation, ecology, and other social services) is leading 
governments to the introduction of various measures, including privatizing 
firms, issuing laws on consultations to workers and citizens, and adding a 
business flavor to publicly owned enterprises (Ansoff, 1990). In this regard, 
public managers are contributing significantly to the strategy-making process 
of organizations by linking endorsed policies with the daily operations of the 
organization. Cascading goals, allocating resources among the different units, 
formulating and implementing strategies that span individual work units and 
providing leadership are the duties of public managers.
Execution is the other stage of the strategy process that is crucial in the 
public sector. Many observers agree on the problem of executions rather than 
planning in public organizations (Kaplan & Norton, 2001; Rajasekar, 2014; 
Zagotta & Robinson, 2002). Execution is a disciplined process with a logical 
360 AlEbAchEW AsFAW YimEr
set of connected activities that create a conducive platform for an organiza-
tion to realize its strategy (Hrebiniak, 2005). It is a process of selecting the 
most appropriate organizational structure for the chosen strategy, support 
systems for resource allocation, suitable leadership, and control mechanisms 
for a smooth flow of operations (Alkhafaji, 2003). Implementing strategies 
requires going beyond rational decisions by public managers and incorporat-
ing calibration to the existing situations, which leads to what Mintzberg and 
Waters (1985) described as emergent strategies. It also requires focusing on 
business priority, cascading accountabilities, high-quality interactions, and 
ensured sustainability (Coon & Wolf, 2005).
Strategy execution takes place through the fabrics of the organizational 
architecture, including structure, policies, procedures, systems, incentives, 
and governance (Lussier & Achua, 2015). The ability to execute strategy 
flawlessly contributes to the success of organizations. However, there are 
formidable roadblocks or hurdles that get in the way of executing strategies 
(Hrebiniak, 2005). According to Hrebiniak (2005) and Noble (1999b) the 
major problems or hurdles affecting strategy implementation include the 
longer time frames needed for execution; the need for the involvement of many 
actors in the execution process; poor or vague strategy; conflicts with the 
organizational power structure; problems in cross-functional coordination; 
poor structure, including information sharing and coordination methods; 
unclear responsibility and accountability in the execution process; and capac-
ity problems in managing change, including cultural change.
3.3. Understanding Managerial Roles at the Middle
Defining Middle Managers in Organizations
Middle management is a broad term (Carlson, as cited in Mintzberg, 2009) 
and so the subject of much confusion in organizations (Hassard, McCann, & 
Morris, 2009). Authors like Huy (2001) and Mintzberg (2009) define middle 
managers as any managers who are positioned two levels below the senior 
executives and one level above the frontline workers, including professionals. 
According to some scholars (Hassard et al., 2009), MMs are individuals 
currying favor from above and communicating top management’s orders 
down to the bottom ranks. For Kaplan and Norton (2001), middle managers 
implement programs based on orders from the senior managers. Middle 
managers (MMs) are managers who are found between the senior manage-
ment that formulates strategy and the frontline supervisors and employees 
who implement it (Livian & Burgoyne, 1997; Mintzberg, 2009). Kay (as 
cited in Livian & Burgoyne, 1997) defined MMs as managers and technical 
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people found below the senior executives (presidents and vice presidents) 
who run businesses without a profit/loss responsibilities. Similarly, Breen 
(as cited in Livian & Burgoyne, 1997) also defined MMs as people who keep 
the wheel of business running through a multitude of small and continuous 
decisions. Dopson, Neumann, and Newell (as cited in Livian & Burgoyne, 
1997) defined MMs as individuals who are placed below a few top strategic 
managers and above first-line supervisors in organizations.
In the case of public sectors, middle managers occupy the place between 
first-line supervisors and department heads in local government (Morgan, 
Bacon, Bunch, Cameron, & Deis, 1996), bureau heads in regional govern-
ments, and ministers and their deputies at the federal level. They receive 
directions and milestones from the top, communicate these to employees, 
and critically follow up progress in implementation. It is the duty of this 
level of management to observe signs and symptoms of deviation and to take 
measures accordingly (Livian & Burgoyne, 1997).
Middle managers need to interpret corporate goals and strategic objectives 
into daily actionable plans so that frontline employees engage in operation 
effectively (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Similarly, they secure senior manage-
ment attention through “issue-selling,” which creates an opportunity for them 
to exert influence upward in the organization hierarchy (Dutton & Ashford, 
as cited in Dutton, O’Neill, Hayes and Wierba, 1997). They serve as resource 
persons in strategy formulation and as key drivers in strategy implementation 
(Kuyvenhoven & Buss, 2011). They are important in connecting diverse work 
areas, serving as an interface between disconnected actors and an agent of 
change (Wooldridge et al., 2008).
Organizational performance is heavily influenced by what happens in the 
middle of the organization, rather than at the top (Currie & Procter, 2005). 
As most organizations are organized in multi-tier hierarchies, MMs who are 
found between the top executives and the frontline supervisors and employees 
play a critical role in realizing organizational objectives. Middle managers 
carry out a variety of tasks, serving as nodal officers who help coordinate 
different units. They have tacit knowledge about their organization, which 
can help in addressing issues of high importance in executing strategies. 
They coordinate, mediate, negotiate, interpret, and connect organizational 
objectives at the strategic level with operational units at the lower levels 
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997). They serve as the providers of information 
to the upper-level management and as the people who are responsible for 
exerting pressure on the frontline workers and supervisors.
Middle managers occupy a strategic position in an organization, which 
enables them to observe daily routines with challenges and opportunities. 
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They are always involved in reading the general environment for any op-
portunities or threats relevant to the organization (White, 2004). Due to 
this unique position, they easily recognize the need for change and influence 
perceptions around the organization –up, down and across the hierarchy – 
regarding the required change (Huy, 2001). Therefore, they are management 
groups that translate strategies into detailed plans and enable employees to 
make sense of the plan to achieve the business’s end result (Caye et al., 2010)
Having a better opportunity than others to understand the inner and outer 
environment of the organization, MMs are capable of detecting new ideas 
essential to the strategy (Dutton, Ashford, O’neill, Hayes, & Wierba, 1997). 
This task requires industry knowledge, working with others, and searching 
for current information. Implementation is more of the middle managers’ job 
in an organization, and with this task they take the lion’s share in completing 
the feedback loop in the system. During the implementation of a strategy, 
MMs are required to help others through the process, meeting the continuing 
operational demands of the business, and implementing required change in 
the system (Kuyvenhoven & Buss, 2011). Although strategy implementation 
brings many actors together, the middle managers have a strong influence on 
the way the lower-level actors interpret, adapt, and implement the designed 
strategy (Balogun, as cited in Kuyvenhoven & Buss; Hantang, 2005).
In general middle managers are indispensable in organizations, for three 
main reasons (Livian & Burgoyne, 1997). First, they serve as a lynchpin 
between the upper and the lower level, easing downward and upward 
communication in the strategy formulation and implementation process. 
Secondly, they help organizations in the articulation and transformation of 
organizational culture by aligning institutional and personal goals. The final 
reason for their importance lies in their role in matching jobs and individual 
action through experiential learning and their responsibility in dealing with 
a broad range of human resource issues within the organization. Hence, 
their managerial tasks are mainly integrative, focusing on cultural flexibility, 
experiential learning, and human resource management responsibility.
Managerial Roles at the Middle – The CVF Perspective
Named one of the forty most important frameworks in the history of busi-
ness, the competing values framework (CVF) has been used in studying 
organization’s effectiveness, managerial leadership, culture, development need, 
and other features for more than thirty years (Cameron, Quinn, DeGraff, 
& Thakor, 2006; Have, Have, Stevens, Elst, & Pol-Coyne, 2003; Lindquist 
& Marcy, 2014). According to Cameron et al. (2006, p. 6), the CVF serves 
as “a map, an organizing mechanism, a sense-making device, a source of 
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new ideas, and a learning system.” The framework shows the relationship, 
contradictions, and complementary nature of organizational features that 
coexist in a system. In analyzing the role of managers in an organization, 
eight roles of managers were identified through this framework. These roles 
are identified as innovating, brokering, producing, directing, coordinating, 
monitoring, facilitating, and mentoring. According to Denison, Hooijberg, 
and Quinn (1995, p. 526), effective managers are “those who have the cogni-
tive and behavioral complexity to respond appropriately to a wide range of 
situations that may, in fact, require contrary or opposing behaviors.” These 
roles are also designed in alignment with the four quadrants of organizational 
effectiveness models (Lindquist & Marcy, 2014; Quinn et al., 2003): the 
rational goal, internal process, human relations, and open system models.
The competing value framework (CVF) explains what makes managers 
effective in a paradoxical environment. Divided by two axes, each continuum 
between internal-external and flexibility-stability highlights an opposite 
value at the end of their range. The two axes form two-by-two tables (four 
quadrants). The four quadrants are labeled based on the orientation and 
relationships among the competing values that can arise in organizations. 
The first quadrant is called the “human relation model,” which results from 
internal orientation and flexibility in the framework. The human relation 
model emphasizes people who are working in organizations. Core values in 
this model include participation, conflict resolution, and consensus building in 
the workplace. The “open system” model is focused on leading change, which 
requires adaptability and external focus in an organization. In the “rational 
goal” model, executing results is important and maintaining a stable structure 
is considered as a significant factor in achieving results. The “internal process” 
model associates itself with the strength of the organization, which includes 
the quality of internal communications, rules, and procedures. This model is 
related to formal organizational structure and bureaucratic arrangement of 
work processes, including documentation, measurement, and management 
of information.
The competing value framework (CVF) is an appropriate framework 
in public organizations, as “there are certainly multiple values, different 
leadership and managerial styles, and considerable change and evolving 
challenges at play” (Lindquist & Marcy, 2014:7). It is an integrative approach 
to contradictory and paradoxical elements within organizations. The impera-
tives to be efficient, effective, and responsive on the one hand and being legal, 
ethical, and impartial on the other often contradict each other, while both are 
needed equally from managers in public institutions. The CVF is helpful in 
integrating important managerial leadership values and behaviors that seem 
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Table 1: Summary of managerial roles and their descriptions in the competing value 
framework
No. Managerial Roles Defining descriptions of the managerial roles
1 Mentoring role  
(human relation 
quadrant)
– Relates to being considerate, helpful, sensitive, 
approachable, and open to followers
– It is about empathy, credibility, and recognizing 
emotions in others (Clutterbuck & Megginson, 1999)
2 Facilitating role  
(human relation 
quadrant)
– Emphasis on managerial intention and action that foster 
collective effort, team spirits and morale in overcoming 
interpersonal conflicts (Quinn et al., 2003).
– Enable managers to develop teams, ensure participative 
decision making, and apply conflict management skills in 
order to carry out the role effectively
3 Monitoring role 
(internal process 
quadrant)
– Controlling internal issues to ensure consistency and 
consolidate continuity
– Seeking information to make a sound judgment regard-
ing the organization
4 Coordinating role 
(internal process 
quadrant)
– Oversee routine work performances of subordinates and 
give due attention to tasks and projects, results, and 
people (DiPadova & Faerman, 1993)
– Responsible for connecting the different individuals and 
work units
– Emphasizes structures, including rules, policies, and 
procedures 
5 Directing role  
(rational goal 
quadrant)
– Relates to setting goals which reflect the vision and 
mission of the organization
– Emphasis on providing direction and clarifying expecta-
tions to subordinates to achieve predetermined goals 
(DiPadova & Faerman, 1993)
6 Producing role  
(rational goal 
quadrant)
– Reflected in the manager’s personal productivity, 
commitment, and empowerment
– Relates to the motivation and encouragement of 
employees (DiPadova & Faerman, 1993) 
7 Brokering role  
(open system 
quadrant)
– Networking with the external environment to create a 
strategic alliance (Belasen, 1998)
– Influencing subordinates through trust, expertise, social 
capital, and opportunity to command resources (Quinn 
et al., 2003).
8 Innovating role  
(open system 
quadrant)
– Focusing on adaptability and responsiveness as 
important features in organization
– Creatively deal with risk and uncertainty, envision 
needed changes, and help others adapt to the turbulent 
environment (Belasen, 1998) 
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opposed to each other. Managers as leaders are required to carry out different 
roles in achieving organizational goals while they are working with others. 
These responsibilities are not always compatible with one another and may 
put managers in paradoxical tensions. Consequently, such responsibilities 
demand that they wear different hats on different occasions. The CVF consid-
ers this tension and helps managers to reach their goal by creating a balance 
among the conflicting demands for managerial leadership in organizations. 
Accordingly, the eight managerial leadership roles incorporated in the CVF 
were used in this study, to help find out where Ethiopian MMs focus at work. 
A brief explanation of these roles is presented below in table 1.
The four quadrants forming the overall model in the CVF are essential, as they 
are simultaneous and complementary opposites (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). 
Therefore, overusing any of the managerial leadership traits is catastrophic, as 
focusing on some leads to marginalizing the others. Overusing the internal 
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process model (monitor and coordinator roles of managers) will result in main-
taining the status quo. Too much focus on the human relation model (mentor and 
facilitator roles of managers) will lead to insufficient concern for productivity and 
goal accomplishment. Unchecked emphasis to change (focusing on innovator 
and broker roles) can lead to chaos. Therefore, managers are required to assess 
the dynamic environment regularly and play managerial roles in a balanced 
manner to accommodate conflicting demands in their organization. The four 
quadrants with the eight distinct managerial roles are presented in figure 1.
4. Methodology 
4.1. Population and Sampling Design
This study focuses on the assessment of middle managers’ strategic con-
tribution in civil service organizations. The research approach was nonex-
perimental, mixed, and descriptive. For the purpose of this study, middle 
managers (MMs) are defined as people working under the heads or deputy 
heads of organizations and managing other managers and/or employees 
in that same organization. Based on this definition, the study required a 
national representative sample to generalize finding related to MMs in the 
country. Collecting data from a widely dispersed population of MMs in the 
entire public sector in the country was not possible due to cost as well as 
time constraints. Therefore, sample data were collected from representative 
offices identified randomly.
To represent offices at various levels, civil service organizations were 
categorized based on the government’s mode of sectoral arrangements 
during the first half of 2018. 121 institutions were found at the federal level 
(Ministry of Public Service & Human Resource Development, 2015) and 
21 were taken as a sample frame for the study. Educational institutions (like 
universities and colleges) and those engaged in medical care (like hospitals 
and health centers) were excluded from the sample due to the nature of their 
operations and administration. One regional state (Amhara), federal institu-
tions (ministries and agencies), and a chartered city administration (Addis 
Ababa) were considered as appropriate for taking samples for this study. 
Though institutions at different levels follow one framework designed at the 
federal level, each level is mandated to craft their own procedures, manuals, 
and regulation based on their unique situation. Accordingly, proportional 
numbers of samples were included in the study to represent the clusters 
identified for this research.
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4.2. Sample Size and Sampling Techniques
The sample size of quantitative data was calculated based on the total number 
of mid-level public sector managers in the federal, regional, and chartered city 
administration levels. For the purpose of this study, the Yemane sampling 
formula (as cited in Israel, 1992) was used to determine the appropriate 
sample size. Based on data acquired from the Ministry of Public Service 
& Human Resource Development (2015), the number of directorate and 
process owners (considered as middle managers in this study) was found to 
be around 4626. At a 95 percent confidence interval and with 0.05 margin 
of error, the sample size to be used was calculated as 368 MMs.
The population and sample size for the study were 4636 and 368 respectively. 
Proportional stratified sampling (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015) was used to appor-
tion the total sample to each category in this study. Accordingly, the sample 
distribution for federal, regional, and city administrations were 125, 195, 
and 48 respectively. All 368 responses from middle managers were collected 
through strict follow-up and replacing missed participants in the process.
4.3. Characteristics of the Research Participants 
Based on reviewed literature and existing practice in the civil service, middle 
managers in the Ethiopian civil service organizations are managers who are 
placed next to the politically appointed officials. As they assume their post 
through the merit system, middle managers are professionals in their work 
unit. Participants for the research were nominated using this definition, even 
though a variety of names and job titles are used in the civil service currently. 
With regard to individual middle manager characteristics, the majority of 
the study participants were young and adults below forty-five (65 percent), 
predominantly male (87 percent), and mostly from line departments (70 per-
cent). According to the data, the gender gap at the middle management level 
was found to be significant. In terms of education, 50 percent of MMs held 
a BA degree, 48 percent held master’s degrees, and 2 percent were PhDs. In 
addition, participants were taken from various sectors to represent the civil 
service in the country, namely, the economic (34 percent), administrative 
and governance (29.3 percent), and social sectors (27 percent).
Interviewees were senior public officials who were supervising middle 
managers in civil service organizations. A total of twelve participants (one 
female) were included from the three locations for this study. Five officials 
were taken from Amhara region, four were from the federal institutions, 
and three were from Addis Ababa city administration. All senior managers 
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interviewed had attained the MA degree and worked as professionals in the 
civil service prior to their assignment in their current position.
4.4. Research Procedures and Measurement of Variables
The purpose of the study mainly was to explore the dominant role MMs 
play, in an effort describe their strategic engagement in the civil service 
organization. In the meantime, “who MMs are” in the civil service was as-
sessed. Self-administered survey questions were used to collect information 
about managerial behaviors. Senior executives were interviewed on critical 
roles MMs play in organizations to triangulate the result from the survey. 
In addition to this, documents related to MMs’ engagement in the strategy 
process were reviewed in sampled institutions.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted and interview questions were 
directly linked to middle managers’ strategic engagement in organizations. 
The questions also include elements helpful for discerning the way senior 
officials defined MMs in the actual work setting. Accordingly, efforts were 
made to solicit the perceptions of senior managers on who middle managers 
are and how much they contribute to the overall strategic management of 
a civil service organization. Documents reviewed for this research include 
BPR and BSC documents from the Bureau of Civil service and the Bureau 
of Finance and Economic Development in the Amhara region.
As use of standardized and widely used measures would help a researcher to 
save time and effort (Blankenship, 2010), avoid mistakes (Tharenou, Donohue, 
& Cooper, 2007), and enable findings to compare with earlier work in the field 
(Price & Mueller as cited in Hinkin, 1995), tested measures with amendment 
were used for this study. Consequently, indicators developed by Quinn et al. 
(2003) were used to assess the basic research question in this study.
As data collected for this study were mainly ordinal data in nature, special 
attention was given to the design and coding to fulfill the requirement of 
equidistance. Consequently, a 7-point Likert scale having a mid-point in the 
center and using linguistic qualifiers for each category was utilized to assess 
the responses from the research participants.
The eight managerial roles identified by Quinn et al. (2003) are considered 
for the purpose of this study. The four quadrants in the CVF are made up of 
two major dimensions in organizations. The first dimension is the vertical 
axis, which demonstrates the flexibility-control continuum indicating how 
much an organization emphasizes centralization and control over flexibility 
and change. The second dimension indicates the internal-external continuum 
demonstrating the degree to which the organization is oriented toward its 
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own internal issues as opposed to the external environment. Based on these 
premises, the CVF employs the human relation model, the open system 
model, the rational goal model, and the internal process model in the four 
major quadrants indicating the inclination of managers in organization. 
Considering the required behavioral needs of managers with respect to 
these four quadrants, the managerial roles in each quadrant were coined as 
change focused (CHANFOC), rule focused (RULFOC), production focused 
(PRODFOC), and human relation focused (HRFOC) in this study.
4.5. Data Analysis
The theoretical perspective of the competing value framework requires data 
analysis methods that would facilitate exploration of the most emphasized 
roles middle managers play in the civil service at present. This involved 
summarizing the quantitative data into categories to identify the roles mid-
dle managers play and the interviews with senior level officials about who 
middle managers are in their organizations. Quantitative data was analyzed 
using simple descriptive statistics, while qualitative data from the interviews 
was analyzed by aligning responses to predetermined themes. Analysis of 
qualitative data starts with transcribing the recorded documents. Transcripts 
were verified separately by the researcher to ensure accuracy and fill gaps that 
were found to be difficult by the stenographer during transcription.
Data obtained from the survey questionnaire on the demographic profile of 
participants was analyzed using descriptive statistics, including measures of 
mean, median, and standard deviation. Similar statistical analysis was used to 
identify dominant managerial roles played by MMs. Mean was calculated to 
understand what MMs on average think about their role in the civil service. The 
results from the quantitative data are also presented in a radar chart. Content 
analysis was used to analyze the data found through interviews. This was done 
using Microsoft Word and printed output from the interview transcripts.
5. Results
5.1. Who Are the Middle Managers in the Ethiopian Civil Service? 
Based on the confirmation of all the research participants, an agreed upon 
definition of middle managers in the civil service is nonexistent. Consequently, 
senior officials’ perspective about who middle managers are and what they do 
in the civil service is reviewed in this research, mainly using interviews. In 
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the process, senior officials were asked to describe the various names given to 
middle managers in their organizations. They were also asked to give details 
on the various tasks (repetitive and occasional) middle managers perform 
in organization.
Senior officials mainly identified middle managers as directorate directors, 
process owners, and in some cases team leaders mostly working immediately 
under them. Research participants agree on the general pictures of mid-
dle managers, with very few differences between organizations. All those 
managers below the politically appointed officials are considered as middle 
managers in general. However, some officials in the civil service also consider 
professionals participating in the management committee as middle managers, 
even though these individuals do not have any managerial responsibilities 
in their work unit. For this reason, some described them as post holders 
below politically appointed officials, while others see middle managers as all 
individuals who belong to the management committee in their organization.
Participants broadly explained the lack of consistent and standard 
definitions of middle managers in civil service organizations (CSOs). Some 
also questioned the need for defining it, as they are civil servants who are 
not different from the others in any form, including skills, knowledge, and 
remuneration in general. In sum, participants reflected on the complexity 
and lack of clarity in the definition of middle management in CSOs, which 
often provoked personal consideration to the issue. Concerning the issue, 
one respondent said
I never come across a clear and standard definition to middle management. 
The only criterion we consider is the place of the manager in the organizational 
hierarchy. When managers are placed just below the politically appointed heads, 
we consider them as middle managers. (Participant 12)
Participants explained that MMs are managers who take care of the day-to-day 
operation in the organization. The majority of the participants expressed 
their belief that MMs are the pillars of organization, placed next to the senior 
appointed officials. In praising middle managers’ role and expressing their 
influence on the overall successes of CSOs, one participant said,
We, the politically appointed officials, are not experts in many respects. We 
spend much of our time in carrying out political assignments which made middle 
managers very crucial in running the organization. They have the expertise 
and the knowledge of the internal and external environment. They understand 
employees’ and citizens’ demand in respect to the given organization. Middle 
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managers are the ones who take care of the detail in the overall mission of the 
organization. (Participant 4)
Documents were reviewed based on the information received from head and 
deputy heads of organizations about middle managers. Accordingly, MMs 
were found to be active in many respects covering the planning, execution, 
and evaluation of various tasks in CSOs. Jobs at the middle management level 
vary widely; however, some basic roles of MMs are fairly common. Based on 
job descriptions from various offices at the federal, regional, and Addis Ababa 
level, MMs are given tasks related to understanding and interpretation of 
organizational strategy, management of daily operations, and the management 
of resources in organizations.
Table 2: Middle managers’ strategic involvement 
(Sample tasks taken from middle managers’ job descriptions)
Job title Issues included in job descriptions
Operations Head
– Ensures possible synergy among work units
– Advises the head and deputy head on policy matters
– Sets goal and objectives to guide the overall operation of the 
organization
– Monitors work unit performance and takes actions for 
improvements
– Monitors department materials and supplies, ordering as 




– Prepares strategic HR Plan consistent with the overall 
organizational strategies
– Designs and recommends administrative policies by adapting 
national and regional policies to ensure consistent standards 
with others in the civil service
– Develops HRM-related strategies and operational plan to 
execute later
– Ensures efficient and effective handling of HRM tasks, such as 
human resource planning, recruitment, placement, develop-
ment, promotion, and transfer
– Coordinates the human resource tasks across the organization
Source: Job descriptions from the civil service offices
Job description documents found in the Amhara civil service commission 
were reviewed in order to check similarities and differences in task assign-
ment for middle managers. Accordingly, it was observed that some MMs 
were found to enjoy a narrower span of control while the others have many 
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subordinates under their supervision. Managers in the staff departments have 
more subordinates than technical (line) managers in organizations where 
they use pool administrative services. Line department heads have a wider 
span of control, especially in bureaus like Finance and Economic Cooperation 
at the regional level. But, as data for such comparison were not collected, it 
would be misleading to conclude such observation as final for the entire civil 
service. Therefore, this area can be considered as a limitation in this research.
According to the findings, MMs were found to be responsible for detailed 
planning and execution. Conclusions drawn from the interviews and docu-
ment review on the definition of middle managers revealed that
– middle managers (MMs) are not defined well in CSOs, though they serve 
as a bridge between the top-level officials and the employees to achieve 
objectives;
– middle managers (MMs) are assigned by merit fulfilling the minimum 
requirement, even though there is a point (up to 15 percent) to be given 
by the head of the organization during the competition;
– middle managers in CSOs are found to be professionals who can guide 
and coordinate complex tasks in the area they are assigned to lead.
5.2. Emphasized Roles Middle Managers Play in the Ethiopian 
Civil Service
The roles of middle managers in the civil service were assessed using the CVF. 
These roles include broker, facilitator, mentor, director, innovator, producer, 
coordinator, and monitor. The CVF defines each of the roles by four distinct 
variables or statements. The managerial roles again are divided into four major 
groups following the quadrants that are formed on the basis of two axes: 
stability/flexibility on the vertical and internal/external on the horizontal line. 
Accordingly, MMs were asked to evaluate their actions in organizations based 
on these four categories: inclinations to change (CHANFOC), orientation 
toward production/result (PRODFOC), focus on rules (RULFOC), and 
their tendency to emphasize human relation (HRFOC).
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for roles played by middle managers 
as perceived by themselves in CSOs. As the data was skewed slightly, central 
tendency measures like mean, median, and standard deviation with the 
coefficient of variation were taken to assess the result. By calculating the 
average focus of MMs based on the four quadrants of the CVF, efforts were 
made to identify which inclination was prevalent during their tenure. The 
median measure of the data was also taken to assess the tendency to check 
whether there exist significant discrepancies with the mean. The standard 
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deviation and the coefficient of variation were also considered to see variability 
in the data.
As observed in table 3, MMs were found to be more engaged in human 
relation activities (HRFOC) compared to other models in the competing 
value framework (m=5.18, med= 5.25, STD = 0.97, and CV=.19). Managers 
focusing on the fourth quadrant of the CVF (human relation model) are active 
in communicating effectively with their subordinates, mentoring and coaching 
employees, engaging followers in decision-making, and building strong teams 
to tap talents and ideas from their employees. This show the human resource 
concern MMs have in CSOs, indicating their effort in handling subordinates 
during task performance. Based on this study, therefore, the most emphasized 
role of MMs in civil service organizations was their human relation focus, 
which involves realizing potential and commitment of staff, encouraging 
a supportive workplace, developing teams, and serving as facilitators and 
mentors in work settings.
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Focusing on results (PRODFOC) was found to be the second priority 
for middle managers in this research (m=5.14, med= 5.13, STD = 0.90, and 
CV=.17). Goal attainment is a feature found in the second quadrant of the 
CVF with competing values that directly oppose the first orientation middle 
managers possess in the study. Managerial actions considered in this quadrant 
(rational goal model) include structure and direction in an organization. 
The key roles middle managers play in this quadrant are those of producer 
and director, which are characterized by focusing on tasks and clarifying 
expectations and objectives in the work unit. Developing meaningful goals 
and communicating them clearly to subordinates are the main task of middle 
managers in this quadrant.
Maintaining stability and managing through strict control was found 
to be the third orientation (RULFOC) middle managers have in CSOs 
(m=4.97, med= 5.00, STD dev. = 0.87, and CV=.18). According to the CVF, 
this quadrant (internal process model) focuses on giving attention to internal 
work processes, such as record keeping, documentation, and measurement. It 
focuses also on keeping order as a means for effective workflow in an organiza-
tion. Key managerial roles in this model are those of monitor and coordinator, 
which focus on detailed task analysis, coordinating staff efforts, monitoring 
facts, and applying of rules and regulations during task accomplishments.
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Compared to the previous three orientations, the least focused model by 
middle managers in CSOs is the open system model (CHANFOC), where 
change is the central purpose of their work (m=4.52, med= 4.50, STD 
dev. = 0.87, and CV=.19). Change-related activities are the central area in 
this model, whereby middle managers are required to exhibit entrepreneurial 
and innovative characteristics. The key managerial roles in this model are 
broker and innovator. Managers in this category represent their subordinates 
in the external world effectively and are expected to be creative, skillful, and 
take risks to achieve organizational objectives.
As the descriptive statistics indicated in table 3 and the radar diagram 
presented in figure 2, MMs play all roles that can influence the overall strategic 
management processes in CSOs in the country. However, two roles (HRFOC 
and PRODFOC) are more dominant than the other two (RULFOC and 
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CHANFOC). Successful managerial leadership requires the ability to navigate 
across the various managerial roles to balance contradictory demands from 
diverse environmental conditions. Effective public managers are required to 
demonstrate all eight managerial roles, with a frequency depending on situ-
ational demands that exist in CSOs. As indicated in figure 2, middle managers in 
this study exhibit all managerial roles (though with varying magnitude), which 
can be related to the actual work environment they are assigned to at present.
Analysis was done to compare differences in managerial emphasis based on 
respondents’ places of work. However, we did not conduct such a comparison 
based on sectoral categorization in the civil service, which can be taken as 
limitation in this research. As to the former, a significant difference was not 
observed for the different category of MMs who work at federal, Amhara 
region, and Addis Ababa levels, as indicated in the separate radar diagram 
in figure 3.
As indicated in the diagrams, MMs at all locations exhibited similar inclina-
tions; i.e., privileging human relations and result-orientation as compared 
to change and rules. The conventional judgment in theory and practices 
regarding MMs assumes their preference for strict adherence to rules and 
regulations. However, the finding clearly demonstrated their engagement in 
all the four categories of managerial activities, integrating all roles indicated 
in the competing value framework (CVF).
According to senior officials, although there is a great deal of similarity in 
tasks carried out by MMs, their roles are varied. Detailed planning, human 
resource management, record keeping, operation follow-up, and representing 
the work unit are jobs performed by middle managers. Depending on their 
position (line or staff), networks (internal and external), skills, and experience, 
their tasks may differ from one to the other. Some MMs quite mature, with 
long years of experience, education, and professional training while others 
are fresh graduates without any managerial experience and training. As most 
of the participants stated, middle managers are professional who have access 
to information from both the lower level employees and their supervisors. 
Due to the long tenure they have in the environment, they are well-informed 
about the opportunities and challenges of their organization compared to 
the top-level managers assigned by the government.
Middle managers have complex and demanding roles (Balogun, 2003) to 
play. They carry out mediation, buffering, and negotiation tasks during the 
generation of new ideas, the preparation of detailed plans for implementa-
tion, and an active involvement in the final execution. They also engage in 
counseling staff, mentoring, coaching, communicating, and team building. 
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The following excerpt from the interviews (senior managers) indicates the 
strategic engagement middle managers have in their respective organizations.
We are more of politicians than professionals. And sometimes we are assigned in 
offices that we don’t have any clue about its past, current operations, and future 
directions. Yet, the government expects us to run the organization effectively, 
including by leading specific projects and programs as head of the organization. 
We are also expected to engage in entrepreneurial activities to transform our 
institution into a more citizen-oriented domain through an effective and efficient 
service delivery. We, the senior officials heavily rely on middle managers skills, 
knowledge, and efforts for all these responsibilities. Therefore, it is possible to 
say that CSOs are as strong and effective as the middle managers working in 
that given organization. (Participant 9)
In practice, middle managers set goals with top managers in organizations. As 
interviewed officials confirmed, the job of a middle manager has never been 
limited to execution as described in the literature. They actively participate 
in the design of strategies, communicate goals to front-line managers, and 
engage in operational activities with their subordinates. According to 
interviewees, strategic plans, including the Growth and Transformation 
Plan (GTP 1 & 2) were prepared mainly by MMs and senior experts within 
the organizations.
Similarly, research participants confirmed that most of the MMs in 
their organization care for their staffs, listen to their problems, and try to 
solve problems within their jurisdictions. They try to mediate between 
the need of the employees and the organization’s requirements when 
these are incompatible. Aligned with this, most participants mentioned 
the need of empowering MMs and encouraging teamwork as a venue for 
performance excellence. This is how one senior level manager described 
their contribution:
When allowed to exercise power, MMs perform a great deal in organizations. 
Most of the failures in the civil service are the results of not including the MMs 
in both planning and decision making as well. Senior managers should give 
open space for MMs to exercise their managerial and expertise power to achieve 
organizational objectives. They should listen to their comments, suggestions and 
in some cases give the whole power to them. You can’t lead alone, you know … 
on your own. This is challenging, especially for us who are politically appointed. 
We need the support of the people around us, mainly the MMs. (Participant 6)
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6. Discussion
Defining a concept is a basis for scholarly discourse, yet the concept of middle 
manger still requires definition on a contextual basis (Huy, 2002). Until 
recently, middle managers were considered as operational people in organiza-
tions, mainly focusing on coordination and control. Though variability is 
common, middle managers these days enjoy the liberty of presiding over 
budgets, making personnel decisions, and engaging in strategy development. 
However, there are institutions that are so centralized and controlled that mid-
dle managers are still passive receivers of orders from the top. These managers 
are denied appropriate power to make their own decisions. Consequently, 
the influences of these middle managers in such organizations is very low.
Despite the fact that the term “middle manager” is used widely both in 
the private and the public sectors (Van Rensburg, Davis, & Venter, 2014), it 
is not possible to find individuals with such a title in an organization. Rather 
the position of middle manager indicates the placement of a position within 
the organizational hierarchy. The term refers to managers having equal 
positions in the organizational hierarchy but with different responsibilities. 
Different authors attempted to conceptualize the term in the past. It has 
been described as managers managing managers (Osterman, as cited in Van 
Rensburg, Davis, & Venter, 2014), as mediators between strategy and opera-
tion (Nonakaas, cited in Van Rensburg, Davis, & Venter, 2014), as positions 
between the top executives and supervisors above employees (Huy, 2001), and 
managers operating at the middle of the organization (Floyd & Wooldridge, 
1992). Similarly, Ikavalko (as cited in Van Rensburg, Davis, & Venter, 2014) 
considered them as individuals who have both superiors and subordinates 
within the organization. Authors like Kaiser et al. (2011) took access to senior 
executives and knowledge of operations as the bases for being considered a 
middle manager. Similar to what has been narrated by various scholars in 
the field, respondents in the present study described middle managers as 
individuals who are placed at the middle of an organizational hierarchy. They 
associated them with titles like director, process owners, and department 
heads, whose positions are next to the politically appointed officials in that 
organization. This was further checked by observing individuals who are 
appointed politically and termed as senior executives, though they have an 
equal hierarchical position in the organization.
In the Ethiopian civil service, those considered as MMs are individuals 
located between the strategic apex and the operating core of the organiza-
tion. They manage human and physical resources in an effort to achieve 
organizational objectives. They easily access both the senior managers at 
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the top and operating staff on the frontline, influencing information flow 
between the two groups. They have a unique place in the organization as 
they have access to each and every move made by either the senior manager 
or the operating staff.
Based on the survey, there was a high level of agreement among study 
participants on who middle managers are and what they do within the civil 
service. According to participants, middle managers in CSOs were found 
to be mangers two levels below the senior officials assigned on the basis of 
civil service regulations. Research participants agreed that middle managers 
in most cases are knowledgeable individuals in relation to their work unit.
Middle managers engage in a variety of assignments in the organization, 
either in teams or individually. According to research participants, middle 
managers carry out tasks that are related to both the present and the future. 
According to the data from the interviews and survey questions, MMs were 
found to be active in all strategic and operational activities. Based on the study 
finding, therefore, the researcher defined MMs in CSOs as those managers 
who have a responsibility of running and representing their work unit and 
who have the privilege of accessing organizational officials directly to sell 
their ideas by assuming responsibility on a meritorious basis.
The findings in this study also revealed the positioning of middle manag-
ers in terms of the competing value framework (CVF). Middle managers 
participating in this study were confirmed to have been balancing the different 
competing roles that are expected of managers particularly in CSOs. As 
results from both quantitative and qualitative data analyses indicated, middle 
managers in the civil service were engaged in carrying out the eight managerial 
roles identified by Quinn et al. (2003). Based on empirical data from the field 
and knowledge from the scholarly community, middle managers in Ethiopian 
civil service are mangers who report directly to appointed officials in their 
organization. Though it was found from the interviews that senior level officials 
manipulate the process, generally middle managers are assigned through a 
competitive process. This research identified middle managers’ managerial 
priorities to include implementing strategies, interpreting and communicating 
information, and exerting both upward and downward influence.
7. Conclusion
This study examined the most emphasized roles of middle managers in the 
Ethiopian civil service using the competing value framework (CVF). Though 
the magnitudes are different, the findings from this study confirmed that 
380 AlEbAchEW AsFAW YimEr
MMs in the Ethiopian civil service play pivotal roles in their organization. 
Based on the research findings, the most emphasized roles MMs play in 
CSOs fall in the fourth quadrant of the CVF, where an emphasis is given to 
facilitation and mentoring roles at the internal-flexible junction. Production, 
rule, and change orientations were found to be the other areas of concern for 
MMs in this study. Similarly the research showed the need to define MMs 
in the civil service, as an agreed-upon definition for the concept is lacking. A 
definition is proposed in this chapter to help CSOs in recruiting, selecting, 
developing, and retaining talented managers.
In general, the conclusions of this study indicate that MMs have a 
contribution to the strategic management of a civil service organization. 
However, contrary to declarations in the literature, the findings indicate 
that middle managers focus more on human relation than rules in executing 
their organizational task. Although the conclusions were drawn based on 
responses of managers on a given day whose views might change at another 
time/place, the findings revealed different managerial roles played by MMs 
that require specific sets of skill. Hence, this study clearly unveils the critical 
need by institutions in capacitating this group of managers to deliver the best 
possible goods and services to citizens by the government.
Failure or unsatisfactory results in delivering government goods and ser-
vices are a common problem in Ethiopia. Though many factors may contribute 
to such inefficiency and ineffectiveness, different studies have indicated 
managerial problems as fundamental challenges in the Ethiopian civil service. 
The attention given to MMs, in this regard, requires due consideration as they 
are very crucial in the overall management of an organization. Thus, rather 
than expecting MMs to be effective and efficient by simply following the 
conventional career path in the civil service, executives above them should 
design contextual mechanisms that enable them to do a better job in their 
organization. After all, experience show that these groups of managers are 
the successors in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the government structure.
8. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
Like any study in social science, this research has limitations that must be 
acknowledged. First, strategic involvement in CSOs is a relative issue, as most 
strategies emanate from the ruling political parties. This research considers the 
wide room middle managers have in design, implementation, and evaluation 
at the civil service. Thus, similar studies in such an environment may result 
in different findings and conclusions. Second, as discussed earlier, the study 
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excludes health and educational institutions. The reason for such exclusion 
was the different structural and managerial arrangement of educational and 
medical institutions in the country. Third, comparison to prior findings was 
not done as getting prior research on Ethiopia was difficult. This may be 
considered as another limitation for this study.
Future research is necessary for areas where this research lack depth 
or coverage. Among others, assessing the situation in specific areas like 
health and education is recommended. Future research could also explore 
the strategic contributions of middle managers in relation to formulation, 
implementation, or evaluation separately.
Acknowledgements 
I am indebted to Dr. Worku Negash, Professor G. Ramakrishna, and Professor 
Melesse Asfaw for their patience and constructive critique during the course 
of this study. I also want to thank the anonymous reviewers who provided 
critical comments and constructive suggestions that helped me in improving 
the entire chapter.
References
Alkhafaji, Abbass F. (2003). Strategic Management: Formulation, Implementation, and Control in 
A Dynamic Environment, The Haworth Press, Inc.
Allan, P. (1981). Managers at Work: A Large-scale Study of the Managerial Job in New York City 
Government. Academy of Management Journal, 24(3), 613-619.
Ansoff, H. I. (1990). Strategic Management. London: Macmillan Academic and Professional ltd.
Araya, E. (2019). Moving Further on Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Findings and Implications 
from a Civil Service Survey and Qualitative Analysis, Synthesis Report (pp. 1-149).
Balogun, J. (2003). From Blaming the Middle to Harnessing Its Potential: Creating Change 
Intermediaries. British Journal of Management, 14(1), 69-83.
Balogun, J., & Johnson, G. (2004). Organizational Restructuring and Middle Manager Sensemak-
ing. Academy of Management Journal, 47(4), 523-549.
Belasen, A. T. (1998). Paradoxes and Leadership Roles. Management, 1(2), 98.
Blankenship, D. C. (2010). Applied Research and Evaluation Methods in Recreation. Champaign: 
Sheridan Books.
Cameron, K. S., Quinn, R. E., DeGraff, J., & Thakor, A. V. (2006). Competing Values Leadership: 
Creating Value in Organizations. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
382 AlEbAchEW AsFAW YimEr
Caye, J.-M., Strack, R., Orlander, P., Kilmann, J., Espinosa, E. G., Francoeur, F., & Haen, P., 
White Paper. (2010). Creating a New Deal for Middle Managers. Empowering a Neglected 
but Critical Group. In T. B. C. Group (Ed.). Frankfurt: The Boston Consulting Group and 
World Federation of People Management Associations.
Clegg, S. R., Kornberger, M., & Pitsis, T. (2015). Managing and Organizations: An Introduction 
to Theory and Practice. London: Sage.
Clutterbuck, D., & Megginson, D. (1999). Mentoring Executives and Directors. Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann.
Coon, B., & Wolf, S. (2005). The Alchemy of Strategy Execution. Employment Relations Today, 
32(3), 19-30.
Currie, G., & Procter, S. J. (2005). The Antecedents of Middle Managers’ Strategic Contribution: 
The Case of a Professional Bureaucracy. Journal of Management Studies, 42(7), 1325-1356.
Daft, R. L. (2008). Management. Cengage Learning.
Denison, D. R., Hooijberg, R., & Quinn, R. E. (1995). Paradox and Performance: Toward a Theory 
of Behavioral Complexity in Managerial Leadership. Organization Science, 6(5), 524-540.
DiPadova, L. N., & Faerman, S. R. (1993). Using the Competing Values Framework to Facilitate 
Managerial Understanding across Levels of Organizational Hierarchy. Human Resource 
Management, 32(1), 143-174.
Drucker, P. F. (2008). Management Rev Ed. Zondervan.
Dutton, J. E., Ashford, S. J., O’Neill, R. M., Hayes, E., & Wierba, E. E. (1997). Reading the Wind: 
How Middle Managers Assess the Context for Selling Issues to Top Managers. Strategic 
Management Journal, 18(5), 407-423.
Gebre, M. and Nigussie, D.(2016). Change Army: The New Face of Modernizing Civil Service in 
Ethiopia: The Case of Addis Ababa in Teshome T. (Ed.), Public Sector Transformation and 
Development Proceedings of the 2nd National Conference, 1(1), 86-102.
Feldman, S. (1980). The Middle Management Muddle. Administration in Mental Health, 8(1), 3-11.
Floyd, S. W., & Wooldridge, B. (1992). Middle Management Involvement in Strategy and Its 
Association with Strategic Type: A Research Note. Strategic Management Journal, 13, 153-167.
Floyd, S. W., & Wooldridge, B. (1997). Middle Management’s Strategic Influence and Organiza-
tional Performance. Journal of Management Studies, 34(3), 465-485.
Hales, C., & Mustapha, N. a. (2000). Commonalities and Variations in Managerial Work: A 
Study of Middle Managers in Malaysia. Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 38(1), 1-25.
Hassard, J., McCann, L., & Morris, J. (2009). Managing in the Modern Corporation: The Intensifica-
tion of Managerial Work in the USA, UK and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Have, S. T., Have, W. T., Stevens, F., Elst, M. v. d., & Pol-Coyne, F. (2003). Key Management 
Models: The Management Tools and Practices That Will Improve Your Business. London: Financial 
Times Prentice Hall.
HBR. (2011). HBR’s 10 Must Reads on Leadership. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press.
Hrebiniak, L. G. (2005). Making Strategy Work: Leading Effective Execution and Change. New 
Jersey: Wharton School Publishing.
strAtEGic contribution oF middlE mAnAGErs 383
Huy, Q. N. (2001). In Praise of Middle Managers. Harvard Business Review, 79(8), 72-79, 160.
Huy, Q. N. (2002). Emotional Balancing of Organizational Continuity and Radical Change: The 
Contribution of Middle Managers. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(1), 31-69.
Israel, G. D. (1992). Determining Sample Size Fact Sheet PEOD-6. In Institute of Food and 
Agricultural Sciences (Ed.). University of Florida.
Kaiser, R. B., Craig, S. B., Overfield, D. V., & Yarborough, P. (2011). Differences in Managerial Jobs 
at the Bottom, Middle, and Top: A Review of Empirical Research. The Psychologist-Manager 
Journal, 14(2), 76-91.
Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (2001). The Strategy-focused Organization. Strategy and Leadership, 
29(3), 41-42.
Kealy, T. (2013). Do Middle Managers Contribute to Their Organisation’s Strategy? International 
Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 5(1), 108-116.
Kellerman, B., & Webster, S. W. (2001). The Recent Literature on Public Leadership Reviewed 
and Considered. The Leadership Quarterly, 12, 485-514.
Kraut, A. I., Pedigo, P. R., McKenna, D. D., & Dunnette, M. D. (1989). The Role of the Manager: 
What’s Really Important in Different Management Jobs. The Academy of Management Executive, 
3(4), 286-293.
Kuyvenhoven, R., & Buss, W. C. (2011). A Normative View of the Role of Middle Management in 
the Implementation of Strategic Change. Journal of Management and Marketing Research, 8, 1.
Leedy, P. D., & Ormrod, J. E. (2015). Practical Research: Planning and Design (11th ed.). Essex: 
Pearson Education Limited.
Lindquist, E. A., & Marcy, R. T. (2014). The Competing Values Framework: Strategic Implications for 
Leadership, Conflict and Change in Public Organizations. Paper presented at the 3rd Research 
Conference of the Canadian Association of Programs in Public Administration Queen’s 
University, Kingston, Ontario.
Livian, Y.-F., & Burgoyne, J. G. (1997). Middle Managers in Europe. London: Routledge.
Lussier, R. N., & Achua, C. F. (2015). Leadership: Theory, Application, & Skill Development: 
Nelson Education.
McIntosh, P., & Luecke, R. A. (2010). Becoming a Manager. AMACOM Div American Mgmt Assn.
Ministry of Public Service & Human Resource Development. (2015). National Public Service 
Human Resource Statistics, Addis Ababa.
Mintzberg, H. (1971). Managerial Work: Analysis from Observation. Management Science, 18(2), 
B-97-B-110.
Mintzberg, H. (1990). The Manager’s Job: Folklore and Fact. Harvard Business Review, HBR Classic.
Mintzberg, H. (2009). Managing. Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
Mintzberg, H., & Waters, J. A. (1985). Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent. Strategic Management 
Journal, 6(3), 257-272.
Mitiku, A. A., Hondeghem, A., & Troupin, S. (2017). Administrative Leadership: Understanding 
the Preferred Leadership Roles of the Ethiopian Civil Service Managers. African Journal of 
Economic and Management Studies, 8(3), 366-394.
384 AlEbAchEW AsFAW YimEr
Morgan, D., Bacon, K. G., Bunch, R., Cameron, C. D., & Deis, R. (1996). What Middle Managers 
Do in Local Government: Stewardship of the Public Trust and the Limits of Reinventing 
Government. Public Administration Review, 56(4), 359-366.
Noble, C. H. (1999a). Building the Strategy Implementation Network. Business Horizons, 42(6), 
19-28.
Noble, C. H. (1999b). The Eclectic Roots of Strategy Implementation Research. Journal of business 
research, 45(2), 119-134.
Nutt, P. C., & Backoff, R. W. (1995). Strategy for Public and Third-sector Organizations. Journal 
of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, 5(2), 189-211.
Quinn, R. E., Faerman, S. R., Thompson, M. P., & McGrath, M. R. (2003). Becoming a Master 
Manager: A Competency Framework (third ed.). New Jersy: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Quinn, R. E., & Rohrbaugh, J. (1983). A Spatial Model of Effectiveness Criteria: Towards a 
Competing Values Approach to Organizational Analysis. Management Science, 29(3), 363-377.
Rajasekar, J. (2014). Factors Affecting Effective Strategy Implementation in a Service Industry: A 
Study of Electricity Distribution Companies in the Sultanate of Oman. International Journal 
of Business and Social Science, 5(9), 169-183
Tharenou, P., Donohue, R., & Cooper, B. (2007). Management Research Methods. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge.
Tompkins, J. (2005). Organization Theory and Public Management: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company.
Van Rensburg, M. J., Davis, A., & Venter, P. (2014). Making Strategy Work: The Role of the Middle 
Manager. Journal of Management & Organization, 20(02), 165-186.
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in Organizations, vol. 3.London: Sage.
White, C. (2004). Strategic Management. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wooldridge, B., Schmid, T., & Floyd, S. W. (2008). The Middle Management Perspective on 
Strategy Process: Contributions, Synthesis, and Future Research. Journal of Management, 
34(6), 1190-1221.
Yukl, G. A. (2010). Leadership in Organizations. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Zagotta, R., & Robinson, D. (2002). Keys to Successful Strategy Execution. Journal of Business 
Strategy, 23(1), 30-34.
15 
The Ethiopian Civil Service System 
in Perspective: Implications for 
Leadership Roles
Adare Assefa Mitiku and Annie Hondeghem
Box 1: Key points in this chapter
 the leadership contexts are myriad of multifaceted overlapping realities, 
inextricably intertwined, and are subject to change
 the leadership contexts influence how leaders are likely to act
 the leadership contexts may call for distinct but interrelated roles, but as some 
roles may be more appropriate in some organizations than in others, leaders are 
expected to make choices that fit well with their work context.
Box 2: Reading this work will give you insights in
 the evolution and current features of the Ethiopian civil service – the context
 the ramifications of leadership contexts for the role of leaders
Box 3: Abbreviations
css = civil service system
ssA = sub-saharan Africa
t&d = training and development
tccs = top civil servants
Introduction
The present work studies the leadership context and its ramifications for 
leadership roles. The overarching context of public sector leaders, as defined 
by Van Wart et al. (2015) and Jackson (2004), is the cultural settings and 
political backgrounds at the “macro level” and the function and structure of 
administrative systems at the “meso level.”
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Van Wart et al (2015) have further specified that the antecedents—cul-
tural-, political-, and organizational-administrative level—factors are a myriad 
of multifaceted overlapping realities, inextricably intertwined, and are subject 
to change. Cultural setting influences and is influenced by the political system, 
which influences and is influenced by the administrative systems. The cultural 
context also influences and is influenced by the administrative system.
The foregoing antecedents determine beliefs as to how the leaders are ideally 
expected to act. For instance, explaining the cultural context, Jackson (2004) 
discusses Hofstede’s “power distance” dimension. According to Jackson, 
leaders in high-power distance countries are expected to “act autocratically.” In 
the low-power distance countries, leaders are considered as “loyal democrats.” 
And in those with the medium score on the said cultural dimension, leaders 
are expected to “act mainly as a benevolent autocrat.” Similar deductions 
can be made based on the political setting and organization-administrative 
level factors.
The broader context influences and is influenced by the content of the 
leaders. According to Jackson (2004:98), “The content of leadership assumes 
particular orientations towards acting in certain ways.” Indeed, this may not 
necessarily say anything about their actual conduct, but it does articulate the 
way they perceive their own conduct as a leader. To be sure, perception is a 
powerful phenomenon dictating individuals’ actions, and as such it “eventually 
transforms into reality” (Saha, 2008:29). Conduct of leadership refers to what 
people actually do. It influences and is influenced by the content of leadership 
and the context (Jackson, 2004). Assessment of leaders’ role conception 
and conduct is beyond the scope of the present work (for assessments of the 
former refer to Adare et al., 2018).
In assessing the leadership context, the civil service is defined as a “system.” 
This, according to Van der Meer (2011:4), suggests the use of an “institutional 
approach.” Thus, relying on the two theoretical traditions – “historical new 
institutionalism” and “sociological new institutionalism” (see section 1 below) 
– the study deals with the subject by asking a straightforward question: What 
are the ramifications of the Ethiopian public leadership context for leadership roles?
The study has strong pragmatic relevance because understanding public 
leadership in the Ethiopian context – a topic that is unaccountably missing 
from systematic academic inquiries – informs recruitment, promotion, and 
T&D practices in the civil service. It also contributes to theory by adding 
specificity and nuances to the existing conceptualization of leadership and 
civil service in the context of Africa in general.
The balance of this work is organized into five sections. It begins by 
elucidating the theoretical approaches and the methodology and methods 
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applied in the study. Next, the historical progression of the Ethiopian CSS 
is discussed. Afterwards, the basic features of the current civil service are 
presented. Finally, analysis is made along the lines of the antecedents of public 
leadership and their ramifications for leadership roles. The study ends with 
some concluding remarks.
1. Theoretical Approaches and Methodology and Methods
1.1. Theoretical Approaches
Scholars (see Lynn, 2006; Pollitt, 2008) have suggested the need to follow 
an institutional approach in the study of public management. The question 
though is which strand among institutional approaches should be used? Old 
or new institutionalism? As each strand has sub-strands, which particular 
sub-strand or combination thereof is appropriate? And why?
The full answer to the aforementioned questions requires an extensive study 
of each strand and its sub-strands. Yet, the objective here is not to contribute to 
the institutional debate but to use it as a framework to understand and explain 
the leadership context. The study therefore captures the main characteristics 
of each of the main strands and then switches to the selection of a sub-strand 
or combinations thereof.
Briefly, the difference between old and new institutionalism is both epis-
temological and ideological (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000). Although old 
institutionalism predominantly places a great deal of attention on the study 
of formal structures, new institutionalism goes further to consider informal 
structures and their role in molding the behavior of the participants (Peters, 
1999). To reap the benefit of these new developments, the present study is 
informed by the “new institutionalism” analytic strand. Such a claim, however, 
is not enough. It requires answering a question concerning which specific 
type of new institutionalism is applied. Then again, the number of types 
means that, despite their similarities, there are heavy disagreements between 
them and that they paint different pictures about institutional phenomena. 
The differences among them further imply that often there may be a need to 
apply combinations of two or more of these types (Ibid).
Under the banner of new institutionalism, different approaches exist for 
studying institutional phenomena. For the purpose of the present study, 
only three of them are presented: historical new institutionalism, rational 
choice new institutionalism, and sociological new institutionalism (see Hall 
& Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999).
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Before selecting one or a combination of these analytic sub-strands, we 
first scanned their defining features. Our criteria for selection were based on 
the research design in terms of the time span privileged by each sub-strand 
and the underlying ways of knowing. The result of our inquiry uncovered the 
limited utility of rational choice institutionalism for the present study. This 
is because while both historical new institutionalism and sociological new 
institutionalism emphasize long-term institutional effects, rational choice 
institutionalism emphasizes short-term outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
Although the first two approaches demand an inductive logic of inquiry, the 
latter requires a deductive logic of inquiry (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000). 
The present work therefore excluded rational choice institutionalism from 
further discussions because the study examines the CSS of Ethiopia from 
the beginning of modern public administration to the present. Moreover, 
although the study applied a mixed approach, it predominantly relies on the 
interpretive logic of inquiry.
In sum, in this study, the assessment of the leadership context is informed 
by two theoretical traditions: the historical new institutionalism and its 
central explanatory notion of path dependency, and the sociological new 
institutionalism and its central explanatory idea of cognitive and cultural links.
1.2. Methodology and Methods
Haverland and Yanow (2012:401) noted that the terms methods and method-
ology are not synonyms. The former refers to the “tools and techniques that 
are used to carry out research: surveys, questionnaires”; the latter concerns 
“ways of knowing or logics of inquiry”—the ‘positivist’ and the ‘interpretative’ 
approaches. The ‘choices of methods and their underlying ways of knowing 
should depend on and reflect the goal or purpose of the research—the research 
question’ (Ibid: 402). In this study a mix of inductive and deductive logics of 
inquiries is applied. That is, it focuses on contextual meaning making. And 
in deducing the ramifications of the context for leadership roles, it is also 
informed by theories and concepts in the field.
As to the methods of accessing and generating data, analysis in this study 
mainly relies on the documentary data. The sources comprise relevant current 
and retrospective public documents, such as the constitution, legislation, 
proclamations, directives, and circulars. Moreover, policy documents, reports, 
and various statistics (e.g., the civil service human resource statistics, popula-
tion census data) are used.
The study also relies on various informative sources, such as IndexMundi, 
Global Integrity–African Integrity Indicators, the Mo Ibrahim Index, the 
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Transparency International corruption perception index, and so forth. The 
bulk of extant literature, both published and unpublished, related to the 
subject of investigation was also reviewed.
Moreover, in undertaking a context-specific study, “restricting the docu-
mentary evidence to written materials alone can also be limiting” (Yanow & 
Schwartz-Shea, 2006:122). This is because the “political, social, organizational, 
and cultural identities and values are embedded also in films … in folk songs 
… military (marching), revolutionary, and women’s songs” (Ibid:122). The 
present work, therefore, uses indigenous aphorisms or proverbs to extend 
the scope of the written documents, as needed.
Finally, sections 3.3 to 3.7 of this chapter are also informed by from the 
results of a recent PhD survey on Ethiopian public sector leadership (see 
Adare et al. 2018).
The documentary sources were analyzed using the “content analysis” 
recommended by Bowen (2009:32), involving “a first-pass document review, 
in which meaningful and relevant passages of text or other data are identi-
fied.” In analyzing the results of the survey, a univariate analysis approach, 
particularly frequency distribution, was applied.
2. The Historical Progression of the Ethiopian Civil 
Service System 
In Ethiopia, the commencement of modern civil service goes back to the 
early periods of the twentieth century (Paulos, 2001). No doubt, in the last 
hundred plus years, it has been transformed several times over. Over these 
periods, the country was governed as a unitary feudal state during the imperial 
regime (-1974); as a unitary socialist state during the Dergue government 
(1974-1991); and currently, as a federal parliamentary republic by the EPRDF 
government (1991-). Below, we analyze the changes, consolidations, and 
stasis in the CSS under each of these administrations.
2.1. The Era of Menelik II (1889-1913)
In Ethiopia, this era is known for state formation and establishment of a 
modern public administration (see Paulos, 2001). The former is said to have 
come about through the northerners’ (aka Amhara) influence (Marcus, 
1994). In the process the regime privileged the Orthodox Christian religion. 
It endorsed a Christian conceptualization of the state and Amharic became 
“a lingua franca” (Adejumobi, 2007).
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In modernizing the public administration, the “European line” was fol-
lowed. The first step was creating various ministries in 1907. Likewise, for the 
first time, the state was “divided into smaller administrative units” (Paulos, 
2001:83). Gradually, many other initiatives were implemented (see Clapham, 
2006; Marcus, 1994; Paulos, 2001).
Moreover, the emperor, seeing his health deteriorating (in 1904), took 
measures meant to ensure the continuity of his administration (see Marcus, 
1994). Among these were the following:
– 1907: Established Ethiopia’s first cabinet
– 1907: Established an independent appellate court system in the provinces
– 1908: Decreed a new inheritance law
– 1908: Established the office of prime minister
– 1908: Instituted a crown council.
It is important to note that during this era individuals’ political loyalty and 
their ability to mobilize an army were the basis for them to assume a ministe-
rial position. Ministers were not salaried and were all housed in a building set 
up within the palace compound. The civil service, in general, was small in size 
and principally “engaged in maintaining law and order” (Paulos, 2001:84).
2.2. The Period between Emperor Menelik II and Emperor Haile 
Selassie
This period was marked by confusion and significantly eroded central govern-
ment authority. The progress of the CSS was briefly stalled by the coming 
to power of Lij Iyasu (1911-1916); and after his dethronement, of Empress 
Zawditu, Menelik’s daughter (1916-1930). Even Zewditu hardly made any 
attempt to improve the CSS founded during her father’s reign (see Marcus, 
1994; Solomon, 2013).
2.3. The Era of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930-1974)
This era mainly tried to uphold the legacies of Emperor Menelik II. As such, 
Christianity remained important, and Ethiopia was identified as a Christian 
state. Amharic continued as the sole official language of the empire (see 
Adejumobi, 2007; Marcus, 1994).
Likewise, Haile Selassie advanced the administrative modernism begun 
during the era of Menelik II. He adopted Ethiopia’s first Japanese-style 
constitution in 1931 (see Clapham, 2006). Moreover, before the Italian 
occupation (1930-1935), he embarked on many reform initiatives. Progress, 
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however, was interrupted during the period the county was under Italian 
occupation (1936-1941), a colonization attempt that forced the emperor into 
exile (see Marcus, 1994).
Upon his return from exile (1941), Haile Selassie continued with his 
ambitious reforms. The following are among the prominent administrative 
reform measures during his reign (see Paulos, 2001).
– 1943: Defined powers and duties of ministries
– 1952: Established the Imperial Institute of Public Administration
– 1955: Revised the constitution of 1931
– 1961: Established the central personnel agency (CPA) and entrusted it 
with maintaining a standardized public service governed by uniform 
rules and principles.
Note that almost all of Haile Selassie’s attempts at modernization, like the reign 
of Menelik II, were based on emulation of foreign development models (see 
Clapham, 2006). As such, the revised constitution of 1955 reflected the adop-
tion of “a British model of constitutional monarchy” (Ibid:112). Similarly, the 
CPA was mainly adopted from the personnel management system of the USA 
(Adebabay, 2011). These developments imply that the attempts to modernize 
the country’s public administration did not have a strong indigenous basis.
Moreover, the successes of the regime’s civil service reform were un-
dermined by the shortage of a competent workforce, limited stakeholder 
participation, and defiance of the civil service principles (see Paulos, 2001; 
Solomon, 2013).
2.4. The Derg Government (1974-1991)
The Dergue government adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology and declared 
socialism to be at the core of its economic policies. In view of this, the regime 
“embraced the maximalist view of the state” (Adejumobi, 2007:120).
Although the regime pledged separation of state and religion, a Christian 
demarcation of the state remained. And, as was the case under the previous 
regimes, Amharic remained the only “working language of the state” (see 
the Constitution of PDRE, 1987).
The Dergue regime was also known for expanding “the state apparatus,” 
“restructuring the cabinet,” and amending “the salary scale of the civil service” 
(Paulos, 2001:86). Associated with these expansion actions, the number of 
civil servants increased from 101,147 under the preceding reign to 216,058 
when the regime left office (see National Civil Service Human Resource 
Statistics 2013-2014).
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Despite the abovementioned changes, there were no major amendments to 
the legal framework of the nation’s civil service. The civil service was mainly 
run by “different orders and decrees issued during the reign of Haile Selassie” 
(Paulos, 2001:86; see also MoCS, 2013).
Furthermore, the Dergue regime is remembered for politicians’ distrust 
of career civil servants. This distrust led to the replacement of the latter, at 
almost all levels, by political patrons, thereby downplaying professionalism in 
personnel management. Likewise, a parallel political structure was introduced 
and was used to pass decisions in the civil service. Such measures, however, 
deteriorated its performance encouraging administrative misconduct (Paulos, 
2001; Solomon, 2013).
2.5. The Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (EPRDF) (1991–)
The EPRDF government, although overwhelmed by concern for politics 
(Assefa, 2015), has implemented “multiple reform interventions.” In doing 
this, a top-down, “big-push” approach to reform was followed (Ibid.). Thus 
far, the transformation measures have been implemented in three phases 
(see Solomon, 2013).
Phase I: From 1991-1996
Transformation in this phase emphasized political and economic reforms 
(Solomon, 2013; World Bank, 2013). Related to the former is the constitutional 
reform of 1995. The new constitution recognizes the state as “the federal 
parliamentary republic.” It also declared a “separation of state and religion” 
(see art. 11).
During this period, Ethiopia selectively implemented a structural adjust-
ment program (SAP) and the free market economic policy (Henze, 2003; 
Stiglitz, 2002). However, international institutions such as IMF not only 
objected to the Ethiopian choice but also suspended its loan to the country 
(De Waal, 2012; Stiglitz, 2002).
Associated with SAP, a “retrenchment policy” meant to reduce “redundant 
employees” was implemented. This policy, according to the government, was 
based on new structures and position reviews (Paulos, 2001). In reality, the 
total number of civil servants increased from 216,058 in 1991 to 287,716 
in 1996 (see table 1). Critics also claim that, at the time, the ratio of civil 
servants to the total population was low. Equally, the reduction was based 
on predetermined percentages (by 10 percent), not based on a call for new 
structures. The policy’s hidden mission was replacing the civil servants who 
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appeared to be associated with the previous regime. Such action further 
eroded the existing limited administrative capacity of the civil service. The 
policy also created an environment of uncertainty and distrust (Ibid).
Phase II: From 1996-2003
Reform during this phase is known as the “comprehensive civil service reform 
programme (CSRP).” CSRP was meant to address “the deep institutional 
constraints on basic functions such as policymaking, service delivery, and 
regulation”(MoCB, 2004:2). It was also encouraged by the influence of the 
NPM reform wave (see Peterson, 2001).
The outcome of the CSRP is mixed. On the positive side, there was the 
development of new legislations (e.g. a civil service law); the emergence 
of an “operating system for budget, procurement, and some aspects of 
personnel management (e.g. salary survey and record management),” and 
the implementation of a “prototype for expenditure management” (MoCB, 
2004:2). On the minus side, the constraints that the reform purported to 
address continued to exist.
Phase III: from 2003-
Reform during this period has been labelled the “Public Sector Capacity 
Building Support Programme (PSCAP).” Its implementation was technically 
supported by leading institutions (see MoCB, 2004).
Putting the PSCAP into action encouraged the use of reform tools such 
as BPR, management by objectives (MBOs), the integrated performance 
management system (IPMS), the balanced scorecard (BSC), and the yelawut 
serawit (Amharic for “the civil service change army”) (MoCS, 2013).
Moreover, the PSCAP is backed by gemgema, a peer evaluation through 
both self-criticism and criticism tactics. Such an evaluation approach, among 
others, has been used to maintain political control up to the Kebele (Amharic 
for “neighborhoods”) level (Aalen, 2002); to shape the behavior of officials; 
and to give input for performance evaluation (Hagmann, 2005; World Bank, 
1998). In sum, gemgema is a “politico-administrative evaluation” (Hagmann, 
2005:16).
A notable success reported as a result of the PSCAP is a relative im-
provement of public service delivery. More importantly, BPR has brought 
an attitudinal change in the civil service, imbuing their operations with a 
client-oriented approach. It has also been praised for simplifying the work 
process cycle (Getachew & Common, 2006; World Bank, 2010).
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3. The current Civil Service
3.1. The Internal Labour Market (ILM)
Until the collapse of the imperial regime, the nobility enjoyed the best of 
every opportunity in the nation. Indeed, education, historically and in 
modern times, was mainly made available to the progeny of nobility, who 
ultimately joined the civil service. As the Dergue government came to power, 
however, some of the individuals in this class were executed; some were exiled; 
and those remaining were systematically distanced from the civil service. 
Such actions opened the door for the middle and lower classes to enter into 
administration (see Adejumobi, 2007; Andargachew, 1993).
3.2. Public Sector Employment
The human resource statistics over the last fifty years shows a remarkable 
increase in the number of people employed by the public sector. Table 1 
depicts the number of civil servants at each moment of major political change 
since 1962.
Table 1: Permanent Employees from 1962–63 to 2013–14
Year Male Female Total Major Events/Descriptions
1962-63 — — 46,701 No. of civil servants at the time the Central 
Personnel Agency was established 
1974-75 82,941 18,206 101, 147 No. of civil servants as the Dergue govern-
ment came to power
1990-91 163,090 52,968 216,058 No. of civil servants as the EPRDF govern-
ment came to power, beginning of the 
implementation of the Retrenchment policy
1995-96 207,358 80,358 287,716 The end of Retrenchment policy 
2013-14 816,686 440,263 1,256,946 Total no. of civil servants as of 2013-2014
75,558 49,775 125,333 No. of civil servants working in the federal 
administration (about 10 percent of the total 
civil servants)
1.43 Ratio of civil servants to the population, 
calculated on a total population of 88,144,515
Source: National Civil Service Human Resource Statistics 2013-2014.
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Of equal importance, over time, the qualifications of civil servants have been 
improving. For instance, of the total civil servants inherited by the Dergue 
government, six thousand were university graduates and twenty thousand 
had completed secondary school; the balance had no more than knowledge 
of reading and writing Amharic (Andargachew, 1993). At present, over 
70 percent of civil servants hold qualifications of a “Diploma”1 and higher 
(see National Civil Service Human Resource Statistics, 2013-2014).
Of the total 1,256,946 civil servants, about 10 percent (125,333) work in the 
federal administration. Of these employees, 43 percent hold a qualification less 
than a college Diploma. The balance has a qualification of a college Diploma 
and above. Figure 1 shows the educational levels of the civil servants working 
in the federal administration.






















LLB BA/BSC MD DVM MA/MSc LLM PhD
0.80.27.90.2121.80.819.343.1Percentages***
*Includes illiterate, read and write, grades 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, certificate, Voc/tech. levels 1-3. 
** Includes a college diploma (10+3), Voc/tech. levels 4 & 5, 1st-4th year college study. 
*** Percentage of employees whose level of qualification is not stated is 4.9 percent. 
LLB = a first professional degree in law; BA/BSc = Bachelor of Art/Science; MD = Medical Doctor; 
DVM=Doctor of Veterinary Medicine; MA/MSc= Masters of Art/Science; LLM = Master of Law; 
PhD = Doctor of Philosophy. 
Source: National Civil Service Human Resource Statistics 2013-2014.
What is the distribution of civil servants by field of academic specialization? 
Thus far, there are no organized data about the civil servants’ educational 
backgrounds. Yet the information displayed in figure 1 seems to indicate 
that employees in most organizations are predominantly generalists rather 
than specialists.
In what forms of federal organizations are the civil servants working? The 
organizations under the federal administration are hierarchically arranged. On 
the top of the hierarchy are ministries, offices, and applicable commissions. 
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These are disaggregated into diverse forms of organizations: offices, boards, 
centers, projects, authorities, institutes, universities, administrations, commis-
sions, funds, and agencies. Some of these diverse forms of organizations have 
no executive boards while the others do and are relatively more autonomous.
3.3. Recruitment Approaches
The question here concerns efforts to fill vacancies for the top positions 
and the criteria most often used in selecting the candidates. The responses 
of survey participants related to this issue are summarized in table 2 and 
table 3, respectively.
In recruiting top civil servants (TCS), the vacancies in most cases are 
either internally or publicly advertised. Circulating a vacancy notice across 
the public sector and relying on recruitment consultants is seldom practised. 
Undeniably, recruiting the TCSs through public advertisement symbolizes 
an important influence of the scantily implemented NPM reform, if at all 
intended.
Table 2: Approaches to Fill the Vacancies for the TCSs
Never Sometimes
In about 






How often are the vacancies for the recruitment of top civil servants … (percentage)*
… internally advertised? (n=213) 7.9 29.4 16.4 33.8 12.2
… circulated to another part of the 
public sector to seek applicants? 
(n=208)
55.1 25.2 5.6 8.4 2.8
… publicly advertised? (n=212) 9.8 21.0 11.2 30.4 26.6
… filled by using executive search 
consultants? (n = 203)
62.6 21.5 3.3 5.6 1.9
* n = Difference from 214, indicating there was a missing value to the extent of the difference.
In Ethiopian civil service, the criteria for the recruitment of civil servants, 
after the establishment of the CPA, was expected to be meritocratic. However, 
actual practices have juxtaposed the “merit and patronage approaches” (As-
sefa, 2015). Often, the former is practised in hiring individuals for lower 
positions. The higher the position, the greater the possibility for individuals to 
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be recruited at best on a “quasi-merit” basis and at worst on a pure patronage 
basis. This is confirmed by a survey we conducted on matters considered in 
recruiting candidates for top positions (see table 3).
Moreover, table 3 presents TCSs claim about the influence of politicians on 
their recruitment. The influence of politicians on their selection is quite high 
(44.9 percent). This figure, if added to the category of “somewhat significant” 
responses, climbs to over 70 percent. Such results speak to how politicized 
the Ethiopian civil service is (for details see section 3.7).








In recruiting TCSs, to what extent is consideration given to candidates’ …
(percentage)*
… political sensitivity? 
(n = 212)
13.6 24.3 18.7 25.2 17.3
… seniority (n = 212) 3.7 17.3 16.8 39.3 22.0
…. professional expertise 
(n = 214)















To what extent do politicians 
influence the selection of 
top civil servants? (n = 214, 
percentage)
44.9 26.6 15 5.1 8.4
*n = Difference from 214, indicating there was a missing value to the extent of the difference.
3.4. Tenure Security
The Ethiopian civil service is a system with strong tenure security offering 
lifelong tenure of employment. Commonly, new recruits enter the civil service 
with a probation period of six months and, based on their performance, 
progress to the status of permanent employee (Federal Civil Servants Procla-
mation, 2007). The same holds true for the tenure of the TCSs. The majority 
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of TCSs (over 80 percent) replied that their employment in the civil service 
is permanent. Despite this, TCSs face the highest possibility of removal by 
their political masters (see table 4).
Table 4: The tenure security of TCSs
Frequency Percent
The tenure of the TCSs is … (n = 214)
… temporary-contractual basis – renewable based on 
performance (frequency, %)
43 20.1
… permanent – lifetime (frequency, %) 171 79.9
In general, can politicians remove top civil servants from their 
positions as they deem necessary? (n = 214) (frequency, %yes)
128 59.8
3.5. The Pay System
In the Ethiopian civil service, the pay system is guided by grades and cadres. 
The former denotes occupational groupings, and the latter refers to the SKA 
requirements of jobs in a specific cadre. The amount of pay is determined 
based on a civil servant’s grade. As such, a particular grade correlates to a 
specific salary scale, which defines the base salary, the horizontal increments, 
and the maximum pay for that specific grade. The pay system is summarised 
in table 5.
Periodic pay increases reward seniority. To date, “performance evaluation 
is more subjective and not yet aligned to an incentive system” (World Bank, 
2013:ix). Although a pay reform has been implemented, it is stalled, partial, 
and ineffective. Similarly, a performance-based arrangement, although pro-
posed, has not yet been implemented (Evans, 2008). Civil servants, including 
the TCSs, mainly receive a standard salary based on the pay scale (see table 6).
Although measured, there is not much linkage between the performance 
of civil servants and their remuneration (see table 7). The civil service, in 
general, does not pay much (see MoCB, 2004).
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Table 6: The pay system for TCS (n = 214)
Frequency Percentage
Standardised – based on pay scale 196 91.6




* Both fixed and flexible scales coexist in the CS
Table 7: Performance–Pay Link (n = 214)
Frequency Percentage
Performance is not measured. 28 13.1
Performance is measured but has no effect on pay. 149 69.6
Performance is measured and has an effect on pay. 37 17.3
Although promotion should be carried out according to the Federal Civil 
Servants Promotion Guideline (2008), in practice it is often based on seniority. 
The practice encourages fast advancement to the next scale within or across 
the cadres at the beginning. The progress, however, stagnates as individuals 
get closer to the highest grade and scale, because there remain only a few 
higher posts to which individuals could be promoted.
However, in Ethiopia, the stagnation at the top has often been disrupted 
upon regime change. At the juncture of each disruption, the new administra-
tion has distanced itself from the higher officials associated with the preceding 
regime (see Andargachew, 1993; Paulos, 2001; Mengistu & Vogel, 2006). 
Such practices, according to Mengistu and Vogel (2006:212), have fashioned 
a “spoils system,” which has “led to a unique brand of rent-seeking among 
government officials.”
3.6. Motivational Factors for Working in the Civil Service
The other question is what motivates civil servants to work in the civil service? 
To understand their motivations, the TCSs were asked to give their position 
on the matters presented in the first column of table 8. The questions begin 
with whether the TCSs would recommend their own children to work in the 
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civil service. The remaining half of the table is devoted to issues related to 
“public sector motivation” (items 1, 2, 3 and 5) and ”public service motivation” 
(items 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10). These factors comprise extrinsic and intrinsic 
considerations, respectively, for working for and in the public sector (see 
Perry & Hondeghem, 2008).
Table 8: Motivational reasons for working in the civil service
Frequency Percentage
Whether the TCSs would recom-
mend their own children to work in 
the civil service (frequency, % yes)
85.0 39.7
Motivational factor for working in 
the civil service (percentage)
1* 2 3 4 5
1. Security of tenure (1)** 9.8 6.1 19.6 25.2 38.8
2. Career opportunities (0) 7.9 12.1 19.6 37.9 22.4
3. Pension benefit plans (0) 11.7 10.7 25.2 24.3 28.0
4. Altruistic motivation–living 
for more than one-self, serving 
citizens or others (0)
10.3 9.3 29.0 29.4 22.0
5. Income level or monetary 
incentive 
36.9 15.9 18.7 12.6 15.9
6. Attraction to public policymak-
ing (1)
11.2 9.3 26.6 32.2 20.1
7. Commitment to public interest 
and civic duty (1)
5.6 7.0 15.4 33.2 38.3
8. Compassion (1) 7.5 7.9 26.6 30.8 26.6
9. Self-sacrifice (1) 10.7 8.9 22.4 30.4 27.1
10. The opportunity to take on 
responsibility to promote the 
welfare of the service users (4)
7.5 5.1 20.6 36.9 28.5
*1 = Not important at all; 2 = Rather not important; 3 =More or less important; 4 = Important; and 
5 = Very important 
** Numbers in the brackets indicate the number of missing responses
The result reveals surprising and even contradictory claims. A large percent-
age of TCSs (60.3 percent) testified that they would not recommend their 
own children to work in the civil service. Yet, of the ten items about factors 
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motivating the TCSs for working in the civil service, only income level is 
reported as an unimportant motivating factor. The question is, if all items 
except income level are motivating factors, why did the TCSs repudiate the 
idea of recommending their children to work in the civil service? This is 
contradictory because a higher motivation for public service should imply 
a higher likelihood of association with that sector (Perry & Wise, 1990).
Then again, according to Bright (2005:149), high public service motivation 
denotes less attraction to monetary incentives. It has a positive corollary 
with individuals’ performance as well (Perry & Wise, 1990). Yet the need for 
higher pay is cited as causing a migration of talent from the civil service to 
nongovernmental organizations or even to employment abroad (see MoCB, 
2004). Equally, the Ethiopian civil service has been blamed for inefficiency 
(Ibid). Briefly, except for items measuring public sector motivation (items 1, 
2, 3, and 5), the TCSs’ position on items related to public service motivation 
seems to manifest the buzzwords and politically correct propaganda of the 
present Ethiopian civil service.
3.7. Politicisation
In Ethiopia, politicization has been an issue ever since the establishment of 
the modern civil service. More specifically, prior to the 1970s, clientelism 
(personal links to the emperor or his political executives) ran rampant, 
and after the military government came to power, “the Derg … mattered 
much more than technical competence” (Assefa, 2015:110). Currently, 
notwithstanding the outward appearance of a ”depoliticised civil service” 
(see Federal Civil Servants Proclamation, 2007; Corruption and Crime 
Proclamation, No. 881/2015), politicization continues to be common. As 
such, the boundary between politics and administration is extremely fluid 
(Assefa, 2015). The patronage arrangement in public appointments is a usual 
practice (see Evans, 2008). Such arrangements are not only limited to the top 
positions but also apply to lower-level posts (World Bank, 1998).
Moreover, during the EPRDF government, a small number of spin doc-
tors, known as “special advisors,” have joined the federal administration, 
numbering one or two per civil service institution. They are appointed by the 
minister/commissioner/ director general, as applicable, of those organizations. 
Their appointment is based on both merit and political criteria. They are 
usually members of the ruling party, and their tenure probably depends on the 
existence of their political masters. Based on the path-dependent experience 
of purging those who are associated with the outgoing government, their 
tenure unquestionably ends upon change of the regime.
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Asked about the functions of the “special advisors,” the TCSs indicate that 
they predominantly provide strategic advice on policy design and reform 
proposals; coordinate relations with the stakeholders; offer political/partisan 
advice; and assist in policy implementation. They also to some degree func-
tion as media/relation and communication assistants and partake in the 
management of civil servants (see table 9).
Table 9: How TCSs describe the function of advisors
Not at al Somewhat Very much
Functions % % %
Provide strategic advice on policy design and 
reform proposals (n = 214)
7.0 38.8 54.2
Coordinate relations with stakeholder (n = 213) 5.6 41.1 52.8
Offer political/partisan advice 21.0 38.3 40.2
Provide media or relation and communication 
assistance (n = 214)
6.5 50.5 43.0
Participate in policy implementation (n = 214) 9.3 34.6 56.1
Manage public servants (n = 214) 35.0 36.9 28.0
3.8. Representativeness
The Ethiopian civil service, in general, has a higher percentage of men than 
women in the workforce. Looking back to 1974, the period when maintaining 
employee data in terms of gender began around 82 percent of public employees 
were male. The expansion of the government apparatus during the Dergue 
government brought about only marginal changes (see table 1).
With the intention of remedying this prevailing gender imbalance, Ethiopia 
formulated a national policy on women in 1993. Since then, the issues of 
gender equity and equality have remained on top of the government agenda. 
In addition, the Constitution has incorporated equality in that “all persons 
are equal before the law” (art. 25). Similarly, the Labour Proclamation (2003: 
art. 14 [1][f]) and the Federal Civil Servants’ Proclamation (2007; art. 13 
[1]) assert discrimination based on sex, among other bases, as unlawful acts. 
Furthermore, the Constitution goes beyond the prohibition of discrimination 
to proclaim “affirmative actions for women” (art. 35 [3]). Going even further, 
the Constitution (art. 42 [1][d]), the Labour Proclamation (art. 87 [1]), and 
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the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation (art. 7) proclaimed the right of 
“equal pay for equal work” for men and women alike.
In enacting and enforcing the above-mentioned laws and policy that pro-
mote gender equality, Ethiopia scored 59.9 (which was above the continental 
average [53.8]) in the 2013 Mo Ibrahim Index. Doing so also enabled the 
EPRDF government to increase the proportion of female TCSs to 35 percent 
(in the federal administration, to 39.7 percent) in 2014 (see the National Civil 
Service Human Resource Statistics, 2013-2014).
Despite representational improvements, gender disproportion in terms of 
hierarchical power persists. Briefly, in Ethiopia “women are barely represented 
in decision-making positions” (UN Women, 2014:39). For instance, in the 
federal administration, in 2013-2014 the number of women in professional 
science, administrative, and clerical and financial cadres was 28, 37.3, and 
66.2 percent, respectively. Such figures imply uneven distributions of gender 
at the higher-level posts.
Similarly, if we break down job categories to grades and salary scales, a 
gender disparity is observable in the salary groups and level of education. 
That is, women largely receive a minimum wage salary, and most of them also 
fall into the lower level education categories (see the National Civil Service 
Human Resource statistics, 2013-2014).
In multi-ethnic Ethiopia, in addition to gender representation, the 
representativeness of various ethnic groups in the civil service has been a 
concern. In this regard, the three regimes discussed in the present work 
have demonstrated two approaches toward dealing with diversity: the as-
similationist and the accomodationist policy. The former has been relegated 
to the past, while the latter, “despite its serious flaws” (Abbay, 2004:593), has 
been implemented since 1991.
The Constitution (art. 25; art. 88 [2]) underlines the equality of nations, 
nationalities, and people. Likewise, the Labour Proclamation (art. 14 [1]
[f]) and the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation (art. 13 [1]) denounce 
discrimination on ethnic grounds. Furthermore, the Federal Civil Servants 
Proclamation proclaimed affirmative action for members of minorities (see 
art. 13 [3][c]). Despite these legal provisions, the federal civil service is 
dominated by ethnic Amhara (43 percent), followed by Oromo (17.2 percent) 
and Tigre (6.6 percent)2 (see the National Civil Service Human Resource 
statistics for the year 2013-2014). The balance is made up of other diverse 
ethnic groups. This indicates that ethnic balance in the federal civil service 
is an unresolved issue.
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3.9. Public Opinion
A comprehensive survey about public opinion toward the Ethiopian civil 
service is lacking. According to the Global Integrity–African Integrity Indica-
tors, Ethiopian confidence in the civil service for the years 2013 to 2016 was, 
on average, “somewhat weak.”
One of the arguments for the decrease of public trust in the civil service 
is corruption. In Ethiopia, a diagnostic study by the World Bank (2012) 
revealed the prevalence of wide-ranging corruption. Indeed, Ethiopia has often 
ranked on the low end of the corruption perception index (see Transparency 
International, 2016).
Related to corruption, some old aphorisms exist about holding a position 
in the government. Among others, these include “sishome yalbela sishar 
yikochewal,” which literally means “unbenefitted when appointed, regrets 
when ousted;” “shumetena mot ande new,” meaning “appointment and death 
come once in life,” and so on. Such sayings have at least two influences. First, 
they entitle officials to seek illegal benefits of all forms, including corruption 
and rent-seeking. They also tease out society’s tolerance for corruption. 
Finally, they inflame negative attitudes toward public officials and institutions, 
damaging public trust and support for them.
The other reason for the fall of confidence in the country’s civil service 
might be the autocratic (ruling) party system, which is in evidence at every 
turn (see Merera, 2001). In each regime considered in this chapter, the ruling 
party’s hegemonic aim has been to obstruct the kind of reform required 
to mitigate corruption. Connected to this, Ethiopia exhibits the stasis of 
patrimonialism (see World Bank, 2013) which inflames negative public 
attitudes toward government institutions.
Finally, in Ethiopia, the other reason for the drop in the support may go to 
what some call a “reform neurosis, ”that is, public fatigue with recurring public 
sector reforms, which are often justified by their deficiency (see MoCB, 2004).
4. Analysis: Implications for Leadership Roles
In this section, the foregoing evidence is analysed based on the overarching 
antecedents of public leadership: the cultural, political, and organisational-
administrative level settings. Subsequently, an attempt is made to deduce 
the ramifications of these antecedents for leadership roles.
406 AdArE AssEFA mitiKu And AnniE hondEGhEm
4.1. Cultural Setting
It should be noted that Ethiopia, although home to many religions, was 
founded on conservative Orthodox Christianity. This hegemonic legacy 
existed from the era of Menelik II to that of Haile Selassie I. Yet its supremacy, 
in general, has been weakened since the downfall of imperialism. Its path 
dependence was visibly disruptedwhen the EPRDF government came to 
power. Under this regime, individuals are free to exercise the faith and beliefs 
of their choice. No matter what, “Ethiopians consider religion most important 
to who they are” (World Economic Forum, 2016).
Furthermore, Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic and multicultural state, an issue 
that has been handled differently by different regimes (see Abbay, 2004). 
Likewise, gender balance and, of course, the issue of the age cohort of civil 
servants have contributed to heterogeneity. Such diversities unquestionably 
challenge cohesion in the workplace (see Visagie & Linde, 2010).
The implication of the foregoing contexts for the leadership roles, therefore, 
is the importance of recognizing workforce diversity and their culture. Leaders 
need to entrench diversity and value heterogeneity in their organizations and 
welcome it through diversified leadership styles. Briefly, managing diversity 
requires leaders to adopt diversity leadership approaches (Fernandez et al., 
2010; Jackson, 2004; Visagie & Linde, 2010), focus on collaborative leadership 
(Haruna, 2009), and develop a cross-cultural competency (Jackson, 2004). In 
SSA, upholding the concept of Ubuntu (see Sigger et al., 2010) is also important.
Additional insight into the Ethiopian culture could be obtained from 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (see Hofstede et al., 2010): power distance, 
individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, uncertainty 
avoidance, long-term versus short-term orientation, and indulgence versus 
restraint. For Ethiopia, only the scores for the first four dimensions are avail-
able. Ethiopia scored high on power distance (70), low on individualism (20), 
high on masculinity (65), and about average on uncertainty avoidance (55). 
These respectively denote that Ethiopians are hierarchical, collectivistic, and 
a largely masculine society.
With reference to the implications for leadership roles, a higher power 
distance implies that leaders are expected to be directive; subordinates expect 
to be told what to do; and the ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat. Furthermore, 
a hierarchical culture endorses a paternalistic leadership (Aycan et al., 2013; 
Jackson, 2016). A lower score on the individualism dimension or a high score 
on collectivism denotes that management is about the management of groups; 
that is, it calls for cooperative teamwork (Nzelibe, 1986) and Ubuntu. The 
masculinity dimension implies that “managers are expected to be decisive 
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and assertive, the emphasis is on equity, competition and performance and 
conflicts are resolved by fighting them out.“ In short, it demands a result-
oriented leadership (see Fernandez et al., 2010).
Finally, Ethiopia falls into the category of a “synchronic culture” (Trompe-
naars & Hampden-Turner, 1997). The issue here is about reviving the past. 
The past is important because, in synchronic culture, time is considered 
inter-connected. As such, “the past informs the present, and both inform 
the future.” In terms of work operation, scheduling has less importance. 
Individuals in such a culture perform several tasks at a time. The emphasis 
is on “doing things right” more than “doing right things.” Punctuality is not 
stressed to a great extent. Furthermore, Ethiopians are aa kind of “we-oriented 
(communitarian)” community (Ibid:131). The implication of such a culture 
for the role of leaders is that they need to assume, among others, the role of 
storyteller (see Ready, 2002).
4.2. Political Setting
All the regimes that have ruled Ethiopia, irrespective of differences in their 
ideologies and corollary policies, have endorsed a maximalist view of the state. 
Until now, except may be during the imperial rule, which in itself has violently 
ended in 1974, there has never been a peaceful transition of political power.
Likewise, the politicization of the civil service has been the hallmark of 
all the regimes considered here. In appointing civil servants, the patronage 
arrangement coexists with the merit approach. Similarly, Ethiopia exhibits 
the stasis of patrimonial authority. In fact, patrimonialism, although found 
in almost all polities, has often been described particularly as the core feature 
of SSA politics and bureaucracy (see Therkildsen, 2014).
The question is what are the influences of the aforementioned factors on 
how leaders are likely to act? To begin with, while leaders in a minimalist 
state hold a “marketizing trajectory” and are likely to opt for a performance-
oriented style (see Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011), leaders in the maximalist-type 
Ethiopian civil service may tend to exhibit a more mandate-driven style, 
being bound by and performing prescribed roles rather than approaching 
tasks unconventionally.
Similarly, in the Ethiopian civil service, as politicization pushes both civil 
servants and politicians toward a close alliance (see Peters & Pierre, 2004), 
it can be assumed that TCSs in such settings will focus more on ideological 
consistency and salience of accomplishments with their party rather than 
on accountability for performance. In other words, the situation calls for 
“political loyalty leadership” (Tummers & Knies, 2015).
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4.3. Organisational-Administrative Level Factors
In Ethiopia, as just explained, the modernism of administration had external 
origins. Nevertheless, over the past hundred plus years, many civil service 
reform initiatives have been tried and the system has been progressing. Even 
so, critics claim that the implementation of reform is overwhelmed by a 
concern for politics rather than a wish to improve the operational efficiency 
of the civil service.
Until now, the Ethiopian civil service has not focused much on the 
meritocratic appointment of civil servants. Equally, the civil service al-
lows permanency of tenure. It does not yet inject market-type mechanisms 
such as contract arrangements, even in recruiting TCSs. The cvil servants 
receive a standardised salary. There is hardly a strong performance-pay link, 
and promotion mainly rewards seniority. Finally, yet importantly, NPM 
reform-guided “agencification” measures have only been implemented to 
a limited extent.
The question, though is, what are the implication of the foregoing factors 
for the role of leaders? Despite widespread talk of reform, as just mentioned, 
their actual execution and resulting outcomes have been quite limited. The 
situation on the ground may not motivate leaders, for instance, to focus on 
performance excellence. Yet, the reform measures might have broadened 
leaders’ role preferences. Currently, for instance, change-oriented leadership 
(lawut tekor amerar) and result-oriented leadership (wutet tekor amerar) and 
so forth are fashionable catchphrases in the Ethiopian civil service.
Lastly, civil servants in Ethiopia function in a work environment with low 
public support. Such a situation does have an impact on staff motivation. The 
pressures on civil servants may call for affective leadership that underscores 
compassion in public service (see Newman et al., 2007). Likewise, the decline 
of public support for the civil service, among other factors, demands ethical 
leadership (Sutcliffe, 2005) and emphasis on trust and integrity, such as 
process “fairness and equity” (Van Ryzin, 2011). It is also important to uphold 
following rules, accountability, and network governance leadership (Tummers 
& Knies, 2015). Leaders need to be stewards of the public interest (see Selden 
et al., 1999) as well.
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5. Conclusions
Relying on historical and sociological new institutionalism, we initially 
studied the evolution and current features of the Ethiopian CSS. In doing 
so, we mainly relied on documentary analysis. Thus, as the limitation of this 
method (see Bowen, 2009) could have effects on the findings of the present 
work, the results of this study should be understood within this limit.
The results, in general, revealed that the civil service evolved in gradual 
fashion both during imperial and post-revolution Ethiopia. Ever since the 
beginning of modern public administration, the appointment of civil servants, 
at all levels, has mixed merit and patronage criteria. The civil service offers 
lifelong tenure of employment. Likewise, civil servants obtain a standard pay 
based on the salary scale. The current NPM motivated a movement toward 
“a contract regime” for employment, and the performance-based pay system 
has not yet reached Ethiopia.
Undeniably, there are remarkably underappreciated influences of the 
old institutions. The strong dominance of a single religion and culture, and 
discrimination on such grounds, among others, is no longer prevalent. Despite 
this, issues of gender and, especially, ethnic representativeness appear to cause 
serious concerns for the present and the future legitimacy of the Ethiopian 
civil service. The legitimacy of those institutions may further be questioned 
because Ethiopian support for them is low.
Finally, the analysis is framed based on the contextual antecedents and 
their ramifications for the role of leaders. Based on what is known as a cross-
walk approach, the Ethiopian setting approximately calls for the following 
distinct but inter-related leadership roles: (a) diversity-oriented leadership, (b) 
collaborative leadership (c) Ubuntu (d) benevolent autocrat, (e) paternalistic 
leadership, (f) result-oriented leadership, (g) storytelling, (h) political loyalty 
leadership, (i) change-oriented leadership, (j) compassionate leadership, and 
(k) ethical leadership.
It should, however, be noted that the presumed ideals of the abovemen-
tioned roles might contradict each other. Yet, this is not a problem because 
of a recent shift from “either … or” to “both … and” philosophies of leading 
organizations (see Quinn et al., 2011). In the present case, it means that 
leaders may at times be expected to play contradictory roles or make “both 
… and” decisions. Moreover, those roles are not “one-size-fits-all” types. As 
some roles may be more appropriate in some organizations than in others, 
leaders are expected to make choices compatible with their work context.
Equally, we leave it to the future research to deal with the question of what 
does and does not work best in this setting. Future works may go further 
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and examine the content of the syllabuses of the public administration and 
related programs to understand if leaders and potential leaders are trained 
in context-specific leadership and how the gaps, if any, need to be addressed.
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Notes
1. In Ethiopia, this qualification refers to one to two years of higher professional education, 
not a bachelor or post-graduate degree.
2. Oromo is the largest ethnic group (33,117,787); Amhara is the second largest (19, 
467,829); Somali is the third largest (5,240,226); and ethnic Tigray is the fourth largest 
(5,162,242) (National Civil Service Human Resource statistics, 2013-2014:1.10).
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Governments, their governance and policies, and their service deliveries, 
need to be effective, performing, and perceived as qualitative. This sec-
tion is situated within the broader performance management models and 
discusses distinct and interrelated issues. Applying non-parametric reference 
technology, the first chapter (chapter 16) examines the relative efficiency 
of twenty-nine municipalities in drinking water supply in Ethiopia. The 
chapter reveals many municipalities were inefficient and unable to balance 
performance on the Triple Bottom Line (TBL) elements. Chapter 17 ap-
plies a descriptive research method and analyzes the performance of sugar 
construction projects. It finds the performance of the projects is inadequate 
and identifies the factors that account for poor performance. Chapter 18 
investigates the trend of good governance in Ethiopia and shows that progress 
is needed. Chapter 19 applies inferential statistics and concerns itself with 
identifying factors that determine the performance of public servants in 
the federal public sector. The key conclusions and insights of authors have 
implications for public administration and public policy.

16 
Managing Performance in Ethiopian 
Municipalities : Analysis of Technical 
Efficiency of Urban Water Services in 
Oromia National Regional State
Bacha Kebede Debela, Geert Bouckaert, and Steve Troupin
Box 1: Key Points of this chapter
 most municipalities had inefficient water supplies.
 most municipalities were not able to balance economic, social, and ecological 
goals in the urban drinking water supply.
 the efficiency of the municipalities’ drinking water supply depends on model 
specifications.
Box 2: Reading this chapter will give you insights in 
 the application of data Envelopment Analysis (dEA) in drinking water supply 
efficiency analysis.
 the effect of dEA model specifications on efficiency score.
 the challenges of calibrating economic, social, and ecological goals in urban 
drinking water supply.
Box 3: Abbreviations
dds = democratic developmental state
dEA = data Envelopment Analysis
dmu = decision making unit
GtP = Growth and transformation Plan
moFEd = ministry of Finance and Economic development
moWr = ministry of Water resources
mssd = most similar system design
sdGs = sustainable development Goals
tbl = triple bottom line
un = united nations
undP = united nations development Program
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1. Introduction 
Ensuring access to drinking water remains a global problem. In 2000, the 
seventh United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
aimed at halving the proportion of people without access to drinking water 
by 2015 (UN, 2000). The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 
Goal 6 seeks to “achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable 
drinking water for all by 2030” (UN, 2015).
Ensuring access to drinking water remains challenging due to the increas-
ing pressure from population growth, urbanization, agriculture, industry, 
and other sectors all competing for water (Axworthy & Sandford, 2012; 
Neto; 2016; Pangare & Idris, 2012;); to historically significant structural 
social inequalities (Castro & Heller, 2009); and to the increasing need to 
ensure sustainable use of water resources (Akhmouch & Correia, 2016; 
Neto, 2016).
In its policy frameworks and development plans, Ethiopia, like many other 
countries, has recognised the importance of ensuring access to drinking water 
to improve the well-being of society and enhance socioeconomic development 
(MoWR, 1999). It has also subscribed to the MDGs and SDG. In its Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTP I), the country aimed at 100 percent urban 
drinking water coverage, with twenty liters per day person within 0.5 km by 
2014-2015 (MoFED, 2010). In GTP II, the target was revised downward to 
75 percent urban access (National Planning Commission, 2016).
In Ethiopia, management of the drinking water supply has been decentral-
ized in two waves: from central to regional governments in 1991-1995 in 
the framework of a Structural Adjustment Program, and further down 
to local governments, under the motto of New Public Management since 
the early 2000s (Transitional Government of Ethiopia, 1993; Peterson, 
2015). Since 2005 the government has strengthened vertical and horizontal 
coordination, in line with the “Democratic Developmental State” (DDS) 
doctrine (Lefort, 2012; Peterson, 2015).
The Ethiopian policy on drinking water supply emphasizes efficien-
cy (MoWR, 1999). Yet research on the efficiency of urban local governments 
in drinking water supply remains scarce. Arsano et al. (2010) covered only 
two municipalities in Ethiopia, while Banerjee et al. (2008) performed a 
generic study. Furthermore, these studies have not used Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), the contemporary approach used in other countries to 
analyze performance of the public sector. Remarkably, micro-level studies 
assessing tensions which could surface when local governments attempt to 
achieve the economic, social, and ecological performance goals codified in 
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the Triple Bottom Line (TBL) are scarce, if not absent. The TBL emphasizes 
concurrently auditing economic, social, and ecological performance (Wied-
mann & Lenzen 2008).
This chapter fills the gaps in the literature by comparing the technical 
efficiency of twenty-nine Grade 2B towns in Oromia National Regional 
State, Ethiopia,1 using DEA reference technology. The study seeks to answer 
the question: What is the relative technical efficiency of Grade 2B towns of 
the Oromia National Regional State, Ethiopia, in supplying urban drinking 
water?
To answer the research question, longitudinal data on two inputs and five 
outputs from the twenty-nine cases were collected. Furthermore, to allow 
the comparability of cases, a population is used as non-discretionary input. 
Moreover, to check the robustness of efficiency scores, forty-two DEA model 
specifications were performed. The study finds many municipalities need 
to improve their technical efficiency on the TBL dimensions. It also finds 
trade-offs between and among TBL elements. Thus, the chapter contributes 
to the SDGs agenda by stimulating dialogue among drinking water supply 
actors. It also adds to the evolving literature on local government performance 
management.
The chapter unfolds as follows. The next section offers analytical frame-
works. A section on research methodology follows. In the fourth section, 
collected data are analyzed and results are presented. Lastly, concluding 
remarks are given.
2. Analytical Frameworks 
2.1. The TBL as Analytical Framework
TBL provides a strategic framework to measure and report organizational 
performance against social, economic, and ecological dimensions (Glavas 
& Mish, 2015). The necessity of integrating the three dimensions in perfor-
mance management is underscored by several international legal frameworks, 
protocols, and reports on water and environment (Akhmouch & Correia, 
2016; Aureli & Brelet, 2004; Dublin Statement and Report of the Conference, 
1992; European Commission, 2014; Munkonge & Harvey, 2008; Neto, 2016; 
Solanes & Gonzalez-Villarreal, 1999; UN, 1992; UN, 2000, 2012, 2015; 
WHO & UNICEF, 2012; WHO & UNICEF, 2013). The concept of TBL is 
crucial for urban water services, particularly from the viewpoint of “strong 
sustainability,” as cities mainly contribute to socioeconomic development 
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rather than to ecological benefits (Mori & Christodoulou, 2012). The TBL, 
however, is generic (Pope et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the production model 
further operationalizes the TBL elements for assessing the drinking water 
supply. Figure 1 shows the relationship between TBL elements. The economy-
equity corner focuses on efficiency (cost recovery and financial sustainability) 
and fairness and effectiveness (affordability) in drinking water supply. In 
the ecology-equity corner, environmental justice (sustainable withdrawals) 
comes into view, while equity is still at the forefront. The economy-ecology 





Source: Adopted from Flint (2013:82).
However, trade-offs are expected, as it is difficult for decision-makers to 
achieve two or three interests concurrently without having “less of the other,” 
and the attempt to address the unachieved goals leads to a vicious cycle 
(Lieberherr, 2016; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). The trade-offs are expected to 
be higher in developing countries (UNDP, 2006). For instance, the increased 
competition for water among various actors for economic gains (economic) 
may not be easily balanced with the need to supply drinking water to an 
increased population at an affordable price (social) and reduce the overex-
ploitation of water resources (ecology) (UN, 2006; 2014; UNDP, 2006). 
Table 1 shows the trade-offs and the hypothetical relationship between TBL 
elements. As the table shows, in the worst case an organization fails to address 
all three elements of TBL.
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Table 1: The TBL matrix 
Criteria
Social Economy Ecology System result
Low Low Low Low (bad shape)
Low Low High Ecological
Low High Low Economy
Low High High Economy-ecology 
High Low Low Social
High Low High Socio-ecology 
High High Low Socio-economy 
High High High TBL 
Source: Authors
2.2. The Production Process Model as an Analytical Framework
Many studies of performance management in the public sector rely on Pollitt 
and Bouckaert’s (2011) production process model. Figure 2 presents the 
three elements of the production process model and one generic criterion 
of performance assessment derived from the model.
Figure 2: The Production Process Model
Eciency
Inputs Activities Outputs 
Public organization or Program
Source: Adapted from Pollitt & Bouckaert (2011)
Inputs refer to resources (human and nonhuman) that are deployed by organi-
zations to produce output (Pollitt & Dan, 2013) through activities. Activities 
are of an operational and management nature and include organizational 
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structure and arrangements, allocation of authority, and working procedures 
(Pollitt & Dan, 2013). Outputs refer to what an organization or program 
delivers or produces (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011)
Efficiency refers to the ratio of inputs to outputs (Woodybury & Dollery, 
2004). In general, an organization/policy is performing well if it maximizes 
the outputs produced with a given set of inputs, or if it minimizes inputs used 
to produce a given set of outputs (Woodybury & Dollery, 2004). Table 2 
present a description of the inputs and outputs used in this study.




Total number of full time equivalent staff of the urban water supply 
and sewerage service enterprise 
Expenditure 
Amount of total financial resource committed to produce drinking 
water in100k
Outputs Variables
Water produced Total amount of water produced by the enterprise in km3
Water sold Total volume of water sold in km3
Water loss 
(transformed into 
water loss control 
capacity) 
Volume of water loss in m3 because of illegal connection, author-
ized but not billed water, leakages, and institutional uses. Since it 
is unintended negative output, the amount was transformed into 
water loss control capacity.
Number of private 
connections 
The total number of number of households and institutions (public, 
business and non-for-profit organizations) that have private 
connection in hundreds
Water revenue
Sum of water revenue collected from sale of water to private 
connections and public stand tap users in Ethiopian Birr(100k)
Non-water revenue 
Revenue from water related-services and other sources such as 
technical service, water meter rental, permission and estimation 
fee, sale of enterprise properties, fines and others(100k)
Non-discretionary variable (input)
Urban population Refers to urban (town) population(k)
Source: Authors
tEchnicAl EFFiciEncY oF urbAn WAtEr sErVicEs 425
These inputs and outputs were selected for four reasons. Firstly, to avoid 
inflated results because of too many variables (Woodbury & Dollery, 2004), 
to account for critical variables (Lijphart, 1975), and to comply with the rule 
of the thumb as to the number of variables in the DEA (Mukokoma & Dijk, 
2013). Secondly, because data on these variables were available, consistent, 
and appeared to be reliable. Thirdly, these variables are identified by a single 
case study (Ambo, one of the municipalities in this study) (Debela & Troupin, 
2015). Fourthly, most water sector analysis that has applied Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) has used some of these variables. Examples include Carballo 
and Marques (2011) and De Witte and Marques (2012). Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of output variables and models on the TBL dimensions.
Figure 3: DEA Output variables and model distribution on TBL Dimensions
Social (Private connection) = 2 models
Social and ecology =
2 models 
Social, economy and ecology = 3 models
Ecology
(Water loss control
Capacity) = 2 Models
Economy (Water produced, Water
revenue Non water revenue,
Water sold) = 14 Models
Ecology and economy = 17 models
Economy and Social = 2 models
Source: Authors
3. Methodology: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
This study applied the non-parametric approach to performance analysis 
referred to as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA may be used to 
compare the efficiency of organizations or organizational units – referred 
to as decision-making units (DMU) – that use similar inputs and produce 
similar outputs (Cooper et al., 2006; Zhu, 2009). It evaluates the efficiency 
of each DMU relative to the efficient frontier (best practice). It produces 
efficiency scores between 0 (0 percent) and 1 (100 percent): a DMU is efficient 
if its efficiency score is 1 (100 percent); otherwise it is classified as inefficient 
(Cooper et al., 2006). Inefficient DMUs are enveloped by fully efficient 
DMUs of comparable size. Examples of authors who used DEA to analyse 
the efficiency of water utilities include Corton and Berg (2009), De Witte 
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and Marques (2012), Abbott et al. (2012), Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2008), and 
Tupper and Resende (2004).
DEA can be either input-oriented or output-oriented. In input-oriented 
models, inefficient DMUs need to focus on input reduction, while in output-
oriented models they should emphasize output augmentation (Jacobs et 
al., 2006). The target for inefficient DMUs is measured by the horizontal 
distance (input-oriented) or vertical distance (output-oriented) from the 
frontier (Cooper et al., 2006).
The most common typologies of the DEA model are the Charnes, Cooper, 
and Rhodes (CCR) and the Banker, Charens, and Copper (BCC) (Cooper 
et al., 2006; Zhu, 2009;). Both are also called the “radial efficiency” or “weak 
efficiency” or “technical efficiency” model and apply proportional decrease 
of inputs or the proportional increase of outputs.
Figure 4 shows the one input-one output BCC DEA. To become efficient 
under an input-oriented DEA, DMU 10 should move horizontally, reducing 
the input it uses (reduce expenditure to 322,499 Ethiopian Birr) while keeping 
its output (water produced) constant (192,968 m3). Conversely, in an output-
oriented DEA, it should vertically increase the output it produces (increase 
water produced to 547,423 m3) while keeping current total expenditure 
(1,081,141 Ethiopian Birr). Note that the graph is convex and that the DMUs 
on the graph enveloped inefficient DMUs.
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This study applied the BCC DEA, for four major reasons. Frist, the BCC is 
more appropriate for managerial use, particularly in cases involving com-
plexity and uncertainty, than CCR (Cherchye & Van Puyenbroeck, 1999). 
This is because the BCC is flexible and postulates variable return to scale 
(VRS) – increasing or decreasing returns – on the assumption that the scale 
of operation matters. The CCR applies a constant return to scale assumption 
and is relevant from a societal perspective, as society is more interested in 
efficiency than the scale of operation in drinking water supply (Jacobs et al., 
2006; Stroobants & Bouckaert, 2014).
Second, the BCC can handle institutional constraints that could narrow the 
space for dialogue between policy makers, managers, and other stakeholders on 
drinking water supply. Thus, it is more suitable, particularly when the market 
is imperfect and distorted by subsidies and when there is a difference among 
DMUs in terms of managerial experience and access to resources, which is 
particularly common in Africa (Banerjee & Morella, 2011). Specifically, the 
BCC output-oriented DEA is suitable when it appears that proportional aug-
mentation of outputs is more acceptable both politically and administratively 
(for reasons such as the politics of the day and employee association pressure) 
than the proportional decrease of inputs (Bouckaert, 2013; Cooper et al., 2006; 
Zhu, 2009). Fourth, more specifically, the BCC output-oriented VRS DEA is 
more relevant in the context of Ethiopia, where managers, among others, are 
more likely to be constrained by many factors such as the top-down political 
culture and DDS doctrine (Lefort, 2012; Peterson, 2015).
3.1. Case Selection
This study used the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) case study strategy. 
The MSSD helps control factors that are common to cases and explains 
differences in terms of any variables that differentiate the cases (Lijphart, 
1975; Meckstroth, 1975). To enhance the validity and reliability of research 
in MSSD, Lijphart suggests:
[…] increase[ing] the number of cases as much as possible by extending the 
analysis both geographically and historically; reduce[ing] the property-space of 
the analysis by combining variables and/or categories; focus[ing] the analysis 
on comparable cases and restrict[ing] the analysis to the key variables and 
omit[ting] those of only marginal importance (Lijphart 1975: 159).
The features of selected Grade 2B municipalities fit with the requirements 
of MSSD and DEA. First, these towns were constituted as urban local 
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governments (Oromia National Regional Government, 2003) and have Urban 
Water Supply and Sewerage Service Enterprises that are mandated, among other 
things, to provide drinking water service efficiently (Ibid.:art. 7 &9). Second, 
they were sufficient in number (twenty-nine) to make reasonable performance 
comparisons using DEA. Third, these towns have a similar organizational 
structure, are located in the same region, and function in accordance with 
the same proclamation (Ibid.): they are thus suitable for benchmarking and 
bench-learning. Furthermore, according to CSA (2014), about 1.17 million 
inhabitants were living in these towns, and the annual urban population growth 
rate was 4 percent, suggesting the necessity to improve performance in drinking 
water supply on the TBL dimensions (Akhmouch & Correia, 2016).
Table 3 Features of Selected Grade 2B Cities, Oromia National Reginal State, Ethiopia 
(June 2013)









































Total DMUs 9 14 6 29
DMU1=Negele Borena, DMU2= Modjo, DMU3= Bedessa, DMU4= Gimbi, DMU5= Arsi Negele, 
DMU6= Haromaya, DMU7= Bedele, DMU8= Sendafa Beke, DMU9= Yabello, DMU10= Ghinir, 
DMU11= Bekoji, DMU12= Nedjo, DMU13= Ambo, DMU14= Goba, DMU15= Weliso, DMU16= 
Fiche, DMU17= Adola, DMU18= Holeta, DMU19=Metu, DMU20= Chiro, DMU21= Dodola, 
DMU22= Bale Robe, DMU23=Agaro, DMU24= Metahara, DMU25= Batu, DMU26= Bule Hora, 
DMU27= Deder, DMU28= Dembi Dolo, DMU29= Shambu 
N.B. population CSA (2014)
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The similarity of cases is important in DEA (Stroobants & Bouckaert, 
2014). Thus, to ensure comparability of cases, the urban population was used 
as a non-discretionary input. This is because data from CSA (2014) shows 
only ten out of twenty-nine grade 2B municipalities had a population from 
45,000 to 89, 999 (official range of second-gradecities). Table 3 shows the basic 
features of the selected cases. This approach follows one of the propositions 
made by Jacobs et al. (2006) to deal with environmental variables (for other 
propositions readers may look at Jacobs et al., 2006).
3.2. Data Collection
Data collection went through four major stages. First, a data collection format 
seeking fifteen years data (1995-2014/15) was developed in consultation 
with drinking water experts working with the Oromia Water and Energy 
Bureau. Second, support was obtained from the Oromia Water and Energy 
Bureau, and the bureau officially requested that the Urban Water Supply 
and Sewerage Services Enterprises of the selected municipalities submit 
data. Third, to ensure timely submission, telephone calls were made to the 
enterprises. Fourth, submitted data were checked and to ensure completeness 
and consistency some enterprises were asked to resubmit their data. In general, 
data collection took about three months. Collected data were filtered, and it 
was found that data from 2010 to 2014/15 were consistent and deemed reliable.
3.3. Data Processing and Model Specifications 
Contrary to some proposition such as Zhu (2009), who suggested multiplying 
negative variable with “-1” or the direct inversion of the variable, water loss 
(negative output) was transformed into water loss control capacity using a 
formula:
Water loss control capacity = 1 –   Water loss in cubic meter    ______________________   
Total water produced in cubic meter
 
Although relevant according to Jacobs et al. (2006), due to the small number 
of DMUs (twenty-nine) and the number of inputs and outputs used, dividing 
and undertaking independent DEA based on the source of raw water was 
found to be unfeasible.
To look at the impact of the number and different combinations of input and 
output variables on the frontier and targets, forty-two DEA model specifica-
tions2 were performed (Cooper et al., 2006; Zhu, 2009). The rule of thumb in 
DEA model formulation stating that the number of DMUs should be at least 
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three times greater than the sum of input and output variables (Jacobs et al., 
2006; Mukokoma & Dijk, 2013) was applied. Sensitivity analysis has been 
suggested in the DEA literature (see for example Cooper et al. 2006; Zhu, 
2009), but it should be emphasized that DEA studies that have used several 
model specifications and longitudinal data are scarce in general. However, 
recently there has been a trend in this direction. For example, Stroobants and 
Bouckaert (2014) applied longitudinal data and the one input–one output and 
two input–two output approach in their study on benchmarking local libraries 
in Flanders (Belgium). They have shown possible expansion of results in time 
and space and the potential of such an approach for efficiency improvement.
The principle of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness was applied in the 
DEA model formulation (Jacobs et al., 2006). To maintain the principle 
of exclusiveness, a Pearson correlation (2-tailed) was performed over five 
years, assuming a two-way influence. Table 4 gives the results on output 
variables. The number in parentheses shows there is a strong correlation 
between variables. For example, WP and WR are significantly correlated 
at a 0.01 level of significance, as are WP and PC. Thus, the combination of 
these variables was avoided in DEA specifications. In general, the exercises 
allowed for excluding variables that have significant correlation and overcome 
the problem of multicollinearity on one hand and complying with the rule 
of thumb in DEA model formulation on the other.
In four DEA model specifications, however, the principle of exclusiveness 
was not maintained for input variables (staff and total expenditure), although 
the Pearson’s correlation (2-tailed) test shows a strong correlation between 
the variables (see models 39 to 42). This allowed for assessing the effect of 
a combination of the two inputs on the efficiency of DMUs and on the TBL 
dimensions. It is also noteworthy that, unlike Stochastic Frontier Analysis, 
DEA does not make assumptions about the relationships between variables 
(Jacobs et al., 2006); furthermore, DEA is relevant when the nature of the 
relationship between multiple inputs and outputs is complex (Cooper et al., 
2006), although this cannot be the best argument as the results are sensitive 
to model specifications, thus its limitation (Cooper et al., 2006; Jacobs et 
al., 2006). In addition, several authors who analyzed water utility efficiency 
using DEA applied used labor (staff) and operating expenses, which are 
expected to have a strong correlation, as input variables. Examples include 
Berga and Lin (2008), Corton and Berg (2009), Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2008), 
and Picazo-Tadeo et al.(2009).
Finally, since DEA applies linear programming methods, Performance 
Improvement Management (PIM) Software, PIM-DEAsoft-V3.0, and DEA 
Frontier software was used. It should be noted that no weight restrictions 
are applied in the analysis.
tEchnicAl EFFiciEncY oF urbAn WAtEr sErVicEs 431
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive statistics
The results from descriptive statistics (figure 5) indicate variations among the 
DMUs over five periods. Substantial variations were observed on all variables 
except on water loss control capacity. Second, the standard deviation of total 
water revenue was much higher than the standard deviation of nonwater revenue 
except in periods three and five. Third, the figure shows that these municipali-
ties have much potential to improve their technical efficiency. In particular, 
municipalities that rely on groundwater might have better potential to improve 
Table 4: DEA variable correlation matrix over five years in sequential order
Output variables 
Decision 
WP WR NWR PC WLC WS




























WR - - (0.05*), (-), 













NWR - - - (0.01), (-), 
(-), (-), (-)
(-), (-), (-), 
(-), (-)
(0.05), (-), 
(-), (-), (-), 







WLC - - - - - (-), (-), (-), 
(-), (-)
WS - - - - - -
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (Pearson, 2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (Pearson, 2-tailed). 
(-). No significant correlation (Pearson, 2-tailed). 
WP=Total Water Produced m3, NWR=Total Non-water Revenue, WS= Water Sold m3, PC= Total 
Private Connections, WLC= Water Loss Control Capacity, WR= Total Water revenue 
Source: Authors
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their technical efficiency, because keeping other things constant groundwater 
is physically and biologically purer than surface water (Byrnes et al., 2010). 
However, although this is plausible from the economic and social dimensions 
of TBL, over-extracting groundwater may threaten ecological sustainability, 
which would threaten the other dimension. Thus, caution is needed.
Figure 5: Descriptive Statistics (Std Dev)





















































































































(2010/11) (2011/2012)  (2012/2013)  (2013/2014) (2014/2015)
Source: Authors
4.2. Technical Efficiency Distribution 
A summary of the results of forty-two DEA model specifications is reported in 
Debela (2017). As inputs and outputs changed, as more variables were progres-
sively added and as model specifications changed, several things happened.
In general, as expected, as the number of inputs and outputs increased, 
more DMUs were classified as efficient (Cooper et al., 2006). For example, 
the results of DEA Models 31 to 37, each with two inputs and three outputs, 
yielded more best practice DMUs as compared to DEA models from 1 to 5.
The discriminatory power of DEA also depends on the combination of 
inputs and outputs, although on the surface the number of efficient DMUs 
with a similar number of inputs and outputs may be in close agreement. For 
example, in period one there were as many efficient DMUs in DEA Model 
25 as in DEA Model 28. However, in the same period, in Model 28 there 
were nine DMUs with less than 60 percent efficiency scores, meaning that 
DMUs operating with 40 percent or more waste ought to exert more effort 
to be efficient. This is particularly necessary when total staff is kept constant 
compared to total expenditure.
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The inclusion of the “non-water revenue” and “water loss control capacity” 
output variables appeared to have a different impact on the target for inefficient 
DMUs. In general, when “non-water revenue” is included, many DMUs were 
found to operate with less than 40 percent efficiency, particularly in periods 
three and five. In contrast, the inclusion of the “water loss control capacity” 
output variable has much impact, as many DMUs were able to improve their 
efficiency scores, although those on the frontier were less or equal to the 
effect of “non-water revenue.” Figure 6 shows instances where a DMU score 
100 percent efficiency was achieved in all models over five years (max 210). 
The distribution of the DMUs efficiency score over five years is reported in 
Debela (2017).






































































































































































From figure 6 it is noticeable that the number of fully efficient and inefficient 
DMUs varies. There were 11, 10, 15, 10, and 14 inefficient DMUs over five 
years (see Debela, 2017). The results show that size and source of raw water 
appear to have weak explanatory power for the inefficiency of the DMUs. 
Figure 6, in particular, shows that DMU1, DMU4, DMU12, DMU17, and 
DMU21 were inefficient over five periods in all model specifications. While 
DMU12, DMU17, and DMU21 were relying on groundwater, DMU1 and 
DUM 4 were respectively using surface and groundwater, and surface water. 
The performance of inefficient DMUs could be explained by hazard and 
geo-environmental conditions, but this should be verified by further research.
Second, figure 6 reveals that only DMU27 was classified as fully efficient in 
all model specifications. DMU8, DMU9, and DMU18 were relatively better 
and ranked second, third, and fourth respectively (see annex for rank of 
DMUs). The rank and efficiency scores of DMUs, in general, may be mislead-
ing, as some DMUs became efficient by default. The next section clarifies 
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this phenomenon. Third, the difference in the efficiency score indicates that 
the efficiency of DMUs varies over five years. For instance, in DEA model 10 
there were 3, 2, 5, 4, and 4 fully efficient DMUs over five years, respectively, 
meaning that the efficiency scores of some DMUs were unstable.
5. Distribution of DMUs on TBL Output Dimensions 
The results in figure 6 clearly show DMU1, DMU4, DMU12, DMU17, and 
DMU21 were in bad shape on the TBL dimensions. It appears also that only 
DMU 27 was able to balance the TBL output dimensions. Such a conclusion, 
however, cannot be held when efficiency by default phenomena (due to lack of 
comparable cases) is considered. Figure 7 shows the performance of the DMUs 
on TBL dimensions. The efficiency by dominance and default phenomena is 
found by mapping peers from each model over five years. However, due to limited 
space we did not report, peers for inefficient DMUs (for peers see Debela, 2017).
The distribution of DMUs on the TBL dimensions brings several interesting 
insights into the foreground. First, many DMUs were weak on ecological 
performance, but relatively better on the economy, followed by social perfor-
mance. Second, the pattern of distribution is unstable and the performance 
of DMUs on TBL does not correlate with the rank of DMUs (see annex 3 for 
rank). For example, DMU15, ranked 12th, was more efficient by dominance 
than DMU22, which was ranked 9th. This means DMU22 exhibits the ef-
ficiency by default phenomenon. Interestingly, even DMU27, ranked 1st, has 
some features of efficiency by default, and it was not classified as following 
best practices on social dimension when compared with DMU9 and DMU15.
Third, there were trade-offs between the economic, social, and ecological 
output dimensions. For instance, DMU15, which was efficient by dominance 
on the social dimension, was classified as inefficient on the economy dimen-
sion. DMU9 was best only on the ecological dimension. All DMUs that have 
good efficiency scores on the economy and social dimensions sacrificed the 
ecological dimension.
An interesting insight also emerges when the combination of TBL dimen-
sions is considered. It is observed that the increase in the number of variables 
has not completely eliminated the trade-offs between TBL dimensions. 
Secondly, even with the maximum number of variable combinations, only 
five DMUs were classified as best on TBL dimensions.
In general, the results show that balancing the TBL dimensions in urban 
drinking water supply is difficult (Jamali, 2006; UNDP, 2006) but not 
impossible.
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Figure 7: Distribution of DMUs on TBL dimensions in 42 DEA model specifications 
(average five years)
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6. The TBL and Efficiency Improvement Strategies: 
The Trade-Offs 
The difference in the efficiency score of DMUs and the target thereof due 
to the combination of variables leads to different efficiency improvement 
strategies, which are often conflicting. For example, when we consider the 
economy dimension of the TBL in the case of “nonwater revenue,” the inef-
ficient DMUs among others need to focus on increasing technical service 
charges. Clearly, such a strategy contradicts the social dimensions of TBL, 
particularly as an increase in technical service charge and connection fees 
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which go beyond threshold negatively affects the poor and the disadvantaged 
(UNDP, 2006).
The inefficient DMUs can also increase efficiency gains by proportionally 
augmenting private connection, water produced, and increasing water revenue 
and water sold. The Pearson correlation results already clarified that there 
was a significant correlation between these variables (see table 2). But each 
of these outputs invites different strategies, which are often conflicting.
Beyond the threshold, over-extraction of raw water to augment water 
production jeopardizes the ecological dimension, which itself affects the 
other dimensions. Increasing water revenue by increasing private connection 
appears to be a plausible strategy to improve social and economic goals. 
However, all things being equal, it remains uncertain whether the inefficient 
DMUs can increase distribution networks to augment private connections, 
among other factors due to challenging urban topography.
Weak DMUs can also improve their economy by increasing water tariff 
rates, which could contradict the social dimensions, without jeopardizing the 
ecological dimension. As such this strategy depends on political decisions 
and is out of the authority of water enterprise managers.
Augmenting water sold and water loss control capacity generates pref-
erential advantage to balance TBL dimensions. Increasing water sold by 
minimizing unbilled authorized consumption and apparent loss (due to 
illegal connections and water meter inaccuracy) is a relevant strategy. By the 
same token, augmenting water loss control capacity has greater potential to 
improve the economic, social, and ecological output performance. Keeping 
existing inputs constant, increasing water loss control capacity helps to avoid 
the real loss related to leaks in the distribution system, service connection 
leaks, and reservoir overflows, if any, and thus minimizes over-extraction of 
raw water while also improving economic and social dimensions.
So what can be said about the learning effect of the story? Notwithstanding 
the potential tensions and conflicts discussed above, the best practice DMUs 
(see figure 4) provide interesting insights. First, the source of raw water for 
these DMUs came from two categories: groundwater (DMU27 and DMU8) 
groundwater, and ground and surface water (DMU9, DMU15, and DMU18). 
Thus, these relatively well-performing DMUs provide lessons for the totally 
inefficient and relatively weakest DMUs. All things being equal, totally 
inefficient and weak DMUs that are relying on surface and groundwater 
sources can switch to one source to balance the TBL dimensions if possible, 
thereby achieving at least some progress. In practice the choice necessities a 
clear understanding of the associated risks, as a simple switching of the raw 
water source may lead to a worse situation if not done correctly.
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Finally, the unstable pattern of distribution of relatively better DMUs 
underlines the importance of continuous learning from their own experience 
and that of others as a group to balance the TBL dimensions as much as 
possible. It also benefits those DMUs that are classified as best practice by 
default. Importantly, DMUs that are classified as best practice on one or two 
dimensions of TBL need to improve their performance on the remaining 
dimensions and learn from best practice and from their own experience.
7. Conclusions and Implications 
Based on empirical work, the following concluding remarks may be made. 
First, the empirical results show that many DMUs need to improve their 
technical efficiency by augmenting short failed outputs, particularly when 
the numbers of variables are modest. But caution is needed. This is because 
the initiative to proportionally increase one output area could contradict 
positive results on the other TBL dimensions.
Second, the efficiency of DMUs was impacted by model specifications 
and therefore unstable over time. It means that DEA applications that focus 
on a single period and only a few model specifications are insufficient. From 
a methodological perspective, therefore, the use of longitudinal data and 
different combinations of variables in DEA is useful to check the robustness 
of DMUs efficiency scores in time and space (Stroobants & Bouckaert, 2014). 
This approach is useful because a best-practice DMU in one model specifica-
tion may not be so in another model specification on TBL dimensions. The 
targets of weak DMUs also change over time and space.
Third, from the policy and managerial perspectives, differences in the 
efficiency scores of DMUs over time allow decision makers to identify the 
most efficient DMUs over time and to initiate a dialogue among stakeholders 
to distinguish reasons for declining performance (Stroobants & Bouckaert, 
2014).
Fourth, related to the third, this study has demonstrated the importance 
of analyzing the performance of water utilities on TBL dimensions, and its 
implications on the agenda of sustainable urban water supply and environmen-
tal management. The results show that many DMUs are better on economic 
performance than on ecological performance, suggesting the prevalence of 
trade-offs. It should be noted that the study argues that except in the cases 
of water loss control capacity and water sold, proportionally increasing other 
outputs leads to trade-offs. Similar studies on urban water service can also be 
undertaken in any country, particularly in those central to the SDG agenda.
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Lastly, in the context of this study, future work may focus on examining 
factors that could explain the relative technical efficiency of the studied 
municipalities.
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Notes
1. Oromia is the largest and most populous National Regional State in Ethiopia. It occupies 
363.136 km2. In 2011/12 the population of the region was estimated at 28 million, ac-
counting for about 35 percent of the Ethiopian population. In 2012, about 4 million people 
(15 percent) lived in urban centers (CSA, 2012). 
In 2013, there were 546 urban centers in Oromia National Regional State (Industry and 
Urban Development Bureau of Oromia, 2013), 6 of which were 1st Grade towns, 38 were 
2nd grade towns (6 Grade 2A and 32 Grade 2B), 55 were 3rd grade towns ranging from 
3A to 3D, and the remaining (466) were 4th grade towns ranging from 4A to 4C (IUDBO, 
2013). Grade 1 towns/cities have more than 90,000 residents, Grade2o towns/cities have 
45,000 to 89,999, Grade 3 towns have between 10,000 to 44,999 while Grade 4 towns have 
populations ranging from 2,000 to 9,999 (Oromia National Regional Government, 2003).
2. The forty-two DEA model specifications are reported in Debela (2017)
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Performance Evaluation of Governance 
and Political System of Ethiopia : 
Post 1991
Gutata Goshu Amante
Box 1: Key messages of this chapter
 insignificant attention to the voice of the people and low accountability
 Weak adherence to the rule of law
 declining government effectiveness
 inadequate efforts to control corruption
 regulations promulgated without considering the interests of all actors
 Very little political exchange between and among different actors in society
 rampant maladministration, which has held back the poor in a vicious circle of 
poverty 
Box 2: After reading this chapter you will have insight in
 dimensions of governance
 the six measures/indicators of governance and their interdependence
 measures of governance and the political system in Ethiopia
 the nature of government and the practice of governance in Ethiopia
 the level of engagement and coordination among governance actors
 the level of trust and respect for the contribution of each actor
 Whether public interest precedes actors’ personal interests
Box 3: Abbreviations
cc = control of corruption
cEd = committee for Economic development
EPrdF = Ethiopian People’s revolutionary democratic Front
FAo = Food and Agricultural organization
GdP = Gross domestic Product
GE = Government Effectiveness
nGo = none Governmental organization
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oEcd = organization for Economic co-operation and development
Ps = Political stability
rl = rule of law
rQ = regulatory Quality
un = united nation
VA = Voice and Accountability
Wb = World bank
WGi = Worldwide Governance indicators
1. Introduction
This chapter presents a concise evaluation of the performance of the governing 
system of Ethiopia, primarily focusing on the period after 1991. The evalu-
ation measures the deviations evident in the implementation of proposed 
plans (Calidoni-Lundberg, 2006). Generally, there are ten indicators used 
to evaluate the performance of governance and political systems: rule of law, 
government effectiveness, control of corruption, regulatory quality, voice and 
accountability, political stability, corruption perceptions, political rights, civil 
liberties, and women in parliament. Yet, this present study has used only the 
first six, which are considered by many scholars as critical, as the presence or 
absence of each provides a good measure for the performance of the system 
overall (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011).
Governance as a concept and as a practice is not new, even though it has 
been understood and defined differently by different scholars over time. 
The roots of governance can be found in the Greek word “kybernan,” which 
means to steer or to pilot a ship, but the concept was also used during the 
Roman Empire under the Latin word “gubernare,” meaning to direct, rule, 
and guide (Ysa et al., 2014). Nowadays, different definitions have been given 
by different scholars and organizations.
Despite the difficulties in understanding “governance,” it is of great im-
portance for governments and government leaders to keep looking for more 
innovative and genuine mechanisms for making government work better in 
terms of serving the public interest (Katsamunska, 2016). In other word, the 
term may be understood as the traditions, institutions, and processes that 
determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how 
decisions are made and implemented on issues of public concern (www.iog.
ca/about_us.asp).
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On the other hand, Högström, (2011, citing Almond et al. 1996:28-29) 
defines political system as:
a set of institutions concerned with formulating and implementing the 
collective goals of a society or of groups within it. That is, it has institutions, 
agencies, or structures, such as political parties, parliaments, bureaucracies, 
and courts, which carry on specific activities, or perform functions, which 
in turn enable the political system to formulate and enforce its politics.
For Troupin (2016, citing Linz 2000: 51), political systems are “ways of organ-
izing political life and the relationship between citizens and government.”
The idea of unifying modern Ethiopia was first put forward by Tewodros 
around 1850 and materialized at the end of the 1880s by Menelik, in a fashion 
whereby the domination of Orthodox Christianity and the Amharic language 
and culture undermined the multi-ethnic character of the country (Gudina, 
2007). Since then, the struggle for freedom continued, until the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew the Dergue 
regime through armed struggle and took the responsibility of governing 
in 1991. This government has adopted a multiparty parliamentary system, 
devolved power to regional state and local governments, and established 
norms and policies and institutional frameworks aimed at promoting and 
protecting human rights (Lives & Nations, 2015). They further embarked on a 
process of reforming the civil service and the justice sector and improving the 
processes and mechanisms for ensuring effective and efficient public service 
delivery. Yet, EPRDF has failed in consolidating its regime and achieving 
nationwide acceptance, leading to a lack of public trust (Abbink, 2006).
Moreover, de facto Ethiopia lives under a “monolithic party-state system” 
(Lefort, 2013 citing Clapham, 2009), governed by a so-called Revolutionary 
Democracy (Lefort, 2013) without real participation, despite the claimed 
“multi-party system.” Lefort further asserts that “the federal state, despite 
nominally decentralized power to regional and local authorities, is stronger 
than any previous Ethiopian state and has developed structures of central 
control and top-down rule that preclude local initiative and autonomy.” 
This could best be described as “centralized, authoritarian state that had 
monopolized access to resources and decision-making” (Lie & Mesfin, 2018). 
Abbink (2006) has described the system as “centralist authoritarianism” that 
does not guarantee even the “professional autonomy” of the technocracy 
(Lefort, 2013). Thus, it may be said that, as in most developing countries, 
governance in Ethiopia is still a century behind where it ought to be.
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In addition, leaders of the so-called Revolutionary Democracy ignore 
societal forces, which itself has a pernicious: because the government labels 
them as “backward,” “uneducated,” and “unorganized,” they have a tendency 
to “to fall into the nets of rent seekers” and may have “little capacity to fight 
anti-democracy”(Lie & Mesfin, 2018). Therefore, it requires a “vanguard” that 
should maintain a “strong revolutionary democratic leadership” (Lefort, 2013).
In reality, community organizations, for example, can contribute to bridg-
ing the gap between people and government, by highlighting key societal 
problems and thereby improving the effectiveness of policies and development 
strategies (Lives & Nations, 2015).
While periodic evaluation of political performance to determine whether a 
state is doing well or badly is a must (Högström, 2011 citing Eckstein, 1971), 
it is not so common in most developing countries, including Ethiopia. Yet, 
periodic performance evaluation of governance and political system should 
be mandatory at the end of each budget year, as it would allow the government 
to consciously navigate in the desired direction by making corrective actions 
whenever policies deviate from the route of progress before it is too late. 
This is all the more important as former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan 
(1998) has stated that “alleviation of poverty would only be possible through 
enhancing good governance.” However, research on evaluation of governance 
and political systems is scarce.
Therefore, using the Kaufmann et al. (2011) governance indicators to 
assesses the performance of the government and political system of Ethiopia 
post 1991, the chapter answers the following questions:
– What does the governance and political system look like under the current 
regime in Ethiopia?
– Has there been progress or regress on the scores of governance and 
political system over time?
– Are poor scores in terms of the governance and political system related 
to poverty?
This chapter has four sections. The first section gives a brief introduction, state-
ment of the problem, and the research question. The second section presents 
the theoretical framework and reviews the previous literature, highlighting 
key relevant concepts. The third section presents the methodology while 
the fourth section presents result and discussion. Finally, the fifth section 
presents the practical implications and some concluding remarks.
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Governance 
Different scholars define the term governance differently, depending on 
their experience and educational background. For Lee (2003, citing New-
man, 2001) governance can be broadly defined as a wide variety of ways 
to solve common problems, including organizational, social, national, and 
international. Defined in this way, governance generally refers to questions 
about forms of power and authority, patterns of relationships, and rights 
and obligations among the people facing common problems. This definition 
anticipates that all affected shall contribute their fair share in solving common 
issues, as they cannot be solved without a joint effort.
Again, Lee (2003, citing Rhodes, 2000) explains governance in seven 
different ways:
(i) corporate governance and (ii) good governance which emphasize formal 
processes of both private companies and governments for auditing, ensuring 
transparency, and information disclosure; (iii) New Public Management 
which refers to improving efficiencies of government bureaucracies by introduc-
ing private sector management methods; (iv) new political economy which 
emphasizes the changed relationship among the government, civil society and 
the market; (v) international interdependence, (vi) socio-cybernetic system, 
and (vii) network which deny the existence of mono-centric power.
Encyclopedia Britannica defines the political system as the set of formal 
legal institutions that constitute a “government” or a “state” (https://www.
britannica.com/topic/political-system).
In broad terms, FAO defines governance as “the process of governing.” It 
is the way in which society is managed and how the competing priorities and 
interests of different groups are reconciled. It includes the formal institutions 
of government but also informal arrangements. Governance is concerned 
with the processes by which citizens participate in decision-making, how 
government is accountable to its citizens, and how society obliges its members 
to observe its rules and laws (FAO, 2007). In addition, Lee (2003, citing 
Lynn et al. [2001:7] defines governance as “regimes of laws, rules, judicial 
decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable 
the provision of publicly supported good and services. “In general, he refers 
to governance as changes in the role, structure, and operation process of the 
government, or the way social problems are resolved (ibid).
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For Toikka (2011, citing Pierre 2000), “governance” could be described as 
“inclusions of private actors in deciding over policy and by the replacement of 
old, monolithic governments by something more dynamic and flexible.” That 
is, an integrative relationship must be established between all stakeholders of 
governance, including state actors, the private sector, civil society organiza-
tions, NGOs, the media, and others on all matters of governance, particularly 
on power sharing, which shrinks the role of the state (Khan, n.d). That is, in 
governance, all activities should be orchestrated and managed in a manner 
where every stakeholder plays their own role and trusts that the other members 
will play theirs as well, including the leadership (Carino, 2003).
In other words, governance is a process in which there is no one independ-
ent actor able to achieve the whole task (Carino, 2003); rather all actors deliver 
their own slice (Stoker 1998a:18; Toikka, 2011 citing Rhodes 1996:660) 
without discrediting the contribution of others within society (Adshead, & 
Quinn, 1998, citing Rhodes, 1996a:666).
The main reason why the state must rely on other actors and share its 
power is the growing complexity of our current societies and the emergence 
of “wicked problems” (Forberger [2014] citing Rittel and Webber, 1973; Ysa 
et al.), which create high levels of conflict among stakeholders, where there is 
neither an agreement about the problem itself nor its solution (citing Roberts, 
2000). Hence, more complex and sophisticated policies are necessary, in 
which public agencies engage with private sector entities and citizens in the 
decision-making and implementation process. Wicked problems require the 
establishment of collaborative processes between public agencies and other 
public, civil, society, and business organizations (citing Mendoza and Vernis, 
2008:392). Furthermore, Ysa, Albareda, & Forberger (2014, citing Lozano et 
al. 2006:392) note that “the governance of our complex and interdependent 
societies will not be possible unless we turn the sense of responsibility among 
their many social actors into one of co-responsibility.”
In this contemporary world, the classical mode of leadership, wherein 
command presumes compliance, has lost acceptance within a knowledgeable, 
interwoven, and decentralized society (Matheson, 2002). It has been replaced 
by a more flexible and vibrant mode of governance (Toikka, 2011). That is, 
power has lost its importance and no longer elicits compliance; because of 
this, the skill to secure compliance from followers takes on great importance 
(Matheson, 2002).
In addition, governance has different dimensions that must be borne in 
mind, which makes measuring it more difficult. That is, according to Ysa, 
Albareda, & Forberger (2014, citing Levi-Faur, 2011), governance can adopt 
the following forms: governance as a structure referring to the formal and 
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informal set of institutions involved; governance as a process referring to 
the dynamics and leading functions that take place in the process of policy 
making; governance as a mechanism referring to the institutional procedures 
of decision-making, as well as compliance and control; and governance as a 
strategy referring to the manipulation of the institutional and mechanical 
design with the aim of influencing choices and preferences. These different 
forms makes it more challenging to evaluate governance and the political 
system in precise terms. In other words, measuring governance in precise terms 
like distance and weight is difficult for three reasons: first, most of the goods and 
services being delivered by governments are primarily public goods, which are 
not easily divisible or easily measured, like peace and order, national defense, 
public health, roads, etc.; second, it involves the contributions of a number 
of (state and nonstate) actors; and third, the instruments used to measure 
these performance are subjective, as mentioned in the introductory section.
2.2. Political Systems 
On the other hand, Scott and Mcloughlin (2014) defined political systems as the 
formal and informal political processes by which decisions are made concerning 
the use, production, and distribution of resources in any given society. Formal 
political institutions can determine the process for electing leaders; the roles 
and responsibilities of the executive and legislature; the organization of political 
representation (through political parties); and the accountability and oversight 
of the state. Informal and customary political systems, norms, and rules can 
operate within or alongside these formal political institutions. That is, while 
formal political systems are generally publicly announced, for example in 
laws, regulations, and codes, informal systems are embedded in socio-cultural 
institutions, norms, and standards. The development of democratic political 
systems that provide opportunities for all, including the poor, to influence 
decision-making is a critical concern for this century.
Working Definition
The working definition of governance and political adopted by this study is 
the one provided by FAO as “the process of governing,” namely, the way in 
which society is managed and how the competing priorities and interests of 
different groups are reconciled. It includes the formal institutions of govern-
ment but also informal arrangements. Governance is concerned with the 
processes by which citizens participate in decision-making, how government 
is accountable to its citizens, and how society obliges its members to observe 
its rules and laws (FAO, 2007). This definition was taken for its inclusiveness, 
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in the sense that it indicates the responsibilities of all actors, how they share 
responsibilities, how decisions are made, how different interests are reconciled, 
how government is accountable, and how citizens observe rules and laws.
2.3. Measuring Governance
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) specify six composite indicators 
of broad dimensions of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011), 
which are described below. It should also be noted that these six dimensions 
of governance should not be thought of as being somehow independent of 
one another.
Rule of Law (RL): expresses “the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likeli-
hood of crime and violence.”
Government Effectiveness (GE): represents “the quality of public services, 
the quality of civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.”
Control of Corruption (CC): “captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests.”
Regulatory Quality (RQ ): captures “the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development.”
Voice and Accountability (VA): expresses the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and free media.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PS): captures 
“the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence 
and terrorism.”
Rule of law
No free man is to be arrested, or imprisoned, or deceased diseased or outlawed, 
or exiled, or in any other way ruined, nor will we go against him or send against 
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land (The 
1215 Magna Carta:Clause 39).
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Langbein & Knack (2010) define rule of law as implying an open, “not under 
the table” transparent market, where contracts are enforced by a “rule” that 
is publicly known to parties outside the contract and applied equitably no 
matter who the enforcer or the contracting parties are. The variable is intended 
to measure the probability that contracts and laws or rules are enforced 
collectively and accountably, rather than privately. Corrupt activities are 
typically illegal, and their proliferation would indicate weakness in the rule 
of law. Corrupt deals are enforced “under table/in darkness,” where contracts 
are enforced not by public law but by private bandits.
Constitutional democracy is fundamentally based upon the principle of rule 
of law. Thus, Rosenfeld (1994) has described three essential characteristics of 
modern constitutionalism as: limiting the powers of government, adherence 
to the rule of law, and protection of fundamental rights. In the absence of the 
rule of law, contemporary constitutional democracy would be impossible.
According to the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (2016), where the 
rule of law is weak, medicines fail to reach health facilities, criminal violence 
goes unchecked, laws are applied unequally, and foreign investments are held 
back. On the contrary, the creators of the index argue that effective rule of law 
reduces corruption, improves public health, enhances education, alleviates 
poverty, and protects people from injustices and dangers.
Government effectiveness
An effective government is one that has honest and competent bureaucrats 
who are capable of defending the population against any violence and enabling 
the provision and maintenance of infrastructure that makes possible the 
exchange of goods and delivery of services (Levi 2006 cited in Sacks & Levi 
[2010]. The more effective government is, the higher the level of social welfare, 
ceteris paribus.
Government effectiveness measures:
the quality of public services, the quality of civil service and the degree of 
its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
to such policies (Lahouij, 2016).
The key concepts measured here are the (i) quality of civil service, (ii) 
quality and quantity of public infrastructure (like education, health, roads, 
transportation, etc.), (iii) the level of red tape, and (iv) the organizational 
structure of public offices, which is reflected in the ability of the bureaucracy 
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to efficiently (a) manage public expenditures, (b) manage the budget, and 
(c) mobilize revenues.
Triesman (2002) argued that the behavior of public officials could be bad in two 
ways: a) they “might do things they are not supposed to do”, which is measured 
by the corruption index and b) they “may fail to do things they are supposed to 
do,” which is captured by the government effectiveness index (as measured by 
the quantity and quality of infrastructure like education, healthcare, etc.).
On the other hand, democracy and effective governance do not overlap 
conceptually or empirically: “Governability is a challenge for all regimes, not 
just democratic ones” (Magalhães, 2014 citing Schmitter & Karl 2008:85-86). 
Furthermore, Holmberg, Rothstein, & Nasiritousi(2009) have concluded that 
“empirically, there is no clear-cut correlation between establishing electoral 
representative democracy and quality of government in the exercise of public 
power.”
On the other hand, Langbein & Knack (2010) argue that effective govern-
ments make transfers but they are not hidden (keeping with the principle of 
Voice &Accountability). Also, effective governments use public resources, often 
for public gain, so that the spending is not a deadweight loss. Effective govern-
ments charge for services that citizens want, implying again no or minimal 
deadweight loss. In general, for the whole-of-government, evidence-based 
decision-making can lead to greater effectiveness and efficiencies in achieving 
strategic outcomes (OECD, 2013). Evidence-based policy analysis clearly 
positively informs important policy decisions being taken by the government.
The GE index is intended to measure the ability of governments to deliver 
these public services, the quality of the civil service (the “agents” of delivery), 
and the independence of the bureaucracy from political influence, including 
the credibility of bureaucratic commitment to its policies (“unbribe-ability,” 
implying Control of Corruption) (Langbein & Knack, 2010). There is thus a 
causal or definitional overlap among the three concepts of GE, RQ and CC.
Control of Corruption
According to Langbein & Knack (2010), controlling corruption implies a 
reduction in the use of public resources for private gain. Corruption is a 
costly, hidden (absence of Voice and Accountability), and usually illegal 
(absence of Rule of Law) transfer of revenues. Government officials often 
collect bribes as an ex-officio tax, fee, or “gift” in exchange for a license or 
service (for example, utility connection) or for exemptions to rules or taxes 
(implicating Regulatory Quality and Government Effectiveness).
Corruption erodes good governance and the rule of law; it adversely affects 
service quality and efficiency, poses threats to the principles of democracy 
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and justice, and undermines the economy (Graycar & Sidebottom, 2012). 
Corruption does not only increase the price of public and private sector goods 
and services, it also has serious consequences for efficiency (Bertrand et al., 
2006; Olken, 2009 citing Krueger [1974]; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).That 
is, it has also a significant financial crime element, estimated by the World 
Economic Forum (2009) to cost about $2.6 trillion per year, about 5 percent 
of global GDP, with about $1 trillion is paid annually in bribes. In developing 
countries, corruption, bribery, theft, and tax evasion cost some US $1.26 trillion 
per year; this amount of money could be used to lift those who are living on 
less than $1.25 a day to above $1.25 for at least six years (UN Goal 16, facts 
and figures; https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/).
Dion (2010, cited in Waldman, 1974) defined corruption as including the 
following components:
a public official, who misuses his authority, position, or power, and as a 
result, violates some existing, legal norm in his or her particular country. 
The corrupt act is usually done in secret and is for personal gain in wealth 
or status or in preferment of family, friends, ethnic or religious groups.
Furthermore, Dion (2010, citing Okogbule, 2004:74)found that “poverty, 
unemployment, greed, institutional weakness, inefficient and ineffective 
law enforcement, disrespect for the rule of law, lack of moral standards and 
codes are correlated to corruption.” These are primarily indicators of cor-
ruption rather than their source. The real causes of corruption are rooted 
in sociocultural practices as well as in political and economic systems. In 
addition, the most important cause of corruption is the lack of political will 
to deal with the problem (Ibid: 84). Dion further describes corruption as 
being a basic threat to the stability of societies and to the maintenance of the 
rule of law. Furthermore, said he asserts that corruption actually impedes 
economic development in the long run.
Regulatory Quality
Regulation is a major way in which governments imposes its influence on 
society. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary; regulation is any 
statement promulgated by an executive authority or regulatory agency of a 
government possessing the power of compliance as a rule or order.
The Committee for Economic Development (CED) (2017, citing Dudley-
and Brito 2012) defined regulations as administrative laws or rules by which 
the government implements laws and agency objectives which dictate what 
individuals, businesses, and other organizations can or cannot do from dawn 
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to dusk. Evidently, regulations do not work well when the majority of society 
is ignorant about their existence. Market economies need clear “rules of the 
game” to function efficiently, for example.
According to Beales et al. (2017), the federal government has two main 
vehicles for diverting private resources to achieve policy goals. The first is 
through spending programs. Customs agencies collect compulsory taxes and 
the revenue is spent on desired public functions such as parks, roads and other 
infrastructure, schools, law enforcement, homeland security, and scientific 
research, as well as on welfare and social insurance programs such as Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, and unemployment assistance. 
The second is through regulation. Federal agencies issue and enforce standards 
ranging from environmental quality to consumer protection, business and 
banking practices, nondiscrimination in employment, internet privacy, labels 
and “disclosure,” safe food, drugs, products, and workplaces.
When governments establish numerous barriers to conducting business, it 
creates opportunities for public officials to collect bribes before delivering a 
service. By definition, corrupt governments set up entry barriers so that public 
officials can act as gatekeepers and collect (hidden) bribes before opening the 
gate to the briber-client (Langbein & Knack, 2010). The RQ index is intended 
to measure the extent to which the formal (and informal) regulations that 
govern the relations between the public and the private sector foster growth 
rather than costly transfers (from the private client to the public regulator, or 
the other way). Thus, RQ implicates (by definition or cause) CC, RL, and VA.
While better regulation can enhance economic growth when it creates a 
convenient working environment, poorly designed regulation can decrease 
economic performance by restraining productivity and increasing wast-
age (Beales et al., 2017). Moreover, good regulatory policies help the poor 
generally via redistributive tools like creating employment opportunities 
or entrepreneurship, reducing opportunities for corruption, increasing the 
quality of public services, and improving the functioning of the housing, 
service, and labor markets on which they rely.
How Do We Construct and Maintain Better Regulations? 
Do we have the capacity to design a better regulatory policy which would 
embrace a wide array of diversified interests in Ethiopia? As stated by CED 
(2017), researchers have designed the following guidelines for countries to 
design and execute rational regulations policies and avoid cronyism:
(i) Better information, that is, the data and economic analysis, the “tools” 
in the regulatory toolbox, that are used in the planning and evaluation 
of regulations;
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(ii) Better oversight and monitoring of the regulatory policy process and 
the institutions and people involved—the regulators, or “the carpenters” 
who build and maintain the regulations; and
(iii) Better collaboration between input from regulators and all stakeholders 
(including businesses and the general public).
Voice and Accountability
According to Sharma (2008) voice and accountability involves a process of 
bargaining between those who hold power and those who seek to influence it. 
Thus, voice and accountability (V&A) is an important dimensions of govern-
ance: it is widely acknowledged that citizens as well as state institutions have 
a role to play in delivering governance that works for the poor and enhances 
democracy through interaction between formal and informal institutions. 
However, citizens need an effective “voice” in order to convey their views; 
and governments or states that can be held accountable for their actions are 
more likely to respond to the needs and demands thus articulated by their 
population.
Citizens’ voice and government accountability (“CV&A”) are important 
dimensions of governance. Citizens’ capacity to express and exercise their 
views effectively has the potential to influence government priorities and 
processes, including a stronger demand for responsiveness, transparency, 
and accountability (O’Neill, Foresti, & Hudson, 2007).
According to O’Neill, Foresti, and Hudson (2007), accountability exists 
when those who set and implement the rules (politicians and public officials) 
are answerable to those whose lives are shaped by those rules and can be 
sanctioned if their performance is unsatisfactory. Voice and accountability 
are therefore important indicators of the nature of the relationship between 
a state and its citizens.
Corruption is usually hidden, which is part of its usual definition. Hidden 
transactions imply weaknesses in transparency and accountability. The Voice 
& Accountability index is intended to measure the ability of citizens to hold 
politicians accountable, including freedom of press, association, and media 
(Langbein & Knack, 2010). Thus, conceptually, VA and CC are either causally 
related or are related by definition.
Thus, voice and accountability measures “the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and free media” (Brewer, Choi, & 
Walker, 2007).
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Voice
Voice refers to a variety of mechanisms – formal and informal – through which 
people express their preferences, opinions, and views. It can include complaint, 
organized protest, lobbying, and participation in decision making, product 
delivery, or policy implementation (Sharma, 2008 citing Goetz & Gaventa 2001).
Accountability
Accountability is for the process of holding individual actors or organizations 
to account for their actions. Accountability requires transparency, answer-
ability, and enforceability between decision makers and citizens (Menocal 
& Sharma, 2008, cited in Combaz & Mcloughlin, 2014).
Responsiveness to Citizens = f (Voice + Accountability)
The degree and quality of responsiveness to citizens achieved will depend 
upon context (f). In terms of responsiveness to the voice of poor people, this 
could include factors such as: the political and organizational culture (whether 
the interests of poor and marginalized groups are acknowledged as legitimate 
and just); the salience of the pro-poor mandate and the relative prominence 
of poverty concerns on the agenda of decision makers; the weight of the 
poor relative to other interest groups and the state’s incentives to address 
their concerns; and the ability of decision-making agencies to comprehend 
the concerns of poor and marginalized men and women and to plan and 
implement policy in response to them (Gloppen, Rakner, & Tostensen, 2003).
How Are Voice and Accountability Inter-related?
Voice and accountability come together at the point where those exercising 
voice seek accountability. It is also important to note that voice can strengthen 
accountability, including by pushing for greater transparency, while account-
ability can encourage voice by demonstrating that exercising voice can make 
a difference. In this respect, there is a two-way relationship between voice 
and accountability (O’Neill, Foresti, & Hudson, 2007).
Political Stability 
Political stability is the regularity of the flow of political exchanges (Ake, 
1975). That is, the more regular the flow of political exchanges, the more 
stability. Alternatively, we might say that there is political stability to the 
extent that members of society restrict themselves to behavioral patterns 
that fall within the limits imposed by political role expectations. Any act that 
deviates from these limits is an instance of political instability. To determine 
the extent of political stability within a polity, we must be able systematically 
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identify both regularities and irregularities in the flow of political exchanges. 
Political behavior is regular if it does not violate the system (or pattern) of 
political exchanges; it is irregular if it violates that pattern.
Radu (2015, citing Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, & Swagel, 1996) define political 
stability as the measure of the perceptions regarding the probability that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism. Therefore an unstable politi-
cal environment will reduce investment and the speed of economic development 
and will increase the probability of a government’s collapse and political unrest.
For Javed and Mamoon (2017) and Michael (1971), political stability 
is a pre-condition for nation building, such as political development and 
national integration. In most of developing countries a new government comes 
into the power overnight; either through a coup or army takeover. The new 
government introduces a new system of rules for the operation of business 
by totally dismantling the previous, which results in significant sunk costs 
holding back the development of the country. This in turn creates frustration 
and anger among the people, leading to state illegitimacy. For Langbein & 
Knack (2010), economic growth is the friend of regime longevity. Therefore, 
political stability is important not only for economic development, social 
integration, and supremacy of law but also for nation building.
On the other hand, Margolis (2010) criticizes scholars for defining political 
stability focusing on the state, because the state is only one example of a 
political object. International institutions, religious organizations, mass 
movements, businesses, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups, for 
example, all struggle with the stability of power relationships. Political stability 
is more than state stability.
Margolis proposes a new understanding of political stability:
Political stability is the degree to which the formal and informal coincide. 
When the formal roles and structures set by authority match those constructed 
by informal social interaction, an object is stable. When either set of roles or 
structures change so they conflict, an object is unstable to some degree. That is, 
the closer the correspondence between formal and informal within a political 
object, the greater its regularity and fewer its disruptions. Perfect stability is 
total correlation; perfect instability, the total absence of correlation (2010).
Redefined operationally, Margolis’s postulate may be rendered thus:
Political stability is the health of authority, resilience, legitimacy, and 
replacement in a political object (ibid).When an authority enforces its rule 
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and adapts to change, and a body confers legitimacy upon it and retains 
the ability to replace it, an object will be stable. That is, it will have a lower 
potential for disruption.
On the other hand, government instability, inefficiency of political parties, and 
a weak political culture create a condition for a politically unstable state, which 
is a serious problem, especially for developing and underdeveloped countries 
(Memon et al., 2011). Political instability can be defined at least three ways. The 
first approach is to see it as the propensity for regime or government change; 
the second is to focus on the incidence of political disorder or violence in a 
society, such as killings; and the third is to focus on economic growth affected 
by instability. This problem is more serious for a multiethnic, underdeveloped 
society. In a politically stable state all sections of society get their due shares 
and are satisfied being a part of a multiethnic society in which they exert 
their energies for the development of nation, which ultimately leads toward 
nation-building. In cases of instability the situation is reversed, people feel 
unsatisfied and powerless, lose their trust in institutions, preferring their own 
interests to those of the state, ultimately leading to the splintering of society.
When government transitions are decided by well-defined and long-lived 
rules, rather than by violent overthrow or perennial coups, government 
officials are more likely to have a longer time horizon and to seek investment 
for growth (and political survival) rather than corrupt transfers (Laura & 
Stephen, 2010). The PS index is intended to measure the expected orderliness 
of political transitions according to established rules. Thus, PS is related to 
CC, RL, and GE, either causally or by definition.
3. Methodology 
This research used mainly secondary data from different databases, includ-
ing the World Bank, Transparency International, World Justice Project, 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) projects, and the Central 
Statistical Authority. The databases of these institutions were prepared 
from the aggregate indicators to combine the views of a large number of 
enterprise, citizen, and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing 
countries. They are based on over thirty individual data sources produced by 
a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, 
international organizations, and private sector firms. In addition, articles, 
journals, and reports from different multinational and local NGOs were 
used as a source of data.
PErFormAncE EVAluAtion oF GoVErnAncE And PoliticAl sYstEm oF EthioPiA 459
The six dimensions of governance are measured both by a governance 
score that gives a country a score on the aggregate indicator that ranges 
approximately from -2.5 to 2.5 (where2.5 is the weakest and 2.5 the strongest 
form of governance) and a percentile rank, which indicates the country’s rank 
among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding 
to the lowest rank and 100 to the highest rank. On the other hand, the World 
Justice Project (WJP) uses a scale which ranges between 0 and 1 to measure 
the same (with 0 being weakest and 1 being strongest form of governance).
Accordingly, the data acquired from these sources were organized in bar 
graphs for easy revelation of trend/patterns, after which descriptive and 
content analyses coupled with inferential statistics were employed.
4. Result and Discussion
This section presents data from secondary sources followed by an analysis 
of each respective indicator used in the evaluation of the governance and 
political system of Ethiopia post 1991. Based on the information available 
in various publications, the various dimensions of governance and political 
system of Ethiopia are presented subsequently. Yet, for some variables there 
were no data during the period 1991-1995, and 2017-2019. On the other hand, 
there are data outside the rage of this study which was left for comparison.
4.1. Rule of Law
Figure 1 depicts the trend of rule of law as measured by the World Bank on 
a scale ranging between -2.5 (weakest) and 2.5 (strongest.)
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The data on the Rule of Law given in figure 1 above covers the period 1996 to 
2017. The average value for Ethiopia during this period was -0.73, revealing 
that the fundamental principle of rule of law has been consistently violated 
across this period. Ethiopia scored a minimum of -0.97 points in 1996 and 
a maximum of -0.45 points in 2017 and ranked 124th. In addition, the data 
from WJP Rule of Law Index (2016-2019), whose scale ranges from 0 to 1, 
shows 0.38 for the years from 2016-2018 and 0.39 for the year 2019, where 
1 signifies the highest possible score (strong adherence to rule of law) and 0 
signifies the lowest possible score (weak adherence to rule of law) confirming 
the data from the World Bank. Yet the trend shows some improvement on 
rule of law.
Thus, it could be concluded that: either the state subjects the citizenry to 
law not publicly promulgated (loosely defined, like the “anti-terrorist” law); 
or that the state’s legislative function is not separated from the adjudicative 
function, and that there might be some group which is above the law; or there 
is no law or the existing laws are not obeyed by all; or law may not exist in 
publication and retrospectively executed; or, the existing laws were vague 
leading to unfair enforcement; or the existing law may contradict as well as 
command the impossible; or the law constantly changes and is not consistent 
with the stated rules.
Generally, figure 1 and the data from WJP Rule of Law Index (2016-2019) 
above show that there is weak adherence to rule of law over these extended 
time periods, which implies that governance functions were not being properly 
delivered.
4.2. Government Effectiveness
The following figure 2 reveals the trend of effectiveness of Ethiopian govern-
ment on the scale ranging between -2.5 being weakest and 2.5 being strongest, 















































Source: The World Bank
PErFormAncE EVAluAtion oF GoVErnAncE And PoliticAl sYstEm oF EthioPiA 461
The data presented in figure 2 above show the measure of the effectiveness level 
of the government for the period 1996 to 2017.The average value for Ethiopia 
during this period was -0.68 points, with a minimum of -1.21 points in 1996 
and a maximum of -0.4 points in 2008. This negative score across these years 
shows that the government of Ethiopia was ineffective. In a nut shell, the graph 
clearly shows that the effectiveness of government improved for some time 
and then declined, which could be described as a move from worst [-1.21] 
in 1996 to bad [-0.4] in 2008, a period of stagnation from 2009-2014, and a 
slight improvement during the last three subsequent years.
That is, it can be concluded that there was poor quality and quantity of 
service delivery, including quality of civil service, quality and quantity of 
public infrastructure, excessive red tape, and the organizational structure 
of public offices, which is reflected in the inability of the bureaucracy to 
effectively manage public expenditures, manage the budget, and mobilize 
revenues.
On the other hand, the study also makes clear that conducting periodic 
election does not necessarily guarantee an effective use of public power. Dur-
ing this study period, four elections took place, while the average government 
effectiveness remained at -0.68, which is way below mid-point. In this era of 
information and knowledge, where citizens are in a better position of rating 
the efficiency and effectiveness of their government, it is more difficult to 
hide their corresponding inefficiency and ineffectiveness.
4.3. Control of Corruption
Figure 3 presented below shows the pattern of control of corruption in 
Ethiopia on a scale ranging between ranging between -2.5 (weakest) and 
2.5 (strongest), during 1996-2017.














































Source: The World Bank
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During the period 1996 to 2017, the average value for Ethiopia during this 
period was -0.61 points, with a minimum of -0.93 points in 1996 and a maxi-
mum of -0.42 points in 2016, leading to Ethiopia being rated being 127th in 
the world (https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_corruption/). 
The money embezzled each year ($1.26 trillion) would enable all those earning 
under $1.25 a day to live a better life for six years (UN Goal 16, facts and 
figures https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/). If 
corruption were avoided totally say for five years (one Ethiopian electoral 
period), we can guarantee that there would not be anyone earning below $1.25 
for a period of thirty years. In other words, if the country had the political 
will and commitment to stop corruption instead of merely establishing an 
“anti-corruption commission,” Ethiopia would be able to use the resulting 
income to seriously invest long-term in alleviating extreme poverty.
In addition, socio-cultural beliefs regarding corruption should be format-
ted and rewritten in a manner that makes it clear that bribery is bad and 
categorized as socially unethical and unacceptable. Unless society ostracizes 
corrupted persons (and cooperating families), it will remain deep-rooted 
and may become unstoppable. Therefore, educating the whole of society is 
important as well. Otherwise, Ethiopia will keep committing a significant 
proportion of her scarce resources to embezzlement and increasing the burden 
upon the poor, keeping them poorer and poorer.
4.4. Regulatory Quality
Figure 4 reveals data on the trend of Regulatory Quality in Ethiopia as 
presented by the World Bank database. It was measured on a scale ranging 
between -2.5 (weakest) and 2.5 (strongest).














































Source: The World Bank
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The average value of regulatory quality during the period 1996 to 2017 for 
Ethiopia was -1.05, which shows that whatever regulations the country has 
promulgated during the aforementioned period was extremely poor. During 
this period, Ethiopia scored a minimum of -1.3 points in 1996 and a maximum 
of -0.86 points in 2008 and ranked 167th. When we look for a pattern in 
figure 4 above, Ethiopia’s score remained almost constant, with very little 
deviation from the average, revealing that there were no improvements in the 
laws and rules promulgated to serve public interest by regulatory agencies.
This consistent poor score may be the result of the following factors: 
regulatory policies were not based on adequate information/data; there 
were no oversight and monitoring of the regulatory policy process and the 
institutions and people involved (the regulators); or there was no collaboration 
where input from stakeholders could have been collected and handed over 
to policy designers; or the sum of all these.
4.5. Voice and Accountability
Figure 5 below shows data on voice and accountability measures in Ethiopia as 
per the World Bank on a scale rated between -2.5 (weakest) and 2.5 (strongest).














































Source: The World Bank
The data presented in figure 5 covers the period from 1996 to 2017. The 
average value for Ethiopia during this period was -1.24 points, suggesting 
either that the people’s voices were not heard or that the authorities were not 
answerable to their citizens. During this period, Ethiopia scored a minimum 
of -1.44 points in 2017 and a maximum of -0.99 points in 1998. When we take 
a closer look at figure 5, it shows a steady decline from bad ([-0.99]) in 1998 
to ([-1.44]) worst in 2017. This means either that the government has either 
passed regressive laws to silence critics and to shutter opposition political 
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parties and human rights organizations (Novogrodsky, et al., 2018), or the 
government has ignored criticism and dismissed it as political propaganda.
Thus, we can conclude that Ethiopians were not privileged to speak their 
mind against their government and had no power to hold all government 
officials accountable for all their deeds. That is, the loudness of the voice 
of the people turned to a whisper across this time, and they were unable to 
hold the government accountable for its deeds (whether good or bad). The 
space provided to the citizenry to express its preferences was consistently 
reduced throughout the specified period and their constitutionally granted 
right to call government officials accountable (as per article 12 [2] of the 
constitution) was also denied.
4.6. Political Stability 
Figure 6 depicts data measuring political stability in Ethiopia from 1996-2017 
on a scale rated between -2.5 (weakest) and 2.5 (strongest) as per the World 
Bank.














































Source: The World Bank
The figure shows that the political stability of the country was consistently 
declining from 1998-2007, showed a little improvement until 2014, and 
then consistently declined till 2017. Furthermore, the graph reveals that the 
country scored a minimum of -1.8 in 2007 and a maximum of -0.63 score in 
1998, and secured 180th rank from among 195 countries.
The average value for Ethiopia during this period was -1.44 points, revealing 
that either there was almost no political exchange or that the members of the 
society did not restrict their behavior patterns within the limits imposed by the 
political role expectations. In other words, there exists a mismatch between 
the formal roles and structures set by the authority and those constructed 
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by the informal social interactions, causing almost perfect instability, as this 
result is nearer to -2.5 (weakest on the scale).
On the other hand, this negative result (-1.44) could be explained as 
instability of government, lower legitimacy of the state, and weak political 
culture, in which there is no flow of political exchange. Furthermore, this 
score reveals that there is high probability that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
domestic violence, resulting in a low investment rate which leads to low level 
of economic development leading to hunger and starvation.
Thus, it could be concluded that the history of the last century in Ethiopia 
demonstrates that there was no one time where there was a constitutional 
replacement of government, reaffirming that Ethiopia as a state has been 
unstable since its unification.
At the end of the day, this instability is anti-nation building and anti-
development, reflecting a situation in which people feel unsatisfied and power-
less; lose their trust in institutions and privilege their own interests over 
those of the state, which ultimately leads to societal disintegration, which is 
our current reality. Furthermore, the consequence of political instability is 
worse where the society is multiethnic like Ethiopia.
5. Conclusions 
This chapter has dealt with the evaluation of the effectiveness of the govern-
ance and political system of Ethiopia primarily from 1996-2019. The indicators 
used for this evaluation included: Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, 
Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, Voice and Accountability, and 
Political Stability. The results revealed that the effectiveness of the governance 
and political system of Ethiopia were far below the median on the scale 
throughout the specified period.
In addition, the failure in regulatory policy negatively affects not just 
those who design policy but actors across the entire country. That is, if we 
have failed to create a conducive environment for actors including the private 
sector, NGOs, CBOs, government agencies, authorities, and citizens at large, 
we cannot expect “angels” to perform the actors’ work for them; nor could we 
expect all actors perform their best without a regulatory framework. Proper 
regulatory policy is a minimal government responsibility.
Our results show that the Ethiopian governance and political system has 
not delivered on its obligations. That is, either all stakeholders in the process of 
governance were not conscious of their corresponding role and thereby failed 
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to deliver their own fair share; or the state actors were not rendering what is 
expected from them as the dominant actor under “revolutionary democracy;” 
or the state actors were impeding other actors or failing to create a conducive 
environment by deliberately designing constrictive rules and regulations.
Thus, we can say that there is maladministration/misgovernance; that 
is, the ancient old monolithic government demanding compliance from its 
subjects is still alive in Ethiopia. That is why we say that “we had a govern-
ment,” without “governance.” The 21st century mode of governance only 
seeks commitment from its followers, not compliance to authority. Thus, 
this situation can be summarized as follows in general terms:




Stakeholders/State & Non-State Actors [Government, Political
Parties CBOs, NGOs, Private Sector, and Citizens in general]
Poor Performance score [Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness,




The above diagram reveals the interdependence between governing (state and 
non-state) actors and poverty. That is, the higher the deviations from good 
governance, the higher the probability that there would be poor performance 
in the overall measure of governance. Poor performance in governance 
functions as measured by the six indicators and leads to maladministration, 
which in turn leads to instability. Instability by its very nature is a situation 
where it is difficult if not impossible to do a regular job. If your do not do 
your regular job, it is high likely that you are on the way to poverty. Poverty, 
in turn, leads to hunger, which forces population displacement in search of 
food and stability.
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Hence, there is a need for major intervention in light of the six indicators 
mentioned above for the government to shift the score from negative to posi-
tive, wherein people would be in a better position relative to the government. 
That is, there should be a transformation from the old monolithic government 
to a governance mode of leadership wherein all stakeholders, civil societies, 
political parties, NGOs, the private sector, and citizens, own governance 
and where everyone wins.
Therefore, the following conclusions were drawn for each indicator used:
1. There exists weak adherence to rule of law despite an insignificant level of 
improvement over time. All law enforcement institutions should imple-
ment law impersonally without any discrimination, regardless of the 
background of the individual, for everyone is equal before law.
2. The effectiveness of government has shown “forth and back” motion 
without ever reaching a satisfactory level. Thus, we can say that there is 
a very poor quality and quantity of service delivery, including quality of 
civil service, quality and quantity of public infrastructure, and excessive 
red tape. In addition, the organizational structure of public offices is 
poor, which is reflected in the inability of the bureaucracy to effectively 
manage public expenditures, manage the budget, and mobilize revenues.
3. Even though there were some fluctuations, we can say that there was 
significant level of corruption throughout the study period. Thus, public 
resources should only be used for public purposes, to ensure that cor-
ruption is controlled.
4. Regulatory quality remained almost constant, with very little deviation 
from the average, revealing that there were no improvements in the laws 
and rules promulgated by regulatory agencies to serve public interests.
5. Throughout the study period, the people’s voices were not heard and 
the authorities were not answerable to the citizens, with this indicator 
demonstrating a steady decline. The government should be aware that 
suppression of the voice of the people will not last long in this era of 
information and knowledge, and should adjust its policy accordingly in 
order to survive.
6. Political stability went from bad to worse during the study period, despite 
little deviation.
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6.  Implications
– If Ethiopia is to continue as a nation, the rule of law must prevail. Other-
wise, contemporary constitutional democracy will be impossible, leading 
to lawlessness and ultimately statelessness.
– Prolonged government ineffectiveness will reduce the productivity of 
the population, leading to poverty and then hunger. Widespread hunger 
may ignite civil unrest, leading to a violent replacement of government 
in a manner consistent with Ethiopian political tradition.
– Reduction of corruption could mean generating extra money to be 
invested on those who are forced to earn below $1.25/day. Therefore, 
reduction of corruption may also mean uplifting the living standards of 
society as a whole.
– Regulation is an instrument that prescribes “the do and don’ts” of every 
actor in society, including state and nonstate actors. Therefore, it not 
only affects the people but the land, the water body, the air we breathe, 
and the relations we ought to have with others. Thus, it either allows or 
restrains any activity, be it governance or development.
– Continued suppression of the voice of the people coupled with the failure 
of government accountability will definitely lead to protests and violence.
– Political stability is the cornerstone upon which all other pillars of the 
nation, like peace and order, economic development, integration, etc. 
could be built. Therefore, political stability is not an option – it is a matter 
of Ethiopia’s survival.
– Thus, for Ethiopia to continue as a country, all nations, nationalities and 
peoples (all sections) of society should receive proportional benefits and 
burdens; only then will we build a consolidated nation where all stakehold-
ers are empowered and exert their energies only for development.
7. Recommendation 
1. “Rules” should be publicly known to every member of society and 
equitably applied, no matter who the enforcer is, thereby ensuring rule 
of law.
2. Public officials should clearly know and “do things they are supposed to 
do” in order to enhance government effectiveness. That is, transforming 
the quality of civil service, quality and quantity of public infrastructure, 
and omission of red tape shall be enforced immediately. In addition, build-
ing the organizational structure of public offices, which is reflected in the 
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ability of the bureaucracy to be effective in managing public expenditures, 
manage the budget, and mobilize revenues is also important.
3. The government shall commit itself to the reduction of corruption, not 
merely establishing an “anti-corruption commission.” Then, the country 
will have room in its budget to change the lives of the needy without 
allocating additional funds.
4. Any rule or regulation should consider the interest of all actors and 
how it either allows or restrain their acts; it should also be thoroughly 
negotiated before it is promulgated. In addition, regulations should be 
designed in a manner that creates a conducive environment for all (state 
and nonstate) actors, which ensures regulatory quality.
5. The ability of citizens to hold politicians accountable, including freedom 
of press, association, and media, should be granted in order to ensure 
voice and accountability. In addition, our government should recognize 
media as the fourth branch of government, as it is in the Western world.
6. There should be regular flow of political exchanges. The more regular the 
flow of political exchanges among all stakeholders, including state and 
nonstate actors, the more opportunity for bargaining for give-and-take 
(understanding), the greater the stability of the government.
8. Further Investigative Direction 
To unfold the current situation, one could further study “why as instability 
in Ethiopia continued despite the occurring changes?”
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Key Factors Contributing to Time 
and Cost Overrun in Mega Sugar 
Construction Projects in Ethiopia
Temesgen Genie Chekol and Denamo Addissie Nuramo
Box 1: Key contributions of this chapter
 the performance of sugar industry construction projects in Ethiopia is poor.
 there are many factors contributing to time and cost overrun of mega sugar 
construction projects in Ethiopia: improper planning and scheduling, unrealistic 
contract duration, improper and poor project feasibility study; capacity limitation, 
etc.
Box 2: Reading this chapter will give you insights in
	the status of sugar projects in terms of time and cost performance
 Factors contributing to delay and cost overrun in mega sugar construction 
projects in Ethiopia
Box 3: Abbreviations
AdsWE = Amhara design and supervision Works Enterprise
AWWcE = Amhara Water Works construction Enterprise
com PlAnt = china national complete Plant import and export co. ltd.
Esc = Ethiopian sugar corporation
EcdsWc = Ethiopian construction design and supervision Works corporation
GdP = Growth domestic Product
GiEcd = Guangxi Gonglian industrial Engineering consulting & design ltd
GtP = Growth and transformation Plan
ha = hectare
mEtEc = metal and Engineering technology corporation
moudc = ministry of urban development and construction
nPc = national Planning and commission
PmboK = Project management body of Knowledge
tcd = ton cane per day
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usA = united state of America
usdA = united state development Association
1. Introduction 
The construction industry is a vital element of the economy and has a sig-
nificant effect on the efficiency and productivity of various industry sectors 
(Jemal, 2015). In Ethiopia, the sector has registered remarkable growth over 
the past eleven years. There has been increased investment in the development 
and expansion of various infrastructure projects (MoUDC, 2012). During the 
first Growth and Transportation Plan (2010/11-2014/15), the construction 
industry on average grew at 28.7 percent per annum, raising its share of GDP 
to from 4 percent in 2009/10 to 8.5 percent by 2014/15 (NPC, 2016). There 
was significant investment in housing, transportation, dam construction, 
accompanied by industry development, such as the construction of Industry 
Park, sugar factory construction, etc., in different parts of the country.
Sugar factory development in Ethiopia began in 1954. But the number of 
factories in the country was limited to three, namely Wonji/Shoa, Metahara, 
and Fincha Sugar factories. These three factories had a total production 
capacity of 316,000 tons of sugar annually. Recently the Ethiopian Sugar 
Corporation (ESC) made heavy investments into the country’s sugar sec-
tor, among which are the construction of new sugar processing factories; 
the revitalization of older factories; and the expansion of land under sugar 
cultivation. Therefore, ESC entered into the construction of different mega 
projects in different parts of the country at the beginning of the first Growth 
and Transportation Plan (GTP-I). The projects include Tana Beles (three 
factories) in the Amhara Regional State; Welkayt, in the Tigray Regional State, 
Kessem and Tendaho in the Afar Regional State, and the Kuraz project for 
six factories in the South Omro Zone of the Southern Nations Nationalities 
and Peoples’ Regional State. Through these investments, the government of 
Ethiopia envisions the country becoming one of the world’s ten largest sugar 
producers by 2023 (USDA, 2015). Figure 1 below briefly summarizes the 
history of the Ethiopian sugar industry’s development. 
1.1. Purpose of the Study
According to a report by (MoUDC, 2012), the performance of the Ethiopian 
construction industry is low. Construction projects in Ethiopia have not been 
completed within the time schedule and allocated budget in the majority of the 
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cases. Mega projects especially suffer greatly from such problems. As a result, 
the country has lost much revenue, job opportunities, and other economic 
and social benefits. The ten new mega sugar factory construction projects in 
Ethiopia are among those highly exposed to such problems as time delay and 
cost overrun. All ten mega projects were scheduled to be completed within 
GTP-I and begin operation at the end of the period (2014/2015). As of the 
time of this research study (2017), these projects were yet not completed. As 
a result, the country is facing a shortage of sugar and remains dependent on 
importing from abroad rather than implementing its plan to become a sugar 
exporter. It is thus important to identify the key factors that have led to the 
underperformance of these projects in order to come up with a nationwide 
mechanism to minimize time and cost overruns related to such mega projects 
and to the construction industry in general.
Figure 1: Background history of Ethiopian sugar factory construction and ESC 
The first Ethiopian sugar corporation come in
to existence In 1974.
Ethiopian Sugar Industry Support Centre
came into existence in 1998.
In 2010 The new Ethiopian Sugar
Corporation is established
 There were only three oldest
 factories in the country starting
 from 1954 till recent years which
 were Wonji/Showa, Metahara
 and Fincha Sugar factories
 Recently but before 2010
 Tendaho and Dediessa sugar
 factories come in existence and
 now (2017) they are in partial
 production.
 In the firt growth and
 transformation plan (GTP-I) ESC
 plan to construct ten new mega
 sugar projects which are Beles(I,
 II and III), Wolkayt, Kessem and
 Kuraz (I-IV)
Later in 1992, the corporation was dissolved
and all the factories were re-established as
public enterprises. 
Source: USDA, 2015; ESC, January 2017
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1.2. Research Questions
The following questions will be answered in this research:
– How have the sugar projects in Ethiopia performed in terms of time and 
cost, in respect to the original plan?
– What are the factors affecting the time and cost performance of sugar 
projects in Ethiopia?
2. Theory and Literature
2.1. Construction Project Management
It is obvious that project management is not new. Noah managed one of the 
earliest recorded projects in the Bible in building the ark. He may not have 
completed it within budget, but he certainly had to finish it by a specified 
time before the flood and it must have met his performance criteria, as it 
successfully accommodated pairs of all existing animals (Lester, 2006). But 
project management seems to have achieved the status of a science during 
World War II, attaining great importance due to various nuclear aerospace 
and other US defense programs in the 1950s and 1960s. In simple terms, a 
“project” is a collection of activities that are interrelated with a specific overall 
purpose (Mishra & Soota, 2005). Management here refers to the planning, 
monitoring, and control of all aspects of a project and the motivation of all 
those involved in it to achieve the project objectives within agreed criteria 
of time, cost, and performance (Lester, 2006). A project is also defined as a 
temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product, service, or result 
(PMBOK, 2013). The temporary nature of projects indicates that a project has 
a definite beginning and end. The end is reached when the project’s objectives 
have been achieved or when the project is terminated because its objectives 
will not or cannot be met, or when the need for the project no longer exists. 
A project may also be terminated if the client (customer, or sponsor) wishes 
to terminate the project.
According to (PMBOK, 2013) project management typically includes, 
but is not limited to:
– Identifying requirements;
– Addressing the various needs, concerns, and expectations of the stakehold-
ers in planning and executing the project;
– Setting up, maintaining, and carrying out communications among 
stakeholders that are active, effective, and collaborative in nature;
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– Managing stakeholders towards meeting project requirements and 
creating project deliverables;
– Balancing the competing project constraints, which include, but are not 
limited to: scope, quality, schedule, budget, resources, and risks.
2.2. Project Success
Since projects are temporary in nature, the success of the project should 
be measured in terms of completing the project within the constraints of 
scope, time, cost, quality, resources, and risk as approved between the project 
managers and senior management (PMBOK, 2013). Many good projects as 
well as project management structures have failed because of the inability 
of the system to facilitate them (Mishra & Soota, 2005). The simplest way 
of defining a project as successful is to show that three primary objectives 
have been met. These might possibly be called the three graces of project 
management and are: time, cost, and specification (Lock, 2004). Accord-
ing to Mishra & Soota (2005), time and cost overrun are a project’s main 
performance indicators.
Time over run or delay: is defined as the lateness in actual completion of 
works in relation to the baseline construction schedule or contract schedule 
the parties agreed upon for delivery of a project (Shete, 2016; Jemal, 2015; 
Ropel, 2011; Sabariah, 2009).
Cost overrun: is treated in this study as the amount by which the final 
cost or expenditure of the project exceeds the original estimation, which 
means the client has to spend more money for the completion of project than 
originally estimated (Shete, 2016; Ali & Kamaruzzaman, 2010; Nega, 2008). 
Cost overrun can also be defined as a measure of a percentage of actual costs 
over the estimated costs of the project (Memon, 2013).
2.3. Factors Influencing Construction Project Management
Projects and project management take place in an environment that is broader 
than that of the project itself. Understanding this broader context helps 
ensure that work is carried out in alignment with the organization’s goals 
and managed in accordance with the organization’s established practices. 
Organizational influences, project stakeholders and governance, project team 
and project life cycle are the main factors influencing project management 
(PMBOK, 2013).
Construction project management practice in Africa is poor as com-
pared to Europe and North America, and Ethiopia lags far behind even 
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poorly performing developing countries in Africa (Ayalew, Dakhli, & Lafhaj, 
2016). One notable reason for this poor performance is the sluggishness 
of construction project management practice in terms of adapting general 
project management procedures, project management functions, tools, and 
techniques. Particularly, the level of practice in terms of safety, risk, and time 
management has been found to be very low. A study by Ayalew, Dakhli & 
Lafhaj (2016) showed that the amount of schedule slippage ranges between 
61 to 80 percent and that of planned costs and other variables such as risk, 
quality, resources utilization, and safety deviates in the range 21 to 40 percent 
from requirements or predetermined or anticipated at the beginning of the 
project.
2.4. Causes of Time and Cost Overrun
The main causes of delay and cost overruns in construction of groundwater 
projects in Ghana were: monthly payment difficulties from agencies, poor 
contractor management, material procurement, poor technical performances, 
and escalation of material prices (Frimpong, Oluwoye, & Crawford, 2003). 
Delays in furnishing and delivering the site, financial problems, and improper 
planning were the common causes of time overrun and delay in construction. 
Inadequate supply of raw materials and equipment by contractors, design 
changes, and incomplete design at the time of tender were considered as the 
most important causes of cost overrun by (Jemal, 2015).
3. Methodology
3.1. Introduction
A research methodology is a way to systematically solve the research problem; 
alternatively, it may be understood as a science studying how research is 
done scientifically. For their part, research methods are all those methods/
techniques that are used for conducting research (Kothari, 2004). Research 
methods are the tools one uses to gather data, such as questionnaires or 
interviews (Dawson, 2002). This section describes all the procedures that were 
undertaken to achieve the objectives set in this study. The procedures that 
were adopted, including how and from where relevant data for the research 
were gathered, are discussed. In addition, the research instruments employed 
and the method of analyzing collected data are presented.
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3.2. Scope of the Study
The research involved the ten new mega sugar construction projects that 
were supposed to be constructed within the first Growth and Transformation 
Plan (GTP-I) by the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (ESC) in Ethiopia. As 
case studies, we focused on the Tana Beles and Kessem projects located 
in the western part of Amhara Reginal State and in Afar Regional State 
respectively. The study focuses on identifying the main causes that led to 
time and cost overrun.

















3.3. Sample Project Selection for Case Study
The two projects, namely Kessem and Beles, were selected due to their relative 
time performance involvement of national and international contractors 
involved and their relative distance.
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Two projects (Kessem and Belles) were selected for case study
Based on table 1 Kessem exhibited a relatively low time overrun, was 
constructed by international contractor, is located a short distance from 
Addis Ababa. On the other hand, Beles has a relatively low time performance 
(demonstrating the highest time overrun) compared to other projects, was 
constructed by a domestic contractor, and is located an even shorter distance 
from Addis Ababa.
3.4. Data Sources and Collection Method 
Data were collected based on the problems identified and the objectives of the 
research. The data collection approach adopted includes both primary and 
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secondary sources. Primary data can be obtained either through observation 
or through direct communication with respondnts in one form or another and 
through personal interviews. The primary data collection method includes 
the on-site observation method, interviews, questionnaires, and mechanical 
devices. Secondary data refers to data that are already available, collected and/
or organized by someone else. Secondary data may include either published or 
unpublished data, among them journals; books, magazines and newspapers, 
reports, and internet sources (Kothari, 2004).
Sugar projects are one of the largest governmental projects in the country, 
meaning they have been given serious attention by higher governmental 
officials. As such, gathering data from the projects was a very challenging and 
delicate proposition. To minimize this and other data collection problems, 
the researcher used different data collection mechanisms, such as desk study, 
interviews, and questionnaires in parallely.
In the desk study approach, several documents, such as contract documents 
and reports, were studied to look into the current status of the project in terms 
of time schedule and budgeted cost in respect to the contract agreement.
Interviews were conducted with managers and professionals who were 
involved in the construction projects. As projects may not have been fully 
recording data on the problems they have faced, it was anticipated that the desk 
study should be complemented by an interview. In total seven professionals 
from among different stakeholders were interviewed, namely, two from the 
client side, two from the contractor side, and two from the consultant side.
In addition to desk study and interviews, questionnaires were developed 
and distributed to the main parties involved in the construction projects, 
specifically on the Beles and Kessem projects. A total of seventy-five ques-
tionnaires were distributed. Forty client representatives, ten consultant 
representatives and twenty-five contractor representatives were considered 
in the questionnaire survey.
3.4. Data Analysis Method
To determine the time and cost performance of the projects, the amount of 
time and cost overrun were calculated using the following two formulas:
 Time Overrun  ( % )  =  
Actual time spent − Estimated planed time
   _________________________  
Estimated planed time
 * 100 Eq.1
 Cost Overrun =  Actual Cost − Estimated Cost  _________________ 
Estimated Cost 
 * 100 Eq.2
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The collected data from interview and desk study were recorded in a prepared 
format to facilitate the analysis. The list of factors was ranked based on their 
repetition and importance. If a factor is listed repeatedly or explicitly stated 
as important by the interviewees or documents, the factor was considered 
as “very high contributing;” if the opposite was the case, it was considered 
“very low contributing.” The data collected through the questionnaires were 
analyzed via descriptive statistics using SPSS and Excel software and ranked 
based on mean score method which is determined based on the following 
formula:
 Ms =  ∑ wixi _∑ xi eq.3 (Ibironke, Oladinrin, & Eboreine, 2013)
Where:
Ms = mean score;
Wi = the weight assigned to the ith response = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5;
 Xi = the frequency of the ith response given as a percentage of the total 
responses for each factor.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Introduction
This section presents and discusses the results of the desk study, interview, 
and questionnaire survey in regards to the extent of time and cost overruns 
in mega sugar projects and their causative factors from the point of view of 
clients, consultants, and contractors.
4.2. Questionnaire
This section provides background information about the respondents in the 
questionnaire survey in terms of affiliation, position, and experience.
Questionnaire Respondents
Out of the total seventy-five questionnaires produced, forty were distributed 
to employers’ representatives, ten to consultants’ representatives, and twenty-
five to contractors’ representatives. Of these questionnaires, sixty-three 
(84 percent) of them were returned, which is a valid response rate and a 
high percentage from the total distributed questionnaire; that is thirty-six 
(90 percent), six (60 percent), and twenty-one (84 percent) from employers, 
consultants, and contractors respectively (table 2).
mEGA suGAr construc tion ProjEc ts 483
Table 2: Questionnaire response rate
Respondents 
category
Number of questioners 
distributed




Client 40 36 90
Contractor 25 21 84
Consultant 10 6 60
Total 75 63 84
Respondents Position in the Organization/company
Table 3 shows that fourteen (22.2 percent) of the respondents were pro-
ject managers, ten (15.9 percent) were site engineers, eight (12.7 percent) 
were designers/engineers, four (6.3 percent) were office engineers, twenty 
(31.7 percent) listed “other” on the questionnaire and seven (11.1 percent) 
did not indicate their position in their company.
Table 3: Respondents’ position in the company
Position Number Percent
Project manager 14 22.2
Site engineer 10 15.9
Designer/engineer 8 12.7
Office engineer 4 6.3
Other 20 31.7
Did not respond 7 11.1
Total 63 100
Experience of Respondents
The professionals involved in this questionnaire survey had different level 
of experience. 34.9 percent had zero to five years of experience and another 
34.9 percent had six to ten years of experience. Therefore, the maximum 
number of respondents (69.8 percent) are in the range of zero to ten years 
of experience. The other 7.9 percent, 1.6 percent, and 11.1 percent of the 
respondents have ten to fifteen years, fifteen to twenty years, and above twenty 
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years of experience respectively. The remaining professionals participating 
in the survey did not indicate their years of experience.
Table 4: Experience of the respondents
Experience (yrs.)
Employer Consultant Contractor Total
No % No % No % No %
0-5 years 13 36.1 2 33.3 7 33.3 22 34.9
6-10 years 11 30.6 2 33.3 9 42.9 22 34.9
10-15 years 3 8.3 0 2 9.5 5 7.9
15-20 years - 1 16.7 0 1 1.6
More than 20 4 11.1 1 16.7 2 9.5 7 11.1
Did not respond 5 13.9 1 4.8 6 9.5
Total 36 6 100 21 63 100
4.3. Interviews 
Initially it was planned to interview at least seven professionals; three from 
among client representatives, two contractors’ representatives, and two from 
consultants’ representatives from the selected projects. However, a formal 
interview was done only with five key professionals (one from the ESC head 
office, three from Kessem, and one from Beles project), complemented by 
several informal interviews with other professionals.
4.4. Case Study
Case Study-I: Tana Beles Development Project
In Tana Beles, the corporation proposed the construction of three factories, 
each with a capacity of twelve thousand tons of cane per day and farms en-
compassing seventy-five thousand hectares of sugar cane. However, later the 
plan changed to two factories and developing fifty thousand hectares. To date, 
only Beles-I is active. The total investment cost of the project was estimated 
at Birr 42.54 billion or USD 2.12 billion. From the total investment cost, 
the highest amount (ETB 14.85 billion) was allocated for Tana – Beles-III, 
followed by ETB 13.93 billion for Tana – Beles-I, and ETB 13.75 billion for 
and Tana – Beles-II.
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The project has the following four major components:
a) Housing and infrastructure development
b) Land development and cane plantation
c) Irrigation infrastructure
d) Sugar factory
Time and Cost Overrun in Tana Beles Project
As shown in table 5, the maximum delay has occurred in the area of factory 
construction, which has been delayed by a factor of about 448 percent, mean-
ing it is delayed by more than four times from the base schedule. The schedule 
called for the factory to be completed within eighteen months, starting from 
March 2011. As of 2017, the contractor METEC had completed 77 percent 
of the work, within seven years duration. The next delayed item of work from 
the given list is the irrigation infrastructure construction, which has a time 
overrun of 174.5 percent. Meanwhile, land development and cane plantation 
has a time overrun of 166.2 percent and housing and infrastructure clocked 
in a time overrun of 112 percent.
Table 5 below shows that land development and cane plantation have 
the highest cost overrun on the list, at 332 percent. While irrigation and 
infrastructure have a cost overrun of 182.8 percent, factory construction has 
a cost overrun of 113.4 percent based on the preliminary investment budget. 
In the case of housing and infrastructure construction, the result shows it as 
coming in under budget (-36.9 percent). But the researcher would argue that 
there is no reason to decrease the actual cost from the plan budget without 
changing the scope; alternatively, workers may have been paid less than 
originally provided for the same amount of work.
Case study-II: Kessem Development Project
Originally, the Kessem project was part of the expansion project of the 
Metahara sugar factory. After the establishment of the Sugar Corporation, 
it was decided the project should proceed as an independent entity.
This project has the following components:
a) Housing and infrastructure development
b) Land development and cane plantation
c) Irrigation infrastructure
d) Factory construction
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Time and Cost Overrun of Kessem Project
Table 6 shows that the land development and cane plantation component of 
the project has a considerable delay, of 937 percent. In other words it is delayed 
by more than nine times compared to the original plan. The second highest 
delayed work item on the list is irrigation and infrastructure work, which 
is delayed by 639.4 percent. The housing and infrastructure construction 
component exhibited a 438.4 percent time overrun. The factory construction 
(102.4 percent) was the least delayed work item on the list.
In the Kessem project, the greatest cost increase from the base contract 
was seen in irrigation and infrastructure, with a 218.8 percent cost overrun. 
This is because the sector faces so many change orders from the original 
contract. The second highest cost overrun was seen in factory construction 
(34.9 percent), while housing and infrastructure had a cost overrun of 30.4%; 
Although the results of land development and cane plantation (-4.7 percent) 
are under budget, the researcher recognizes that there was no reason to 
decrease the actual cost from the plan budget without changing its scope; 
alternatively, contractors may have been paid less than originally provided 
for the same amount of work.
4.5. Key Factors Contributing to Time and Cost Overrun
Factors Contributing to Time Overrun
A literature review was conducted, as a result of which fifty-three factors 
contributing to delay were identified. This study asked respondents (includ-
ing clients, contractors, and consultants) to rank the factors based on their 
opinion on the relative significance of the factor’s contribution to the delays 
in the sugar construction projects under consideration. Based on result of the 
survey, the top fifteen contributing factors are indicated in table 7, of which 
the top three are discussed afterwards.
Improper planning and scheduling, a contract-related factor, is ranked 
1st, with a weighted average mean score of 3.92. Without proper planning, 
it is difficult to measure and control the progress of the project during con-
struction. This may be attributed to preparing an overambitious plan with 
respect to the capacity of the country as well as improper time planning and 
scheduling. For instance, planning to execute construction of ten new mega 
sugar projects, including the expansion of old factories in parallel with design 
activities which in total costs around 200 billion birr within five years, in areas 
of the country where adequate experience and knowledge are limited, seems 
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unrealistic. In addition, all ten factories were allotted to one inexperienced 
domestic contractor (METEC) with a mandate to complete them within 
18 months, which shows poor procurement and time planning. No evidence 
was found in terms of a compensation plan. This is one of the reasons for the 
shortage of land for cane plantation in the Kessem project.
Unrealistic contract duration (MS=3.7). This is a client related factor, 
which ranked 2nd according to the survey result. According to respondents’ 
responses during interviews and to the document review, the contract duration 
given for all ten factory projects was eighteen months; however, none of 
the projects were completed within the planned contract time. This shows 
that the planned time did not consider the ground situation and didn’t take 
into account various risk factors in estimating the duration. It appears that 
the decision by the political leaders to venture into such mega projects and 
finish them within eighteen months was not adequately backed by scientific 
or technical analysis and justification.
Improper and poor project feasibility study (MS=3.66) ranked third 
among factors contributing to delays. While clients rank this factor as 2nd 
and contractors as 5th, consultants rank it in 41st place, which is a significant 
difference. However, information gathered through interviews and desk study 
shows that the construction of sugar projects started without a proper feasibil-
ity study and detailed site investigation. It is vital to note that the projects 
were begun based on the directions given from the government in relation to 
the first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-I). The government pushed 
each stakeholder to go into implementation with a slogan of “we can do the 
study/investigation in parallel with the execution” without first conducting 
a detailed socio-economic, environmental, and technical assessment of the 
project. Initially, the only major consideration was the availability of land 
and water source. For instance, problems identified in Kessem dam project 
included the presence of 60oC hot spring water and percolation of water 
through mountains, which may be attributed to poor site investigation before 
commencement of the project. The projects also lacked adequate participation 
of the community and other stakeholders. (Lewis, 2007) argues that “projects 
often fail at the beginning, not the end,” meaning that if a project fails to 
conduct a proper feasibility study and project plan, it is obvious that it will 
fail in achieving its intended objectives, especially in terms of time and cost. 
According to information gathered in the conducted interviews, the project 
implementation was started without aquiring adequate information.
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Table 7: Factors affecting time delay
Groups Factors
Client Contract or Consultant Weighted avg
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Groups Factors
Client Contract or Consultant Weighted avg
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Factors Contributing to Cost Overrun
Table 8 shows all a list of all twenty factors contributed to cost overrun 
identified from the literature review and their ranks based on responses from 
clients’, contractors’, and consultants’ representatives. The top three factors 
contributing to cost overrun are found to be poor project (site) management, 
wastage, and construction cost underestimation
Table 8: Factors contributing to cost overrun
Factors
Client Contractor Consultant Weighted avg
MIS Rank MIS Rank MIS Rank MIS Rank
Poor project (site) 
management / poor cost 
control
3.89 1 3.38 4 4 3 3.73 1
Wastage 3.75 4 3.2 7 3.6 8 3.56 2
Construction cost 
underestimation
3.54 6 3.33 5 4.4 1 3.54 3
Poor site investigation 
and feasibility study
3.75 2 3.1 8 3.6 7 3.52 4
Lack of experience 3.67 5 2.85 14 4.4 2 3.46 5
Quantity underestimation 3.19 13 3.71 2 3.4 11 3.39 6
Design change 3.33 10 3.52 3 3.2 12 3.39 7
High cost of machineries 3.41 7 3.24 6 3.6 9 3.37 8
Additional work/variation 
order
3.03 15 3.81 1 3.4 10 3.33 9
Poor procurement policy 3.38 9 3.05 9 3.83 4 3.31 10
Corruption 3.75 3 2.62 16 3 14 3.31 11
Fluctuation in prices of 
raw materials
3.2. 12 3 11 3.8 5 3.18 12
Delays caused by the 
owner and his agent
3.4 8 2.95 12 2.5 18 3.16 13
Unforeseen site 
conditions
3.26 11 2.95 13 3 15 3.13 14
Lowest bidding procure-
ment method
3.14 14 3.05 10 3.2 13 3.11 15
Material price escalation 2.85 17 2.57 17 3.67 6 2.84 16
mEGA suGAr construc tion ProjEc ts 493
Factors
Client Contractor Consultant Weighted avg
MIS Rank MIS Rank MIS Rank MIS Rank
Increasing of foreign 
currency exchange rate
2.91 16 2.48 19 3 17 2.77 17
Acceleration 2.52 19 2.75 15 2.4 19 2.59 18
Inappropriate government 
policy
2.63 18 2.14 20 3 16 2.48 19
Change in legislation 2.21 20
2.48
18 2.4 20 2.32 20
Poor project (site) management is ranked as the first factor causing cost 
overruns, based on questionnaire responses, with a weighted average mean 
score of (MS=3.73). This is the major factor for increasing the cost of project, 
as poor project management may lead to inefficient resource usage and in 
project cost increase.
Wastage (Ms=3.56) was ranked as the second significant factor as de-
scribed in table 8. During interviews and site observation, it was observed 
that there are many equipment and resources not properly utilized for their 
intended purpose. For example, in the Tana Beles project, 13,148.5ha of cane 
was wasted, incurring an additional cost to remove aged cane. In contrast, in 
the Kessem project, the factory was ready to process 6000TCD, however, the 
available cane with which to feed the factory was not more than 4000TCD.
Construction cost underestimation, with a mean score of 3.54, is 
considered as the third contributing factor. The projects considered in this 
research entered into implementation without proper investigation and 
detailed cost estimation. It was apparent that the budgeted cost was not 
enough to execute the projects, which resulted in cost overrun after a while. 
The revised study done in 2016 shows there is a huge difference between the 
original estimate and real cost.
Capacity limitation: The other key factor affecting time and cost overrun 
in these projects raised by the interview participants was capacity limita-
tion. This includes limitation on financial capacity, lack of client experience, 
contractors’ capacity limitation, designer and consultant capacity limitation, 
shortage of capable man power, limitation in machinery and equipment, 
and limitation in using the current technology, etc. More than 80 percent 
of the funding sources for the project comes from a long-term loan, which 
highlights financial constraints. In addition, the contractors’ capacity and 
experience is limited and not specialized in the sector; they also did not have 
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prior experience. The Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (client) was a newly 
established organization which had never previously managed such sugar 
projects. As a result, the capacity in terms of experience managing mega 
projects on both the company/client levels is poor, which also contributed 
to time and cost overrun.
Poor coordination and communication among stakeholders: According 
to the data from the interviews and desk study there is poor coordination 
among different stakeholders in the project, which greatly contributed to 
time and cost overrun. Lack of coordination between two or more internal 
stakeholders, between internal and external stakeholders, and two and more 
external stakeholders were some of the major problems observed in the 
projects.
Professionals involved in the Tana Beles project informed that the 
contractor was not willing to accept instruction and direction from ESC 
representatives. Furthermore, a lack of coordination in resettling, compensa-
tion payments, and awareness creation in the community between the local 
government and ESC contributed to the shortage of land for cane plantation in 
the Kessem project. Another example of poor internal stakeholder coordina-
tion was seen between different tasks in the project. Wastage of matured cane 
due to the factory delay in the Tana Beles project, shortage of cane to feed the 
factory in Kessem project, the delay in infrastructure such as access roads, 
electric power, and telecommunication are other factors.
The existence of a railway construction project across the irrigable area of 
the Kessem project created an obstacle whereby the designed underpass height 
of the railway project didn’t consider the height of cane-loaded trucks that 
would need to cross the road from the other side. The design only considered 
the height of a camel. As a result, there is a problem in transporting cane 
from the plantation to the factory. The type and interest of a stakeholder are 
of great influence on the project’s success and failure (Lester, 2006). This 
underlines the importance of classifying and assessing the influence of each 
stakeholder on the project.
Poor procurement system: As it is the practice in the procurement of 
goods, procurement of works and services for the contractor and consultant 
should be properly done. However, this study revealed gaps in this area. 
For example, purchasing low-standard materials and machinery at high 
cost relative to the market was listed as a problem in the project. The other 
problem in relation to procurement was contractor and consultant selection. 
Most tasks were directly awarded to governmental organizations without 
considering their capacity or selecting competent bidders. Both the construc-
tion and consulting tasks for irrigation and housing projects was also given to 
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governmental construction companies in the region. According to responses 
from respondents, signing both the construction and supervison contracts 
with firms from the same country is found to be one of the challenges they 
faced as it might open doors for dishonest practices.
Contract management problem: According to different respondents’ 
point of view, the contract had problems beginning with contract document 
preparation all the way to contract formulation and contract administration.
In addition to the above, other factors identified through the interviews 
and desk study included resource management problems, poor organizational 
structure, lack of infrastructure in the area, compensation problems, delays in 
transportation, and weather conditions, Despite the long list of contributing 
factors, the majority of interview respondents argued that the presence of 
political influence and capacity limitation may be considered as the underlying 
factors behind other factors contributing to time and cost overruns.
5. Conclusion
This study was conducted to investigate the extent of time and cost over-
run and identify the key factors leading to the latter in mega sugar industry 
construction projects in Ethiopia. The results of study showed such overruns 
are indeed severe problems. In Tana Belles, an average of 225.2 percent and 
147.8 percent time overrun and cost overrun respectively were recorded based 
on the current status of the project (as of 2017). Similarly, in Kessem, the 
amount of average time and cost overrun were 529.3 percent and 69.8 percent 
respectively.
The research identified key factors leading to these poor results by using 
desk study, interviews, and questionnaires. The respondents were professionals 
from key stakeholders participating on the projects, including clients (ESC), 
contractors and consultants. Improper planning and scheduling, unrealistic 
contract duration, improper and poor project feasibility study, capacity 
limitation, poor coordination and communication among stakeholders, poor 
procurement and contract management, poor project (site) management, 
wastage and construction cost underestimation were all found to be the 
main contributing factors of time and cost overrun in the projects analyzed 
in this study.
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6. Recommendation and Limitations
6.1. Recommendations
Based on the literature review and responses from participants of this study, 
the following recommendations for minimizing cost and time overrun in the 
Ethiopian mega sugar industry construction projects:
– Adequate attention has to be given to feasibility study and site investigation
– Designing, planning, and scheduling has to be given serious attention.
– Facilitate discussion, communication, and coordination between different 
internal and external stakeholders
– Implement proper procurement system and contract administration
– Provide projects to domestic contractors as sub-contracts from foreign 
experienced contractors or form a joint venture with them.
– Proceed step-by-step rather than starting several mega projects in one 
GTP period with a limited capacity.
– Provide the required service and infrastructure before entering into the 
actual construction work.
– Ensuring the availability of resources like land, water, finance, and 
machinery before and during construction works is crucial.
– Capacity building by the project implementer (owner), consultants, and 
contractors has paramount importance.
6.2. Limitation
The following were the major limitations of the research:
– Among the ten new mega sugar industry development projects in Ethiopia 
begun in GTP-I, the research focused only on two projects (Tana Beles 
and Kessem) as a case study due to the complex nature of the projects 
as well as time and financial limitations.
– Due to the politically sensitive nature of the project and the anticorruption 
campaign of the government during data collecting time, getting access 
to contract documents, letters, reports, etc. (especially data related to 
finances) was extremely challenging.
– Identification of the responsible parties for the problems of time and cost 
overrun was not included as part of this study.
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Determinants of Public Servants’ 
Performance in Federal Public Service 
Sectors in Ethiopia
Kassa Teshager and Zekarias Minota
Box 1: Key conclusions
 Public servants are a most significant and precious asset essential for healthy 
operation of all other resources of the public sector. it is the only resource that is 
never depleted as its increased use increases human intelligence
 organizational factors (human relations dimension, rational goals dimension, 
open systems dimension, and internal process dimensions) and individual factors 
(job selection, employee competence, employee incentives [rewards], employee’s 
commitment and turnover intention) determine the attitude and performance of 
public servants in federal public sectors in Ethiopia.
 Public servants’ attitude toward public service reform tools significantly mediates 
the relationship between individual factors and employee performance. however, 
attitude does not mediate the relationship between organizational factors and 
employee performance in the federal public sectors.
 Accordingly, public servants need to be motivated in such a way that it will 
bring about attitudinal change and higher satisfaction, thereby enhancing their 
performance.
Box 2: Key insights 
reading this chapter will give you insights in
 the nature and performance of the public sector and public servants in Ethiopia
 Factors (organizational and individual) affecting public servants in Ethiopia
 the mediating effect of attitudes on the relationship between factors 
(organizational and individual) and the performance of employees in the public 
sector.
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Box 3: Abbreviations
csrP = civil service reform Program
FdrE = Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia
mocs = ministry of civil service
sPss = statistical Package for social sciences
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the factors determining the performance of public 
servants in the federal public service sector in Ethiopia. In the early 1990s 
the current government of Ethiopia came to power and established a task 
force to investigate the deep institutional constraints on basic functions, 
such as policy-making, service delivery, and regulation (MoCS, 2013).The 
task force reported that core public management systems at the federal and 
regional levels were hampered by outdated civil service legislation and working 
systems; the absence of a medium-term planning and budgeting framework; 
ineffective financial and personnel management controls; inadequate civil 
service wages and inappropriate grading systems; poor capacity for strategic 
and cabinet-level decision-making; and an insufficient focus on modern 
managerial approaches to service delivery. To address these constraints, the 
government undertook phased-based reform measures, the first of which 
(1991-1996) focused on the restructuring of government institutions and 
a retrenchment program. The second phase of the Civil Service Reform 
Program (CSRP) was launched in 1996, and included five subprograms, 
namely, in the areas of the top management system, expenditure management 
and control, human resource management, service delivery, and ethics. 
The subprograms were further split into various projects. The overall aim 
was to enhance the capacity of the public service so that it will be effective, 
efficient, transparent, accountable, ethical, performance oriented; promote 
good governance, provide client-oriented service delivery; and support the 
government’s social and economic development policies, with the Ethiopian 
public being the most important beneficiary of the programs.
Since then, various efforts were undertaken, such as the development of 
new legislation (for example, a financial management proclamation, a civil 
service law, a code of ethics, complaints-handling procedures, and a service 
delivery policy) as well as reforms of the operating systems for budgeting, 
procurement, and some aspects of personnel management such as salary 
surveys and records management, among others. However, due to various 
problems, including a lack of capacity, only limited success was achieved in 
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bringing about improvements in performance and service delivery, effective 
policy formulation, and program and project execution, as well as in tackling 
other problems of the public service in general.
As some scholars argue, public service reform is a means to an end, which 
involves deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector 
organizations with the purpose of getting them to run better (Pollitt & Bouc-
kaert, 2011). The public service is the life blood of any government, given that 
the implementation of government policies and strategies is highly dependent 
on the courage and passion of the public service. The major responsibility of 
the public service sector is implementing government policy in accordance 
with on-going economic development. In line with this thought, the govern-
ment of Ethiopia has been striving to replace the traditional rule-driven and 
highly bureaucratic public administration by an effective and responsive public 
service capable of facilitating and implementing developmental programs. So 
far, various tools have been introduced to make the necessary adjustments 
to the way in which public services are organized and operated, in order to 
sustainably respond to changing needs and the demands of the public at large.
According to the former Ministry of Civil Service (2013), three key factors 
are affecting the performance of the current public service sector in Ethiopia. 
First, the attitude of the public servants is awful. Widespread public distrust of 
public institutions has deep historical roots, and the removal of such distrust 
demands great commitment and effort from public servants. The second 
problem lies in the skill and knowledge gaps among public servants. Although 
the country has achieved remarkable socioeconomic development, its cur-
rent status does not meet the demands of the situation. The public service, 
therefore, is under greater pressure to upgrade the knowledge and skills of 
public servants. The third challenge is resource constraints in discharging 
the monumental task of building the nation on a new foundation. Although 
these gaps have been identified, there is no comprehensive study dealing 
with the individual and organizational factors as well as with the attitude of 
public servants in relation to the performance of the public sector in Ethiopia. 
Existing studies on organizational and individual factors determining the 
performance of public servants are not comprehensive, up to date, or relevant 
to the current competitive situation. This study, therefore, fills this gap by 
investigating the determinants of public servants’ performance in the federal 
public sector in Ethiopia. It does so by addressing the following questions:
1. How does bureaucratic heritage determine the reform programs and 
public servants’ performance in Ethiopia?
2. What are the factors determining the performance of public servants in 
the federal public service sector?
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3. Does public servants’ attitude matter in improving their performance?
4. What is the policy implication of assessing the determinant factors af-
fecting public servants’ performance?
Despite the fact that positive results have been attained, encouraging the 
government to intensify implementation of the reform programs aimed at 
attaining sustainable growth and poverty reduction, the public service has 
not yet achieved the desired outcomes because of a combination of internal 
and external factors. The effective delivery of an organization’s objectives 
depends on the harnessing of qualified and competent employees. However, 
the performance of employees in the public sector is not only a function of 
individuals factor but also depends on organizational factors. This chapter, 
therefore, investigates the determinant factors affecting the performance 
of public servants (both employees and managers) in the federal public 
service sector. The researchers believe that change can come only if the 
public servants perform well in their day-to-day activities. To achieve this 
goal, a clear understanding of the organizational and individual factors 
affecting employees’ performance is important, because it provides the top 
management with an understanding of how to improve the performance 
of public servants for better organizational functionality. Moreover, the 
findings of this study will assist academics in broadening of the prospectus 
with respect to this study, hence providing a deeper understanding of the 
determinant factors that affect employees’ performance. The study will 
enrich the existing literature and may be used as a cornerstone for further 
research in this area. The findings of this study will also help the human 
resource management of the organizations concerned (as well as others), by 
providing insight into the benefits of using different factors highlighted by 
this research to predict the factors that affect the performance of employees 
and design remedial actions to enhance their performance. Finally, the 
data produced as a result of this study is expected to be of some value for 
decision- and policy-makers with respect to determinants of employees’ 
performance.
Following the introductory section, this chapter is organized into four 
sections. In section 2 the relevant theoretical and empirical literatures are 
reviewed. Section 3 discusses the conceptual framework, research design, 
and methods used in the study. The fourth section presents data analysis and 
the main findings of the study. The last section concludes with the policy 
implication of the study based on its major findings.
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2. Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
2.1. Institutional Factors
The literature on economic development shows that the three most determi-
nant factors driving development are geography, trade integration, and institu-
tions. According to Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), institutional 
factors explain the bulk of the cross-country variation in development. It is 
therefore logical to assume that institutions matter for economic development, 
and that a good bureaucracy is an important ingredient of institutional quality.
Rauch and Evans (2000) carried out research on the bureaucratic structures 
of the public service institutions of thirty-five countries along three dimen-
sions: meritocratic recruitment to the public service, internal promotion and 
long-term careers, and competitive salaries compared to the private sector. 
They found a significant correlation between meritocratic recruitment and 
good scores on several bureaucratic quality indices capturing bureaucratic 
delays, red tape, and corruption. Recanatini, Prati, & Tabellini (2005) con-
ducted research on why some public agencies are less corrupt than others. They 
found that regular internal and external auditing, transparent procedures, 
merit-based assignments and promotions, and a nonpolitical appointment 
process of organization heads are all associated with lower levels of corruption.
The other relevant study was carried out by the World Bank (2003), where 
data from surveys among officials, households, and firms in three countries was 
used to investigate the links between a government performance measure (cap-
turing bribery and service quality) and four “dimensions” of public administra-
tion, namely personnel management, administrative procedures, performance 
management, and financial management, while controlling for organizational 
culture. The main finding of this study is that (perceived) meritocratic personnel 
management is associated with perceived quality in all three countries. Still, 
although the above-mentioned studies discussed the institutional factors, they 
didn’t address the factors determining the performance of public servants.
2.2. Public Servants’ Performance 
Public servants’ performance has always been an important concern for 
managers of organizations (Kelidbari, Dizgah, & Yusefi, 2011). Because 
employee performance is an important building block of an organization, 
the factors that lay the foundation for high performance must be analyzed 
critically by the organizations for them to succeed (Abbas & Yaqoob, 2009). 
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Along these lines Wu &Lee (2011), defined job performance as employees’ 
overall performance in meeting the expected quality and achievement of 
tasks under the policy and time requirements of the organization. Similarly, 
Liao, Lu, Huang & Chiang (2012) define job performance as the benchmark 
for promotions, redundancy, rewards, punishments, reviews, and salary 
adjustments. Ahmad & Shahzad (2011) also argue that employee perfor-
mance represents the general belief of the employees about their behavior 
and contributions toward the success of the organization.
Anitha (2013) defines employee performance as an indicator of financial 
or nonfinancial outcomes of the employee that have a direct relationship with 
the performance of the organization and its success; he further mentioned 
working environment, leadership, team and coworker relationships, training 
and career development, compensation program, policies and procedures, 
workplace well-being, and as major factors that determine employee 
performance. However, a study conducted by Alagaraja & Shuck (2015), 
which aimed to explore existing perspectives of organizational alignment 
and employee engagement in order to understand factors associated with 
enhancing individual performance, argues that employee performance can 
be enhanced through training and development.
Based on the above definitions, employee performance can be referred to as 
the extent to which an employee carries out assigned duties and responsibili-
ties. It encompasses the level of efficiency and effectiveness of an employee in 
accomplishing assigned tasks. Moreover, optimal employee performance leads 
to innovative and enhanced firm performance as a whole, in that the successful 
efforts of satisfied, motivated, and committed human resources generate in-
novative ideas for new products or services and improve quality performance, 
operating performance, and customer satisfaction (Sadikoglu & Zehi, 2010).
Employee performance is, therefore, paramount to the achievement of 
organizational objectives. The employee needs to be motivated accordingly 
in such a way that it brings about higher job satisfaction, thereby enhancing 
employee and organizational productivity.
2.3. Factors Determining Public Servants Performance 
Among all the assets of an organization, employees are the most significant 
and precious, essential for the healthy operation of all the other resources of 
the organization. Furthermore, this resource, which relies on human intel-
ligence, is never depleted. Due to these very important reasons, employees 
are the spinal cord of any organization. By taking this premise into account, 
a well-managed organization normally considers the average employee as the 
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primary source of productivity gains (Qasim, Cheema, & Syed, 2012). These 
organizations consider employees rather than capital as the core foundation 
of the business and as contributors to firm development. Mulatu Takele 
(2013:122) noted that:
Without people organizations are simply empty buildings and unused equip-
ment. It is people who give them life, purpose, and meaning. Healthy and vibrant 
organizations are those with healthy and vibrant workers. Happy and vibrant 
workers are productive workers; and productive organizations are those with 
satisfied workers and conducive environment.
Satisfied employees develop loyalty or commitment to the organization, 
which results in greater productivity and lower turnover rates (Mahamuda, 
2011). According to Lease (1998) as cited in Neog and Barua (2014:305) 
“Employees who have higher job satisfaction are usually less absent, less likely 
to leave, more productive, more likely to display organizational commitment 
and even more likely to be satisfied with their lives.” Robbins (2003) also 
notes that organizations with more satisfied workers are more effective than 
those with less satisfied workers.
2.4. Organizational Factors 
The organizational climate has a major influence on employee performance 
through its impact on employees’ attitudes (Butt, Buhitoo, & Abass, 2013). 
The perception of employees regarding their organizational climate has 
significant consequences for both public servants and public organizations. 
It has profound impact on the work behavior of public servants in public 
organizations (Afolabi, 2005; Metle, 2001). It is a key variable in successful 
organizations because organizations that are able to create environments 
which employees perceive to be considerate and in which they are able to 
achieve their full potential are regarded as a key source of competitive advan-
tage (Brown & Leigh, 1996; Castro, 2008; Haritha & Subrahmanyam, 2013). 
Correspondingly, in high-performing organizations, organizational climates 
have particular measurable characteristics of performance that directly 
account for up to 30 percent of the variance in key business performance 
measures (Watkin & Hubbard, 2003). Pittigrew, cited in Al-Kasawneh (2013) 
has also suggested that organizational climate is crucially important for 
organizational excellence and is the basis for organizational success.
The organizational climate is the set of characteristics that describe an 
organization and distinguish it from others while influencing the behavior 
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of people iwithin its walls (Farooqui, 2012). Most researchers agree that 
organizational climate is multidimensional. For example, Patterson et al. 
(2005) divided organizational climate in to four dimensions that consists 
of seventeen scales.
In the case of Ethiopia, few studies have been undertaken on organizational 
climate and job satisfaction. Moreover, these prior studies lack comprehensive-
ness: for instance the investigation by Bekele Serbasa (2014) focused only on six 
dimensions of organizational climate (autonomy, trust, team work /cohesion, 
rewards and recognition, fairness, and organizational/supervisory support); 
similarly, Fekadu Abdissa (2015) used only ten dimensions of organizational 
climate (training and development, communication, performance management, 
team work, salary package, work load, leadership, administrative styles, role clar-
ity, quality of service, and rules, regulations and policies).These limitations mean 
that there is a deficiency in our understanding of very important organizational 
dimensions such as integration, involvement, formalization, tradition, innova-
tion and flexibility, outward focus, reflexivity, efficiency, effort, and pressure to 
produce. Therefore, the researchers believe that this study will fill the gap by 
considering Paterson et al.’s (2005) seventeen dimensions of organizational 

























Source: Patterson et al. (2005)
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climate, which they developed and categorized into four quadrants, namely 
human relations, internal process, open system, and rational goals.
2.5. Individual Factors 
Individual factors affecting public servants performance included in this 
research are: 1) Job Selection, the way in which the public servant is selected 
for his/her job or position; 2) Employee Competence, the ability of the public 
servant to do his/her job; 3) Employee Incentives/Rewards, – inducements 
(either financial or nonfinancial)that stimulate one to action in a desired 
direction; 4) Employee’ Commitment, the measure of the employee’s willing-
ness to remain with the organization in the future, which often reflects the 
employee’s belief in the mission and goals of the organization, willingness to 
expend effort in their accomplishment, and intentions to continue working 
in the organization; and 5) Turnover Intention, a measurement of whether 
a public servant plans to leave his/her job or position.
2.6. Empirical Evidence on Ethiopian Public Service 
Since 1991, the Ethiopian government has embarked on a series of reform 
programs associated with the ideological shift from a command economy 
to a free market economy. In the early 1990s, the government launched a 
Structural Adjustment program, which included a Civil Service Reform 
Program (CSRP) as one of the components to be undertaken in phases. 
The first phase of the reform (1991-1996) focused on the restructuring of 
government institutions and a retrenchment program. The second phase 
of CSRP was launched in 1996 and comprised five subprograms, namely, 
the top management system, expenditure management and control, human 
resource management, service delivery, and ethics. The su-programs were 
further split into various projects (Eshete, 2007; Mesfin, 2009).
Six projects were designed under the umbrella of the Service Delivery 
SubProgram. These included the development of a service delivery policy, 
grievance handling directives, an award system in the civil service, methods 
integrating related public service, and preparation of technical directives for 
improving civil service delivery and service delivery standard directives. 
However, the actual implementation performance of these projects did not 
meet expectations (Capacity Building Strategy paper, 2001). This result may 
be attributed to many factors, such as too much focus on technical aspects 
rather than on changing the attitudes of the workforce, an impulsive start to 
implementation, a and lack of committed political leadership (Mesfin, 2009).
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The Ethio-Eritrean War and the split of the EPRDF party was followed by 
“Tehadiso,” otherwise known as the party Renaissance, in which it took the 
initiative to critically evaluate the implementation of CSRP reform. Having 
evaluated the pros and cons of CSRP performance during 1996-2001, the 
government found a huge implementation capacity gap. Consequently, the 
Ministry of Capacity Building was established in 2002 to take charge of 
capacity building activities that had been fragmented previously, and to 
give centralized directives and leadership to public organizations at various 
levels (Mesfin, 2009; MoFED, 2012). Next, in 2004, a new program emerged 
titled the Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) emerged, 
comprising six programs: Civil Service Reform, Tax System Reform, Justice 
System Reform, District level Decentralization, Urban Management Capacity 
Building, and Information and Communication Technology Development. It 
aimed at improving the scale, efficiency, and responsiveness of public service 
delivery at the federal, regional, and local level, empowering citizens’ self-
development, and promoting good governance and accountability (Mesfin, 
2009). 2012). However, the Ministry of Capacity Building was soon merged 
with Federal Civil Service Agency in 2010, into a new institution named the 
Ministry of Civil Service (MoFED, 2012).The establishment of the Ministry 
of Civil Service necessitated a revision of PSCAP to reflect the duties and 
responsibilities of the ministry (MoFED,2012). Despite this, the expected 
performance improvement in the civil service did not materialize. (Ibid).
Consequently, changes in the implementation of CSRP manifested 
themselves in a series of trainings on change management, performance 
management, management by objectives, strategic planning management, 
business process re-engineering, and balanced score card among other topics 
(Mesfin, 2009). In February 2012, the Ministry of Civil Service even launched 
a Citizens’ Charter, with the aim of enabling civil servants to serve the com-
munity in an improved way. However, the development and reformation of 
programs and management tools in the country became a fashion rather than 
resulting in real change in the service delivery system.
According to the World Bank (2008), Ethiopia’s experience with the 
introduction of a handful of performance related systems, namely the BPR 
and BSC, signalled the need for a coherent and consistent plan to avoid 
confusion and conflicting priorities during implementation.
Despite the reform efforts of the government in transforming the public 
sector in service of the improved socioeconomic development of the new 
Ethiopia, the country has experienced a syndrome of on again, off again 
reform measures. A copious literature indicates that the implementation of 
the civil service reforms in Ethiopia has faced the lack of a properly integrated 
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and sequential approach (Mesfin, 2009), the lack of accountability in the 
performance management system (Solomon, 2007), inconsistency in the per-
formance evaluation system (Teka, Fiseha, & Solomon, 2007), civil servants’ 
resistance to change (Emnet & Habtamu, 2011; Eshete, 2007; Tesfaye, 2007; 
Tilaye, 2007), the lack of a well-designed and implemented remuneration 
system (Tilaye, 2007), the lack of awareness on the service seekers’ side on 
their duties and responsibilities (Mesfin & Taye, 2011), poor communication, 
poor sense of ownership, inefficient technological readiness, and a weak team 
work culture (Emnet & Habtamu, 2011).
The researchers assume that institutional and behavioral issues are primar-
ily responsible for this major gap between public expectations and actual 
performance in service provision. These may include both economic and 
noneconomic reasons together with ever-changing market conditions. The 
question now is, what are these factors, how can we measure them quanti-
tatively for concrete decision-making, and what implications can we derive 
for emerging Ethiopia? Thus, the current study critically assesses the factors 
that actually determine public servants’ performance within selected federal 
public institutions by developing a simple analytical model and hypothesis 
as indicated below.
3. Conceptual Framework, Research Design, and Methods
3.1. Conceptual Framework of the Study
As described in figure 2, both organizational and individual factors determine 
public servants’ performance either directly or via attitudinal change.












Source: Researchers’ own construction path model
510 K AssA tEshAGEr And zEK AriAs minotA
A series of single and multiple regression analyses (path analysis) were used 
to explore the mediating effect of public servants’ attitude on the relationships 
between organizational climate, individual factors, and public servants’ per-
formance. For this purpose, we established three regression models as follows:
Model 1: Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ε1 Equation (1)
Model 2: M = αo + a X1 + b X2 + ε3 Equation (2)
Model 3: Y = β’0 + β’1X1 + β’2X2 + β3 M + ε2 Equation (3)
Where:
Y is the outcome variable = public servants’ performance,
X1 and X2 are independent variables = organizational climate and individual 
factors respectively,
M is the mediator = public servants’ attitude,
β1 and β2 are the total effects = that demonstrates the zero-order correlation 
between X1 and X2 and Y (ignoring M) in the first equation,
β’1 and β’2 is direct effect = that demonstrates the Beta coefficient relating 
the independent (X1 and X2) to the outcome (Y) adjusted for the effects of 
the mediator(M), in the second equation,
a and b = is the coefficient that demonstrate the zero-order correlation between 
X1 and X2 and M (ignoring Y), in the third equation,
ε1, ε2 and ε3 code unexplained variability of equations (1), (2), and (3) re-
spectively, and
β0, αo and β’0 are the intercepts of equations (1), (2), and (3) respectively
Specifically, the study assesses public servants’ attitude as a mediating factor. 
The argument here is that an employee with a positive attitude toward their 
job or career as well as to the organization’s vision will likely prove to be a more 
productive, motivated, and reliable employee than one harboring negative 
attitudes (Burns & Burns, 2008). In the literature, Kagaari et al. (2010) found 
that there was significant positive relationship between employees’ attitude and 
performance. In this study, we investigated the relationship as stated in figure 2.
Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1 stated that “organizational climate and individual factors have 
a significant and positive effect on public servants’ job performance” and has 
been confirmed in this study.
Hypothesis 2 was “organizational climate and individual factors have a 
significant and positive effect on public servants’ attitudes” and was also 
confirmed.
Hypothesis 3 stated that “public servants’ attitudes significantly mediate 
on the relationship between predictors and public servants’ job performance” 
and was confirmed with variation.
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3.2. Research Design and Methods 
This research was a mixed method design that combines both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches due to the very nature of the study objectives 
related to public servants performance and the expected outputs identified 
by the federal public service sectors.
Population and Sampling 
The target populations for this study were public servants in the federal public 
service sector. The federal public sector was classified in to three categories: 
1) Civil Service (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development, 
Ministry of Finance and Cooperation, etc.), 2) Public Enterprises (Ethiopian 
Airlines, Commercial Bank, Telecommunication, Hydropower, etc.), and 
3) Political Institutions (the Parliament Office, the Prime Minster’s Office, 
Office of the President, House of Federation, etc.).
Sample Design: A total of fourteen public institutions from the three 
categories were included in this study. This included ten organizations from 
the Civil Service: 1) Ministry of Education, 2) Ministry of Health, 3) Ministry 
of Agriculture, 4) Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Develop-
ment, 5) Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation, 6) Ministry of 
Urban Development and Construction, 7) Ministry of Trade, 8) Ministry 
of Industry, 9) Addis Ababa University, and 10) Ethiopian Civil Service 
University; three public enterprises: 1) Ethiopian Airlines, 2) Ethiopian 
Telecommunication Corporation, and 3) the Ethiopian Electric Power Cor-
poration; and the Parliament Office (of the House of People’s Representative) 
from among the political institutions
Once the institutions were selected, sample public servants (both managers 
and employees) were selected based on proportional a random sampling 
technique across the selected organizations, providing all respondents with 
an equal chance of being included in the sample. The sampling frames were 
the lists of public servants in these selected federal public service institutions.
Sample Size: A sample size should be statistically representative and 
ensure that the sample is disaggregated based on the selected institutions. 
The standard sampling frame formula that was used to estimate the sample 
size is Kish, Leslie (1965):
 n =  
 z 2 * p * ( 1 − p )  _
 c 2 
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The following parameters are assumed in estimating the sample size:  n  = sam-
ple size, Z = Z value (e.g. 2.054 for 96% confidence level), p = prevalence, if 
prior information is not known. In this case we took 0.5, thus for this study 
a conservative estimate of 0.5 will be used to get the maximum sample size 
and c = confidence interval, expressed as a decimal (0.05).
n = (2.064)2 * 0.5 * (1-0.5)/(0.05)2
n = 422
There are over eighty federal public institutions in Ethiopia. However, this 
study was carried out in fourteen federal public institutions located in Addis 
Ababa. The sample size presented in line with the selected institutions.
Table 1: Number of employees and sample size of each institution
Branch name
Number of permanent 
public servants
Sample size response
Ministry of Education 1155 33 33
Ministry of Public Service and 
Human Development
1015 29 29
House of People’s Representatives 1015 29 29
Ministry of Urban Development and 
Construction
1225 35 35
Addis Ababa University 1190 34 34
Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Cooperation
1330 38 38
Ministry of Agriculture 1330 38 38
Ministry of Industry 910 26 26
Ethio-Telecomm 945 27 27
Ethiopian Civil Service University 770 22 22
Ministry of Trade 1120 32 32
Electric Power Corporation 1120 32 32
Ethiopian Airlines 735 21 21
Ministry of Health 910 26 20
Total 14770 422 416
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3.3. Data Collection Methods
In this study, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected from 
secondary and primary sources.
Secondary Data /Documents Review/ 
The study began by reviewing the selected public service institutions’ policy 
documents, reports, published and unpublished documents, website data, 
CSA data, Ministry of Public Service and Human Development data, and any 
documents related to the public service. Secondary data on the bureaucratic 
heritage of the public service were collected from the literature. Moreover, 
the concepts of public service reform, public servants, etc. were reviewed 
and used as a data collection and analysis tool. In addition, to this, literature 
that can inform international best practices in the study and support of the 
public service was reviewed.
Survey and Key Informants Interviews
The data collection was carried out at the institutional level (federal public 
service institutions) and individual public servants’ level. At the institutional 
level, key informant interviews were undertaken with ministers, department 
leaders, and experts. This typeof interview permits the researcher to obtain 
rich, detailed information regarding the bureaucratic heritage and factors 
affecting employees’ performance in a flexible way. At the individual level, 
a survey was conducted of public servants in different hierarchies of the 
selected federal public service institutions. This survey data, which was 
based on a structured questionnaire identifying the key determinant factors 
affecting the performance of public servants, allowed the researchers to do 
quantitative analysis.
The questionnaire had five main sections. The first comprised seven ques-
tions dealing with respondents’ general information, whereas the second, 
which covered the major area of this study (organizational climate) comprised 
eighty-two questions under four broad categorical dimensions. The third 
part, which comprised six broad categories, addressed the individual factors 
determining public servants’ performance. The fourth part focused on public 
servants’ attitude, via twelve items. The final section addressed employee 
performance and included thirteen questions.
Standard tools developed by Paterson et al. (2005) for measuring organi-
zational climate and by Halim (2013) for measuring employee’s performance 
were employed. The researchers developed their own tools for measuring 
individual factors and attitudes. The level of agreement in the questionnaire 
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used a 5-point Likert scale that scored 1 to 5 as follows: Strongly disagree = 1, 
disagree = 2, neutral = 3, agree = 4, strongly agree = 5 for positive questions, 
and scored reveresely in SPSS for negative questions.
Eight key informants were interviewed to supplement the survey data. 
In addition, five focus group discussions were conducted with experts and 
public servants’ representatives in five selected public institutions.
3.4. Data Analysis and Presentation
Both descriptive and inferential statistical techniques were used to analyze the 
quantitative data. Data collected from the public servants’ survey and different 
secondary sources were analyzed and presented in tabular or graphic form, 
while qualitative information was incorporated in the report to support the 
quantitative data in thematic summaries on the basis of determinant factors. 
The data analysis technique was supported by the SPSS software program.
Data gathered through the structured questionnaires were processed 
and analyzed using SPSS version 20. Accordingly, descriptive statistics 
(frequency, percentage, mean, standard deviation) was used to describe the 
data. Next, inferential statistics, such as correlation and regression analyses, 
were employed. Inferential statistics allow the researcher to draw conclusions 
about a population from the sample of a particular study (Cooper & Schindler, 
2006). Moreover, inferential statistics make it possible to test hypotheses by 
determining the statistical likelihood that the data reveal true differences. 
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was used to examine 
the relationship between organizational climate, individual factors, attitude, 
and performance. Next, regression assumptions tests like the normality test 
and multicollinearity test were undertaken. AFinally, a series of multiple 
regression analyses were conducted to determine the mediating effect of 
public servants’ attitude in the relationship between organizational climate, 
individual factors, and public servants performance.
Reliability Statistics
The reliability test is an instrument used to measure the items in a question-
naire that act as the indicators of the variables. Nunually (1978) has suggested 
that the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of a scale must be greater than 0.7. 
Reliability analysis tells us whether the items included in the model are 
realizable proxies of variables. Table 2 shows reliability statistics as follows.
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Table 2: Reliability statistics
Scale Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (standardized) No. of Items 
Organizational factors 0.897 75
Individual factors 0.829 30
Attitude 0.926 13
Performance 0.895 14
Source: Computed from survey data
The value of Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient (based on standardized items) 
for organizational factors is 0.8970, which clearly indicates that the results 
are reliable. Similarly, Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for individual factors, 
attitude, and performance is 0.829, 0.626, and 0.895 respectively. Since the 
reliability value for the dependent, independent, and mediator variables is 
greater than 0.7, the results in this study are viable.
4. Results and Discussion
This section presents the findings of the study obtained from descriptive and 
econometric analysis. It aims to analyze the factors that affect the performance 
of employees at Ethiopian federal public institutions. The data (primary and 
secondary) was collected, organized, coded, and analyzed systematically 
using a mixed approach. The Likert scale data was analyzed quantitatively 
while data from interviews and document review was analyzed descriptively.
The descriptive part includes: the characteristics of respondents, the 
major factors of employee performance, how employee attitudes affect their 
performance, the actual performance of employees and their interrelationship 
presented in tables and figures. Finally, the quantitative analysis is based 
on the three multiple regression models indicated above. Generally, our 
result reveal how organizational and individual factors (causal factors) af-
fect employee attitudes, how the employee attitudes (casual mechanisms) 
affect their performance, and how both the casual factors and attitude affect 
employees’ performance.
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4.1. Characteristics of Respondents 
As depicted in figure 3, the total number of respondents is 416, with a 
maximum and minimum respondents of 38 and 20 respectively from each 
sample organization. These respondents were drawn randomly from nested 
work units. They filled out standardized questionnaires having 136 specific 
items, 24 sub-dimensions, and 7 main dimensions. The questionnaire de-
sign involves standard grid measurements used to collect five-level Likert 
scale data. The index of each variable was computed using SPSS/STATA to 
obtain the weighted mean values for each subdimension, which in turn was 
indexed to generate weighted mean value for the major dimensions, namely, 
organizational, individual, attitudinal, and performance values.
This approach is supported by O’Reilly et al. (1996), who proposed the 
“Organizational Culture Profile (OCP),” the most widely cited survey instru-
ment in the organizational culture literature. In addition, Boone Jr. & Boone, 
2012) have successfully demonstrated how Likert scale data can be analyzed 
quantitatively.
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Respondents’ composition by sex indicated that 311 (about 75 percent) 
of federal public workers in the selected organizations are males and 105 
(25 percent) are female. This implies that the workforce in the public service 
sector is still predominantly occupied by males and that females are marginal-
ized for different reasons (individual and organizational).
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The education level of respondents has implication for performance. In this 
study, about 60 percent of the respondents hold the first degree, 35 percent 
hold the second, and 2.6 percent hold PhDs. At the same time, 2.4 percent 
hold diplomas, about 0.5 percent completed grade 10, and 0.2 percent; left 
school between grades 7 and 8 (second cycle primary school). Although it is 
difficult to draw a conclusion about the entire country based on this sample 
survey, the result indicates that there is improvement in the human resource 
composition of the federal public sector.
4.2. Descriptive Analysis 
In this subsection, we analyze the basic determinants of employees’ perfor-
mance by using summary statistical figures and correlation of variables. As 
described above, the five-point Likert type data is systematically estimated 
to obtain the weighted mean for each variable/factor in order to analyze the 
Likert scale data quantitatively. As indicated on the conceptual framework, 
public servants’ performance is broadly determined by organizational and 
individual factors through attitudinal factors. The organizational dimension 
in turn is proxied by four major dimensions, namely, human relations, internal 
process, open systems, and rational goals. Furthermore, these four dimensions 
involve seventeen subdimensions and eight-one individual items or factors. 
The five-point Likert scale captures: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), indif-
ferent (3), agree (4), and strongly agree (5), with corresponding codes. The 
descriptive statistics for these major dimensions are presented in tables and 
analyzed in that order as follows. According to Zaidatol and Bagheri (2009), 
a mean score of <= 3.39 is low, from 3.40 up to 3.79 is moderate, and > 3.80 
is high. We use these parameters to compare the scores obtained.
Table 3 shows that the average response of the respondents to the state-
ment “human relation interventions highly improve the performance of 
federal public servants” was “indifferent.” This implies that there was neither 
disagreement nor agreement about the role of human relations on employees’ 
performance. This might be because the do not have adequate information 
about the variable or the result is mixed (positive or negative). Therefore, 
actual workers’ involvement and autonomy in decision-making, supervisory 
support by the management, work-related integration, training and welfare 
activities does not determine the performance of employees at in the federal 
public sector of Ethiopia.
Theoretically, the existence and practice of a merit system respecting 
cultural values within an organization is expected to contribute to the at-
tainment of goals. However, the results (see table 3) nullify this assumption, 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of organizational and individual factors
Items/Variables
Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Variance
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic
Human relations dimension
Involvement 416 2.903 .027 .565 .320
Autonomy 416 2.981 .032 .655 .430
Supervisory support 416 3.045 .044 .899 .810
Integration 416 2.982 .032 .655 .429
Training 416 2.959 .032 .670 .449
Welfare 416 2.935 .037 .763 .583
Internal process dimension
Formalization 416 2.803 .030 .621 .386
Tradition 416 3.087 .045 .937 .879
Open systems dimension
Innovation & flexibility 416 2.774 .042 .866 .751
Outward focus 416 2.819 .037 .773 .598
Reflexivity 416 3.036 .041 .836 .700
Rational goals dimension
Pressure to produce 416 2.929 .036 .742 .551
Clarity of organizational goals 416 3.041 .036 .751 .565
Performance feedback 416 2.890 .031 .642 .413
Quality 416 3.034 .041 .836 .700
Efficiency 416 3.434 .038 .782 .612
Effort 416 3.069 .033 .689 .475
Individual Factors
Job selection 416 3.082 .037 .760 .578
Employee competence 416 3.835 .040 .820 .673
Employee incentives 416 3.034 .035 .732 .537
Employee’s commitment 416 3.313 .038 .775 .601
Turnover intention 416 3.004 .040 .817 .668
Attitude 416 2.965 .038 .789 .624
Performance 416 3.500 .03194 .651 .424
Source: Computed from survey data
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since the estimated score is about 3, similarly to the human relations case. 
Indeed, with little autonomy, poor relations, and mutual values among workers 
and managers, realizing the intended target would be unlikely. Thus, we 
can conclude that internal process dimensions do not necessarily affect the 
performance of public servants.
Although the standard deviation for the three variables is large, the mean 
value is nearly 3. However, the mean scores of innovation and flexibility/
outward focus are low, indicating that the system is not as open as it should 
be. Unless sufficient opportunity is provided for innovation, employees will 
not be creative and visionary, leading to a deterioration in their performance. 
This “indifferent” response indicates that the organizational system is neither 
closed nor open but falls between the two.
Rationality may refer to those decisions that maximize common benefit. 
The actual relationship between RGD and workers’ performance is depicted 
in table 3. In comparison to the internal process dimension, the rational 
goals dimension marginally affects performance of government employees 
working at federal institutions. However, the entire mean estimate falls 
around 3, approaching the neutral point on the scale. Given this fact, the 
value of efficiency and effort slightly exceeds 3, meaning that respondents 
fairy agree that efficiency and effort (see table 3) contribute to the outcome 
variable. Still, one cannot conclude that RGD significantly determines work-
ers’ performance.
The individual employees’ factors remain an importance source of their 
performance. What are these and how large they are? Table 3 shows the 
individual variables that influence work performance. The indicators of the 
individual dimension are: job selection, employee competence, employee 
incentives (rewards), employee’s commitment, and turnover intention.
The employee competence estimate promises to raise individuals’ perfor-
mance among other individual factors; these latter were found by respondents 
to be unconvincing. However, the employee’s commitment score is 3.31, 
which slightly falls above the neutral scale. Despite poor statistical evidence 
of individual factors, still the individual dimension is better when compared 
to organizational factors. Generally, this dimension is found to be incon-
clusive, and may call for an eclectic reform in the public sector of Ethiopia. 
Fundamental changes such as enforcing the rule of law and professionalism, 
providing recognition and autonomy for employees, and treating the public 
service and politics separately are equally important.
Among others, attitude plays a key role in realizing certain endeavors. 
While a positive attitude leads to better results, a negative attitude leads to 
poor outcomes. Although attitude is a qualitative variable, it is measured by 
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many items and its weighted index is taken as single figure. The quantitative 
estimate is given in Table 3.
As shown by these statistics, workers’ attitude toward their roles, organiza-
tion, and managers is neither positive nor negative but indifferent. However, 
since attitude is a linking variable (casual mechanism) in our model, its effect 
on performance depends on other casual variables (organizational and indi-
vidual factors). In order to change the attitude of workers, various institutional 
and individual positive interventions might be needed on a continuous basis.
Best performance is associated with organizational goal achievement. As 
presented in table 3, the composite index of employee’s performance statistics 
reveals an acceptable level (3.5) of achievement.
Despite the small statistic for basic determinants as seen above, the ag-
gregate performance estimate is attractive. The standard error is also very 
small, indicating that the majority of the respondents fall around the mean 
value. Furthermore, a detailed explanation will be made from econometric 
analysis below.
4.3. Econometric Analysis 
In this subsection, a quantitative analysis is made from multiple regression 
models. The correlation and reliability analysis, model adequacy tests, and 
the regression results are presented and analyzed.
Correlation Analysis
Correlation between variables is said to be significant when the value is 
less than 0.05. The correlation along explanatory, mediator, and outcome 
variables is statistically significant at less than 1 percent level of significance 
(0.00). Table 4 presents the correlation of variables included in the model.
Table 4: Correlation statistics
Variables Org factor Ind factor Attitude Perform
Org factor 1.000
Ind factor .521** 1.000
Attitude .517** .494** 1.000
Perform .389** .537** .372** 1.000
Source: Computed from survey data
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From this table, it is clear that organizational factors have a good correlation 
with individual factors (0.52) and attitude (0.52) but are poorly correlated 
with performance (0.39). While individual factors yield acceptable levels 
of correlation with organizational issues and performance, they show weak 
correlation with attitude. Similarly, there is weak correlation between attitude 
and performance (0.37) and moderate correlation between attitude and the 
other two variables. Finally, performance is correlated with individual factors 
(0.54) but has weak correlation with organizational factors (0.39) and attitude 
(0.37). Generally, correlation analyses allow us to make a simple assertion, 
while regression results are more robust, as will be seen below.
Regression Analysis
The first model analyzes the basic determinants against employees’ perfor-
mance. The result of multiple regressions is depicted in table 5 below.
Table 5: Regression results
Model 1* Model 2* Model 3*
(Constant)
Indfactor .483** .323** .442**
Orgfactor .102* .354** .056
Attitude - .128*
Level of education .113** -.104* .127**
Work experience -.084* .042 -.089*
1* Dependent variable: Perform 
2* Dependent variable: Attitude 
3* Dependent variable: Perform 
Source: Computed from survey data
The weighted mean of these explanatory variables was taken, regressed, and 
the estimators presented. This stylized novel result is analyzed hereunder. The 
finding indicates that both the organizational and individual factors have a 
positive and significant impact on employees’ performance. However, neither 
all the organizational variables nor all the individual ones are significant. 
For instance, factors such as involvement, autonomy, supervision, welfare, 
innovation, formalization, tradition, outward focus, performance feedback, 
clarity of goals, etc. are statistically insignificant variables. The basic reason 
behind this is that a motivation and merit-based reward system is lacking 
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in public institutions. The other two control variables, level of education 
and work experience, are also important factors. But experience is inversely 
related to employee performance.
When coefficients are considered, the constant term is positive but 
statistically insignificant. This implies that, in the absence of collective 
and individual roles, performance cannot be assumed. Despite the direct 
relation and significance of organizational factors, its magnitude is small 
(for a unit role of OGF, employee perform would improve by 0.18 roles). 
This small magnitude implies that much work is required in order to raise 
the employees’ performance. Meanwhile, a unit increase in individual role/
intervention would lead to an increase in 0.707 units of workers’ performance. 
This value is relatively adequate, indicating that an individual’s role is vital 
to task performance. Put differently, individual roles are more important 
than institutional roles in determining performance. Important variables 
here include job selection, employee competence, employee incentives (or 
rewards), and employee’s commitment. The more motivated the employee, 
the more productive he/she will be and hence his/her organization too.
The second model considers attitude as a dependent variable and organi-
zational and individual factors as well as the control variables as explanatory 
variables. Table 5 model 2 shows the regression estimators of attitude.
This composite variable consists of twelve scaled items (reflecting indi-
vidual, organizational culture, value, goals, and mixed roles). Although the 
variable is more subjective, we have systematically quantified it to see both 
its direction and magnitude of influence. As presented in Table 5, all the 
indicated factors have significant (1 percent & 5 percent levels of significant) 
role on attitude. While the level of education and individual factors influence 
attitude at 1 percent levels of significance; work experience and organizational 
factors fit at 5 percent. In addition, work experience is negatively related to 
attitude, which means the longer an employee stays at a given organization, 
the lower his/her attitude toward common ends.
The third model in Table 5 analyzes the effect of organizational, individual, 
and attitudinal factors on employee performance. The regression result is 
presented as follows:
While the individual factor and attitude significantly affect public servants’ 
achievement, the organizational factor does not. This implies that organiza-
tional interventions are too small to influence employees’ performance, or 
that the approach might be not convincing. Use of inappropriate intervention 
strategies and poor leadership and the availability of a centralized decision-
making system may be responsible for such results. For a unit increase in 
individual and attitudinal factors, employees’ performance is improved by 
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a value of 0.646 and 0.105 units respectively. If one compares the coefficient 
of individual factors in model 1, 2 and 3, the direction of influence is similar. 
However, the magnitude of individual factor in model 1 is higher, followed 
by model 3 and then model 2.
The interesting implication here is that optimal employee performance 
can be achieved if and only if the cumulative effects of all basic determinants 
are in their normal states. Put differently, if one or more of organizational 
and attitudinal variables are missing, these conditions are expected to pull 
down the effect of individual factors on performance, ultimately decreasing 
the performance value. Thus, to achieve best organizational goals, public 
institutions need to work on individual factors, organizational factors, and 
attitudinal factors simultaneously.
5. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
5.1. Summary 
A total of 422 questionnaires were distributed to employees of selected 
federal public institutions in Addis Ababa. From the distributed question-
naire, 416 (98.6%) were collected and used in the data analysis. Reliability 
test was conducted and the result was acceptable for further analysis. Since 
each construct was affected by other constructs, a regression analysis was 
conducted, using employee performance as the dependent variable, attitude 
as the mediator variable and organizational climate and individual factors as 
independent variables. This was done to get the best linear combinations of 
the constructs as well as to obtain the predictive value of individual predictors 
for testing the hypotheses proposed. The researchers applied a quantitative 
approach, in the form of descriptive statistics to assess the level of employee 
perception on organizational culture, individual factors, attitude, and em-
ployee performance; inferential statistics involving the Pearson correlation 
in describing the relationship between organizational culture, individual 
factors, attitude, and employee performance; and path analysis in evaluating 
the mediating effect of attitude on the relationship between organizational 
climate, individual factors, and employee performance. In section 4, the 
primary data was analysed and interpreted in relation with the statement of 
the problem and objectives of the study. Finally, in this section, the conclusions 
reached on employee perception of organizational climate, individual factors, 
attitude, and employee performance were assessed and presented.
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5.2. Conclusion 
This research was conducted at Addis Ababa with the intent of critically 
assessing employees’ perception of organizational climate, individual factors, 
attitude, and employee performance in the federal public sector of Ethiopia. 
Based on the objectives and findings of the study, the following conclusions 
are worth highlighting.
The results of the study enable us to conclude that both organizational 
climate and individual factors determine public servants’ attitude and 
performance in federal public organizations in Ethiopia. The Pearson cor-
relation results of this study indicate that there is a significant relationship 
between organizational climate, individual factors, attitude, and employee 
performance in the studied areas. In terms of mediating effect, the study 
shows that attitude significantly mediates the relationship between individual 
factors and employee performance in the federal public sector. However, 
attitude does not mediate the relationship between organizational climate 
and employee performance.
5.3. Recommendations 
– It is recommended that the federal public sector should work on both 
the organizational factors (human relations dimension, rationale goals 
dimension, open systems dimension, and internal process dimensions) 
and individual factors (job selection, employee competence, employee 
incentives [rewards], employee’s commitment and turnover intention) 
and find ways to improve the perception of public servants, since their 
perception toward these factors is either low or moderate.
– The federal public sector should provide due emphasis to individual factors 
to facilitate positive attitudes in order to enhance employee performance
– An attitude is based on many factors that an employee brings to the 
workplace. When a public servant reports to work, his/her attitude 
affects his/her work performance. Public servant with good attitudes 
demonstrate stronger performance, while workers with poor attitudes 
exhibit less-than-superior performance. It is up to managers to monitor 
employee attitudes and address attitude problems.
– Management can assess whether an employee’s poor performance reflects 
an attitude problem or factors such as job satisfaction, an inability to 
handle work tasks, training needs, problems with the work environment, 
or personal problems. Upon closer examination, managers may find that 
an employee struggles to perform because of a combination of these 
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or other factors. Therefore, it is important to approach an employee’s 
performance problems with care, because they may or may not be related 
to his/her attitude.
– Management should encourage and recognize employees with positive 
attitudes and satisfactory or above-average performance. These employees 
contribute to a positive workplace and positively impact workplace morale. 
They are often unnoticed because people with negative attitudes or weak 
performance demand more of a manager’s time. Recognition reinforces 
their positive attributes and promotes continued achievement.
– Management should empower the executives and believe in the ability of 
their people and give them the support they need to achieve organizational 
goals. Management should provide freedom to employees to decide how 
to deliver the required results through innovation, decisiveness, and 
action.
– It is optimal for federal public institutions to enhance public servants’ 
performance by investing more in incentives, training, and development 
programs. Employees need up-to-date knowledge and skills to perform 
well, because training continually nourishes their work attitude and 
behaviour.
– Finally, further research should investigate in depth how public servants’ 
performance within the federal public sector varies over time. Panel data 
econometric modelling might be used to explain the determinants of 
performance across time. Similarly, future empirical research in the area 
in question will be helpful in considering the space-time differences in 
explaining determinants of public servants’ performance.
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Box 1: Key points of the chapter
 there are various approaches/perspectives used to assess/measure universities’ 
level of iA;
 the level of iA of Ethiopian public universities is quite low when evaluated 
through the EuAs methodology; and
 though it has its own limitations and contextualizing that warrant serious 
attention, the EuAs could serve as a useful tool in evaluating and improving the 
iA of public universities in Ethiopia.
Box 2: Reading this chapter will give an insight about
 the concept of iA (including its types, the rationale for it, and how it is measured /
assessed); and
 Ethiopian public universities’ current levels of (a) organizational; (b) academic; (c) 
staffing; and (d) financial autonomy.
Box 3: Abbreviations 
EuA = European university Association 
EuAs = European university Autonomy scorecard
Fcsc = Federal civil service commission 
FdrE = Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia 
hE = higher Education 
hEis = higher Education institutions 
hEP = higher Education Proclamation
hErQA = higher Education relevance and Quality Agency 
hEss = higher Education systems 
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hEsc = higher Education strategy center 
hPr = house of Peoples’ representatives
iA = institutional Autonomy
moshE = ministry of science and higher Education
mu = mekelle university 
QA = Quality Assurance
1. Background 
Since the end of the twentieth century, the rapid expansion of higher education 
(HE); the growing complexity of higher education institutions (HEIs); 
and the emergence of the knowledge-based global economy (which has 
led to growing expectations from HEIs to contribute to national economic 
development), have resulted in a demand for states to give more autonomy 
to HEIs (Marmolejo, 2016). Consequently, a significant reduction in state 
regulation of HEIs and a substantial increase in the latter’s autonomy have 
become characteristic features of higher education systems (HESs) in the 
twenty-first century. In the context of HE, Mora (2001) defines autonomy as 
“the ability of universities to organize their own affairs without interference 
from the state” (p. 102, cited in Tamrat, 2012, p.2). Here, it is noteworthy 
that institutional autonomy (IA) does not imply the absence of external 
regulation. For example, states can regulate HEIs to ensure quality and 
fairness (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017). Further, IA is defined not only in 
terms of the state-university relationship but also in terms of the universities’ 
independence from the market and non-state actors.
So far, however, the questions of the pertinent areas/dimensions of 
autonomy, how much autonomy should be granted, and how autonomy is 
measured in the context of HE remain debated among scholars and practition-
ers alike. For example, historical and traditional practices as well as political 
and societal culture ideals, norms, and beliefs usually dictate the question how 
much autonomy should be offered to institutions. This is so because countries 
have different legal frameworks and historical and cultural settings that shape 
universities’ IA (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017). This makes comparison among 
HESs difficult. Cognizant of this, the European University Association (EUA) 
launched a European University Autonomy Scorecard (EUAS) in 2011 and 
developed, for the first time, a methodology to score and compare data on 
university autonomy in Europe (Estermann & Pruvot, 2018). In 2017, the 
EUA produced an updated version of the EUAS, published with the title “The 
University Autonomy in Europe-III: The Scorecard 2017,” which includes 
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the autonomy profile of twenty-nine European HESs and an interactive 
online tool demonstrating the level of autonomy in each system. The EUA 
claims that the EUAS allows for benchmarking and can serve as a reference 
and tool of analysis within and beyond Europe (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017). 
In fact, Matei & Iwinska (2018) argue that the EUAS “is the only such tool 
allowing for benchmarking of autonomy available in Europe and probably 
in the world” (p. 363). This study thus intends to apply the EUAS to Africa, 
taking Ethiopia as a case study.
Ethiopia is an interesting case study because, on the one hand, the num-
ber of HEIs (both public and private) has grown rapidly over the last two 
decades. The number of public universities and the number of private HEIs 
(universities, university colleges, colleges, and institutes) increased from 
barely two public universities before 2000 to forty-five and from zero private 
institutions to two hundred twenty-one in 2019, respectively (HERQA, 2019; 
MoSHE, 2019). This rapid expansion has made it difficult, if not impossible, 
for the state to regulate HEIs directly. On the other hand, the Ethiopian 
HES is characterized by poor performance in terms of quality of teaching, 
quality and productivity of research outputs, and level of engagement with 
the local community and industry (Akalu, 2014; Woldegiyorgis, 2014). 
Although there could be several other factors (including lack of the necessary 
inputs/resources) for the low performance, it could partially be attributed 
to lack of sufficient autonomy. This is so because recent studies have identi-
fied governance, with autonomy as its core component, as among the key 
determinant factors that influence the performance of HEIs (Aghion et al., 
2010; Fiszbein & Ringold, 2012). More specifically, a study by Aghion, et al. 
(2010) found a strong relationship between universities’ level of autonomy 
and their performance on research. Autonomy enables HEIs to respond 
flexibly to emerging market and societal demands (Fiszbein & Ringold, 
2012). Generally, although other factors are equally necessary, “institutional 
autonomy is a crucial precondition that enables universities to achieve their 
missions in the best possible way” (Estermann & Steinel, 2011:87). Today, as 
HEIs are increasingly affected by both government regulations and market 
mechanisms, university autonomy has become a key area of focus for HES.
Thus far, there are only a few studies (see for example, Akalu, 2014; As-
gedom & Hagos, 2015; Gebru, 2013; Tamrat, 2012) focusing on the IA of 
Ethiopian public HEIs, and none of them employed comprehensive autonomy 
indicators such as the EUAS. Gebru (2013) rightly observes that the “academic 
literature on university autonomy in Ethiopia is scanty” (p.278). Thus, the 
present study fills this gap by applying the EUAS methodology. Pruvot and 
Estermann, the crafters of the EUAS, claim that the EUAS “contributes to 
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raising awareness in the university sector of the changes needed to create 
a regulatory environment favorable to university autonomy.” Therefore, 
a study that applies the EUAS methodology, a tool devised to drive “the 
modernization of European higher education” (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017:7) 
to Ethiopia, could motivate the concerned bodies to either adapt the EUAS 
methodology as a tool to modernize Ethiopia’s HE system or develop an 
alternative tool. Here, it is noteworthy that, so far, Ethiopia has no tool or 
methodology designed to assess the IA of its public universities. Thus, this 
chapter intends to: (1) examine the concept of IA; and (2) asses/measure 
the level of (a) organizational (b) academic (c) staffing, and (d) financial 
autonomy of Ethiopian public universities using the EUAS methodology.
The next section presents a literature review. While the third section offers 
the methodology adopted, the fourth one assesses/measures the level of IA 
of Ethiopian public universities using the EUAS methodology. The chapter 
ends with a discussion and concluding remarks.
2. Literature Review 
2.1. The Concept of Institutional Autonomy 
IA is a multidimensional concept (Matei & Iwinska, 2018; Pruvot & Ester-
mann, 2017). It denotes “to the ability of [HEIs] to set and implement their 
own policies and priorities for teaching and research, perhaps also other 
aspects of their mission, such as community service” (Bergan et al., 2016:3). 
In a recent publication, Matei (2017, in Matei & Iwinska, 2018) provided 
a similar definition, wherein IA is defined as “the right of the university 
to determine its organization and administrative structures, to decide on 
priorities, manage its budget, hire personnel and admit students, decide on 
the content and form of its teaching and research”(p. 349). IA involves the 
“freedom to exercise control over staffing, student, curriculum and teaching, 
academic standards, research, leader selection, administration, and finance” 
(Gebru, 2013:279).
IA is not a static concept. Accordingly, Estermann (2015) defines IA “as 
constantly changing relations between the state and universities and the 
differing degree of control exerted by public authorities, which are dependent 
on particular national contexts and circumstances” (p. 28). Similarly, Berdahl 
(1990) argues that unlike academic freedom, whose contents are supposed 
to be a universal value, IA is a relative value and may justifiably vary in its 
contents from place to place and from time to time. Thus, HESs can give more 
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freedom to certain dimensions of autonomy and less to other dimensions 
depending on several factors (Gebru, 2013). All these definitions imply 
that IA is not absolute. In this chapter, we adopted the following definition 
provided by the International Association of Universities (IAU):
The principle of institutional autonomy can be defined as the necessary degree 
of independence from external interference that the University requires in 
respect of its internal organization and governance, the internal distribution 
of financial resources and the generation of income from non public sources, the 
recruitment of its staff, the setting of the conditions of study and, finally, the 
freedom to conduct teaching and research (IAU, 1998: n.p).
2.2. What is the Need for Institutional Autonomy? 
Universities need “exceptional” freedom “because they provide or contribute 
to the provision of an exceptional public good or service to society: knowledge” 
(Marginson, 2016 cited in Matei & Iwinska, 2018, p. 348). A recent joint 
statement by All European Academies, EUA, and Science Europe (April 2019) 
asserts, “Research can only contribute to a prosperous and sustainable future 
if it is conducted according to [the principles of academic freedom and IA]” 
(n.p). Similarly, a special statement on academic freedom from a 1992 UN-
ESCO conference in Romania warns, “History has shown that violations of 
academic freedom and institutional autonomy have high costs in intellectual 
regression, social alienation and economic stagnation” (Matei & Iwinska, 
2014:22). In sum, autonomy is at the heart of intellectual dynamism, scientific 
development, and innovation (King, 2007 cited in Gebru, 2013).
Generally, two broad perspectives may be distinguished: the non-instrumen-
talist and instrumentalist perspectives. From a non-instrumentalist perspective, 
universities need distinctive autonomy to serve as a social conscience in 
pursuit of truth and articulation of universal values (Moses, 2007) and to 
play a pivotal role in nurturing democratic culture and progressive values 
(King, 2007 cited in Gebru, 2013). From an instrumentalist perspective, 
universities need autonomy to enhance their performance (Aghion, et al., 
2010; Choi, 2019; Estermann; 2015; Varghese & Martin, 2013).
2.3. Types of Institutional Autonomy
Broadly, IA is classified into two major types: substantive and procedural. 
While substantive autonomy refers to determining institutional goals and pro-
grams, procedural autonomy concerns the right of universities to determine 
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the means of achieving the goals and implanting the programs (Berdahl, 
1990). According to Raze (2009, cited in Tamrat, 2012), in the context of 
HE, while substantive autonomy involves academic issues (which include 
curriculum design, research policy, setting entrance standards, academic 
staff appointment, awarding degrees, etc.), procedural autonomy deals with 
the nonacademic aspects of the university (such as budgeting, financial 
management, purchasing, etc.).
2.4. Measuring Institutional Autonomy
Since the notion and perception of IA varies from country to county, so far it 
remains difficult to come up with a standardized way of measuring/assessing 
the level of IA that could be applicable across HESs.
Having said this, three approaches to assessing/measuring IA are noticeable 
in the current literature. One is represented by Beiter et al. (2016, cited in Choi, 
2019), and approaches IA from a non-instrumentalist perspective. Based on this 
perspective, Beiter et al., “developed a scorecard that measures the degree of 
protection of institutional autonomy using indicators such as provision on insti-
tutional autonomy in legislation, organizational autonomy, financial autonomy, 
staffing autonomy, academic autonomy, extent of government intervention, and 
institutional independence from private interests” (Choi, 2019, p.19).
The second approach is represented, principally, by the EUA, which tackles 
IA from an instrumentalist point of view. In 2011 the EUA developed a 
relatively comprehensive quantitative methodology, the EUAS, to measure 
and rank university autonomy in Europe in a comparative perspective (Pruvot 
& Estermann, 2017).
Finally, Choi (2019) recently developed an IA assessment framework that 
combines the instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist perspective. Choi identi-
fied indicators based on universities’ stakeholders, which are grouped into six 
categories: (1) academic staff, (2) administrators, (3) students, (4) governments, 
(5) industries, and (6) society at large (p. 21). Using this perspective, Choi 
identified autonomy indicators for each stakeholder. For example, the autonomy 
indicators for academic staff include the “right to speak on institutional issues, 
representation in university governance, autonomy in curriculum design, and 
legal provision for the protection of academic speech” (p. 25). Choi’s approach 
is interesting but may need further investigation and validation.
In general, it should be noted that, as rightly claimed by Pruvot & Es-
termann (2017), “autonomy cannot be measured objectively” (p.13) and 
thus selection of indicators and the values of importance attributed to each 
indicator are determined normatively. Further, some regulations are not 
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considered as restrictions. For example, the EUA does not consider regula-
tions meant to ensure quality of services and fairness of employment as 
restrictions. However, if HEIs are not allowed, for example, to freely choose 
quality assurance mechanisms and providers, it may be seen as a restriction.
3. Methodology
The concept of IA is usually approached from an institutional perspective. 
Thus, the EUAS takes public universities as its unit of analysis (Pruvot & 
Estermann, 2017). This study adopted the EUAS approach to measuring 
IA. The EUAS “focuses on regulatory frameworks” (Estermann & Pruvot, 
2018:3) because constraints to autonomy usually stem from proclamations, 
presidential decrees or regulations, directives, and circular letters, etc. Ac-
cordingly, data for this study are mainly generated from Ethiopia’s regulatory 
frameworks pertinent to the HE sector.
However, to further understand the interpretations and practical applica-
tions of the regulatory framework, we studied Mekelle University (MU), 
one of Ethiopia’s large public universities. The reason for selecting only one 
university is that Ethiopia’s public universities, large or small, old or new, are 
(re)established by the Council of Ministers’ Regulation as equal autonomous 
entities (see HPR, 2019). Thus, they are not legally differentiated in terms of 
autonomy, notwithstanding the recent attempt for differentiation1 (which has 
not yet been implemented,). Moreover, the EUAS does not account for the 
peculiarity of institutions available within a given HE system. For example, 
it may be assumed that research universities may have more autonomy (in 
some respects) than comprehensive universities in a given HE system. The 
EUAS does not entertain this, albeit the EUA sees this as a limitation.
Although the EUAS measures autonomy from an institutional perspective, 
its focus is on developing a country profile on university autonomy. Finally, the 
reason for selecting MU has to do with convenience. One of the researchers 
is a faculty member of this university, which makes accessing data relatively 
easier. Moreover, his lived experience, including as Institutional Reform 
Team member and Institutional Reform Director in this university, is an 
asset for this project.
The EUA separates autonomy dimensions into four categories: organi-
zational, academic, staffing, and financial, each of them composed of several 
indicators (thirty-eight in total) (Estermann & Pruvot, 2018), each indica-
tor having relative weights within each dimension of autonomy (Pruvot 
& Estermann, 2017:60). For example, organizational autonomy consists 
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of eight indicators and a value is allocated to each indicator based on rela-
tive importance. For instance, from the eight indicators of organizational 
autonomy, the highest value is allocated to the indicator called “capacity to 
decide on academic structure” (15 percent). However, unlike indicators, the 
dimensions of autonomy are not rated based on their relative importance and 
thus each dimension is assumed to have equal value.
For the purpose of simplicity, the EUA also uses a non-weighted rating. 
By this approach, “Each restriction on university autonomy [is] assigned a 
deduction value based on how restrictive a particular rule or regulation [is] 
seen to be. A score of 100% indicates full institutional autonomy; a score 
of 0% means that an issue is entirely regulated by an external authority” 
(Pruvot & Estermann, 2017:10). To take the above indicators as an example, 
if central law determines a university’s academic structure, the indicator 
would be rated as 0 percent; if it is internally determined, it would receive 
100 percent; and if it were to be negotiated with external authority, it would be 
around 60 percent. Another example is the selection procedure of a university 
executive head. If the selection of a university executive head is externally 
verified, the indicator receives 0 percent, if it is determined internally, then 
the score becomes 100 percent.
In this study, we adopted the unweighted system because the weighted 
system2 is developed based on the relative importance of indicators, consider-
ing Europe’s context. Second, we did not consult stakeholders such as the 
Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MoSHE), Higher Education 
Relevance and Quality Agency (HERQA), Higher Education Strategy Center 
(HESC),3 or university presidents, etc. The EUA determined the weighted 
value after conducting several round discussions with concerned stakeholders, 
such as with the Rectors’ Association of European Universities (Pruvot & 
Estermann, 2017).
The unweighted system of the EUAS online tool enables assigning un-
weighted value for each indicator, thereby determining the level of autonomy 
for each dimension. For example, according to the online interactive tool, if 
the selection of the executive head is not validated by an external authority, 
then the indicator receives 100 percent. If external validation is required, 
however, it will receive 0 percent regardless of how much the university 
is involved in the selection of the executive head (see EUA, 2020). This 
is so because external validation could imply rejection of the university 
community’s preferred candidates.
We introduced two minor modifications in adopting the EUAS methodol-
ogy. First, under the staffing dimension, the EUAS limits the indicators to 
senior academic and senior administrative staff. However, since there is not 
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much difference between senior and junior staff in the context of Ethiopia, 
except in the case of promotion to full professorship, we decided to simply 
use the term staff (for both academic and administrative). Second, under 
financial dimension, there is an indicator for the “ability to charge tuition 
fees for non-EU students” (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017, p. 70). For the case 
of Ethiopia, international or non-Ethiopian students replace the “non-EU” 
students in the original methodology.
The EUAS assumes that for universities to be considered as fully autono-
mous entities, all issues represented by each indicator should be decided/
handled internally. In order to facilitate comparisons, the EUA clusters the 
level of autonomy of HESs as follows:






Source: Pruvot & Estermann, 2017
Finally, based on the four dimensions of autonomy identified by the EUA, we 
purposefully selected the following key informants from MU: vice-president 
for academics; budget and planning director; quality assurance head; hu-
man resource officers; and finance officers. Semi structured interviews were 
conducted from December 11 to 13, 2019. Interview results were analyzed 
against each indicator. Consent for an interview was obtained in exchange 
for anonymity. Hence, interviewees are cited in the text anonymously.
4. Assessing the Level of Institutional Autonomy of 
Ethiopian Public Universities 
In this section, we assess the level of IA of Ethiopian public universities. To 
put it into a comparative perspective, we compared it with several European 
HESs, whose level of IA is measured using the EUAS. The comparison is made 
based on the 2017 EUA report that covers the autonomy profile of twenty-nine 
European HESs. Under annex 1, we present the autonomy scorecard of 
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twenty-nine European HESs. Table 2 presents the actual values generated 
for each indicator as well as the overall and each dimension’s score of IA in 
Ethiopia. Each of the dimensions and indicators are discussed.





Organizational 24.4 Low 
Selection procedure for the executive head 0
Selection criteria for the executive head 75
Dismissal of the executive head 0
Term of office of the executive head 0
Inclusion of external members in university governing 
bodies 
30
Selection of external members in university governing 
bodies
30
Capacity to decide on academic structures 0
Capacity to create legal entities 60
Academic 24.3 Low 
Capacity to decide on overall student numbers 60
Capacity to select students 30
Capacity to introduce and terminate 0
Capacity to choose the language of instruction 0
Capacity to select QA mechanisms 0
Capacity to select QA providers 0
Capacity to design content of degree programs 80
Staffing 39.4 Low 
Capacity to decide on recruitment procedures 
(academic staff)
80
Capacity to decide on recruitment procedures 
(administrative staff)
0
Capacity to decide on salaries (academic staff) 0
Capacity to decide on salaries (administrative staff) 0





Capacity to decide on dismissals (academic staff) 100
Capacity to decide on dismissals (administrative staff) 60
Capacity to decide on promotions (academic staff) 50
Capacity to decide on promotions (administrative staff) 25
Financial 42 Medium low 
Length of public funding 60
Type of public funding 60
Ability to keep surplus 0
Ability to borrow money 0
Ability to own buildings 0
Ability to charge tuition fees for Ethiopian students 75
Ability to charge tuition fees for non-Ethiopian 
students
100
Overall 32.3 Low 
Adopted from Pruvot & Estermann, 2017.
4.1. Organizational Autonomy 
Selection Procedure for the Executive Head (the President) 
The Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MoSHE) is the main regula-
tory body of the HE sector. All universities have governing and advisory 
bodies, which include a board (composed of external members and mandated 
with supervising and monitoring the overall operation of the university), 
a president and vice-presidents, senate (composed of internal members 
and mandated mainly with academic affairs), etc. (HPR, 2019). The board 
nominates and the Minister of MoSHE (if the university is under the federal 
government) or the head of the appropriate regional state agency (if the 
university is under a regional government) appoints the president of a public 
university. Selection procedures for the president are stringently stated by 
the country’s current Higher Education law (HEP, Proc.No. 1152/2019) (see 
HPR, 2019, art. 52) and by the “Directive on Selection and Appointment 
of Leaders and Managers in Higher Education Institutions” (here after the 
Directive) (MoSHE, 2018). According to the Directive, the nominees are 
542 solomon GEbrEYohAns GEbru, AnniE hondEGhEm, And bruno broucKEr
first selected by a “Search and Selection Committee,” which is composed 
of representatives (one each) from the board, senate, academic staff, and 
administrative staff and students’ union. After screening candidates, the 
committee submits five nominees to the board.
The board conducts additional evaluation and recommends three nominees 
for appointment to the minister of MoSHE. Although the board and senate 
representatives have a say in rating presidential candidates, the minister has 
a final say in selecting the president from among the three nominees. The 
fact that Ethiopian universities are fully dependent on state for funding may 
justify the appointment of their presidents by external authority. However, 
it could also emanate from the country’s political culture, which is known 
for power centralization. Usually, executive heads are either elected (for 
example by electoral body or governing body) or appointed (by the board or 
the senate or external authority). In either case, the selection of the executive 
head may need external verification (like in Ethiopia), which undermines 
IA since external verification could imply rejection of preferred nominees 
or elected candidates. According to the 2017 EUA report, in Europe too, 
external validation for the appointment of the rector is required in twelve 
out of the twenty-nine HESs considered.
Selection Criteria for the Executive Head 
Similar to the selection procedure, detailed criteria for presidential candidates 
and their weights are listed under the Directive. For example, presidential 
candidates are required to have a doctorate degree or its equivalent, albeit 
exceptions are allowed. However, candidates are not required to hold academic 
positions. Accordingly, candidates can come both from within and outside 
the university (MoSHE, 2018). This gives universities the opportunity to 
choose their president from a wide range of candidates, within the given law. 
This is in line with the designation of the president as “chief executive” by 
the HEP (HPR, 2019), which shows the focus on managerial quality rather 
than academic excellence. Thus, the president can be someone with a good 
managerial background from other sectors. Although some HESs are still 
exercising the traditional rectorship, particularly in Southern and Eastern 
Europe, Europe has shifted towards the CEO type (Estermann, 2015). Stating 
the qualification for candidates in the national law remains dominant in 
Europe too, where two-third (nineteen) of the twenty-nine HESs fall under 
this model. Unlike Ethiopia, fourteen of these nineteen HESs also require 
presidential candidates to hold academic positions in the university. In this 
regard, thus, there is more flexibility in Ethiopia, although this may not be 
necessarily for the good.
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Term of Office and Dismissal of the Executive head 
The term of office for the president as stated both in the HEP and in the 
Directive is six years and can be renewed once. Thus, universities do not 
have the freedom to determine the term of office of their presidents. This 
seems in common with many European states, where the term of office of the 
executive is stated in the law in nearly 80 percent of the twenty-nine HESs 
(Pruvot & Estermann, 2017). The dismissal of the executive head is also 
strictly regulated by law and it is the minister of MoSHE or the concerned 
regional state agency, as the case may be, who relieves her/him from power. 
The conditions for dismissal are also plainly stated in the HEP. The HEP 
also allows the board to remove or cause the removal of the president under 
certain circumstances (HPR, 2019). In Europe too, rectors’ terms of office 
are stated in the law in nearly 80 percent (twenty-three) of cases, and rector’s 
dismissal is strictly regulated by law in almost two thirds (eighteen) of the 
twenty-nine HESs.
Determining Internal Academic Structure 
Ethiopia’s HEP grants universities the autonomy to “set up their organizational 
structure and enact and implement [their] internal rules and procedures” 
(HPR, 2019:11456). Yet, this autonomy is highly restricted by the same 
proclamation. The HEP prescribes the list of governing and advisory bodies 
that must be constituted in universities. They include: board, president and 
vice-presidents, senate, managing council, university council, academic 
unit council, academic unit managing council, and department council. 
Moreover, the constitution, composition, power, and responsibilities of the 
first five bodies are already stipulated by the HEP. Although determining 
the composition, constitution, responsibilities, and decision-making process 
of the last three bodies is left to universities, this requires an approval from 
the board. The board, senate or the university council can establish other 
advisory or specialized committees. The HEP also obliges universities to 
establish academic units in a hierarchical governance structure, even though 
determining the level of the hierarchy is left to universities.
The names of the academic units are also already prescribed by the HEP 
and include college, faculty, school, institute, department, and center, although 
the law does not specify the number of academic units to be established. 
Moreover, the HEP requires that the governing and managing bodies of 
academic units be approved by the board. Here, it is noteworthy that the board 
is usually seen as an external body (see for example, Gebru, 2013) since all its 
members, except the president, are external and since it is established by and 
directly accountable to MoSHE (HPR, 2019). Generally, therefore, much of 
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the internal academic structure and the governing and managing bodies of 
universities is centrally prescribed, leaving less freedom to universities. Only 
in less than a third of the twenty-nine HESs is internal academic structure 
determined by external law in Europe, which implies Ethiopia is lagging 
behind on this indicator.
Creating Legal Entities
This indicator concerns whether HEIs have the autonomy to establish both 
not-for-profit and for-profit legal entities to support their mission. Ethiopia’s 
current HEP allows universities to establish an income generating enterprise, 
which operates like any business organization, albeit this needs approval from 
the board (HPR, 2019). Although this may seem formally less restrictive, 
again the fact that all board members, except the president, are external to 
universities may make establishing income-generating enterprises difficult. 
Moreover, the sources of income that enterprises may generate are restricted 
by the HEP. Here, the board is expected to play a political role by preventing 
universities from engaging in income generating areas that would negate 
their main mission and negatively affect the interest of other businesses. 
Universities are also required to report to the Ministry of Finance and MoSHE 
“receipt of funds from third parties and its investment incomes” (HPR, 
2019:1150). This could result in restrictive consequences. Finally, the new 
HEP states that a directive shall determine details about income generating 
enterprises, which has not yet been issued. While Ethiopia is ahead of two 
European HESs, which allow establishing only not-for-profit entities, it is 
lagging behind nineteen HESs, which allow creating legal entities without 
specific constraints.
Inclusion and Selection of External Members in University Governing 
Bodies
This indicator assumes that HEIs should have the autonomy to include or 
not to include external members in their governing bodies, and that if they 
have the right to include external members, they should have the autonomy to 
select them by themselves (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017). However, the types 
of governing bodies depend on the type of governance structure. There is no 
common nomenclature among HESs and institutions. The international trend 
shows the presence of two main types of governance structures in terms of 
governing bodies: dual and unitary. In a dual structure, there are mainly two 
types of governing bodies: board/council and senate. Although the scope 
and division of responsibilities varies from system to system, they usually 
have clearly divided competencies. In countries with unitary governance 
institutionAl AutonomY oF EthioPiAn Public uniVErsitiEs 545
structure, there is only one governing body, which may be known as the 
senate, council or by other names, responsible for all major decisions (Pruvot 
& Estermann, 2017).
Ethiopia’s HEP lists several governing and advisory bodies for universities 
(HPR, 2019). However, in common with the international trend, here we 
shall focus on two governing bodies: board and senate and evaluate whether 
universities have the right to include, or not, external members in these 
bodies. The board, composed of seven voting members, is the “supreme 
governing body” (p.11482) in public universities. All members of the board, 
except the president, who is a nonvoting member, are centrally decided to be 
external and thus universities do not have the autonomy to decide on this issue. 
The board is mainly entrusted with administrative, financial, and strategic 
matters. The senate is the leading body for academic matters. According to 
the HEP, membership to the senate and its size is left to be determined by 
the establishing law of the university, and the latter is not prohibited from 
including external members to this body. Nonetheless, the HEP clearly 
states that the majority of the members of the senate should come from the 
academic staff. Upon advice by the president, the board is entitled to modify 
or change senate membership, number, and terms of office. In Europe, there 
has been a trend toward the inclusion of external members, especially in 
HESs or HEIs with dual governance structures. The purpose is not only 
to ensure accountability but also to foster links with industries and other 
sectors (Estermann, 2015). In Ethiopia, however, members of the board have 
been dominantly drawn from the government (more specifically from the 
ruling party). One key informant judges the board as a “club of politicians” 
(interview, December 11, 2019).
Regarding selection of the board, while public universities have only the 
right to be consulted in appointing three members, the MoSHE directly 
appoints four members. The HEP also prescribes the profiles of the individuals 
to be nominated to board membership. Ethiopia’s current HEP shows a trend 
of recentralization in the nomination of board members. In the previous 
HEP (Proc. no. 650/2009), the president, in consultation with the senate 
and university council, had the power to nominate three members (see HPR, 
2009). Today, this power is reduced only to being consulted. When it comes 
to the senate, the president is authorized to appoint a majority of the members, 
who should come from academic staff. The HEP does not prescribe as regards 
to the appointment of the remaining members.
Generally, compared to the senate, the board has a plethora of powers 
and responsibilities (such as determining policies regarding employment, 
promotions, discipline, salary, allowance, payments related to education, and 
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other benefits, etc. (HPR, 2019, see art. 45). Thus, the fact that board members 
are external and their composition and appointment, predominantly drawn 
from top government officials, is externally decided is a severe restriction for 
public universities compared to a self-governing institution (Moses, 2007). 
In Europe, the situation with regard to selection and inclusion of external 
members in universities’ governing bodies is highly divided. In some HESs, 
universities can appoint external members, in others they cannot appoint 
but can make proposals, still in others they can neither appoint nor propose 
(and thus it is done externally), and finally, in other systems they can appoint 
some of the external members. With regard to inclusion, while three HESs 
prohibit universities from including external members, many HESs determine 
the threshold for/proportion of external members to be included (Pruvot & 
Estermann, 2017).
4.2. Academic Autonomy 
Autonomy to Decide on Overall Student Numbers
In Ethiopia, according to the HEP, MoSHE determines student placement in 
public institutions, based on university intake capacity proposed by academic 
units and the availability of facilities (such as dormitories), universities’ 
proposal of the overall number of undergraduate students they would be 
able to accommodate, and in consultation with universities. However, if the 
number of deserving students exceeds the demand offered by the universities, 
then MoSHE negotiates with each university. Yet, the HEP does not make it 
clear whether MoSHE determines student placement for all levels of academic 
programs (bachelor, master’s, and doctorate) and for fee-paying students. 
In practice, so far, MoSHE decides only on the placement of state-funded 
undergraduate students in consultation with universities. Meanwhile, uni-
versities have been freely determining the overall number of regular master’s 
and doctorate programs, except for those assigned by MoSHE (former MoE) 
and self-paying non-regular graduate and undergraduate students (interview, 
December 12, 2019), although the HEP does not prohibits MoSHE from 
determining the overall number of applicants, in consultation with universities 
(HPR, 2019). In Europe, from the twenty-nine HESs, “only in a minority 
of systems are institutions entirely free to decide on their student intake” 
(Pruvot & Estermann, 2017:34).
Generally, however, the trend in Europe seems to be moving toward a 
negotiation-based approach (which is the case in Ethiopia too). Universities 
exclusively decide about the overall number of students in seven HESs; decide 
only on fee-paying students in four HESs (while the number of state-funded 
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students is determined externally); negotiate with external authority in eleven 
HESs; have no say in one HES; and admission is free in six HESs.
Autonomy to Select Students
a) Undergraduate Students 
In Europe, twelve out of the twenty-nine HESs follow a co-regulated model at 
the undergraduate level. In Ethiopia, the HEP and MoSHE determine admission 
criteria for undergraduate students. According to the HEP, admission to the 
undergraduate program requires accomplishing secondary school and passing 
entrance exams set by individual universities. The HEP also allows gradu-
ates of TVET with level 4 qualification and two years’ experience to enroll in 
undergraduate programs (HPR, 2019). So far, students who passed secondary 
school with the score above the cut-off point set by MoSHE (annually) have 
been allowed to enroll in undergraduate programs, with no entrance exam from 
the university side. Thus, universities do not have any say in determining the 
admission criteria for undergraduate students (interview, December 1,1, 2019). 
Finally, until the 2019/20 academic year, universities were required to place 
70 percent of their students in engineering and natural science and 30 percent in 
humanities and social sciences. Recently, the ratio has been changed to 60 percent 
and 40 percent, respectively. Since public universities are fully dependent on 
state funding and since the state sees the value of HE from an instrumentalist 
point of view (producing working force, reducing poverty, bringing economic 
structural change, and ensuring global competitiveness, etc.,) (see for example, 
MoE, 2015; NPC, 2016), this kind of regulation is not unexpected.
b) Graduate Students
Similarly, the HEP dictates the minimum requirements needed for joining 
graduate programs. However, it also allows universities to set their own 
requirements and determine the content of entrance exams. For a master’s 
degree, students are required to accomplish undergraduate studies with 
adequate academic results and pass entrance exams given by the individual 
universities. For the doctorate level, candidates are required to accomplish 
a second degree and obtain academic results required by the individual 
university (HPR, 2019). Therefore, formally, universities have the autonomy 
to select second- and third- degree applicants. However, until recent years, 
the government was requiring universities (particularly those which run 
graduate programs) to enroll some second- and third-degree applicants 
without requiring them to take entrance exams. This was so because, following 
the rapid expansion of HE, the government was aggressively looking for 
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academic staff for its newly established universities. This was perceived by 
the academic community as a violation of autonomy and as damaging to the 
quality of education (Akalu, 2014). At the graduate level, officially, Ethiopia 
seems in line with the European trend where admission is entirely regulated by 
universities in twenty-seven HESs, except in “the French-speaking community 
of Belgium and in Switzerland” (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017:36).
c) Special Admission 
Ethiopia’s HEP also allows for special admission procedures for disadvantaged 
citizens. The Council of Ministers determines such a procedure. Universities 
can also admit adults under a special admission procedure determined by 
MoSHE and the senate of individual universities.
Autonomy to Introduce and Terminate Academic Programs
Universities can open new and close existing degree programs at all levels 
(bachelor, master’s and doctorate) and all modalities (regular, distance, 
evening, etc.) but only with the approval of the board and MoSHE (HPR, 
2019). Thus, external approval is required for opening and closing academic 
programs. Although not explicitly mentioned in the HEP, this approval serves 
as accreditation, because students who received degree awards from academic 
programs not recognized by MoSHE are not allowed to enter the market. 
Getting approval also implies getting funds. So far, external approval remains 
more formal than substantive (interview, December 12, 2019). Previously, 
public universities followed a self-accreditation approach, where the senate 
was the highest body responsible. So far, although universities conduct course 
or curriculum evaluation, academic programs at public universities are not 
legally subject to external accreditation, be it from professional associations 
or HERQA. Finally, although it has been positively received, the government 
has been pressuring (or encouraging) universities to diversify academic 
programs vertically and horizontally.
In relation to the introduction and termination of academic programs, the 
situation in Europe is complex and divided. In some HESs for example, the 
“state determines the academic field, or educational remit, of universities” 
(Pruvot & Estermann, 2017:37), while other HESs require regular periodic 
accreditation of academic programs. Generally, there are four varieties. In 
eight HESs, opening a new program does not require pre-accreditation; 
pre-accreditation is necessary for public funding in four HESs, introducing 
any new program requires accreditation in nine HESs and other restrictions 
apply in eight HESs. Thus, the freedom to open academic programs without 
accreditation or other restrictions seems limited to only a few HESs.
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Autonomy to Design Content of Degree Programs 
Ethiopia’s HEP states that HEIs “shall enjoy the liberty of developing curricula 
for all of [their] academic programs” (HPR, 2019:11459). On the other side, 
the HEP authorizes MoSHE to “coordinate curricula development common 
to public institutions”. Besides, the HEP authorizes MoSHE, HERQA, and 
HESC to guide curriculum development through a national qualification 
framework. Practically, curriculum development for undergraduate students 
is highly centralized or homogenized. One key informant at MU had to say 
the following in relation to this:
Almost a decade ago, most undergraduate curriculums were harmonized, under 
the patronage of MoSHE [formerly MoE], and both old and newly established 
public universities have been adopting them. During the harmonization process, 
representatives from many public universities participated in shaping curriculums 
and a 10%-20% margin was allowed for each university to shape its curriculum in 
its own interest. Generally, nonetheless, course/curriculum contents were designed 
in the form of one size fits all. Moreover, the worst is coming with the adoption of 
the New Education Roadmap5 in 2019. The Roadmap reintroduced freshman 
courses for newly enrolled undergraduate students. These courses were directly 
sent from MoSHE to all public universities, in the beginning of this academic year 
[2019/20) and we already recognized that they have problems. We are not certain 
what will happen to the other undergraduate courses. Finally, I would say, designing 
the content of curriculums/courses for graduate programs [master and doctorate] 
remains under the prerogative of each university (interview, December 12,2019).
Generally, however, although the experience of undergraduate programs 
demonstrates the opposite, legally, universities have the right to design the 
content of their curriculum, albeit with some restrictions (HPR, 2019). This 
means that universities have the right to reject a centrally imposed curriculum 
if it is imposed against their consent, provided there is independent leadership 
from the university side. In Europe, in twenty-six of the twenty-nine HESs, 
“Universities can design the content of their degree programs/courses (other 
than for the regulated professions) without constraints” (Pruvot & Estermann, 
2017:39).
Capacity to Choose the Language of Instruction 
In Ethiopia, universities do not have the autonomy to determine the language 
of instruction. English is made to be the medium of instruction, albeit excep-
tions to use local languages are allowed (HPR, 2019). This has mainly to do 
with historical traditions, wherein British and American experts dominated 
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the HE sector of the country. In contrast, although the degree varies be-
tween bachelor and master’s programs, universities are free to choose their 
language of instruction in twenty out of the twenty-nine HESs in Europe, 
which shows that Ethiopia is lagging behind, although there could be an 
acceptable justification for this.
Autonomy to Select Quality Assurance (QA) Mechanisms and QA 
Providers
Ethiopia’s HEP prescribes the mechanisms that may be used to ensure quality, 
although universities are neither allowed nor prohibited from using other 
QA mechanisms and providers.
Two main mechanisms are prescribed: accreditation and quality audit. 
While institutional accreditation so far remains applicable only to private 
HEIs, both private and public HEIs are subject to internal and external quality 
audit. The exemption of public HEIs from accreditation could be associated 
with the fact that, unlike private HEIs, they are established by regulation as 
autonomous entities (HPR, 2019). At the program level, however, the power 
to accredit academic programs in public HEIs is given to the senate, although 
its decisions require consent from the board and MoSHE. According to the 
EUA, program accreditation is seen as restrictive and instead institutional 
accreditation is recommended (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017).
As mentioned earlier, although the HEP does not prohibit universities from 
using other QA providers, HERQA is the national agency mandated with 
accreditation and quality audit. HERQA “evaluates [HEIs] to ensure their 
compliance with the standards of relevance and quality of education set forth 
[in the HEP]” (HPR, 2019:11517). Thus, being accredited (for private HEIs) 
and audited (for private and public HEIs) by this agency is mandatory, even 
though universities can employ other QA providers. Moreover, universities 
are required to establish an internal quality control unit, which carries out 
quality audit and enhancement measures, and to submit the results of their 
internal quality audit to HERQA for review (HPR, 2019). Internal quality 
audit is usually accompanied by external audit, which is done by HERQA. 
Even internal quality audits are carried out based on the standards prescribed 
by HERQA. The approach adopted by HERQA for quality audit, so far, has 
been a peer review, where most of the members of the quality audit team are 
selected from similar institutions. So far, HERQA has conducted quality audits 
in the eight relatively large and old universities (interview, December 13, 2019).
Generally, universities cannot ignore the above QA mechanisms and 
provider and choose freely according to their needs, but they can employ more 
mechanisms and providers, including from abroad. Accordingly, for example, 
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MU has recently initiated ISO-17025 to standardize (internationalize) its 
laboratories, and it is the Ethiopian National Accreditation Office that awards 
the accreditation (interview, December 13, 2019). With regard to choosing QA 
mechanisms and providers, the practice in Ethiopia seems no different from 
Europe. Pruvot & Estermann (2017) concluded that except in Germany (the 
three states), “It is rare for universities to be able to select quality assurance 
mechanisms freely and according to their needs.”
4.3. Staffing Autonomy 
According to the EUAS, staffing autonomy involves the capacity to decide on 
recruitment procedure and criteria, salaries, promotion, and dismissal of staff 
(Pruvot & Estermann, 2017). In HEIs, staff is broadly categorized as academic 
and administrative (even though there could be medical and other types of staff 
in universities that run hospitals), and the level of autonomy of HEIs in making 
decisions about their staff may vary depending on the type of staff. In Ethiopia, 
the HEP classifies the staff of HEIs into four categories: (a) academic staff, 
(b) academic technical staff, (c) administrative staff, and (d) professionals in 
teaching hospitals (HPR, 2019). Generally, Ethiopian universities are entitled 
to “recruit and administer their personnel in accordance with the [HEP] 
and other applicable laws” (HPR, 2019:11451). The HEP also permits the 
Board to issue directives that regulate administrative staff, albeit this should 
comply with the applicable civil service laws (HPR, 2019). However, the level 
of autonomy granted to universities in relation to staff administration varies 
depending on the type of staff. For the purpose of this study, we focus on the 
two dominant categories of staff: academic and administrative.
Autonomy to Decide on Staff Recruitment
Broadly, restrictions in relation to staff recruitment include external confirma-
tion of appointment, controlling the number of posts externally, and carrying 
out recruitment externally (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017). Universities in 
Ethiopia are free to determine the number of academic posts and recruit their 
academic staff. However, while determining the number of academic posts 
and recruitment for academic staff and setting criteria for the recruitment 
of senior (PhD holders and above) is left to universities, the recruitment 
procedures and criteria for recruiting academic staff below the rank of assistant 
professor or non-PhD holders is highly regulated by an external law, i.e., by 
the “Academic Staff Recruitment Directive” (MoE, 2018). This Directive 
includes procedures, criteria, and the value assigned to each criteria for 
recruiting academic staff. Moreover, the type and level of academic ranks/
552 solomon GEbrEYohAns GEbru, AnniE hondEGhEm, And bruno broucKEr
positions and the type of employment are determined by the HEP (HPR, 
2019). In Europe, only twelve out of the twenty-nine HESs allow universities 
to decide freely on the recruitment of senior academic staff, which shows 
Ethiopia is in a better position in this indicator.
Compared to academic staff, recruitment for administrative staff is more 
restricted. First, officially, MoSHE, together with universities, is authorized to 
determine the optimum number of administrative staff of universities (HPR, 
2019). Second, the number of posts for administrative staff needs approval 
from the Federal Civil Service Commission (FCSC). Third, the Civil Service 
Law (Proc.1064/2017) (HPR, 2017), determines the recruitment procedure 
and criteria for administrative staff. Once the number and level of posts are 
approved by the FCSC, however, the law allows universities to freely recruit 
their administrative staff for each post based on the criteria set by civil service 
laws and regulations. Therefore, recruitment procedure, criteria, and number 
of posts is externally controlled. In contrast, in Europe, as opposed to senior 
academic staff, around 70 percent (nineteen) of the HESs allow universities 
to freely decide the recruitment of senior administrative staff.
Autonomy to Set Staff Salary
The HEP allocates the power to determine staff salary neither to external 
authority nor to universities. So far, however, the salary of both academic and 
administrative staff of universities has been externally determined. Although 
MoSHE is consulted about the salary scale of academic staff, salary scales 
are proposed by the FCSC and decided by the Council of Ministers (HPR, 
2017; interview, December 12, 2019). Unlike administrative staff (who are 
treated as civil servants), academic staff is recruited on “contractual basis” 
(HPR, 2019), which assumes that their scale would be determined differently. 
Nevertheless, like any other civil servant, their salary is centrally determined, 
and they are entitled to government pensions (interview, December 12, 
2019). The government introduced a new salary scale in 2019, which also 
determined the salary scale of federal universities’ employees, including for 
academic staff (FCSC, 2019). To wind up, therefore, universities do not have 
the right to set salary or to link salary with performance. There are more 
than six options when it comes to determining the salary of senior staff in 
the twenty-nine European HESs and only in less than a third of HESs are 
universities allowed to set salaries for their senior staff.
Staff Dismissal 
Again, the HEP does not explicitly mention whether universities are free 
to dismiss their academic staff. Nevertheless, there are different provisions 
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under the HEP that would enable universities to dismiss their academic staff 
internally. First, employment to academic positions is on a “contractual basis 
and one contract term is two years” (HPR, 2019:11466). In principle, this 
should give universities the prerogative to fire their academic staff if they are 
not satisfied during the two years’ service. Second, the HEP stipulates that 
“academic staff shall have job security, and may not be dismissed from his 
position unless he has committed a serious breach of discipline as stipulated 
by the senate statutes of the public institution” (p.11469). This implies that 
universities are allowed to dismiss their academic staff based on their internal 
rules. Academic staff have the right to appeal to the court or other appropriate 
external bodies (interview, December 12, 2019). In contrast, dismissal of 
administrative staff is seen as highly restrictive by universities (interview, 
December 12, 2019). Unlike academic staff, universities are required to 
strictly follow civil service laws and rules in dismissing their administrative 
staff (see CM, 2002; HPR, 2017), where staff can easily take the issue into an 
administrative court, hosted by the FCSC. There have been scenarios where 
the FCSC reversed the decision of universities. In Europe too, dismissal is 
strictly regulated in the majority of the HESs considered, where universities 
are required to comply with civil service or other specific regulation (Pruvot 
& Estermann, 2017).
Staff Promotion 
MoSHE is authorized to determine directives concerning the promotion of 
academic staff (HPR, 2019). Consequently, MoSHE has recently produced 
a “Guideline for Academic Publishing and Promotion” (currently under 
discussion), which determines the requirements for promotion to all levels 
of academic ranks (MoSHE, 2019). Previously, universities determined 
their academic staff promotion based on their senate legislation/internal 
regulation (interview, December 12, 2019). If the guideline is approved, 
however, universities’ freedom will be limited to promoting their academic 
staff based on the guideline. Contrary to the case of administrative staff, 
however, they do not need to wait for open posts. The promotion to the rank 
of professorship requires an approval from the board (HPR, 2019). Though 
this may be considered as an internal matter, as pointed out earlier, it may 
still restrict the freedom of universities, particularly because all members 
of the board are external. While HEIs have the autonomy to decide about 
the promotion of their administrative staff, they can only do so when there 
are open posts, and only using the criteria set by civil service laws. This 
indicates universities do not have the freedom to determine the procedure 
and criteria and to promote their administrative staff even if the requirements 
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are fulfilled (interview, December 12, 2019). In Europe too, only twelve and 
fourteen HESs (of the twenty-nine) allow universities to freely determine 
the promotion of their senior academic and administrative staff, respectively.
4.4. Financial Autonomy 
Length and Type of Public Funding 
In Ethiopia, universities are required to develop a strategic plan for five 
years in agreement with MoSHE. The strategic plan is expected to include 
an indicative block grant for five years and for every year of the strategic 
period. However, the HEP prescribes that the fiscal year of universities is the 
same as the fiscal year of the government (HPR, 2019), which is one year. 
This requires universities to settle all advance payments made for research 
and other projects by the end of the year. It is also noteworthy that budgets 
are released on a quarter basis (after quarterly reports are submitted to the 
Minister of Finance, and all other concerned bodies) and not on an annual 
basis. However, funds not utilized during a given year are rolled over into 
the following year (interview, December 11, 2019).
In contrast to a line item budget, a block grant is considered as a mechanism 
that enables HEIs to flexibly utilize their budget. With regard to funding 
type, in principle, Ethiopia introduced block grants for universities in 2003. 
The current HEP also allows for “block-grant system based on strategic 
plan agreement” (HPR, 2019:11498). Despite this, however, the Program 
Budgeting system that the country follows has been applicable to universities.
According to this system, the government sets a budget ceiling for each 
university. Then, each university may prepare its budget within this ceiling 
for its different programs (like research, teaching, etc.). Here, there are two 
restrictions in using the budget. First, universities are required to categorize 
their budget into recurrent and capital types. In this regard, universities do 
not have the autonomy to move capital budget to recurrent and vice versa. 
Second, according to the Program Budgeting formula, the budget is distrib-
uted among the following four programs: teaching, research, community 
service, and administration. Once the budget for each program is approved, 
although universities can freely allocate funds internally within the scope 
of each program, they do not have the freedom to transfer funds from one 
program to another without the approval of the minister of finance (interview, 
December 11, 2019). Further, funding is accompanied by other restrictions 
when it comes to internal spending. For example, it is very difficult or even 
impossible for universities to reward best-performing staff from their budget 
(even from the internal budget) and to provide sponsorships (interview, 
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December 11, 2019). In fact, universities have been recently prohibited from 
providing sponsorship by a directive from the Ministry of Finance (see 
MoFEC, 2018). In Europe, by far, the most common funding period remains 
one year. However, in most HE systems (sixteen of the twenty-nine), funding 
is provided in a lump sum and universities can internally allocate funds 
without restrictions (which is not the case in Ethiopia). According to the 
EUA 2017 Report, of the twenty-nine HESs, only one HES follows a line 
item budgeting approach.
Ability to Borrow Money, Keep Surplus, and Own Buildings 
Although EUA treats the ability to borrow money, keep surplus, and own 
buildings separately (see Pruvot & Estermann, 2017), they are here combined 
simply because there is no difference among these criteria when they are 
applied to Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, universities are either not allowed to borrow 
money or own and sell land and buildings or need external approval to do so 
(HPR, 2019). Unlike the current HEP, the 2003 HEP allowed universities to 
get loans and to transfer, buy, lease, or mortgage their property. In the current 
HEP this is neither allowed nor prohibited. Universities can keep a surplus 
(unspent budget) but this needs to be integrated with the next annual budget 
(interview, December 11, 2019). In Europe too, twenty-six of the twenty-nine 
HE system can keep surplus (with or without restriction). Ethiopia seems also 
not exceptional when it comes to borrowing money, whereby universities in 
over 70 percent of the twenty-nine European HESs are either not allowed to 
or face restrictions to borrow money. Twenty-two of the twenty-nine HESs 
allow universities to own buildings but only a third allow selling buildings 
without restriction. In Ethiopia, where universities are fully dependent on 
state funding and where land is supplied and buildings are fully funded by 
the state, the restriction is expected.
Ability to Set Tuition Fees for National and International Students
Universities are allowed to charge tuition fees, although the board determines 
the kind, amount, and manner of payment. However, the law does not specify 
which kind of students universities may charge tuition fees (HPR, 2019). 
Practically, Ethiopia follows the split system. All regular undergraduate 
(bachelor) students in public universities are state-funded and their tuition 
fees are externally determined. However, universities are fully free to charge 
tuition fees on part-time undergraduate and graduate students as well as on 
self-paying or institution-sponsored regular graduate students (interview:, 
December 11, 2019). Ethiopian universities are also free to set tuition fees for 
international students at the bachelor, master’s and doctorate levels (interview, 
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December 11, 2019). In Europe, the situation is also divided. Only a few HESs 
(four out of twenty-nine) can set tuition fees freely, others need to cooperate 
with external authorities, others can set fees under an externally set ceiling, 
in some others fees are determined externally, and finally, in some systems, 
universities may not charge fees (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017).
5. Conclusion and Implications 
5.1. Conclusions
This chapter assessed Ethiopian public universities’ level of IA using the 
EUAS methodology. The result shows that Ethiopian universities’ level of IA 
is quite low both in absolute terms (see also Gebru, 2013; Tamrat and Teferra, 
2018; Woldegiyorgis 2014) and compared with many European HESs. This 
implies that Ethiopia is following the “state-centered/controlled” governance 
approach, which contradicts the international trend, i.e., a shift toward the 
“state supervision” or “steering from a distance” model (see Dobbins & Knill, 
2014). In fact, based on studies on the state-university relationship or the HE 
governance model pursued since the emergence of HE in Ethiopia, Hailu (2018) 
and Gebremeskel & Feleke (2016) concluded that Ethiopia’s HE governance 
model over the last six decades is best characterized as a “state-centered” model.
Although Ethiopia’s HEIs are legally established as autonomous entities, 
the ruling party has been exerting considerable influence with a strong pres-
ence in universities. It is public knowledge that the ruling party infiltrates 
universities not only through its internal members but also by assigning its 
members externally to each university. Generally, party control has been a 
salient element of university governance (interview, December 11, 2019). The 
degree of external influence depends on the strength of university leaders. 
Capable presidents/rectors usually exercise IA to the maximum possible 
and to the best interest of the university (Varghese & Martin, 2013). In 
Ethiopia, some universities’ presidents were submissive and collaborative to 
external intervention (Akalu, 2014). Further, for university presidents, “their 
association with political leaders and affiliation with local politics is more 
important than merit” (Anteneh, 2016 cited in Hailu, 2018, p.46).
Ethiopia’s HEP stipulates that among others the purpose of HEIs is to 
produce graduates “with competence to support Peace, Democracy and 
National development that make the country internationally competitive” 
(HPR, 2019:11448). According to Mosese (2007), realizing such a golden 
objective requires a minimalist intervention from the state. Thus, based on 
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the pertinent literature and the findings of this study, any desire to augment 
HE performance would require Ethiopia to initiate reforms that boost the 
IA of its universities. In this regard, Ethiopian universities could opt or push 
their government to allow them to join the Magna Charta Universitatum, 
which has been signed by 904 universities from 88 countries to defend and 
promote academic freedom and IA (Matei & Iwinska, 2018). The govern-
ment on its side may need to plan whether it wants to enhance the IA of all 
public universities simultaneously or selectively. The country’s recent move 
toward HE differentiation could be of help in this regard. For instance, the 
government can start by offering more autonomy to one of the categories 
(for example research universities) and evaluate the impact of this reform 
before conferring the same level of autonomy to other groups. Similarly, the 
government may need to decide on whether to increase the IA of universities 
in all dimensions of autonomy or selectively. This study could serve as an input 
on this issue. For example, the government could start with the dimensions 
of autonomy, which are exceptionally low both in absolute and relative terms 
(for example compared to the European HESs referred to in this study).
Generally, the findings are expected to inspire the leaders of public HEIs to 
initiate discussions among themselves and all other concerned bodies to reform 
the regulatory environment in a way that augments the IA of public HEIs.
The study demonstrates that the EUAS methodology is a useful analyti-
cal tool. It enables evaluating not only the overall level of HE institutional 
autonomy but also that of each dimension of autonomy and each indicator 
within the various dimensions of autonomy. However, there are five remarks 
that warrant attention in adopting the EUAS to the context of Ethiopia.
First, the relative importance of the value attributed to each indicator, 
based on Europe’s context, needs contextualization.
Second, one can clearly recognize that the indicators under the “academic 
autonomy” dimension in the EUAS focus on teaching or education. Thus, 
as the EUA itself admits, the EUAS ignores research and engagement (with 
community or industry).
Third, the EUAS is meant to aid the promotion of university autonomy. 
Nonetheless, as Aghion et al. (2010) warn, greater autonomy needs to be 
accompanied by disciplined competition and a strong system of account-
ability. In other words, since autonomy could be prone to abuse, a strong 
accountability framework composed of various mechanisms and tools should 
accompany adopting the EUAS.
Fourth, as the EUA rightly acknowledges (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017), 
it is worth noting that the EUAS, as a methodology, does not entertain the 
diverse and complex situations found in each HE system.
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Finally, the EUAS follows a quantitative approach and in this regard, 
scholars warn of the problem of excessive quantification in assessing IA. 
Further, scholars argue that any attempt to promote and measure IA should 
include academic freedom, because universities can optimally achieve their 
mission when the two are equally protected. Some even argue that the EUAS 
as a methodology “sacrifices academic freedom altogether on the altar of [IA)” 
(Beiter et al. 2016, in Matei & Iwinska, 2018, 358). Thus, the EUAS is biased 
toward the instrumentalist perspective of autonomy, wherein autonomy is 
seen as a performance enhancer rather than as a right. Cognizant of this, 
Choi (2019) recommends developing a methodology that views IA both “as 
an instrument for academic freedom and as a performance enhancer” (p.20).
Generally, however, we believe that the attempt to apply the EUAS to the 
context of Ethiopia could motivate other (Ethiopian) researchers to examine 
the EUAS methodology, refine it, and either contextualize it to the country 
or develop an alternative methodology.
5.2. Limitations 
This study has limitations. First, as the name indicates, the EUAS is Euro-
centric (and even there it is not sensitive to institutional diversity), is biased 
toward the instrumentalist perspective of IA, and its indicators do not say 
much about research and engagement. Second, the study found that Ethiopia’s 
IA is low but did not try to explain much about the underlying cause as to why 
this is the case. For example, this low autonomy could be attributed to the 
historical legacies and modes of establishment of public HEIs; the political 
culture and level of economic development of the country; the degree of 
compatibility between HE reforms and the regulatory laws, etc. Fourth, the 
state-of-the-art literature demonstrates that there is a positive relationship 
between level of autonomy and the performance of HEIs. Thus, analyzing 
empirically the effect of the current low level of autonomy on the actual 
performance of Ethiopia’s public HEIs would be of interest to policy makers 
and academia. Fifth, the study heavily depends on regulatory frameworks 
(laws, policies, etc.), using empirical data from only one public university 
(MU), even though the country’s public HEIs are equally autonomous by 
law. Finally, the study focused only on public HEIs despite the presence of 
both public and private providers in the country. Axiomatically, therefore, we 
recommend future research to look into these issues. Despite the limitations, 
this study can serve as a springboard for other researchers and as an input for 
policy makers in relation to IA in general and to the level of IA in Ethiopia 
in particular.
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Notes
1. Ethiopia has recently ( January 2020) differentiated its public universities into research 
universities (eight), applied (fifteen), specialized (three) and comprehensive (twenty-one) 
(Ethiopian Press Agency, January 4, 2020).
2. For example, the eight indicators of organizational autonomy are weighted as follows: selec-
tion procedure for the executive head (14%); selection criteria for the executive head (14%); 
dismissal of the executive head (12%); term of office of the executive head (9%); inclusion of ex-
ternal members in university governing bodies (12%); selection of external members in university 
governing bodies (12%); capacity to decide on academic structures (15%); and capacity to create 
legal entities (12%) (Pruvot & Estermann, 2017:70).
3. While MoSHE is the main regulatory body of HE, HERQA is in charge of accreditation (so 
far private HEIs) and external quality audit, while HESC is mandated with developing HE 
policies and strategies and funding formulas.
4. Based on the score obtained, HE systems are clustered as follows: high (100%-81%); me-
dium high (80%-61%); medium low (60%-41%); and low (40%-0%) (Pruvot & Estermann 
(2017).
5. The Education and Training Policy adopted in 1994 had been the core policy from which 
all education strategies and plans were developed and implemented. In 2019, however, 
Ethiopia adopted a new education policy called Education Development Roadmap (2018-
2030) (MoE, 2018b).
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Appendix 1: Level of (university) institutional autonomy 
in Europe (unweighted score) 
Countries 












































































Austria 77 44 72 72 66.25 
Belgium 
– Flanders 
70 68 75 34 46.25 
Belgium 
– Wallonia
94 44 43 31 53 
Croatia 62 65 35 49 52.75 
Denmark 94 53 86 75 77 
Estonia 82 69 100 95 86.5
 
Finland 91 51 92 88 80.5 
France 56 33 42 39 42.5 




55 31 57 83 56.5 
Germany 
(Hessen (y)
75 24 62 87 62 
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Countries 
















































































69 31 62 87 62.25 
Iceland 45 55 67 77 61 
Ireland 71 71 42 92 69 
Italy 59 62 42 55 54.5 
Latvia 56 93 89 50 72 
Lithuania 82 73 89 44 72 
Luxembourg 35 93 95 92 78.75 
The 
Netherlands
76 78 72 57 70.75 
Norway 72 29 62 87 62.5 
Poland 64 47 84 78 68.25 
Portugal 74 75 62 52 65.75 
Slovakia 40 64 59 55 54.5 
Slovenia 68 55 42 41 51.4 
Spain 60 40 47 58 51.25 
Serbia 53 60 58 44 53.75 
Sweden 62 44 96 72 68.5 
Switzerland 56 62 95 75 72 
United 
Kingdom
100 90 96 92 94.5 
Source: European University Association. Online: https://www.university-autonomy.eu/

21 
Outcomes and Challenges of the 1994 
Ethiopian Education and Training 
Policy Reform
Challa Amdissa Jiru
Box 1: Key points of this chapter
 the 1994 education policy reform was part of the political, economic, and social 
reforms that took place in Ethiopia in 1991.
 the goals of the 1994 education policy were to correct the acute shortage and 
inequitable access, inefficiency, low quality, low relevance, and undemocratic 
nature of Ethiopian education system.
 this policy was implemented for about twenty-five years and achieved mixed 
results.
 Any future education program should focus on improving the quality and 
sustaining the current pace of expansion in access to education.
Box 2: Reading this chapter will give you insights in
 the driving forces for the formulation of 1994 Education Policy of Ethiopia;
 the major changes introduced by the 1994 education and training policy reform;
 the achievements in access, equity, efficiency, quality, relevance, and 
democratization goals of the education system; and
 the challenges ahead.
Box 3: Abbreviations
EPrdF = Ethiopian Peoples’ revolutionary democratic Front
EsdP = Education sector development Programs
GEr = Gross Enrolment rate
nir = net intake ratio
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1. Introduction :Political Context of the 1994 Education 
Policy and the Problem Statement
The 1994 Education Policy of Ethiopia was part of the systemic changes in 
political, economic, and social order in Ethiopia following the regime change 
in 1991 (Demeke, 2011). Therefore, to understand the political environment 
within which the education policy was formulated, it is essential to highlight 
the country’s macroeconomic policy and the political and institutional reforms 
of the 1990s. May 1991 is a turning point in Ethiopian history, as it marked 
the end of the two decades of internal war and civil strife that led to the 
secession of Eritrea. The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) took control of state power in May 1991 and formed the 
Transitional Government in July of the same year. Upon seizing control, the 
EPRDF immediately started radically restructuring the political system of 
the country to establish a country with a new order that differs significantly 
from its predecessors.
The political reform of the 1990s transformed the old centralized unitary 
state system into a federal state arrangement, while the economic reform put 
into effect privatization, deregulation, denationalization, and other liberaliza-
tion measures. Besides the liberalization of the economy and regionalization 
of the state structure, new social sector polices such as women, population, 
education, health, and disaster prevention and preparedness were formulated 
(Tewodaj, Gezahegn, & Zelekawork, 2008). Among these social policies, the 
subject of this chapter is the 1994 Education and Training Policy of Ethiopia. 
This policy remained in place until the endorsement of a new education road 
map in 2019.
Criticisms of the policy by different stakeholders were often heard ever since 
its commencement in 1994. For example, at the HR Development summit, 
held at the United Nations Conference center at Addis Ababa from August 30 
to 31, 2017, employers’ representatives noted that they were facing challenges 
due to the incapability of the education system to produce candidates with 
employable skills. According to views reflected at the summit, the graduates 
of the Ethiopian education institutions do not have reliable competence 
that the employers need; as a result, employers face challenges in finding 
skillful candidates in the local labor market to fill their job vacancies. Since 
poor labor productivity will make the country uncompetitive in attracting 
foreign investments, the participants of this summit warned the government 
to rethink its policy (HRD Africa, 2017).
In addition to lack of competence, the current generation of graduates is 
also criticized for lacking acceptable moral and ethical behaviors. For instance, 
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the prime minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, claimed at a meeting in Assosa 
that the Ethiopian education system is unable to produce graduates who could 
serve the interest of their family and the interest of their country, particularly 
from the moral and ethical perspective. Similar to this view (Demeke, 2011) 
indicates that there are groups who conceive of Ethiopians who have passed 
through the school system as disrespectful to their society and institutions.
The professionals in the education sector have also been known to criticize 
the appropriateness of the existing education policy of Ethiopia. This group 
shares the concern over the deterioration of education quality in Ethiopia 
and links the problem among other factors with the 1994 reform policy’s 
reduction of four-year degree programs to three-years. Meanwhile, students 
and parents blame the education policy of the country for poor prospects 
injob opportunities for school graduates.
Thus, the appropriateness of the Ethiopian educational policy has been 
challenged by many stakeholders from different perspectives. It is true that 
the policy has many shortcomings; nevertheless, most of the criticisms of 
the education system of Ethiopia were not research based. The few available 
studies are incomplete in balancing both the achievements and the failures 
of the policy across all aspects of the policy goals. In addition to the scarcity 
of research evidence, the neutrality of the critics is also questionable as most 
of them are ideologically driven. The author of this chapter argues that the 
criticism of education policy has some basis but is mostly not supported 
by research evidence and not balanced in revealing both the success and 
failures of the policy. Policy analysis requires a good understanding of policy 
intentions, adequate analysis of policy environments, and assessment of the 
policy outcomes in relation to desired goals. In this regard, research conducted 
so far on the 1994 education and training policy of Ethiopia is insufficient to 
reveal the lessons to be taken from the past experience.
This study is motivated by such critical limitations in research on education 
policy. The objective here is to evaluate the effectiveness of the 1994 education 
policy of Ethiopia in terms of its achievement in access, equity, efficiency, 
democratization, relevance, and quality goals. More specifically, the study 
tries to address the following research questions:
1. What were the driving forces for the formulation of 1994 Education 
Policy of Ethiopia?
2. What major changes were introduced by the implementation of the 1994 
education policy reform?
3. How well has Ethiopia achieved the education goals established by 1994 
education policy and what are the challenges ahead?
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Analysis of these questions is important if we are to derive lessons from the 
success and failure of the 1994 education policy and to provide policy inputs 
for future initiatives. Accordingly, by shedding lights on the policy aspect 
of the Ethiopian education system, this chapter identifies the achievements 
and failures of the policy and suggests ideas that will help to overcome the 
challenges faced by the country’s education system. Furthermore, this research 
shows avenues for future research on education policy of Ethiopia. Guided 
by these questions, the remaining part of this chapter presents consecutively 
data sources and methodology, literature, discussions, and conclusions.
2. Data Sources and Methods of Data Analysis
A mixed research approach was chosen to take advantage of combining 
quantitative and qualitative techniques of analysis and to make use of data 
of different forms. Different secondary sources, which include the official 
data of government, the World Bank database, government education sector 
plans and reports and statistical abstracts, were used to analyze policy driving 
forces, policy goals, policy outcomes and new challenges. The problems of 
the Ethiopian education system prior to 1994 and the policies pursued by 
the current government to solve them were analyzed based on a review of 
government policy statements and other publications of Ministry of Educa-
tion. Different reform plans and implementation reports were reviewed to 
determine the changes introduced in the education system by the government, 
so as to identify the major departure of the 1994 policy from the past. The 
effectiveness of the education policy was assessed by comparing policy goals 
and policy achievements. Finally, new challenges not covered by the exist-
ing policy are explored based on the views of experts as shown in different 
statistics, research reports, and media. In order to ensure the reliability and 
validity of the research, the study used data from official sources, after careful 
inspection of their relevance to the topic. Because of the nature of the data 
at hand, the descriptive method of analysis was chosen.
The next part of the chapter presents performance indicators in education 
policy analysis, participation in the 1994 education policy formulation process, 
the driving force for policy change, and major changes in the 1994 education 
policy of Ethiopia. It then analyzes the achievements of education policy in 
terms of access, equity, efficiency, relevance, and quality and democratization. 
Finally, the discussion part highlights the challenges not properly addressed 
by the 1994 Education and Training Policy of Ethiopia.
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3. Indicators of Performances in Education Policy 
Analysis
As education is a complex social undertaking, analysis of education policy is 
also complex; however, it is worth doing as education is also a determinant 
of development. Education has become the most powerful tool in providing 
solutions to various challenges (Semela, 2011) and it plays a key role in the 
globalized world. The many dimensions of social and economic objectives that 
education policies aim to achieve are complex to understand, nevertheless, 
conducting study on education policy is a necessary task.
One of the important indicators of education policy is its attention to 
educational inputs. The better-endowed schools tend to produce better results, 
as measured by such indicators as student achievement and schooling careers. 
As teachers typically represent the single most important component of 
educational inputs, managing the resources they embody warrants especially 
close attention (Mingat, Tan, & Sosale, 2003). Achievement on the basis of 
input measurement focuses on education expenditures, for example on the 
expenditure on primary education as (a) percentage of GNP and (b) as per 
pupil, or as a percentage of GNP per capita and as a percentage of total public 
expenditure on education (Norelius & Mendes, 2003).
Another element of education policy is the issue of equity and access 
that affirms the need to ensure equitable access and participation of all 
groups, particularly of vulnerable and disadvantaged children, as well as 
adults. Equity may be assessed from the perspective of gender, geography/
region, and place of residence (urban/rural) (Mingat, Tan, & Sosale, 2003). 
Equity in education attracts interest in public policy for several reasons. In 
most countries the government subsidizes education, so access to education 
determines who benefits from the subsidies. Because spending on education 
represents a substantial share of government budgets in both industrial and 
developing countries, the education system effectively is a major conduit for 
the distribution of public subsidies. Furthermore, education affects people’s 
life chances as adults in terms of their earning capability as well as social 
mobility. Equity in educational opportunity therefore influences the future 
distribution of income, wealth, and status in society. Beyond its economic 
significance, education is viewed widely as a good in itself, and indeed a basic 
human right with regard to the lower levels of education. For this reason too, 
equity in education is often a focus of public policy debate.
With regard to methods for analyzing access and equity in education, 
several approaches are suggested by the vast literature on the subject (Norelius 
& Mendes, 2003). This chapter uses comparison of differences in access to 
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a specific level or type of education across population groups, using such 
indicators as relative rates of entry, transition, and completion. This approach 
of equity analysis assumes that education is a good in itself without elaborating 
on the specific nature or value of the benefits.
Besides inputs and equity, there are many measurements of achievements in 
education policy analysis (Norelius & Mendes, 2003). Achievement in access 
to education can be measured along indicators such as: gross enrolment in 
early childhood development programs, as a percentage of the official age 
group concerned, if any, otherwise in the age group three to five; percentage 
of new entrants to primary grade 1 who have attended some form of organized 
early childhood development program; apparent (gross) intake rate (new 
entrants in primary grade 1 as a percentage of the population of official entry 
age); net intake rate (new entrants to primary grade 1 who are of the official 
primary school entrance age as a percentage of the corresponding population); 
gross enrolment ratio; and net enrolment ratio.
When it comes to assessing quality aspects, indicators like percentage 
of primary school teachers having the required academic qualifications; 
percentage of primary school teachers certified to teach according to national 
standards; and the pupil-teacher ratio are widely used.
Widely used indicators of achievement in relation to efficiency are the 
repetition rate; the survival rate to grade 5; the coefficient of efficiency; and 
percentage of pupils having reached at least grade 4 of primary schooling 
who have mastered a set of nationally defined basic learning competencies. 
Literacy rate of fifteen to twenty-four-year-olds; adult literacy rate; and the 
Gender Parity Index can also be used as indicators of education achievement 
(Norelius & Mendes, 2003).
Indicators are related to goals and targets (Norelius & Mendes, 2003). 
For instance, some targets of the UN millennium development goals and 
associated indicators are presented in the table below:







Ensure that, by 2015, children 
everywhere, boys and girls alike, 
will be able to complete a full 
course of primary schooling
– Net enrollment ratio in primary 
education
– Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who 
reach grade 5
– Literacy rate of 15- to 24-year-olds








Eliminate gender disparity in 
primary and secondary educa-
tion preferably by 2005 and in 
all levels of education no later 
than 2015
– Ratio of girls to boys in primary, second-
ary, and tertiary education
– Ratio of literate females to males among 
15- to 24-year-olds
– Share of women in wage employment in 
the nonagricultural sector.
– Proportion of seats held by women in 
national parliament.
One of the seventeen goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is 
to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learn-
ing opportunities for all. The indicators of this goal among others are to ensure 
access to free, equitable, and quality primary and secondary education; quality 
early childhood development, care and preprimary education; affordable and 
quality technical, vocational, and tertiary education; increase the number of 
youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational 
skills, for employment, decent jobs, and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the 
global actors agreed by 2030 to eliminate gender disparities; achieve literacy 
and numeracy; and substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers.
The Education and Training Policy of 1994 has been the inspiration for five 
medium-term Education Sector Development Programs (ESDP). Each ESDP has 
its own goals and specific targets. For instance ESDP I aimed at increasing access, 
improving quality, increasing effectiveness, achieving equity, and expanding 
finance at all levels of education in Ethiopia (Martin, Riitta, & Tuomas, 2000). 
The ESDP V is the fifth medium-term plan, which serves as the central strategy 
document for educational development in Ethiopia from 2015/16 to 2019/20. Its 
major goals are to provide equal opportunities and participation for all; deliver 
quality education that meets diverse learning needs; develop competent citizens; 
promote effective leadership, management, and governance at all levels; and to 
assist citizens to share common values and experiences and to embrace diversity.
4. Participations in the Process of Framing the 1994 
Education Policy
The process of policy formulation requires consultations with the stakehold-
ers. Policymakers in education are responsible for developing a vision and 
strategy for educational development and mobilizing support and cooperation 
for implementing the former from a wide range of stakeholders. The key 
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stakeholders of the education sector may include ministers in other sec-
tors, nongovernment organizations that provide resources, teachers, and 
school administrators; students and their families who are the immediate 
beneficiaries of the services provided; and employers and the public at large. 
Thus, this section overviews the participation of these stakeholders in the 
1994 Education and Training Policy formulation process.
A taskforce composed of eleven members from various institutions was 
formed under the coordination of the prime minister’s office to study key 
educational issues and come up with policy recommendations. The taskforce 
studied six policy issues: teacher training, teaching methods, professional 
development, and working conditions; educational measurement and evalu-
ation; language in education; educational organization, management and 
finance; and educational materials and support inputs (Martin, Riitta, & 
Tuomas, 2000). In order to assess the above issues a technical committee 
composed of six study teams from various ministries, research organizations, 
the teachers’ association, and institutions of higher learning was formed. All 
in all, forty national organizations and three hundred experts participated in 
the study. Moreover, public consultation on the draft policy document was 
conducted at the central, regional, zonal, Woreda, and school levels throughout 
the country. For instance, schools in Addis Ababa were closed for a day to 
discuss the Education and Training Policy (Martin, Riitta, & Tuomas, 2000).
In the development of the different educational policy documents, the 
MoE and the Social and Administration Sub-Sector of the Office of the Prime 
Minister were key players. Additionally, the regional education bureaus, 
higher education institutions, and international organizations such as Sida, 
UNDP, UNESCO, etc. took part in the policy development process (Martin, 
Riitta, & Tuomas, 2000).
Despite the attempt to involve these stakeholders, commentators describe 
the government as having a make-or-break role while other stakeholders had 
a symbolic role in the policy formulation process. As described by Alemu 
& Tekleselassie (2006), though discussions were held with stakeholders, 
no input provided by teachers was incorporated in the final policy. Worse, 
people who reflected different views on the policy proposal were threatened 
by the government. Alemu & Tekleselassie (2006) further found that the 
worst outcome of participation in consultations was the split of the Ethiopian 
Teachers’ Union into two opposing factions (one pro-EPRDF/government 
and the other independent). The level of the government’s involvement in the 
Ethiopian higher education system is very high (Yohannes, 2016). The amount 
of financial contributions affects the influence of various donor groups. 
Additionally, in countries (such as Ethiopia) following macroeconomic 
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structural adjustment programs, general policy conditionality agreed on 
between the government and the World Bank/IMF is significant in framing 
educational policy (Martin, Riitta, & Tuomas, 2000).
5. The Driving Forces for Change and the 1994 Education 
Policy Goals
As the twentieth century drew to a close, Ethiopia found itself with an 
education system that was regimented in its management, conservative in 
its intellectual orientation, limited in its autonomy, short of experienced 
doctorates among academic staff, concerned about declining educational 
quality, weak in its research output, and poorly connected with the intellectual 
currents of the international higher education community (Saint, 2004). The 
reform pressures that had begun to build in the 1960s were suppressed by 
the Dergue in the 1970s and1980s (Saint, 2004). The seizure of state power 
by EPRDF in 1991returned the reform of the education system to the fore 
of the government’s concerns.
At the time when the education and training policy of Ethiopia was framed, 
the Ethiopian government was embarking on establishing a new order to 
transform the command economy of the military regime into a market 
economy. The new policy direction in the education sector was motivated 
by the need to destroy the vestiges of the military regime and replace it 
with the new order. For example, the policy study sponsored by Ministry of 
Education confirms that it was necessary to replace the educational system 
that served the old discarded order with a new one (Ministry of Education, 
2002). Similarly, Teshome (2003) also notes that Ethiopia engaged in reform 
to realign its higher education system in more direct support of its national 
strategy for economic growth and poverty reduction.
As shown in (Ministry of Education, 2002), the government justified 
a reform and a new policy direction because of the many problems of the 
previous education system. EPRDF held the belief that the past regime never 
had a clear policy by which education and training would be guided and 
evaluated(Ministry of Education, 2002). EPRDF questioned the objective 
of education under the previous regime, which aimed to produce trained 
manpower for the emergent government bureaucracy. It also denounced 
the ambition of the students, which was securing government employment.
It should be noted that, at a time where the country depended on expatriates 
who were working at various levels in public offices and schools, seeking to 
produce manpower for the government bureaucracy and replacing expatriates 
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with Ethiopian nationals should not be criticized as a mistaken objective. 
Similarly, in the absence of a private sector that would have provided employ-
ment opportunities for those who left schools without capital and without 
necessary entrepreneurial background, students should not be expected to 
aspire to anything other than securing employment in the public sector. 
Devising a policy reform simply to avoid the heritage of the past regime is 
not convincing.
The dismantling of the institutional systems of the Dergue regime was 
however not the only motive of the EPRDF government in formulating the 
new education and training policy for Ethiopia. A study by the Ministry of 
Education (2002) identifies the long-standing problems associated with the 
Ethiopian education system, which were related to limited and inequitable 
access, lack of quality and relevance, and continuous decline in quality and 
standards. These problems are further discussed in detail.
a) Limited Access: While many African countries that are generally con-
sidered to be poor had 60 to70 percent of their school-age children enrolled 
in elementary schools, only 20 percent of school-age children had the op-
portunity to attend first- to sixth-grade education in Ethiopia. As (Ministry of 
Education, 2002) shows, in 1993 only 277 high schools, 2 universities, 5 junior 
colleges, and 16 vocational and technical schools were found in the country. 
Similarly, there were only about thirteen teacher training centers and sixteen 
technical and vocational schools, with a very limited enrollment capacity 
that had never exceeded 2,500 per year. Towards the end of the Dergue 
period, enrollment was even declining, which is thought to be attributed 
to the prolonged effects of war and instability. Table 2 depicts vividly the 
decreasing trend recorded between 1988/89 and 1992/93, particularly at 
the primary level (Martin, Riitta, & Tuomas, 2000).
Table 2: Gross enrollment ratio at primary (1-6) level (1985/86 – 1993/94)
Year Gross Enrolment Ratio Year Gross Enrolment Ratio
1985/86 37.4 1990/91 32.7
1986/87 40.8 1991/92 26.5
1987/88 41.9 1992/93 23.1
1988/89 40.3 1993/94 27.5
1989/90 36.5
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b) Inequitable Distribution of School Services: The beneficiaries of the limited 
educational opportunities were the children of urban dwellers and the rich. 
The tuition-free primary, secondary, and higher education created an unfair 
benefit, whereby the poor and the rural population was forced to contribute 
to the construction of educational facilities to which their own children 
had no access. This inequity had also created educational opportunity gaps 
between regions, residents of urban and rural areas, and between genders as 
well (Ministry of Education, 2002).
c) Problem of Efficiency: In the old system, according to (Ministry of 
Education, 2002), the high repetition rate was considered as an indication 
of the educational system’s academic rigor and excellence. A high rate of 
dropouts and repeaters came to be considered an indicator of the inefficiency 
of the educational system.
d) Lack of Quality and Relevance: The other driving forces for the formula-
tion of the 1994 policy were the lack of focus on mathematics, science, and 
engineering; insufficient vocational education both at the high school and 
college levels; and a poor supply of educational inputs, such as poor laboratory 
facilities, poor library service, unmotivated teachers, a shortage of books, 
and limited opportunity to involve in practical learning. These constraints 
in educational inputs together with lack of focus on the “more important 
fields of study,” according to the government, had reduced the quality and 
relevance of education (Ministry of Education, 2002). Low employability of 
the graduates was also taken as an attribute of the poor quality of the pre-1994 
education system of Ethiopia. The government also considered the twelve 
years of education necessary to leave high school and four years of university 
education as irrelevant and wasteful.
e)Problem of School Language: In Ethiopia before 1991, the principle 
that every child should, at least in primary school, learn in the child’s native 
language was totally ignored. In addition to being a violation of the right to 
language, every aspect of the contents of the old education system glorified 
the attributes, contributions, customs, culture, and history of one group and 
reinforced its domination over the others(Ministry of Education, 2002).
Together with ideological change, the above problems drove education 
policy revisions in Ethiopia in 1994. When critically evaluated, the meager 
access to education was well shown by comparing the enrollment with other 
African countries, but the study by the Ministry of Education did not clearly 
indicate the repetition rate, the dropout rate, and the level of equity in educa-
tion. The low education quality and relevance was indicated by a lack of focus 
on mathematics, science, and engineering, as well as by insufficient vocational 
education and inadequacy of inputs. Hence progress can be measured by 
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the proportion of students enrolled in science and in vocational fields, and 
improvements in educational inputs. Moreover, since the government associ-
ates a low education quality with the high unemployment of school alumni, 
change in employment opportunity is another indicator for measuring the 
success of the 1994 education and training policy.
Motivated by radically changing the policies of the preceding regime and 
the need to correct the problem of low access, high dropout and repetition, 
inequitable access, undemocratic content, and poor quality and relevance, 
the government of Ethiopia launched an education and training policy and 
began its implementation in 1994. The 1994 Education and Training Policy 
of Ethiopia set educational goals as describe below:
– Expanding Educational Opportunity and Ensuring Its Equity: The 
government aspired to create access of education to all nations and 
nationalities, urban and rural residents, the poor and the rich, male and 
female. It intended to ensure equity in order to reduce the gaps that 
existed since the introduction of modern education in Ethiopia.
– Democratization of the Administration and Content of Education: The 
1994 policy aspires to foster the use of mother-tongue languages in 
order to reduce the difficulty of students learning in the lower primary 
schools. The decentralized system of government is considered helpful 
to materialize the use of different languages as medium of instruction in 
different regions and to increase community participation in education.
– Provision of Quality and Relevant Educational Services: Government-
revised curricula were intended to make the education relevant to the 
needs of society and to make the curriculum career-oriented. The policy 
also established a quality and standards authority to ensure schools and 
colleges would provide quality education.
– Ensuring Efficiency: The government intended to increase the completion 
rate by keeping repetition and dropout rates at lower levels than they had 
been under the previous regime.
6. Major Changes Introduced by the 1994 Education 
Policy of Ethiopia
The 1994 policy redefined primary education as grades 1– 8 and eliminated 
standardized testing prior to grade 8. It placed new emphasis on the expansion 
of technical and vocational education and training and the use of mother 
tongue languages for primary instruction (Tewodaj, Gezahegn, & Zelekawork, 
2008).
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Other initiatives included harmonizing curricula for all of the under-
graduate programs, adopting a modular approach for course delivery so 
as to enhance active learning, instituting quality assurance offices at each 
university, and trying to equip libraries and laboratories. Bachelor degree 
courses were reduced from four to three years in length, with much of the 
former “freshman” year subject matter being transferred to the secondary 
school level (Yohannes, 2016).
Graduate program enrollments are rising rapidly in an effort to boost 
the supply of academic staff for the expanding system. All existing diploma 
programs (50 percent of public enrollments in 2003) were transferred to 
technical colleges to make universities concentrate on the bachelor level 
and above. A revision of university curricula has added courses like civics, 
ethics, communication skills, and entrepreneurship, among others. Anew 
oversight agency was mandated to monitor both the quality and the relevance 
of academic programs. To shore up quality in the classroom, national and 
local pedagogical resource centers were set up to encourage instructional 
innovation and to assist less experienced lecturers (Saint, 2004).
Education expenditure also increased as a proportion of the overall 
government budget, from 9.5 percent to 16.8 per cent. Such increases still 
fall short of reaching the general range of 20 percent to 25 percent seen in 
most developing countries (Saint, 2004), suggesting the need for further 
increasing the financing efforts. Expenditure per student was very low and 
seemed likely to be pushed lower by rapid expansion (Saint, 2004).To reduce 
the burden on the government budget as a result of expanding the education 
sector at all levels, the government introduced user charges through a cost 
sharing program in September 2003.
The proclamation of 2003 (No.351/2003) awards some autonomy to 
universities. Autonomy is granted in the administration of personnel, fi-
nances, internal organization, and in establishing linkages with internal and 
international organizations, etc. All nonacademic staff is classified as civil 
servants managed by the national civil service system (Saint, 2004). Strategic 
planning, income diversification, and information and communications 
technology development are being encouraged to meet the fiscal, space, 
and instructional requirements of the on-going expansion (Saint, 2004). 
The Higher Education Proclamation No.650/2009 also grants universities 
autonomy to administer and govern their core activities. According to this 
proclamation, universities are free to set up their organizational structures 
and to introduce reform programs and activities that support academic and 
research excellence (Yohannes, 2016).
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However, in the view of some critics, persistent violations of academic 
freedom make effective institutional autonomy a difficult proposition. The 
study by Saint (2004) uncovers that the government has sought to inject 
political criteria into the academic staff evaluation process and directly ap-
point universities’ presidents and vice presidents. The government ordered 
all public higher education institutions to implement BPR, BSC, and other 
business model management techniques as part of the nationwide reform 
process since 2008 (Kahsay, 2012).
7. The Performance of Education Policy
7.1. Performance in Expansion of Access
As discussed in the previous section, one of the critical problems of the 
education system during the formulation of the 1994 education policy was 
very low coverage, even in comparison with achievements in other poor 
countries. To reverse this situation, the education policy of the EPRDF-led 
government has aimed to improve access to education. In line with this 
policy goal, the government made tremendous efforts to expand educational 
opportunity at all levels and has achieved remarkable success. The government 
has implemented five consecutive education sector development plans since 
it began implementation of the 1994 education and training policy.
This research relies on the ESDP IV, because the data of ESDP V is expected 
to be compiled only after the end of the planning period. At the end of ESDP 
IV in 2014, the Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) for preprimary education reach 
34 percent, of which around a quarter is in three-year kindergarten and the 
remainder one-year O-Class and Child-to-Child instruction (Ministry of 
Education, 2015).
In the 1971 to 1972 education review, the year 2000 was set as the year 
when Ethiopia would extend universal primary education to all its citizens 
(Demeke, 2011). However, Ethiopia was far from achieving universal primary 
education in 1994 when the education policy was put to effect. The EPRDF 
government has planned to achieve universal primary education in line with 
the “Education for All” goals. By the end of ESDP IV, the number of primary 
schools had risen from 11,000 to 32,048 and student enrollment at this level 
had grown from less than 3 million to over 18 million. In 2015, the supply of 
schools allows for full intake of students into Grade 1 when they reach the age 
of seven years. As of 2013/14, the Net Intake Ratio (NIR) was 106 percent, 
compared to the target of 100 percent.
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Rates of more than 100 percent are technically impossible, but happened 
in the measure of NIR. Such an irregular measure arises due to imprecise 
population figures and challenges in measurement of student age at the point 
of entry due to lack of uniform birth registration. Such a situation makes 
the precision of educational performance measure less reliable. GER ratios 
indicate the capacity of each level of the education system, but a high ratio 
may reflect a substantial number of overage children enrolled in each grade 
because of repetition or late entry rather than a successful education system. 
Table 3 depicts the comparison of primary school enrollment.
Table 3: Primary school enrollment, (% gross)
Countries 1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Ethiopia 35.3 54.7 91.7 94.3 94.3 99.3 101.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 72.6 82.1 97.4 98.8 99.6 99.8 99.4 98.0
Low income 62.2 75.4 102.8 103.2 104.1 103.4 103.6 102.4
High income 102.4 100.8 101.9 101.6 101.7 102.2 101.9 102.1
World 99.7 98.8 103.2 103.5 104.2 104.0 102.8 102.5
Source: World Development Indicators, 2019
Comparison of educational access in Ethiopia with other countries is one 
way of measuring educational achievement. Table 3 compares performance 
of Ethiopia in primary school enrollment with Sub-Saharan Africa, with 
low income countries, and with the world. As depicted in the table, in 1990 
Ethiopia performed the lowest of all groups being presented for comparison. 
After twenty-five years of expansion of education service, Ethiopia had able 
to exceed the average primary school enrollment of Sub-Saharan African 
countries.
Secondary school enrolment has also expanded rapidly, roughly increasing 
five-fold, from an enrolled population of 371,000 in 1994/95 to almost 2 
million in 2013/14. However, the achievement in secondary school enroll-
ment was lower than the achievement in primary school, due to low primary 
completion (flow through the system). The GER in Grades 9–10 has changed 
from 39.1 percent to 39.3 percent, against a target of 62 percent. Other factors 
that influence low achievement in secondary education were poverty, lack of 
transport, the need to work (time and economic restrictions), early marriage, 
gender biases, lack of accommodation near schools (financial, cultural and 
social), and disability (Ministry of Education, 2015).
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Still, the government has demonstrated a continued commitment to 
expanding equitable access to higher education. As a result, the number of 
public higher education institutions has increased to thirty-six at the end 
of ESDP IV (and now reached forty-five), distributed across all regions 
of the country. Private higher education institutions have also expanded, 
reaching ninety-eight institutions in total, accommodating around 15 percent 
of all student enrollment by the end of the ESDP IV period (Ministry of 
Education, 2015). This extra capacity has allowed rapid increases in intake. 
Undergraduate enrollment (government and private) rose from 447,693 
in 2010/11 to 593,571 in 2013/14. Of total enrollment, 57 percent of stu-
dents now participate in regular undergraduate classes and 43 percent in a 
combination of distance, summer, and extension courses. Likewise, total 
masters’ enrolment in public higher education institutions increased from 
7,211 in 2007/08 to 27,643 in 2013/14. Recently private institutions began 
enrolling postgraduate students and in 2015 they accommodated 3,000 
master’s students.
7.2. Performance of Education Policy in Ensuring Efficiency and 
Equity
Despite the dramatic achievement in policy goals pertaining to access 
to education, the Ethiopian education policy did not achieve equivalent 
success in efficiency and equity goals. Grade 8 completion rate was only 
47 percent in 2015.The overall GER and NER in the second cycle stand 
at 64 percent(63 percent for girls and 65 percent for boys) and 50 percent 
(50 percent for girls and 49 percent for boys) respectively in 2013/14. These 
are against targets of 100 percent and 80 percent, respectively. As a result of 
inefficiency in primary school education, expansion of secondary school was 
constrained to remain below the planned target. For both boys and girls, the 
target set in ESDP IV for dropout was 1 percent in all primary grades and the 
target set for repetition was 1 percent in all primary grades. But, as ESDP V 
begins, repetition rates persist at around 8 percent and dropout remains at 
22 percent in grade 1 and 11 percent thereafter. Both repetition and dropout 
rates are approximately the same for girls and boys.
Ensuring equity goal in terms of area of residence (between urban and 
rural), region, and gender remains unattained. Access to secondary schools 
is uneven, with supply favoring urban areas. Enrollment rates vary from less 
than 10 percent in Afar to more than 100 percent in Addis Ababa (Ministry 
of Education, 2015).
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7.3. Performance of Education Policy in Ensuring Quality and 
Relevance Goals
The 1994 Education and Training policy outcome was envisioned as the 
improvement of education relevance and quality in terms of improving 
educational inputs, the achievement of 70 percent of students joining the 
science and vocational field, and the increase in job opportunities for the 
school and university graduates. This section presents the data and evidence 
of education quality in higher education and in general education, while the 
next section will discuss job opportunities.
Quality in Higher Education
The effort to improve education quality by increasing educational inputs 
has been challenged by the rapid expansion of higher education institutions. 
Arega (2016) argues the rapid expansion in the number of higher education 
institutions and student population, with inadequate human and invest-
ment capital, negatively affected education quality of in Ethiopia. This view 
was shared by the World Bank (2005), which warned that rapid enrollment 
expansion in Ethiopia is inevitably bringing progressively less qualified 
student into the system. A similar view was reflected by Negash (2006), 
who stated that the most fundamental cause for the decline of education 
is the uncontrolled expansion of the sector in relation to available material 
resources and job opportunities.
According to Arega (2016), the poor and declining quality of education 
is likely not a misperception by the public or the media; rather it is a real 
phenomenon occurring in the education system of Ethiopia. He strongly 
argued that rapid expansion of schools for the sake of opening access to 
education despite inadequate infrastructure and resources has negatively 
affected the quality of education in Ethiopia. Arega (2016) calls for action, 
as he believed that the quality of education should be a real concern both for 
the institutions involved and for the nation at large.
Contrary to the objective of the education policy, the poor quality in higher 
education is still caused by a low inputs system. Arega (2016) identified some 
of inputs-related shortcomings as follows:
(a) Serious academic staff shortages with quality implications, such as huge 
teaching loads, eventually leading to the discontinuation of tutorials 
(The teacher-regular student ratio was 1:16 in 2014 [when students of 
regular and non-regular classes are considered, the ratio rises to 1:23]). 
This is against the international standards of a 1:19 ratio and without 
consideration of excessive moonlighting.
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(b) Employment of unqualified personnel. Given the target of 0:70:30 
(Bachelor: Master’s: Doctorate degree holders, respectively), so far only 
a ratio of 27:58:15 has been achieved.
Bolton and Foster (2014) observe quality constraints due to poor infra-
structure. In their assessment, universities still report insufficient supplies 
of text and reference books, laboratory and workshop equipment, and access 
to information and communications technology facilities. The country has 
suffered from regular rolling blackouts, and few universities have generators to 
keep technical infrastructure operational during power cuts. The construction 
of classroom space, expansion of library collections, addition of computer 
labs, and the development of electronic networks lag behind enrollment 
expansion (Bolton & Foste, 2014).
Many students have joined higher education institutions with results below 
the 50 percent threshold in the higher education entrance examinations. Stu-
dents’ behaviors and attributes, such as poor communication skills, resistance 
to active learning, and absenteeism, were seen as major challenges by internal 
leadership. Another serious challenge was associated with negative behavior 
and attributes of instructors, such as low levels of academic qualification, lack of 
dedication, excessive moonlighting, and lack of pedagogical skills (Arega, 2016).
Financial support for research is low. In 2011/12, the research allocation of all 
universities accounted for only 1 percent of their total budget. In addition, there 
are limited numbers of personnel available to conduct high quality research and 
higher education research is conducted predominantly by postgraduate students.
The government has achieved its goal of increasing the ratio of students 
studying in the science fields but has been unable to provide resources to 
achieve quality education. Apart from input aspects, the competence of 
graduates is also an indicator of education quality. Measuring quality of educa-
tion in this aspect, Arega (2016) argues there is stakeholders dissatisfaction 
with the quality of graduates, which can be explained by a large number of 
graduates who cannot be productive without being retrained to meet applied 
technical skill and communication skill requirements.
Quality in General Education
The performance of education and training policy in ensuring quality is assessed 
using the results of students at different grades. Examinations were adminis-
tered by the government in order to get feedback on the quality of education. 
Table 4 shows baselines for oral reading fluency in seven languages, at grade 
2, and table 5 shows the targeted and achieved examination results. The data 
in both tables clearly show the poor quality of general education in Ethiopia.
EducAtion And trAininG PolicY rEForm 583
Table 4: Baselines for oral reading fluency in seven languages, at grade 2 (%)
Language
Proficiency level
Proficient Basic Below basic None
Afan Oromo 5 20 21 54
Af-Somali 34 27 13 26
Amharic 6 21 48 25
Hadiyyisa 4 7 13 76
Sidaamu Afoo 3 13 15 69
Tigrinya 2 33 34 31
Wolayttatto 12 20 18 50
“Proficient”: Reading fluently with full comprehension 
“Basic”: Reading with some fluency and comprehension 
“Below Basic”: Reading slowly with limited comprehension 
None: Non-reader 
Source: National Learning Assessments (Ministry of Education, 2017)
Table 4 shows that students with proficient and basic oral reading fluency 
constitute more than half of the students only among those who use the Somali 
language. In all the rest, students who are proficient and basic in their oral 
reading fluency comprise less than 35 percent. Surprisingly, students who 
cannot read at grade 2 are as high as 76 percent in Hadiya and 69 percent 
in Sidamu. The figure is a good warning signal for the government to take 
appropriate measures to improve education quality in the lower grades.
Every four years a National Learning Assessment is conducted in grades 4, 
8, 10 and 12. For ESDP IV, the shares of students scoring at least 50 percent 
and 75 percent in National Learning Assessments were set as targets. But 
the gaps between what was planned and what was achieved at all levels were 
huge (see table 5).
The data in table 4 and in table 5 show similar results with other research 
findings. Modern education in Ethiopia has been criticized for failing to 
provide students with depth of understanding, an ability to interpret and 
apply information, the habit of critical thinking-reflection, the ability to form 
opinions and to value the expression of diverse opinions, and the ability to 
apply school knowledge to realities of personal experiences and the problems 
of everyday life (Demeke, 2011).
At the outset, the 1994 education policy masked quality with what it calls 
relevance (allocation of students in different fields). It attempted to improve 
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the investment of resources but the resources supply was challenged by rapid 
expansions. Tewodaj et al.(2008) argue that the improvement in coverage of 
education in Ethiopia has been accompanied by a sustained deterioration in 
quality of education. As evidence to support their argument, the Pupil-to-
Teacher Ratio, which was thirty-two in rural areas and thirty-four in urban 
areas in 1994, had reached seventy-three in rural areas and forty-eight in 
urban areas by the year 2001. This chapter concludes that quality never get 
due attention in the Ethiopian education sector reform programs of the period.












Benchmark Target Achieved Target Achieved Target Achieved Target Achieved
Scoring 50% 
or above
75 25 70 7.5 70 23 70 34
Scoring 75% 
or above
25 2.3 25 0.1 25 3 25 4
Source: (Education Statistics Annual Abstract, 2008 E.C. (2015/16), 2017)
7.4. Performance in Correcting the Undemocratic Content of 
the Previous Education System
In the political context of Ethiopia, the issue of language as a medium of 
instruction in schools is hotly debated. Studies on language policy (Ra-
machandran, 2012; Trudell, 2016) unanimously confirm that using a language 
spoken by the pupil has comparative advantage over using one that is not. 
Trudell (2016) indicates that the language of instruction has positive impacts 
on students’ learning outcomes, their overall learning experience, as well as on 
the wider community as well. A study by Ramachandran (2012) shows that the 
provision of mother tongue instruction could increase the percentage of the 
population completing primary schooling by as much as 15 percentage points. 
Beyond its effect on educational attainment, the mother tongue is important 
for effective transmission of knowledge, participation, and division of power 
in society (Ramachandran, 2012). On the other hand, choosing a language 
that the learners do not master has high costs in terms of poor uptake of the 
curriculum content, poor performance on examinations, increased dropout 
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rates, and the marginalization of populations that do not control the language 
of instruction (Trudell, 2016).
Providing education in mother tongues has been considered as part of 
democratizing the education system of Ethiopia (Ministry of Education, 
2002). In this regard, the government has seen are markable achievement in 
protecting and fulfilling language rights of Ethiopian nations and nationalities. 
By the year 2013, the number of languages used as a medium of instruction 
in primary schools reached thirteen in the most ethnically diversified region 
of SNNP. While the Amhara region provides education in four alternative 
languages, Harari, Dire Dawa, and Gambela use three mediums of instruction, 
as shown in table 6. Similarly, Somali, Afar, and Oromia are offering primary 
education using two languages. In 2013 Tigray, Benishangul, and Addis 
Ababa were using a single language as medium of instruction in schools, 
but more recently Benishangula Gumz and Addis Ababa started providing 
education in Afan Oromo. Further study is required to know the level of 
representation of values, cultures, and history of nations and nationalities 
in the education curriculum.
Table 6: Number of local languages used in primary education in 2007 and percentage 
of people with mother tongue other than the official language in 2007
Regions /City Admin 
No. of local languages used 
in primary education in 2007 
% of people with mother 
tongue other than the official 
language
1. Addis Ababa 1 29%
2. Afar 2 -
3. Amhara 4 7
4. Benishangul Gumuz 1 -
5. Dire Dawa 3 -
6. Gambela 3 -
7. Harari 3 -
8. Oromia 2 13
9. SNNP 13 -
10. Somali 2 3
11. Tigray 1 5
Total 35
Source: compiled from (Vujcich, 2013 )
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7.5. Limited Job Opportunity Remain a Challenge
Toward the end of the imperial regime, the public sector could no longer 
absorb secondary school graduates produced by a continuously growing 
number of schools. Hence, as early as 1973, up to 25 percent of the second-
ary school graduates were unemployed (Demeke, 2011). This huge level 
of unemployment continued to be a problem during the Dergue and the 
EPRDF regimes. Though EPRDF associated the problem of low employment 
opportunity for students who leave high school with the quality of education 
in the past, in the end this government itself produced even larger number 
of graduates who cannot find job.
The EPRDF-led government criticized the past regime due to a high 
number of youths that completed grade 12 and could not be employed by 
the government. However, the problems of unemployment have become 
worsen and now even university graduates are challenged to find jobs. Saint 
(2004) correctly understood the problem of limited job opportunity for 
university graduates as early as the problem became apparent. He states that 
the Ethiopian labor market for university graduates will remain limited in an 
economy where 80 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture and 
in which the civil service appears amply staffed.
Only steady economic growth will provide the financing required to 
improve opportunities for gainful employment for the rising numbers of 
graduates (Saint, 2004). Furthermore, he notes that roughly a century ago, 
many of Europe’s industrialized countries had tertiary enrolment ratios 
similar to those of Ethiopia today. In contrast to Ethiopia, however, they (with 
the exceptions of Italy and Russia) already had less than 50 percent of their 
labor force engaged in agriculture and had all achieved universal primary 
education (Fredriksen, 1984). The implication is that a rapid expansion of 
access to education at all levels may not by itself stimulate economic growth 
unless it is accompanied by productivity-driven structural changes in the 
economy. The latter is yet to occur in Ethiopia (Saint, 2004).
At present the government has accepted the fact that the existing job 
opportunities will not absorb all graduates of universities. In its ESDP V, 
the government has planned to increase the share of graduates with degree-
relevant employment within twelvemonths after graduation to 80 percent. 
This means that even if the plan will be 100percent successful, 20 percent of 
the graduates will not find a job within a period of one year. Improving the 
quality of education and expanding job opportunities will continue to be on 
the agenda in future education policy change initiatives.
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8. Conclusions and Implication for Future Research
The education policy of Ethiopia was developed as part of the impetus to 
replace past legacies with a new order and as a response to acute shortage in 
equitable access to education, inefficiency in using limited supply of resources 
due to high repetition and dropout rates, low quality, low relevance, and 
limitation in upholding democratic values. The 1994 education policy did 
not receive wide acceptance among stakeholders due to the unbalanced 
power of the ruling party in the formulation process, but implemented for 
about 25 years regard less of those criticism. This analysis shows the policy 
has achieved mixed results. Above all, Ethiopia has been most successful in 
addressing the problem of low access to education while still struggling to 
address the problem of inequity and inefficiency. The promotion of the use 
of mother tongue as a medium of instruction in schools has been successful, 
while other attempts to democratize the education system as stipulated in the 
policy goals need further studies. Likewise, the education policy under the 
EPRDF regime has completely failed in improving the quality of education, 
particularly from the perspective of the competence of graduates. All the 
assessed evidence suggests the challenge of low quality is valid at all levels 
of education, from preprimary to higher education. This chapter argues that 
whatever reform programs may be introduced, if they have no positive effect 
on quality of education, then they have little relevance.
Unbalanced growth in the job market with the supply of graduates has 
been a persistent problem for about half a century. The government severely 
criticized its predecessor on the basis of the failure of education system to 
provide adequate job opportunity to those who leave schools, but has ended 
by exacerbating the problem of unemployment. Whether related to the quality 
of education or other socioeconomic factors, the shortage of job opportunities 
for those who leave school has only become worse. Based on these conclusions, 
the author recommends the central focus of education program should be 
on achieving quality and the employability of graduates, while sustaining 
the current pace of expansion and creating equitable access to education.
Though the chapter discusses relevant policy issues using secondary data, 
there are a number of limitations that must be considered in future research. 
In a bid to cover achievements in all policy goals, this research has compro-
mised elements of depth. Thus, future researchers will benefit in producing 
further insights by concentrating on one goal of the education policy and 
one level of education instead of covering the whole education policy at a 
glance. For example it is essential to study in depth the educational inputs, 
competence and motivations of teachers, school facilities, and pedagogical 
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issues. Furthermore, future study is required to know the level of the repre-
sentation of values, cultures, and the history of nations and nationalities in 
the educational curriculum.
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Catch-up Trails: Public Administration 
Education and Professionalization 
Trajectories in Ethiopia
Kiflie Worku Angaw
Box 1: Key Points of the chapter
 the chapter studied the Ethiopian public administration education and the labor 
market.
 Public administration education is important for achieving values of economy, 
efficiency, effectiveness, and social equity of bureaucracies.
 strengthening public administration education leads to strengthening the public 
sector’s institutional executive (policymaking and implementation) capacities.
 Professionalization of public administration is crucial to the success of local, 
federal, regional, and supranational institutions.
 Ethiopian public administration education and professionalization has faced 
bottlenecked challenges.
Box 2: Lesson drawn from the chapter
 readers will be able to understand the path and trend of Ethiopian public 
administration education.
 readers will be able to underscore the importance of strengthening public 
administration to the contemporary governance spectrum.
 readers will understand public administration graduates’ experiences in the labor 
market.
 readers will understand the indispensable role of public administration at the 
micro and macro (local, national, and supranational) levels.
Box 3: Abbreviations
Au = African union
GtP = Growth and transformational Plan
moshE = ministry of science and higher Education
mtPA = management and Public Administration
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nGos = nongovernmental organizations
PAdm = Public Administration and development management
sdGs = sustainable development Goals
un = united nations
1. Introduction 
The origin of public administration as a practice traces back to ancient human 
civilization and emerges as an academic body of knowledge after Wilson’s 
article “The Study of Administration” in 1887. Thus, as an academic arena, 
it is a relatively young field of study.
The professionalization of public administration provides the latter with 
capable diligent socioeconomic and politically responsible experts, who are 
the building blocks for carrying out public policies for national development 
in the contemporary world. In the real world, these experts advise politi-
cians, providing crucial assistance in policy-making and implementation at 
different levels of government, i.e., local administrations, regional agencies, 
central government ministries/agencies (Hustedt et al., 2020), as well as 
within supranational bureaucracies, i.e., the United Nations, African Union, 
European Union, and so forth. For instance, the paramount role of public 
administration has been clearly reflected in the Agenda 2063 goals of Pan-
Africanism, which envision the strengthening the continent’s well-being 
and prosperity via a clear roadmap through which Africa aspires to achieve 
inclusive growth and sustainable development, continental integration, and 
political unity aimed at improving African governance for Africa’s renaissance 
(Agenda 2063, 2017).
Supranational agencies’ efforts/policies responding to complex societal 
challenges are meant to be realized through public governance across a 
spectrum of partnerships between multiple actors. The UN is typical in this 
respect, as seen in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) #8, 11, 16, 
and 17, which highlight the following expertise areas of public administration: 
promoting sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all (corresponding to the social 
security policy concern of public administration); making cities and human 
settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable (corresponding to the 
public services and urban governance areas of public administration); promot-
ing peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development through 
strong institutions (public sector capacity building); and strengthening the 
means of implementation and revitalizing global partnerships (partnership 
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with multiple actors) (UN, 2015). Bouckaert (2020) also underlines the 
indispensable role of public administration in the achievement of the above 
UN goals, as they may be achieved by moving to concrete principles of ef-
fective SDG governance through public administration, wherein the UN 
envisions the provision of safe and nutritious food, affordable drinking water, 
universal access to education, physical, mental and social well-being, granting 
equal opportunities and permitting the full realization of human potential 
in promoting shared prosperity (Bouckaert, 2020).
Public administration education has become extremely important these 
days because public services are expected to provide value for public money 
(Kwaku Ohemeng 2014), with careful consideration of the following public 
administration values/pillars: economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and social 
equity (Norman-Major, 2011). In the context of developing economies and 
Africa in particular, effective public governance is called upon to respond 
to numerous developmental challenges while taking into consideration the 
explicit normative dimensions of public service values and administration 
(Bouchaert, 2020). In Ethiopia, public administration is expected to con-
tribute to the success of the Ethiopian national development policy, i.e., the 
implementation of the strategic pillars of the Growth and Transformational 
Plan (GTP), specifically, fostering the governance and management of rapid 
urbanization to accelerate economic growth and building democracy and 
ensuring good governance through enhancing the implementation capacity 
of public institutions (National Planning Commission, 2015).
Taking all of the above into consideration, this chapter seeks to explain the 
history of Ethiopian public administration education and the country’s labor 
market trajectories using empirical evidence. In this chapter, readers will able 
to understand the path and trend of Ethiopian public administration education 
in Ethiopia since its inception in the 1960s to the present time. The chapter 
also provides insight into the experiences of public administration graduates 
in the labor market. Furthermore, the chapter posits that the importance of 
strengthening public administration education lies in strengthening executive 
agencies for effective policy formulation and implementation at both the 
micro and macro levels of local, national, and supranational institutions.
2. The Study Setting and Problem Context
The relevance of public administration education in the contemporary world 
is vital, as it provides employees of public organizations with the knowledge 
and skills that they should possess as competent and qualified public servants 
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(Blace, 2015). Its scientific inquiry and study domain are characterized by 
often competing paradigmatic perspectives and seemingly endless teaching 
modalities that differ from other applied social sciences (Van der Waldt 
2014). As Nadia (2016) stated, the evolution and current status of public 
administration education is well developed and documented in the Western 
world but less clear and underdeveloped in developing countries in general 
and Africa in particular. According to Pal and Clark (2016), the hypothetical 
assumption of public administration education is that those who do better have 
been taught better, and that quality education in this field enables graduates 
to deal effectively with real life problems, acting as social physicians via 
effective public policy-making and execution.
Quality public administration education can potentially improve the 
quality of government and governance through nurturing responsible 
graduates who build effective civil service systems imbued with high rates 
of commitment to civic virtues (Rubaii & Pliscoff, 2014), enabling govern-
ment officials and civil servants to demonstrate and adhere to higher levels 
of professionalism. The implementation of the Ethiopian development plan 
(GTP-II) requires strong institutional capacities. Strategic pillars of the 
GTP include building democratic and developmental good governance 
through enhancing the implementation capacity of public institutions and 
actively engaging the citizens, fostering the governance and management 
of rapid urbanization to accelerate economic growth (National Planning 
Commission, 2015). Besides the GTP, the success of different public sector 
reform tools (Business Process Re-engineering, Balanced Score Card, and 
Kaizen) introduced and others to be introduced in the future in Ethiopia 
largely relies on public administration.
The inability of educational institutions to provide quality training and 
education of public administrators and civil servants has resulted in inef-
fective policymaking and execution (Barabashev and Kastrel, 2013). This 
situation is embodied in inadequate curricula, which often copy courses from 
Western programs without adapting it to the specific country’s’ realities. As 
a result, public administration education has failed to grow, a deficiency that 
is exacerbated by merging public administration with business management, 
underestimation by labor markets, lack of educational competences, and 
pedagogical limitations (Barabashev and Kastrel, 2013; Ewoh, 2014).
The management of public affairs is a complex activity that entails the 
balancing of various and/or contradictory objectives. Thus, public administra-
tion education is necessary for equipping public administrators with the tools 
to deal with often complex tasks and sensitive situations (Antwi-Boasiako, 
2015). Furthermore, the complexities and changes in the political, social, and 
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economic landscape and functions of the government and public agencies 
manifest the need for excellence in public administration education (Blace, 
2015). The complexities that public administrators face in the contemporary 
world the preparation of qualified graduates who can deal effectively with 
highly complex issues involving very complicated issues related socioeconomic 
development. According to Henry (2005), the education of public administra-
tors comprises an understanding of the ecology of public agencies function, 
including the questions of how they function, what they do, and why they 
do it. A public administration education that provides students with a body 
of knowledge while ensuring practical experience is expected to contribute 
to the creation of a better government, better public agencies, and therefore 
to the realization of a better and egalitarian society, in which the body of 
knowledge acquired through rigorous research methodologies ranges from 
simple observations to complex modeling (Blace, 2015).
Public administration education trains future public administrators for 
mid-career, senior, and managerial positions in the areas of management, 
organizational leadership, personnel administration, budgeting and financial 
management, public policy, program evaluation, project & program manage-
ment, and administrative functions, who will work within government, 
nonprofit organizations, and the private sectors (Blace, 2015; Pal and Clark, 
2016). Students may pursue either the academic field of study (public ad-
ministration theory and research) or practical studies, such as executing the 
policy of public administration in practice and learning about administrative 
structures with their functional responsibilities (Antwi-Boasiako, 2015).
Education and curricula in this field should adequately prepare public 
management to be aware of the political processes that characterize the work of 
government officials. Unfortunately, most of the time government appointees 
critically lack this required training, hindering them from functioning and 
performing as expected (Antwi-Boasiako, 2015). European countries’ public 
administration education systems may be classified in in three clusters; legal 
(strong emphasis on administrative law), public (unique public and political 
character) and corporate or managerial (business management techniques) 
(Hajnal, 2003). The main characteristics of public administration educa-
tion differ in different political and social contexts, as well as depending on 
historical factors that have influenced the selection and training of graduates 
(Cepiku, 2013).
Fred (1962) argues that public administration as education and practice 
will not achieve its goal if it fails to consider the country’s specific context in 
applying the prismatic model and structural functionalism. Public administra-
tion education in Ethiopia began soon after the introduction of the higher 
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education system in Ethiopia during the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie 
I, in the 1950s. Since then the discipline has been producing experts and 
practitioners in the field. However, as far as this author knows, there has been 
little research on public administration education and professional growth 
trajectories in Ethiopia. To this end, this chapter tried to answer: What are 
the public administration education trajectories in Ethiopia? How does the 
labor market accommodate public administration graduates?
Ultimately, this chapter seeks to contribute as a springboard work on public 
administration education and professional development trajectories, as it 
provides empirical evidence on Ethiopian public administration education 
and professionalization endeavors while solving the problem of the constraints 
stemming from the paucity of available literature.
3. Methods and Materials
The study applied an exploratory type of research using the mixed research 
approach. The study used both primary and secondary data sources. Funda-
mentally, the primary data of the study were public administration scholars’ 
profiles obtained from Ethiopian public universities and labor market data. 
The Ethiopian public administration scholars’ (researchers and academicians) 
profiles were collected from different Ethiopian public universities: Addis 
Ababa, Ambo, Dilla, Kotebe Metropolitan, Dire Dawa, and Wolayta Sodo 
Universities. The data were collected in two ways (departments’ database and 
the online Survey Monkey tool). In the online Survey Monkey tool, scholars 
were asked to click on the questionnaire link through their email address, 
fill in the survey questionnaire, and return it back to the researcher. In all, 
sixty-five public administration scholars’ profiles were collected using the 
two mentioned data collection mechanisms.
In terms of the labor market and professionalization, data were collected 
from the well-known Ethiopian job advertising newspaper Addis Zemen, 
which publishes on a daily basis. Two months’ worth (sixty-one days) of 
open positions/vacancies were collected, as published in Addis Zemen from 
June 1, 2019, to July 31, 2019. All vacancies published in the newspaper were 
collected; subsequently, positions unrelated to the professional domain of 
public administration were automatically filtered out. After this filtering, 142 
vacancies remained for analysis within the public administration domain, 
all of which were related to the current curriculum of public administration 
education in Ethiopia. In theory, graduates could effectively discharge the 
required functions and adhere to the job responsibilities, demonstrating 
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their professional competencies on the assignments to be given them by 
these employers and advertised vacancies.
Furthermore, the author used the following secondary data: published 
works (scientific articles/journals, book chapters, and books) and policy docu-
ments, such as the new Ethiopian education development policy roadmap, 
the Growth and Transformational Plan (GTP I&II), the harmonized public 
administration curriculum, the Pan-African University strategic plan, the 
African Agenda 2063, and the UN SDGs, among others. Finally, the data 
were analyzed using narrative, descriptive and explanatory data analysis 
methods. The study used path dependency (historical institutionalism) 
theory as the framework of analysis. Readers should note that in addition 
to the universities studied here, other public sector capacity development 
institutions include civil service universities (federal and regional), Meles 
Zenawi leadership academies, and Ethiopian management institute (on job 
training institute). However, due to different limitations and institutional 
setups, the structures and curricula they are using differ from those of the 
Ethiopian higher education institutions (universities). For this reason, those 
institutions were excluded from the study as sources of data.
4. Result and Discussion
4.1. Public Administration Education in Ethiopia
The African education systems are largely dominated by Western educational 
ideologies, particularly those of the former colonial powers (Ewoh, 2014; 
Haruna, 2004). Consequently public administration education in Africa has 
narrowly focused on the need to respond to the pressures of global forces, 
Western theories, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, without paying considerable attention to the uniqueness of the social, 
economic, and political experiences of the African context.
As highlighted earlier, public administration education in Ethiopia as an 
independent academic discipline is sixty years old. In 1961, public administra-
tion began to be offered as an independent department within the faculty of 
Arts at Addis Ababa University (the then Haile Selassie I University). From 
1977-1981 it was placed under the department of political science and govern-
ment, and subsequently under the department of management at the college 
of business administration. In 1982, management (business administration) 
and public administration were merged together into the department of 
management and public Administration (MTPA) and stayed that way for 
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more than two decades (National Harmonized Curriculum, 2013). In 2004, 
public administration was established as an independent department (public 
administration and development management (PADM)) and placed in the 
faculty of business and economics, taking into consideration the global and 
national demands for skill and knowledge within its curriculum (National 
Harmonized Curriculum, 2013). Here we can understand the instability of 
the discipline, buffeted by institutional systemic changes over time.
From the point of view of historical institutionalism or path depend-
ency theory, it may be observed that the institutions already created in the 
context of public administration education in Ethiopia are disincentives 
(Stuteville and Jumara, 2010) for change (clear and long-lasting) in the field 
of the study through the creation of self-reliant schools or faculty, because so 
much is already invested in the existing institutions. Patterns of timing and 
sequence matters are in favor of incremental changes (Stuteville and Jumara, 
2010) instead of building new systems, introducing new designs, and new 
institutional change platforms that consider institutions (public administra-
tion teaching universities) as structural variables (Trouvé et al., 2010) from 
which stem arrangements of ideas, interests (public administration placement 
faculty), and powers (among public administration and other disciplines’ 
academicians). The historical institutionalism analytical framework considers 
institutions as structural variables from which stem arrangements of ideas, 
interests, and powers that affects the system (Steinmo et at., 1992). The theory 
starts from the premise that organizations and actors are part of institutions 
that structure and channel their behavioral standards and activities along 
established paths. The path taken highlights a historical dynamic that dictates 
that once a path is chosen, it is difficult to change it because the processes 
become institutionalized and are reinforced over time (Trouvé et al., 2010). 
It becomes increasingly difficult to reverse past institutional choices because 
not following the rules and standards established by previous choices (exit 
option) and building up new systems might incur inconveniencies. These 
paths are made up of institutional structures determined by previous choices 
that impose constraints on institutional development processes. That is why 
existing institutions are usually modified and not replaced despite their less 
than optimal nature and institutional inertia (Steinmo et at., 1992; Trouvé 
et al., 2010).
Currently, several public universities in Ethiopia offer an undergraduate 
program in public administration even though private colleges and universities 
haven’t yet offered it as a field of study in their programs. This might be due 
to the low demands for public administration graduates in the job market 
(Antwi-Boasiako, 2015). The job market and public administration graduates 
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will be discussed later on. Within public universities, till now Ethiopian 
public administration education remains disbursed in different faculties 
throughout the Ethiopian public universities, such as under the college of 
business and economics in more than ten public universities; under the school 
of law (Bahir Dar and Jimma Universities); in the college of social sciences 
(Hawassa University); and within the school of management (University 
of Gondar and Kotebe Metropolitan University), with related names like 
governance and development studies, etc. Even though the discipline has 
had different names, such as public administration, public policy/policy 
science, public management, and public governance (Bouckaert and Jann, 
2020; Verheijen and Connaughton, 2003), the nomenclature is unstable and 
will likely see unending renovation in the years to come. In this context, clear 
distinctions and borderlines must provide to distinguish academic program 
of public administration from public administration as an interdisciplinary/
transdisciplinary program or as a public administration specialization inte-
grated with other programs (Verheijen and Connaughton, 2003), in order 
to maintain its specific identity.
Because of different actors’ interests (public administration teaching 
institutions and scholars), Ethiopian public administration education follows 
the path dependency theory based on the premise that organizations and 
actors are part of institutions channeled along established paths (Trouvé 
et al., 2010). These paths are made up of institutions (with their interests, 
standards, and rules) determined by previous choices that impose constraints 
on the development of public administration education. It’s difficult to change 
since the processes become institutionalized and are reinforced over time (; 
Stuteville and Jumara, 2010; Trouvé et al., 2010).
Thus, the placement of the field within the university system remains 
contentious. With regards to its identity crisis, Rasmussen and Callan (2016) 
argue that it stems from the absence of a public administration epistemic 
community that would serve as a gatekeeper/owner society guarding the 
profession, as seen in law, economics, medicine, engineering, and other profes-
sional fields of studies. As Van der Waldt (2017) has pointed out, because of 
the lack of clear disciplinary border lines, the Ghanaian public administration 
education overwhelmingly accepts the superiority of business administration 
education curricula in its curriculum (Kwaku Ohemeng, 2014).
Similarly, the Italian public administration educational cluster covers 
three major areas: public (includes programs whose disciplinary orienta-
tion is political science, as well as sociology or economics), legal (covers 
programs whose disciplinary orientation is law), and corporate (programs 
whose disciplinary orientation is management as well as communication) 
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(Cepiku, 2013). The Ghanaian public administration education also has no 
single system; rather it varies based on national size, the interest of tertiary 
institution/diversity, political system structures, and the role of the central 
government. Furthermore, in the Ghanaian case, the influence of former 
colonial (Britain’s) legacies is an associational factor on public administra-
tion education (Antwi-Boasiako, 2015; Stuteville and Jumara, 2010). More 
importantly, (Cepiku, 2013) argues that the concept and tradition of the state 
has a direct impact on the development of public administration education.
The identity crisis of public administration as an academic and professional 
label, combined with its multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary character and 
the continuously evolving nature of government and government-society 
relations, disallows the development of a unified body of theory. This lack 
of unified identity is evident in Europe, Asia, the US, and Africa as well 
(Cepiku, 2013).The survival of public administration as a distinct field of study 
and areas of professional expertise will depend on the ability of scholars to 
develop relevant techniques, concepts, methodologies, theories, and practices 
(Cepiku, 2013).
Because of the above-mentioned factors and disciplinary development 
trajectories, public administration borrows theories and methodologies 
from other disciplines, a fact that has been at the center of debate since the 
first days of its self-awareness as a field of study. Indeed, the field owes its 
theories and methodologies to other disciplines like economics, law, and 
political science, due to the necessity of relevant methodologies to test theories 
(Onder & Brower, 2013) and hypothetical assumptions/problems and the 
association of practicability with disciplinary development and self-sufficiency. 
In this regard, Van der Waldt (2017) presented public administration as an 
interdisciplinary field of study entailing the convergence different disciplinary 
theories. Meanwhile, according to Pollitt (cited in Van der Waldt, 2017) “public 
administration suffers from multiple personality disorder,” is characterized 
by diversity, and finds its origin in various theoretical schools of thought 
instead constructing its own theories and methodologies.
I argue here that, while keeping in mind it’s interdisciplinary, multidiscipli-
nary, and transdisciplinary characteristics, public administration education 
has a peculiar identity and unique mode of scientific inquiry that should be 
maintained in Ethiopia via the creation of independent schools/institutes 
and/or the establishment of unique departments. Indeed, this is done in the 
United States (Harris School of Public Policy, American University School of 
Public Affairs, and others), Republic of South Korea (Korean Development 
Institute School of Public Policy and Management, Korea Institute of Public 
Administration, and others), Hungary (School of Public Policy at the Central 
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European University, National University of Public Service and others), 
Singapore (Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy), and in other countries 
around the world. While this is not an easy task to accomplish, above all, 
public administration scholars must come together and design methods and 
theories applicable to the discipline of public administration.
This is due to the importance of public administration education, which 
is increasing as never before. According to Rosenbaum (2015), the 21st 
century’s growing demand for effective public governance make it clear that 
the demands on the next generation of public administrators will be great 
and the demands on those who train them will be even greater (quality and 
quantity). Since the demands and needs of contemporary society continue 
to grow, the tools and technologies with which public administrators need 
to work have become increasingly sophisticated.
4.2. Ethiopian Public Administration Scholars Profile
The academic and professional profile of scholars of a certain discipline has a 
remarkable contribution to the development and embracing of disciplinary 
self-sufficiency. In this regard, (Rosenbaun, 2015) clearly stated that the com-
mitment and quality (the highest standards of teaching, training and research 
and community services) of the faculty members of public administration is 
central to the achievement of program goals in all areas of activity.
In this study, we observe the disciplinary backgrounds of the Ethiopian 
public administration scholars, both researchers and academicians, who are 
responsible for teaching-learning assignments in public universities, both at 
the undergraduate and postgraduate level, engaging in research undertak-
ings and discharging community services. As the faculty members’ profiles 
revealed, significant numbers of scholars have non-public administration 
backgrounds (undergraduate and postgraduate degrees). Graph 11 below 
presents the statistics of public administration faculty members’ profiles. 
30.77 percent of the scholars selected in this study have business management/
administration undergraduate degrees, 23.07 percent have other (civics and 
ethical studies, political science, law, language, cooperative and administrative 
sciences) undergraduate/bachelor degrees, and only 46.15 percent of the 
scholars have public administration undergraduate degree backgrounds.
In a similar vein, more than 10 percent of the staff postgraduate (MSc/
MA) degrees are either in business administration, globalization studies, 
gender studies or international economics. From this we can surmise that 
large number scholars might lack the theoretical foundations and funda-
mental background knowledge of public administration, which increases the 
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probability of their being influenced by their prior background knowledge, 
which in turn affects the curricula, teaching pedagogy, research activities, and 
community service, all of which cumulatively influences public administration 
students’/graduates’ knowledge, competency, and skills. Even though public 
administration education should involve a pragmatist approach to enable 
students to comprehend sensitive contexts (structural functionalism and 
prismatic modeling), it also involves focusing on uncertainties and teaching 
students to decide on issues after sensing, reflecting, and acting on their 
outcomes using their discipline distinctive methods. In this regard Rubaii 
& Pliscoff (2014) argue public administration education programs must 
prepare graduates with a full range of competencies knowledge, skills, and 
public service values (economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and social equity), 
and they must do so in ways that are relevant to their national culture and 
context, which is greatly faculty members profiles (Rubaii & Pliscoff, 2014). 
The overall effects of this have presented (Mitiku, 2018) the Ethiopian public 
service systems with serious challenges involving serious technical and 
tactical institutional incompetence, skill inadequacies, and methodological 
disorientations of public values. Public administration as an academic and 
practice will contribute to the expected result when a considerable investment 
is assigned to its education system. This was confirmed by Bouchaert and 
Jann (2020), who have pointed out that strengthening public administration 
means strengthening academic research outputs and teaching activities.
Therefore, these scenarios are highly likely to affect students’ professional 
competencies, expertise knowledge, as well as skill acquisition. According 
to Barabashev & Kastrel (2013), public administration education might 
be influenced by institutional development (higher education systems), 
educational curricula of higher education, government standards, and the 
job market demand for graduates. Similarly, the interrelationship between 
academicians and practitioners’ collaborative research and interoperability 
plays an underpinning role in disciplinary development. As Onder & Brower 
(2013) point out, a public administration education system and practitioners’ 
productivity have direct associations. This spillover effect also expands to in-
dustry: for instance, Turkish public administration practitioners’ engagement 
in research undertakings and article publication declined from 18.9 percent 
to 8.5 percent in the 1990-2009 period (Rubaii & Pliscoff, 2014).
As (Barabashev & Kastrel, 2013) have stated, public administration educa-
tion is influenced by faculty members’ qualifications and level of professional-
ism (publication tracks and scientific research undertakings related to societal 
problems and solution provision in an academic forum where scholars come 
together and interact with state authorities). In relation to this, nevertheless, 
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even though public administration education began in Ethiopia with the 
introduction of higher education in Ethiopia in 1960s, for more than fifty years 
it stayed without a professional organization comparable to other disciplines. 
Interestingly, the Ethiopian Public Administration Association (EPAA) 
was established in 2016, as a platform for research undertakings, dialogue, 
and exchange, as well as a forum for the professionalization of Ethiopian 
public administration. However, in this chapter, it’s difficult to evaluate the 
professional organization’s performance due to its recent establishment.
In regard to the general academic rank of public administration scholars 
as presented below, it is at the infant stage of development. As shown in 
graph 2, more than 78 percent of the scholars surveyed in this research have 
a rank of lecturer (MA/MSc degree holders), less than 16 percent are as-
sistant professors (Ph.D. degrees and research assistantship), 7.77 percent are 
Ph.D. candidates, 4.61 percent are assistant lecturers (BA/BSc holders), and 
only 1.54 percent hold associate professorships. However, the government 
of Ethiopia and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MoSHE) 
declare the public universities staff ratio should, as a general principle, reflect 
a 0-30-70 basis (zero percent undergraduate, 30 percent MA/MSc holders, 
and 70 percent Ph.D. holders). In contrast, the dominant number (more than 
78 percent) of public administration faculty members are still MA/MSc 
holders. We can deduce that this scenario significantly affects the disciplinary 
development of public administration as a field of study and professional 
areas of expertise. This is due to the limitation of postgraduate programs, 
specifically research degrees or Ph.D. programs in public administration 
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in Ethiopian universities. This is the critical challenge of departmental staff 
development as well as for the development of the field of study more generally. 
Addis Ababa University is the only university that has a Ph.D. program in 
public management and policy but at present there are no regularly enrolled 
Ph.D. candidates in this program.
4.3. Professionalization of Public Administration and Labor 
Market in Ethiopia
Public administration education potentially nurtures graduates capable 
of carrying out government functions with normative and pragmatic ap-
proaches that seek the general public’s interests. According to Henry (2005), 
the government (at all levels i.e., federal to local) is the biggest employer of 
public administration graduates in areas of public administration professional 
domain and expertise.
The Ethiopian public administration field of study foundational document 
and national harmonized curriculum clearly state that the professional profile 
of graduates of public administration should allow them to effectively discharge 
responsibilities as experts and team leaders and assume managerial positions in 
areas of human resource administration, policymaking and implementations, 
leadership and strategic lesions, diplomacy, public relations and governance, 
project/program and development, public service provisions, finance admin-
istrations as they pursue careers in the public sector (federal, regional and 
local constituents) working in the realm of public interests, nongovernmental 
Graph 2: Academic rank of Ethiopian public administration scholars
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organizations, associations, civil society organizations, international organiza-
tions, and development partners (UN agencies, AU, regional and international 
organizations) as experts in project management, strategic management, 
human resource development and management, technical advisors, consultants, 
and researchers (National Harmonized Curriculum, 2013).
While this sounds impressive on paper, the present study has found that 
public administration graduates are having difficulty finding jobs in the above-
mentioned areas of expertise and organizations. As table 1 shows, among 
thirty-four vacancies in human resource administration (managerial and 
expert level) offered by public sectors, private companies, public enterprises, 
NGOs, and think tank organizations, public administration graduates are 
excluded from applying to seventeen (50 percent). This is despite the fact 
that graduates had studied human resources administration in a seven-hour 
lecture module comprising human resources administration and personnel 
administration courses. Only fourteen (41 percent) of open human resources 
vacancies invited them to apply.
Furthermore, among twenty-six positions open in project/program man-
agement nineteen (73 percent) vacancies automatically excluded public ad-
ministration graduates from applying for competitions, and only three invited 
them to apply. This is in spite of the fact that students routinely take courses 
related to these vacancies, counting twenty hours lecture hours’ courses in 
project planning and administration, strategic management, macroeconomics 
and microeconomics, and entrepreneurship. Moreover, among twenty-six 
open vacancies offered by different organizations in the areas of budgeting/
planning and finance administration eighteen (69 percent) excluded public 
administration graduates from applying and only five (19 percent) indirectly 
invited them to do so. In fact, public administration graduates have taken 
a twelve lecture hour’s module entitled Public Finance Administration, 
which is composed of relevant courses (public finance and taxation, public 
budgeting and financial administration, and principles of accounting). For 
detailed information on the labor market and public administration graduate 
career opportunities, see annex 1 at the end of this chapter. The role of public 
administration education in strengthening public sectors is clearly stipulated 
in GTP-II, which emphasizes building democratic and developmental good 
governance through enhancing the implementation capacity of public institu-
tions (National Planning Commission, 2015) as a strategic pillar of GTP-II. 
Without hiring/attracting the public administration graduates into the public 
sector, how will this development plan be successfully implemented?
As other scholars argue, (Blace, 2015; Henry, 2005; Pal & Clark, 2016), 
the government is the biggest employer of public administration graduates, 
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specifically in the areas of budgeting and financial management, public policy, 
and program evaluation. Furthermore Evans et al. (2019) has highlighted that 
public affairs education schools primarily anticipate and build the immediate 
and long-term skills needed by students entering public service leadership 
roles. The new Ethiopian education policy roadmap document also confirms 
that the higher education curricula are not geared toward the development of 
employability and other lifelong learning skills among graduates. Ethiopian 
universities did not seem to have strategies and tactics to prepare programs 
requiring intensive use of IT and emerging technologies/theories within the 
discipline (Tefera et al., 2018).
As the study confirmed and labor market data reveals, the domestic job mar-
ket of Ethiopia does not yet consider and treat public administration graduates 
as a competent, potential, and qualified workforce for vacant positions in 
the main areas of graduates’ expertise offered by the public sector (federal 
to local), public enterprises, private companies, NGOs, and development 
partners, regardless of the graduates’ professional profile, professional domain, 
and the Ethiopian public administration curriculum own stated main areas 
of expertise. Surprisingly, candidates from other fields who are less likely to 
have expertise in the areas required by the market are often invited to directly 
apply to these same positions/vacancies directly (see annex 1) while public 
administration graduates are still excluded from applying.
Of the other sixty-four vacancies/positions used for analysis, twenty-five 
were public/customer service positions, nine covered crosscutting issues (gen-
der experts and youth affairs exerts), ten offered general manager, executive 
director, country representative, public relations, and directorship positions, 
and the remaining twenty positions were others, like secretary-general, office 
coordinator, team leader, and cost-sharing expert positions offered by the 
public sector, public enterprises, financial institutions, and NGOs. Still, more 
than 90 percent of those job offers don’t invite public administration graduates 
to apply for competition (see annex 1), even though public administration 
graduates are equipped with the essential competencies and skills of the job 
specifications and job analysis of those offered jobs requirements. Public 
administration graduates have gained the required knowledge, skill, and 
competencies for these vacancies and positions during their study at university 
from public administration modules, namely, development management, 
management of public enterprises and NGOs, foundations of public admin-
istration, government and governance, and public finance administration, 
all of which includes different comprehensive courses within each module 
specifically with the required knowledge, skills, and competencies required 
by the above job vacancies.
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This situation urges us to raise questions as to why public administration 
graduates are excluded from the job market to this extent? One might argue 
this is because of the subject matter and because the discipline is a young 
field of study. The appropriateness of this argument is questionable since 
the beginning of public administration as a field of study has traced back to 
the introduction of higher education in Ethiopia since the 1960s. The other 
two arguments might be that, first, the discipline doesn’t market itself to the 
job market (particularly to the domestic) and second, the job market might 
not have enough information on the professional domain, qualification, 
competencies, and potential areas of expertise of public administration 
as a field of study and the professional aptitudes of the graduates. I believe 
both these arguments may be valid, affecting the labor market and the 
professionalization of the discipline in Ethiopia. In this regard Barabashev 
& Kastrel (2013) argue that the information employers have on graduates’ 
profiles greatly affects employment opportunities. Furthermore, Pan African 
University’s strategic plan document clearly envisions the projection of its 
graduates’ employability rate to at least 80 percent (PAU, n.d); meanwhile, the 
Ethiopia public administration education curriculum says nothing about its 
graduates’ employability rate, nor is such a target found in the strategic plan.
Consequently, I argue that public administration graduates face fragile la-
bor market development and/or opportunities in Ethiopia due to information 
asymmetry in which employers lack a clear understanding of what professional 
competencies they need from their employees/graduates and analytical 
segments of the market as well. Likewise, there are no clear employment 
prospects after graduation and even employers and government authorities 
may have no idea what specialists they require (Barabashev & Kastrel, 2013; 
Van, 2014).
Even though public administration graduates rigorously studied the 
required modules and are equipped with necessary competencies, financial 
institutions discriminate against them in competition for offered jobs. Surpris-
ingly, the public sector and public enterprises don’t offer public administration 
graduates the opportunity to apply to vacancies regardless of the fact that the 
graduates’ main domain of studies is related to those organizations (see annex 
1). Besharov & Oser (2013) argue that to the challenges public administration 
graduates face in career opportunities around the world, combined with a 
narrowing job market that does not address the needs of students planning 
to work elsewhere, the study of public administration is restrained. In this 
regard, the undergraduate program of public administration is not the priority 
choice of students as they apply to universities.
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5. Implications and Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we came to understand that public administration education is 
worthwhile. It adds value to public interest and ensuring the general welfare, 
value for public service and money, and strengthens the executive (policymak-
ing and implementation) capacity of institutions at the local, regional, federal, 
and/or supranational organizational levels. Public administration education 
enables the public governance and leadership to comprehend the complexity 
of emerging societal challenges and responds proactively in appropriate ways.
As the Ethiopian GTP-I performance report evidenced, institutional capac-
ity constraints were major challenges to implementing the development plan 
(National Planning Commission, 2015). To this end, public administration 
education plays a significant role in strengthening public sector institutional 
capacity building. Thus, the government and universities teaching public 
administration should work jointly to overcome these institutional capacity 
constraints. Therefore, strengthening public administration education may be 
equated to strengthening public sector institutional executive (policymaking 
and implementation) capacities. To do so, due attention is required from 
concerned stakeholders (government, universities, and industries) as well.
The chapter also assessed the Ethiopian public administration education 
and its professional development, which is now nearly sixty years old. As the 
study makes evident, there have been different efforts to integrate it into the 
Ethiopian higher education system. During this period, the discipline has 
passed through different development routes. Even though its inception 
coincided with the introduction of the higher education system in Ethiopia, 
public administration’s disciplinary development is immature and its place 
within the system is still debated. The implication of this situation is a long-
lasting challenge for public administration education development and 
disciplinary growth as well as professionalism in Ethiopia.
Furthermore, its graduates experience serious challenges in the job 
market (labor industries) despite the fact that available vacancies fit with 
their major areas of expertise; this probably negatively affects the ability of 
public administration programs to attract outstanding prospective students. 
In a similar vein, public administration instructors’’ profile still remain poor 
and a significant number of faculty are from related fields of studies that 
directly negatively affect the disciplinary and professional development of 
public administration. The limitation of postgraduate and research degrees, 
especially Ph.D. programs in Ethiopia public universities, like other disciplines 
greatly affects the academic profile of the scholars teaching these subjects, 
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contributing to the inadequate disciplinary development and professional 
growth of Ethiopian public administration.
Therefore, considerable attention should be given by concerned bodies to 
market the discipline, improving its ability to sell itself to job markets through 
job fairs and internships, and launching/expanding postgraduate/research 
degrees to improve scholars’ academic profile. As Kwaku Ohemeng (2014) has 
pointed out, marketing of public administration is a breaking-through strategy 
into the labor market and expansion of graduate programs development is 
extremely promising due to its education (quality and relevance). Because 
public administration is applied science (Rosenbaun, 2015), universities 
that teach it should make commitments to the integration of theory and 
practice (the highest quality of research and the most outstanding practi-
cal experience, i.e., facilitate internship [students’] as well as externships 
[faculty members]). Programs should be actively engaged through their 
teaching, training, research, and community service activities with all of 
their stakeholders from the local, regional, federal institutions and with the 
global community (scholarship) spectrum at large.
Finally, I want to inform the readers that the study has certain limitations. 
Due to different constraints the study was limited in its ability to assess 
the public administration education program course contents, curriculum 
and pedagogical methodologies, as well as instructional techniques and 
public administration graduates’ (employed) efficiency and effectiveness 
on the assigned positions/jobs. Therefore, these are the remaining potential 
areas for potential future research into the Ethiopian public administration 
education system.
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The Implementation of Community 
Policing in Addis Ababa City, Ethiopia
Wondem Meuriaw Ayalew
Box 1: Key messages of the chapter 
 AAPc has organized community policing geographically and assigned 
community policing officers for a long period of time at the “ketena” level.
 AAPc is a moderately formed community partnership to prevent crime in the city.
 the commission is partially applying problem-solving techniques and devolution 
of authority and responsibility to frontline officers.
 major obstacles to community policing include the organization of the 
commission and awareness gaps among residents, officers, and managers. 
Box 2: Reading this chapter will give insight in
 the practice of community policing in the city
 the structure of community policing in the city
 the level of implementation of community policing in the city
 major challenges facing the implementation of community policing
Box 3: Abbreviations
AAPc = Addis Ababa Police commission
AEo = African Economic outlook.
EFPc = Ethiopian Federal Police commission
EPrdF = Ethiopia Peoples’ revolutionary democratic Front
FdrE = Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia
li = level of implementation
moFEd = ministry of Finance and Economic development
nPm = new Public management
PAsdEP = A Plan for Accelerated and sustained development to End Poverty.
tQm = total Quality management
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1. Introduction
Ethiopia has registered remarkable economic growth and improvement in 
the human development index in the last decade (Molina & Purse, 2010). 
This economic growth enhances the overall welfare of the citizens, but it does 
not guarantee a decent quality of life (Bekele et al., 2012). Thus, it is vital to 
strengthen the capacity of law enforcement institutions to promote human 
security by protecting citizens’ entitlements (Bekele, et. al., 2012). The absence 
of peace and order disrupts commerce, provision of public services, and all 
economic activities, plunging people into destitution and poverty. Therefore, 
efforts to sustain economic growth should be accompanied by building durable 
institutions capable of upholding lasting peace and order (Bekele et.al, 2012).
The police department is a law enforcement institution charged with ensur-
ing safety and security. In Ethiopia, the modern police force was established 
during the reign of Emperor Menelik II in 1913, under the name “Yeketema 
Zebegna” or the City’s Guard. Since its establishment, the police department 
has undergone several reforms to meet the demands of the time (EFPC, 2017).
To adjust to the current situation, the Ethiopia police department was 
re-established by Ethiopian Federal Police Commission establishment 
proclamation no. 720/2011. The proclamation reorganized the Addis Ababa 
Police Commission (AAPC) under the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission 
(EFPC) in order to ensure better institutional capabilities. According to the 
proclamation, the objectives of the commission are ensuring and maintaining 
peace and security of the public and state through the active participation 
of the public (FDRE, 2011).
To strengthen the institutional capacity of the commission, the government 
of Ethiopia planned to implement a justice system reform plan, particularly 
community policing, in the 2006-2010 national five-year development plan, 
i.e. in the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASDEP) (MoFED, 2006). One of the objectives of the justice system 
reform program is building the capacity of law enforcement institutions to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness (MoFED, 2006). AAPC commenced 
community policing to improve the institutional capacity to maintain peace 
and order in the city (Mulat, 2015).
Community policing, as its name implies, involves the community in 
policing efforts, in identifying problems and conditions that give rise to 
crime, and providing solutions proactively (Diamond & Weiss, 2016). The 
core idea of community policing is the police and community should work 
together to identify and solve community problems before they cause crime 
(Community Policing Consortium, 1994).
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Community policing was launched by the Addis Ababa Police Commission 
regulation no.1/2010. The regulation states that the structure of community 
policing in Addis Ababa stretches from the City to the community level. The 
formal structures include the City, Sub-city, Woreda, and village/ “Ketena” 
structures (AAPC, 2010). However, block level and household level com-
munity structures are voluntary and managed by a selected committee with 
the help of a community policing officer. According to AAPC (2010), there 
are consultative councils at each level of community policing and the councils 
are chaired by the mayor, sub-city chief administrator, and chief woreda 
administrator, respectively. The consultative councils are tasked with solving 
problems proactively to prevent crime and reduce fear of crime.
The structures below the “Ketena” level are led by committee with the 
assistance of the assigned community policing officer. The structures enable 
the community to participate. Every household has a family police member 
who is a representative of the family and is obliged to control the actions of 
his/her family members (AAPC, 2010).
However, there has been no research conducted on how effectively 
community policing has been implemented in Addis Ababa City, with the 
exception of Legesse et al. (2016). They have researched the specific subpart 
of Addis Ketema Sub-city of Addis Ababa city. However, they did not clearly 
show the level of community policing implementation either in their specific 
study area or in the city at large.
Community policing emphasizes the value of individual community polic-
ing officers. Frontline community policing officers, in community policing, are 
responsible for managing every activity that concerns community policing. 
They are also responsible for delivering policing service to the neighborhood. 
Therefore, the shifting of responsibility to line officers requires organizational 
changes in terms of the management style, organizational structure, human 
resource management practices, and information system of the police depart-
ment. In consideration of the importance of police service, the government 
of Ethiopia has introduced several reforms, of which the justice system 
reform program and service delivery reform program are perhaps the most 
significant (MOFED, 2006). These reforms have been introduced to make 
police organization fit with new philosophy, i.e., the community policing 
system. In doing so, AAPC has made some adjustment in police organizations 
in line with the federal government’s system. However, how far these reforms 
support community policing system has not been assessed.
Community policing demands smooth relations with and support from 
the community to be effectively implemented. Alpert et.al (2001) and Skogan 
(1995) insist that without the support of the community that knows the 
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neighborhood well the police will hardly be able to effectively implement 
community policing. Against this assertion and the missions and vision of 
the police, Ethiopian police, particularly Addis Ababa police, were engaged in 
political activities. As Nunzio (2014) and Woldekidan (2016) have explained, 
under both the previous and current regimes, Addis Ababa police were politi-
cally partial and advocated the political agenda of the ruling party instead of 
upholding the constitution. This unconstitutional experience damaged the 
image of the police and resulted in negative community memories. Yet, as 
has already been said, community policing demands smooth relations with 
the community and the creation of a partnership with it. Wilson and Kelling 
(1982) strengthen the argument that the success of community policing relies 
on community partnerships (Alpert, Flynn, & Piquero, 2001). Without the 
support of the community who knows the neighborhood well, police will 
be unable to maintain peace and order (Skogan, 1995). Thus, how these bad 
experiences with the police affects the effective implementation of community 
policing remains to be examined.
Against this backdrop, the study answers the following research questions:
– How far has the commission been transformed to adopt community 
policing?
– What are the practices of community policing in Addis Ababa City?
– What is the level of implementation of community policing in Addis 
Ababa City?
– What are the challenges of community policing in Addis Ababa City?
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Western governments were challenged by a finan-
cial crisis, public discontent on inflexible public sector bureaucracy, and low 
public trust (Pollitt et al., 2007). These issues brought a historic shift toward 
the neoliberal movement in industrial countries, especially in the USA and 
UK. The ideology rejects the welfare state, opposes large bureaucracy, doubts 
the capacity of the government, blames public bureaucracy for inefficiency 
and ineffectiveness, advocates adapting the private sector management and 
operating system into the public sector, and focuses on the private sectors 
like service delivery (Pollitt et al., 2007).
This ideological turn was reinforced by new managerialism thinking, 
called New Public Management (NPM), which supports adopting of the 
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organizational principles, leadership styles, and other experiences of the private 
sector into the public sector (Gruening, 2001). It also focuses on structural 
devolution and management principles and efficiency (Christensen and Læg-
reid, 2011). Sozar (2008) argues that Total Quality Management (TQM) also 
gave momentum to the new movement. TQM is a management approach that 
advocates continuous improvement with the participation of all employees in 
an organization with the aim of achieving customer satisfaction (Kim, 2016).
In addition, the end of 1990s saw the emergence of post-New Public 
Management (post NPM). This approach focuses more on central capacity 
and control, coordination within and between sectors, and value-based 
management (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011). These paradigm shifts have 
compelled public service delivery institutions to consider the quality of 
service and public satisfaction (Sozer, 2008). As police departments are by 
their nature a public service delivery institution, they also became worried 
about efficiency, effectiveness, quality of service, and public satisfaction.
Particularly, in the 1960s street riots, the civil right movement, and the 
rise of crime and fear of crime put police departments at the center of the 
maelstrom (Uchida, 1993). Between the 1960s and 1970s, the crime rate in 
the United States doubled. In addition, the continuous civil right movement 
exerted another pressure on the police department (Uchida, 1993). Moore 
and Trojanowicz (1986) posit that the fear of crime had been increasing 
continuously since the 1960s. Finally, the local police departments were 
faced with a budget imbalance as they sought to tackle the growing problem 
(Community policing consortium, 1994).
The circumstances of the 1960s compelled politicians, police, and policy-
makers to reassess the situation of law enforcement organizations. Scholars 
were also invited to study the effort of policing and police organization from 
several perspectives and brought into question the effectiveness of professional 
policing. According to Walker (1977), on the one hand, the situation revolves 
around the level of training, recruitment, efficiency, and the level of service. 
On the other side, despite improvements in these areas, the problems in society 
remained the same or increased (Uchida, 1993). Furthermore, professional 
policing views police officers as experts in crime prevention, considering police 
as the experts who have all the answers, which undermines the capacity and 
contributions of the community in policing efforts. It, therefore, limited and 
weaken the relationship between police and community (Community Policing 
Consortium, 1994). In short, traditional policing disregarded the contribution 
of community to the police service and concentrated on the top-down approach 
while remaining reactive in nature. This approach has, in effect, failed to cope 
with the complex and dynamic nature of crime and fear of crime (Chan, 2008).
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The main objective of traditional policing is reducing crime and gives little 
emphasis to fear of crime, public satisfaction, and disorder (Bucqueroux and 
Trojanowicz, 1990). Furthermore, it focuses on “serious” crimes rather than 
on disorder. It deals with crimes through rapid response and undercover 
operations. In conclusion, professional policing limits the capacity of police 
in the crime fighting effort (Community Policing Consortium, 1994) and 
as such is no longer considered an effective strategy in crime prevention 
(Kusow, Wilson and Martin 1997). Research has revealed that the tactics 
of professional policing have had little or no contribution to preventing or 
minimizing crime and fear of crime in society (Uchida, 1993).
These problems compel the government to innovate a new policing which 
would the weakness of traditional policing strategies. In the 1990s, the police 
department brought community policing into the police department to 
tackle the elevated crime and fear of crime. Community policing has been 
developed as an alternative solution to the failed efforts of professional policing 
to effectively deal with crimes.
2.2. The Rationales of Community Policing in Ethiopia 
Like Western countries, Ethiopia faced a similar situation in preventing crime 
and delivering quality police service to the community. In 2001 and 2005 
young citizens were rioting in support of the opposition political parties. 
However, arguably, such riots were labelled by the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) as a dangerous alliance between 
opposition politicians and ordinary street crime and named participants 
“gangsters and dangerous vagrants.” In labeling the youths as vagrants and 
unemployed, the government was able to frame their behavior as a sign of 
disorder and crime. In addition, from 2001 to 2004, there was an intensive 
youth group conflict over a simple and an irrelevant reason, which created 
tension in the community and fertile ground for offenders to commit crime 
(Di Nunzio, 2014).
Another influential factor that compels police reform is the centrality of 
crime prevention and community policing in the current political discourse 
of African countries. Western development aid came up with conditionality, 
which is a governance system used to overcome the challenges related to 
growth and security. It also focuses on extensions of best practices to the role 
of the state and local community, and commitment to cost-effectiveness and 
accountability (World Bank, 1989). Therefore, to get international develop-
ment aid, African countries, including Ethiopia, consider adopting reforms 
proposed by donor agencies. For instance, the Department of International 
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Development of the UK allocated more than 20 million euro for community 
policing programs in Ethiopia. The government of Ethiopia was externally 
induced to implement and indeed implemented community policing in Addis 
Ababa City (Di Nunzio, 2014).
Abebe (2002) rationalized that the demand for responsive, transparent, 
accountable, and customer-oriented police service; the inability of professional 
policing to maintain peace and order in the city; and increasing awareness 
that police alone cannot maintain or prevent crime gave momentum to the 
Ethiopian government to question the policing system.
Indeed, the inability of the police department to maintain peace and 
order in the city concerns the government, especially since Ethiopia is a 
developmental state that encourages state intervention to correct social and 
economic injustice (Bayeh, 2018). In its view, building a strong and competent 
professional bureaucracy and creating a public private partnership (major 
features of developmental state) are important panacea for the problems of 
law and order. Therefore, the government of Ethiopia implemented the justice 
service reform program in law enforcement institutions, especially the police 
commission, in part through introducing community policing into the police 
department (Abebe, 2002; FDRE, 2006).
The government attempting to restructure the police commission and 
trained officers by relying on community policing science to provide custom-
ized and quality service to the community. Besides, the government has 
created an opportunity for the community (residents and other stakeholders 
who have concern for the community) to participate and shoulder the policing 
service along with the government in order to reduce budget burden and 
provide effective and inclusive service. The reform focuses on the governance 
system and making police public service more citizen centric (Stebek, 2018).
2.3. Community Policing 
Community policing is a governance system in the police department 
that promotes partnership with multiple actors; applies problem-solving 
techniques to address problems that lead to crime and disorder; and changes 
the organization to support such efforts (Diamond & Weiss, 2009). COPS 
(2014) defines it as a philosophy that encourages organizational change that 
backs the systematic utilization of public partnership and problem-solving 
practices, to proactively solve problems that compromise the safety of the 
community. Community policing has three interrelated core elements, namely 
organizational transformation, community partnership, and problem-solving 
(Lawrence & McCarthy, 2013).
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2.4. Elements of Community Policing 
In community policing, frontline officers are responsible for all policing tasks 
and deliver police service to the neighborhood. Hence, the enhanced role 
of the officers requires changes in the structure, management, operation, 
and information system (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). One of 
the changes in the police department entails reorganizing the department 
geographically and assigning frontline officers for a long period of time at 
the neighborhood level. It facilitates close and frequent contact with the 
community. The officers also get opportunities to identify local priorities, 
problems, and resources available within the community, to address issues 
before they cause crime and disorder (Lawrence & McCarthy, 2013). Under 
community policing, frontline officers are given the discretion to decide 
what, how, when, and where should be done in the area where they are in 
charge. Thus, community policing requires the devolution of authority and 
discretion (Community Policing Consortium, 1994).
Community policing officers should be recruited and hired in the spirit of 
service provision rather than adventure. In addition, they should be trained 
and encouraged to develop creative thinking, communication, proactive 
orientation, and analytical skills, and techniques for dealing with community 
issues. Moreover, change changes in departmental information systems is 
required to facilitate access to quality information. Accurate and timely data 
make problem-solving effective in proactively addressing issues (COPS, 2014).
Community policing invites the community to participate in the quest 
for crime control and prevention and exploit the community’s resources to 
address priorities. A strong community partnership helps to pinpoint and 
alleviate the underline causes of crime and disorder (Community Policing 
Consortium, 1994). Additionally, the community has the right to participate in 
community policing, since citizens have the right to a voice in any decision that 
affects their lives. Thus, police should develop a positive and strong partnership 
with the community (encompassing residents, public and private agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations, religious institutions, local government 
offices, hospitals, schools, etc.)
Problem-solving is a process of systematically identifying and analyzing 
specific community problems that can give rise to crime, fear of crime, and 
disorder, and providing proactive solutions and evaluating the outcome of 
the solutions (Diamond & Weiss, 2009). It transformations the police depart-
ment’s approach from reactive and incidence-driven policing to proactive or 
preventive policing (Lawrence, and McCarthy, 2013). The assumption of 
problem-solving relies on minimizing crime and disorder by systematically 
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studying the characteristics of a definite geographical area’s problems and then 
providing area-specific solutions (Community Policing Consortium, 1994).
Community policing changes the structure and practices of an organization 
in terms of organizational transformation, community policing, and problem-
solving. Therefore, this study has measured the level of implementation of 
community policing from the perspectives of such changes.
3. Research Methods
3.1. Research Design and Approach 
The purpose of this study is measuring the effectiveness of implementation 
of community policing in Addis Ababa City. A descriptive research design 
is appropriate to achieve the objectives. Such a research design serves to 
describe the characteristics of community policing and states the practice 
of community policing as it is.
A mixed research approach is used to address the objectives. Both qualita-
tive and qualitative data are used. Quantitative methods show the level of 
implementation of community policing in Addis Ababa City. On the other 
hands, qualitative methods help to identify challenges that hinder the effective 
implementation of community policing in the city.
3.2. Types and Sources of Data
The study used both primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected 
through a questionnaire and interviews. The questionnaire emphasized the 
implementation of community policing and was distributed to frontline 
officers. The interviews were conducted with middle and higher officials 
of community policing. They focused on the overall implementation of 
community policing and challenges that inhibit community policing from 
being effective.
Secondary data consulted included unpublished documents available 
from authoritative and authenticated organizations such as AAPC. The data 
therein is utilized to substantiate the survey results.
3.3. Sampling Methods and Procedures 
The study used different procedures to select respondents for the question-
naire and interviews. Since Addis Ababa City Administration is too vast to 
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cover all areas, the study took 50 percent of sub-cities as a sample. Addis 
Ababa City Administration is divided into 10 sub-cities and/or 116 woredas 
(Addis Ababa City Administration, 2018). Out of ten sub cities, five sub-cities 
were taken as a sample study area. Sample areas included Bole, Arada, Kolfe 
Keranio, Gullele and Lideta sub-cities. The sample sub-cities were selected 
by lottery method.
To determine how far community policing is successfully implemented in 
the neighborhood, a questionnaire was distributed to community policing 
officers. The target population (community policing officers) of the study 
is found on the “ketena” level. In each “ketena,” one community policing 
Table 1: Sample sub-cities, “ketenas,” and community policing officers for the 
questionnaire
Sampled sub-cities Number of woredas Number of “keternas” Sampled officers
Bole 14 75 50
Arada 10 65 44
Kolfe Keranio 15 128 85
Gullele 10 68 45
Lideta 10 54 36
Total 59 390 260
Source: Author’s Survey, 2018
Table 2: Interview respondents
Community policing structure Sub-cities Number of interviewees
Commission level 2








Source: Author’s Survey, 2018
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officers is assigned. To sample these officers, the study used a two-stage 
sampling technique.
Interview respondents comprised community policing coordinators at the 
woreda, sub-city, and commission level. The study interviewed twenty-two 
community policing officers to obtain information about the overall com-
munity policing activity of Addis Ababa. The respondents of the interview 
were selected purposefully.
3.4. Sample Size Determination 
The study should have include an optimum sample size for efficiency, repre-
sentative, reliability, and flexibility. Hence, the sampling procedure and sample 
size should be determined based on logical processes (Kothari, 2004). The 
study used the Krejcie and Morgan (1970) sample size determination formula.
 S =  
 X 2 NP ( 1 − P )   _______________  
 d 2 (N − 1) +  X 2 P ( 1 − P ) 
Where:
S= Required sample size
X= The degree of freedom at the desired level of confidence Z value (1.96)
N= Population size
P= Population proportion (assumed to be 0.5, which would give maximum 
sample size)
d=Degree of accuracy marginal error
Out of 816 community policing officers, 261 community policing officers 
responded to the second questionnaire.
3.5. Data Analysis
The data collected through a review of documents, questionnaire, and in-
terviews were analyzed within the framework of the study objectives. The 
data collected through the questionnaire was coded and entered in SPSS 
version 21. Subsequently, the data were analyzed using descriptive statistics: 
mean, percentage and frequency. Data collected from the interviews were 
analyzed and interpreted to get a real picture of the system. Data obtained 
from secondary sources were utilized to enrich, illustrate, and elaborate on 
the quantitative and qualitative findings.
Since community policing has three core interdependent elements, 
it requires the implementation of each element. These core elements are 
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expressed in the activities of community policing activities. Hence, twenty 
community policing activities were developed to represent all core elements 
of community policing. Activities were developed and adopted from the 
A APC (2010), Mwachidudu and Likaka (2014), and Maguire and Katz 
(2002).
The sampled officers were asked to indicate the activities performed by 
AAPC. The activities were coded “0” if the activities are not performed by the 
commission and coded as “1” if the activity is performed by the commission.
The level of implementation of community policing is obtained by the 
total score of the twenty community policing activities for the ith respondent 
by the sum of the most desirable score of all community policing activities, 
thereby reducing the level of implementation to a scale of 0 ≤ LICO ≤ 1 
(Asante et al., 2012).
 LICP =  ∑ A 1i A 2i A 3i A 4i A 5i …  A 20i   _______________T 
Where:
LICO= Level of implementation of community policing
A1i to A20i= Community policing activities
T= The sum of the most desirable score of all community policing activities
The threshold value of the additive index is 0 to 0.33 considered as “low,” 
0.34 to 0.66 as “moderate,” and 0.66 to above labeled as “high” (Asante 
et al., 2012). Based on this decision rule, the level of community policing 
implementation is determined.
4. Findings and Discussions
Off 252 frontline community policing officers who participated in the study, 
248 are male and rest 4 frontline officers are female. The age of frontline 
officers falls in the age category between 18 to 29. The experience of frontline 
officers in community policing is on average 1.58 years.
4.1. The Implementation of Community Policing 
Community policing promotes problem-solving partnership between police 
and the community to proactively identify and address the problems that 
could lead to compromising the safety of the public. It advocates geographical 
organization of the police department and provides decentralized services 
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suited to local conditions. In addition, it empowers frontline officers’ discre-
tion and authority to manage everything concerning policing in the area 
where the officers are in charge (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). 
Thus, it requires organizational structure and practices.
Table 3: Level of organizational change made in Addis Ababa police commission. 
Activities related to organizational change N Frequency Percent 
The structure of community policing decentralized to 
community level, i.e., “ketena” level
252 251 99.6
The commission decentralized decision making power to 
community policing officers
252 172 68
Community policing officers are assigned to beat permanently 252 240 95
Community policing centers are constructed in each “ketena” 252 151 60
Frontline officers are recruited, hired, and trained in the spirit 
of community policing
252 21 08
Community awareness training provides for the last 
12 months
252 156 62
Community policing officers have facilities such as a cell phone 
that help to communicate with the community.
252 119 47
The commission developed specific evaluation criteria for 
community policing.
252 233 92
Source: Author’s survey, (2018)
AAPC has been successful in restructuring the commission and making 
community policing closer to the community (99.6 percent), assigning of 
frontline community policing officers at the neighborhood level for a long 
period of time (95 percent), and developing specific performance evaluation 
criteria for community policing (92 percent) (table 3).
On the other hand, the commission does not recruit, hire, and train officers 
for community policing. Table 3 reveals that only 8 percent of the officers 
believed that the commission is recruiting, hiring, and training in line with 
the community policing philosophy.
The commission’s structural transformations are not enough for the ef-
fectiveness of community policing. It requires changes in the philosophy and 
practices in terms of problem solving and partnership.
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Table 4: Activities related to problem solving and community partnership of 
community policing.
Activities related to problem solving and partnership N Frequency Percent 
There is a regular meeting with the community to identify 
problems that need solutions
252 101 40
Community policing officers are encouraged to provide 
creative and innovative solutions to the problems
252 211 84
Community policing officers’ conduct crime analysis in the 
assigned areas (e.g., keeping records of crimes and the types of 
request for help)
252 128 51
Consultative councils regularly hold meetings to provide 
solutions for the identified problems
252 85 34
Consultative councils are formed at each level of community 
policing
252 182 72
Community policing works with other governmental organiza-
tions to solve community problems
252 103 41
Citizens serve voluntarily in patrols coordinated by community 
police officers
252 141 56
Citizens participate in the neighborhood watch committee 252 140 56
Develop a partnership with schools to combat crime 252 144 57
Develop a partnership with neighborhood associations to 
combat crime
252 142 56
Source: Author’s Survey, 2018
Table 4 reveals that 84 percent of community policing officers believe that 
the commission encourages the officers to utilize innovative and creative 
solutions to problems. 72 percent of the officers also attested that consultative 
councils, in which all stakeholders propose solutions to the problems above 
the jurisdiction of line officers, were formed, but only 34 percent officers 
believed that the councils are regularly in session. In general, the commission 
has been limited in the implementation of activities related to problem-solving 
and community partnership.
4.2. The Challenges of Community Policing in Addis Ababa City.
Coordinators of community policing at woreda, sub-city and city level were in-
terviewed. They identified the challenges affecting the community, community 
police officer, and Addis Ababa Police Commission levels of the present study.
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The respondents pointed out that the Ethiopian Federal Police establish-
ment proclamation no. 720/2011 to reorganize AAPC is under the federal 
police commission (FDRE, 2011). The proclamation indirectly mandates 
that the peace and security issues of Addis Ababa City are the responsibility 
of the federal government and the city administration in general and the 
mayor, in particular, do not have the power or police personnel to maintain 
peace and order in the city. Hence, maintaining this peace and order is not 
the responsibility of the mayor and chief executives.
On the other hand, the mayor and chief executives at the sub-city and 
woreda level are key people in creating partnerships with the community. 
This paradox creates a gap in implementing community policing functions 
as planned. As a result, the heads of the councils call meetings either at the 
instigation of the mayor and chief executives or when there are current and 
urgent security issues where they are in charge. In addition, the structure 
creates a challenge for transparency and accountability. Since policing is not 
the responsibility of the city administration, the mayor and chief executives 
are not responsible for the failure of policing in the city.
Another challenge affecting the performance of community policing is 
low community participation. The community is reluctant to participate in 
community policing efforts. Historically, Ethiopian police, especially the 
Addis Ababa police, were politically partial and worked for the ruling party 
instead of upholding the constitution, which is one of the missions of the 
commission. The police were highly involved in political activities in current 
and previous regimes. Besides, the current ruling party used community 
policing as a political tool to spy on the members of rival political parties 
and terrorizing the public into not supporting opposition parties. These 
unconstitutional acts have made it difficult for community members to 
enter into an active alliance with the police. In addition, the interviewees 
have pointed to the inability of community policing officers to mobilize the 
community. The departure of experienced community policing officers either 
through resignation or transfer to another division along with insufficient 
training about community policing results low community participation.
Weak relations between community policing officers and the community 
is another challenge that inhibits the effective implementation of community 
policing. The task of community policing depends on the level of relations 
built between the officers and the community. However, the commission 
have not trusted community policing officers to have closer relations with 
the community. This is manifested in the fact that the commission does not 
devolve decision-making power to frontline community officers and suspects 
community policing officers of being corrupt when they have good relations 
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with the community. Secondly, senior and experienced community policing 
officers have left the division and the low commitment of the existing officers 
also creates a gap in terms of building strong relationships between police and 
the community. Thirdly, AAPC was involved in political activity and serving 
the ruling party instead of upholding the constitution in the recent past 
national elections, a partial political activity that has hindered the police from 
having a good relationship with the community. Finally, the confusion and 
mixing of the role of community policing and pre-crime prevention officers 
is also creating a challenge to building strong relation. Pre-crime prevention 
officers are involved in apprehending criminals, using force if necessary, and 
escorting criminals, and are trained in the spirit of adventure. These features 
of pre-crime officers affect the good will of community policing officers and in 
turn harm the relationship between community policing and the community. 
At the end of the day, low levels of trust in the community police/community 
relationship have hindered the practice from reaching its effective potential.
The effectiveness of community policing depends on the ability to pro-
vide solutions to existing problems. Community policing officers and/or 
consultative council are the bodies responsible for providing solutions for 
identified problems. The councils provide solutions when the identified 
problems demand the involvement of a third party and the officers are unable 
to provide solutions in their personal capacity. However, only 9 percent and 
6 percent of consultative councils are functional at the woreda and sub cities 
level, respectively (AAPCCPD, 2017). This malfunction of the councils 
hinders the effective implementation of community policing in the city.
Another formidable challenge facing community policing is the high 
turnover of community policing officers. The activities of community policing 
are too vast and require a high level of commitment from community officers. 
Conversely, the salary of community policing officers is too small to cover 
their basic needs. In addition, the absence of incentives forces community 
policing officers either to transfer to another division or leave the commission. 
The number of officers who leave the commission has increased every year. 
In 2010, the number of officers who left the commission was 823 and reached 
2026 in 2014/15 (figure 1).
AAPC (2010) states that all “ketenas” should have community policing 
centers where in community policing officers reside and deliver service. 
AAPC (2010) also stipulates that each center should be constructed with 
community participation. The commission does not have a budget for the 
construction of community policing canters. The construction of the centers 
depends on the ability of community policing officers and development 
committee to mobilize the community and on the willingness of the sub-cities 
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land administration to give land for construction. Currently, the coverage 
of community policing centers does not exceed 46 percent (Addis Ababa 
Police Commission Community Policing Division, 2017). This informal and 
inconsistent work creates a challenge for community policing.
Another formidable challenge to the effective implementation of com-
munity policing involves awareness gaps in the coordination of community 
policing. The coordinators pointed out that community policing officers and 
managers of police stations have awareness gaps about community policing. 
This is manifest in the fact that they assign community policing officers 
as pre-crime prevention officers, which is against the philosophy of com-
munity policing. Additionally, the coordinators discourage the committed 
and energetic community policing officers by labelling them as corrupted 
and rent seekers. In addition, they compel the officers to focus on process 
instead of being result-oriented. They further elaborate that community and 
community partners, namely neighborhood associations, private organiza-
tions, nongovernmental organizations, and religious institutions have an 
incorrect perception, which is that the peace and security of the city is vested 
merely in the police. These awareness gaps of the community are created/ 
creating obstacles to the proper implementation and functioning of com-
munity policing.








































Source: Addis Ababa Police Commission (2010/11-2017)
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One of the problems that poses a tough challenge is budget constraints. 
The interviewees revealed that community policing officers are faced with 
a serious budget shortage to run the activities of community policing. The 
proclamation in article 20 sub article 2 arguably states that the budget of the 
commission is allocated by the city administration council (FDRE, 2011). 
The city administration council appropriates the budget for the organization, 
which is not under its jurisdiction. Since the commission is under the federal 
police commission, it does not follow the budget request and allocation format. 
This creates a huge gap between the demand and the appropriate budget 
to run community policing. Hence, the efforts of community policing are 
financed by the contribution of the community and the personal capacity 
of the chief administrators at the woreda and sub-city levels, respectively.
The last but not least challenge to the success of community policing is 
competency of community policing. One of the assumptions of community 
policing is that each specific geographic area has unique problems that require 
area specific solutions (Cordner, 1997). Community policing focuses on 
delivering personalized and tailored policing service. Therefore, the officers 
have a pivotal role in managing all community policing efforts and delivering 
police service in the area they are in charge of and should have appropriate 
competencies that fit with the philosophy. However, community policing 
officers do not have appropriate training to carry out the task. Even though 
community policing officers are expected to develop specific area strategies 
to deliver personalized service, only 9 percent and 8 percent of sub cities and 
woreda have area specific plans, respectively (AAPCPD, 2017).
4.3. The Implementation Index of Community Policing 
The commission has been implementing justice service reform, particularly 
community policing, to make police service customer-oriented in a way 
that satisfies the public. The essence of the reform is building durable in-
stitutions that are capable of delivering quality service. The reform focuses 
on organizational transformation, community partnership, and providing 
effective and quality service. Organizational transformation focuses more 
on devolution of authority and structure, information systems, and other 
aspects that enable the commission to create a governance system. On the 
other side, community partnership deals with inviting multiple actors from 
multiple sectors to participate in delivering police service. It also applies a 
problem-solving approach to provide decentralized, personalized, and tailored 
service that fits the norm and value of the community. Hence, to measure the 
level of implementation, measurement indexes have been developed by the 
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commission from these perspectives. The implementation index was adapted 
from Maguire and Katz (2002) and Mwachidudu and Likaka (2014) and 
contextualized into the Addis Ababa community policing context.
Table 5: Level of implementation of community policing in Addis Ababa City.
Indicators N Index Decision
Level of organization change 252 .6662 High
Level of problem solving 252 .5208 Moderate
Level of community partnership 252 .5635 Moderate
Level of community policing implementation 252 .5835 Moderate
Source: Author’s survey, 2018
Table 5 reveals that the level of problem-solving and community partnership is 
moderately implemented whereas, the level of organizational transformation 
implementation is high, based on the index of Asante et.al (2012). Additionally, 
the result shows that the overall level of community policing implementation 
in Addis Ababa city is moderate (table 5).
5. Conclusions 
Community policing is a policing philosophy that promotes problem-solving 
partnerships to proactively identify problems that cause crime and disorder 
and addresses them in creative and innovative ways (Diamond & Weiss, 2009). 
It assumes that each area has a specific type of problem that requires specific 
solutions that fit the norms and values of the community (Cordner, 1997). 
Hence, it promotes decentralized and personalized policing that suits the local 
context (Cordner, 1997). Community policing requires active community 
involvement in policing and gives autonomy, discretion, and responsibility 
to the frontline community policing officers to manage the whole activity 
of community policing and deliver police service in the area where they are 
assigned (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). Existing organizational 
structure, management style, and information systems are obsolete when it 
comes to carrying out the new policing philosophy (Community Policing 
Consortium, 1994).
Therefore, community policing requires changes in the police department 
in terms of management style, structure, personnel, and information system 
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(Lawrence & McCarthy, 2013). These changes empower frontline community 
policing officers and create an opportunity for community participation 
(Community Policing Consortium, 1994). In considering these factors, the 
commission has made organizational changes to support partnership with 
the community and problem-solving techniques.
The commission has restructured the structure of the commission and 
organized operations based on geography, assigned community policing 
officers at the “ketena” level for a long period of time, and developed perfor-
mance evaluation criteria specific to community policing and the officers 
involved. The establishment of neighborhood community policing centers 
and fulfilling facilities, and devolution of authority and responsibility to the 
frontline officers have been partially implemented.
Even though community policing officers should be recruited, hired, 
and trained in the spirit of community policing the commission does not 
perform such practices. Rather, it assigns pre-crime prevention officers as 
community policing officers with three days orientation. In general, the Addis 
Ababa Police Commission has tried to implement organizational change to 
support community partnership and problem-solving techniques. There is 
moderately implemented organizational change in the commission in terms 
of carrying out the new philosophy.
Community policing underlines the importance of community partnership 
in pursuit of achieving the mission and vision of the commission. Community 
policing is a type of policing that considers community as a major partner and 
involves it in the effort of prevent crime and reduce fear of crime (Community 
Policing Consortium, 1994). Additionally, involving the community in 
policing efforts is not a privilege, rather it is the right of the community to have 
a voice in any decision which affects residents’ lives (Skogan, 1995). Hence, 
involving the community in policing efforts is mandatory. In consideration 
of this fact, the federal police establishment Proclamation no. 720/2011 
states that active participation of the community is required in the efforts of 
crime prevention (FDRE, 2011). As a result, consultative councils, one of the 
main methods of community participation, are formed at each level of the 
structure of community policing (AAPC, 2010). The members of the councils 
are a representative of all stakeholders who have an interest in the peace and 
security of the community. Private organizations, religious institutions, the 
representatives of the residents, non-governmental organizations, govern-
ment officers, community associations, i.e., “Eders” and other neighborhood 
institutions are represented in the councils (Addis Ababa Police Commission 
[AAPC], 2010). The councils are responsible for providing solutions to the 
identified problems and evaluating the effectiveness of the solutions. However, 
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the functionality of the councils merely depends on the assent of the head of 
the councils. The heads of the councils are the mayor, chief administrator of 
the city, and the sub-cities and the woreda, respectively. There is no law that 
compels the councils to be in operation. As a result, fewer than 10 percent of 
the councils are operational. To sum up, the evaluation of community policing 
officers and households shows that there is a moderate level of partnership 
between police and the community.
The third core element of community policing is problem-solving. Problem-
solving is a process of proactively identifying and analyzing problems from 
which crime rise, examining them systematically, and putting forward solu-
tions that will be evaluated (AAPC, 2010). Cordner (1997) has elaborated 
that each geographic area has a unique problem, which requires a unique 
strategy that fits with the values and norms of the community. Hence, frontline 
officers have the discretion and responsibility to provide appropriate solutions 
(Community Policing Consortium, 1994). The solutions should be designed 
by considering the resources, norms, and values of the community. However, 
Addis Ababa community policing has applied almost a uniform style of solu-
tion to all areas. Despite the effectiveness of the problem-solving techniques, 
AAPC only moderately implemented problem-solving techniques in the city. 
In general, Addis Ababa Police Commission has moderately implemented 
community policing in the city.
To summarize, AAPC has been moderately effective in implementing com-
munity policing in the city to prevent crime, reduce fear of crime, and improve 
public satisfaction with police. However, there are several challenges that 
hinder the commission from effectively implementing community policing.
– The problem of the organization of AAPC under the Federal Police 
Commission instead of under Addis Ababa City Administration creates 
various problems in accountability, mobilizing the community, applying 
problem-solving techniques to solve problems that compromise the safety 
of the community, and providing incentives to the officers.
– The history of the political partiality of Ethiopian police limits the com-
munity’s desire to actively participate in policing efforts.
– Awareness gap between the community, community policing officers, 
and coordinators of community policing about the methods and benefits 
of community policing.
– Shortage of budget at the “ketena” level affects effective implementation.
– High turnover of community policing officers
– Low community interest in participating in community policing.
– There is no legal mechanism that forces stakeholders to participate in 
policing efforts.
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6. Implications 
– Community policing is implemented to improve efficiency and effective-
ness, increase community participation and improve police legitimacy 
in the community. These objectives are achieved when the structure 
of the commission is decentralized and accessible to all stakeholders. 
However, the structure of the commission is under the Federal Police 
Commission, which is more centralized and more hierarchal, depriving 
the community of a voice in the affairs that affect them, which is against 
the basic feature of the developmental state, which promotes strong 
community partnership. Thus, the participation of community in policing 
efforts is low. To enhance the participation of the community in policing 
service, the structure of the commission should be decentralized and 
accessible to the community. This would increase the opportunity of the 
community to have a voice in decisions that concern them and enable the 
commission to provide personalized and tailored public service that fits 
the norms and value of the constituency. This implies that the structure 
of public administration is crucial in creating a real governance system 
and making government more citizen centric.
– One of the challenges that affects the effectiveness of the commission 
in implementation of community policing is the political partiality of 
the commission, which is against the basic features of developmental 
state. State machinery should not be mixed with party politics and the 
bureaucracy should be competent and professional. Even though FDRE 
proclamation 720/11 clearly states that police involvement in political 
activity is strictly prohibited, the Addis Ababa Police Commission was 
involved in political activity in recent past national elections of 2010 
and 2015. In addition, police were engaged in arresting and terrorizing 
people based on their political ideology and opinion (Di Nunzio, 2014). 
These activities damaged the efforts of community policing. Therefore, 
the effectiveness of the developmental state depends on a neutral and 
professional bureaucracy. Thus, public institutions should be competent 
and impartial from party politics in principle as well as in action. Unless 
the public administration is professional and neutral in regard to party 
politics, a formidable challenge to implementing reforms in the public 
sector will remain.
– The community has the right to a voice in any decision that affects their 
lives. In addition, Reddy (2002) points out that the community has 
the capacity participate in decision-making in setting goals and how 
resources are utilized, contributing in ideas, financial support, material 
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and labor, working together to benefit the whole community and creating 
a long-term partnership. On the other hand, police alone neither maintain 
nor prevent peace and order in the community. The community should 
shoulder policing efforts along with the police to reduce the budget 
burden of the government (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). 
Thus, community participation is crucial to providing customer-oriented, 
effective, responsive, transparent, and accountable public police service.
– Community policing is a governance system that invites the participation 
of multiple actors from multiple sectors to address the problems that 
could compromise the safety of the community. As a result, community 
policing is organized geographically to make the service more accessible 
and inclusive. However, the commission does not devolve authorities 
and responsibilities to the grassroot level and limits the frontline officers’ 
ability to mobilize the community and participate in policing efforts. The 
governance system helps to provide customer-driven service, where the 
public interest is defined and enables the provision of customer-oriented, 
responsive, transparent, and accountable police service. Therefore, 
decentralization of the structure and tasks to the grassroot level is a 
basic imperative in the creation of creating the commission’s governance 
system.
7. Limitations 
The current study has contributed by giving insights into the concept and 
importance of community policing and contributed to the literature of 
community policing. However, this chapter has limitations that should be 
acknowledged, as well as suggestions for future research.
– Since the concept of community policing is amorphous and varies 
depending on country context, there is no comprehensive model that is 
used to measure the level of implementation of community policing. If 
someone would replicate the measurement and the model on the regional 
and country level, this would provide good input for policy analysts and 
the commission to improve the measurement of the implementation of 
community policing.
– There are insufficient empirical findings in the context of developing 
countries, especially in Africa context. Since the concept of community 
policing is new for developing countries, it proved impossible to obtain 
empirical findings that would allow a comparison of implementation 
levels.
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– The study relied on cross-sectional data to measure the level of implemen-
tation of community policing. It was impossible to obtain documentation 
of the progress of implementation of community policing in the city. 
Hence, the study shows only the level of implementation at the time of 
data collection and is limited in its ability to predict future progress.
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The Practices and Challenges of 
Community Policing in Reducing Crime : 
The Case of Adama City Administration
Dessalegn Kebede Kedida
Box 1: Key points of this chapter
 there is little practice and a lack of skilled community policing officers in the area 
studied
 there is no clear strategy for community policing in the area studied
 there is a lack of concern about implementing community policing in Adama 
(oromia), Ethiopia.
 citizens’ reluctance to participate is the major challenge of community policing.
Box 2: The readers will have insight into
 the role of community policing in reducing crime in Adama (oromia), Ethiopia
 Elaborating the practice and challenges of community policing in Adama 
(oromia), Ethiopia.
 organizational changes in community policing: organizational structure, 
organizational culture, and management style.
 methods/Processes of problem solving (sArA model).
Box 3: Abbreviations 
cP = community policing
FGd = Focus Group discussion
oPc = oromia Police commission
sArA = scanning, analyzing, response, and assessment
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1. Introduction 
Community policing is a substantive reform in police institutions. It is a 
dramatic change in the philosophy that determines the way police agencies 
engage the public. It incorporates a philosophy that broadens the police 
mission from a narrow focus on crime and law enforcement to a mandate 
encouraging the exploration of creative solutions for a host of community 
concerns, including crime, fear of crime, perceptions of disorder, quality of 
life, and neighborhood conditions (Trajanowicz et al., 2002).
This philosophical shift has occurred over the past decade in the nation‘s 
thinking about policing, the role of police officers, and their relationship to 
the communities they serve. This implies that new strategies are needed to 
increase police department effectiveness and community connectedness 
(Harris 2001). Hence, it can be argued that community policing models 
have their roots in the failure of previous models of professional policing to 
address community concerns (Wilson, 2006).
Community policing is a philosophy and organizational strategy that 
promotes a partnership based, collaborative effort between the police and 
the community to more effectively and efficiently identify, prevent, and solve 
problems of crime, the fear of crime, physical and social disorder, and neighbor-
hood decay in order to improve the quality of life for everyone (Force, 2017).
Community policing was a paradigm shift established on the bedrock of 
community partnership in creating safe and secure environment for all. It was 
envisioned as policing whereby the people would take active part in their own 
affairs; the would not be seen as a problem or stranger whose presence stands for 
danger but as partners in development; and members of the community would 
be coproducers of justice and a quality police service. This fact indicates the 
need of involving the community, the local government, and the police to work 
together to tackle crime. One rationale for public involvement was the belief 
that police alone can neither create nor maintain safe communities. Therefore, 
community policing has emerged as a major issue in the development of public 
safety in many countries in the world. For example, England, Singapore, Canada, 
Israel, and the Scandinavian countries (i.e., Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and 
Finland), had already variously introduced some form of community policing 
by 2000. Community policing has seen worldwide growth. Indeed, “Police 
in previous times were brutal in their actions. We used to run when we saw 
them. Now the changes are dramatic … developing the mentality of serving 
the community was always on the mind of police officers” (Di Nunzio, 2014).
Developmental state doctrine and its emphasis on bureaucracy as the basis 
of the developmental state led to the creation of an alliance between politics 
thE PrAc ticEs And chAllEnGEs oF communit Y PolicinG in rEducinG crimE 663
and the economy, which materialized in the establishment of a specialized 
bureaucratic apparatus that had ample powers and coordinated the develop-
mental efforts, at least in their initial stages (Esteban, 2008). This is directly 
related to the concept of community policing and police sector reform.
In practice, as Baker (2009, 2013) points out, community policing in 
Africa has been interpreted as the creation, recognition, and incorporation of 
alternative security providers with a wide variation in terms of their capability, 
legitimacy, and links to the state police. It is also a conceptualization that has 
become engrained within security sector reform approaches more broadly, 
with the advocacy of “multi-layered” approaches to security that recognize 
nonstate actors as “the primary purveyors of day-to-day service delivery” 
(OECD, 2007:7). This was partly a pragmatic recognition of the reality on 
the ground, namely, the lack of resources available to the police preventing 
coverage, particularly in rural areas (Baker and Scheye, 2007). It also puts the 
African state in a permanent state of negotiation or mediation (Menkhaus, 
2006) with nonstate providers and a hybrid political system (Boege et al., 
2008). The state is now only one provider among many, and boundaries 
between state and nonstate actors are problematized by complex interactions 
and interpenetration of providers following different logics and drawing on 
varying sources of power (Luckham & Kirk, 2012).
Community policing is a new type of police service provision, in which 
officers cooperate with the community to proactively identify problems and 
provide a solutions in advance to minimize crime (Community Oriented 
Policing Service, 2014). In the other words, it is a type of policing in which the 
police provides police services in combination with the community. The aim 
of the community policing system is to improve the living quality of the com-
munity by reducing crime and disorder and promoting safety (Community 
Policing Consortium 1994, quoted in Fridell, 2004). In consideration of the 
above, the government of Ethiopia in general and in Oromia regional state, 
Adama City Administration in particular commenced a community policing 
system in the country since 2005, in an effort to make service accessible and 
responsive to the community (Abebe, 2009).
This entailed several changes within the police system. The first was the 
restructuring of the police organization and bringing the previously centralized 
police service closer to the people. Secondly, it required building community 
policing officers’ capacity to do multiple tasks and change their orientation 
toward service provision. Additionally, community policing officers were 
supposed to be generalists capable of carrying out multiple responsibilities 
and taking a team approach to collaborative problem solving and partnership 
with the community. Thirdly, the organization had to decentralize and commit 
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resources and finances in fulfilling necessary facilities such as offices, com-
munication infrastructures, and other facilities to make the system continuous 
and effective (Community Oriented Policing Service, 2014). In pursuit of this 
objective, the Adama City administration has undertaken an adjustment in 
the organization of the local police force. However, how effective the reforms 
have been in supporting police services remains a debatable issue. Against the 
backdrop of the above-mentioned issues and arguments, therefore, the study tries 
to close the gap in our knowledge of the situation in Adama City by investigating 
the practices and challenges of community policing in reducing crime.
Specific objectives
– To assess the practice of community policing in reducing crime in Adama 
City,
– To examine the role of community policing in reducing crime in Adama 
City,
– To assess the attitudes of local residents toward community policing in 
reducing crime in Adama city, and
– To identify the challenges of community policing for reducing crime in 
the area studied.
Research questions
– What is the current practice of community policing in reducing crime 
in Adama City ?
– What challenges are faced in implementing community policing in 
reducing crime in Adama City?
– What has been the role of community policing in reducing crime in 
Adama City?
– What have been the attitudes of local residents and police officers toward 
community policing in Adama City ?
2. Review of Related Literature
2.1. The Concept of Community Policing
Community: Some conceive community as a geographic area while others 
look at community as an area of common life. The following definitions show 
the essence of community. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 
“community” can refer to small neighborhoods, areas within a city, or small 
villages or towns, or in some cases groups of citizens with particular concerns. 
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In addition, as Taye Kejila (2015) has stated in his dissertation, a community 
may be defined as any group of people which is “likely to have a number of 
characteristics in common, such as geographical area, occupation, ethnicity, 
economic status, shared government, and a common cultural and historical 
heritage.” Moreover, as stated by Oliver, “community was the term that refers to 
a group of people who share three things: they live in a geographically distinct 
area (such as a city or town), they share cultural characteristics, attitudes and 
lifestyles and they interact with one another on a sustained basis.”
The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA, 1994) states: “Community polic-
ing was democracy in action. It requires the active participation of local 
government, civic and business leaders, public and private agencies, residents, 
churches, schools, and hospitals. All who share a concern for the welfare of the 
neighborhood should work together with Police officers. The above-mentioned 
bodies must take a unified stand against crime, violence, and disregard for 
the law and must make a commitment to increasing crime prevention and 
intervention activities.”
It is also helpful to better understand the relationship between the police 
and the community they serve. For this reason, this study has been strongly 
driven by the imperative to investigate the concept and practice of community 
policing.
Community policing may be concisely defined as “the Nine P’s of 
Community Policing.” Community policing is a philosophy of full-service 
personalized policing, where the same officer patrols and works in the same 
area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive 
partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems (Wycoff, 1999).
2.2. The Practices of Community Policing
In 1984, the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) was created to provide federal 
leadership in the United States with assistance in developing the nation’s 
capacity to prevent and control crime, administer justice, and assist crime 
victims (US Department of Justice, 2001). OJP pursues its mission by forming 
partnerships with other federal, state, and local agencies as well as with 
national and community-based organizations to develop, operate, and evaluate 
a wide range of criminal and juvenile justice programs. OJP is dedicated to 
comprehensive approaches that empower communities to address crime, 
break the cycle of substance abuse and crime, combat family violence, address 
youth crime, hold offenders accountable, protect and support crime victims, 
enhance law enforcement initiatives, respond to terrorism, and support 
advancements in adjudication.
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OJP also works to reduce crime in Native-American communities, enhance 
technologies within the criminal and juvenile justice systems, and support 
state and local efforts through technical assistance and training (US Depart-
ment of Justice, 2001).
2.3. The Role of Community Policing for Crime Prevention
The lack of a concrete definition for community policing and vague measures of 
success have contributed to the difficulties in determining its effectiveness. In 
addition, the complex nature of community policing limits the ability to provide 
sufficient evidence of either success or failure. However, the literature shows a 
number of benefits of implementing community policing. According to the New 
Zealand Police, for example, the (perceived) benefits of community policing 
include “improving Police community relationships and community perceptions 
of Police; increasing community capacity to deal with issues; changing officers’ 
attitudes and behaviors; increasing perceptions of safety; and reducing crime, 
disorder and anti-social behavior” (Thurman & McGarrell, 2005).
Generally, implementation issues that have not been identified or resolved 
can affect the overall success of a community policing initiative. Indeed, a 
range of barriers to successful implementation could negatively affect the 
potential benefits of community policing. Some of the possible consequences 
of poor implementation include: lack of control, flexibility, and tailoring at 
neighborhood level; not recognizing the historical lack of trust between police 
and certain communities; and lack of good quality information about crime 
provided to communities.
More specifically, on the side of police officers, they may work independently 
of the community in identifying and solving problems; training in problem 
solving and community engagement may be neglected; and community 
police officers may lack performance measures. On the part of the residents/
communities, problems may include: their ambiguity with respect to different 
values and expectations; agencies’ promotion of conflicting values; ownership 
of problems often allocated to police rather than the whole community; low 
participation resulting from individualism and lack of social capital; and 
limited community voice given to the vocal minority. With respect to police 
culture, resistance to community policing has been attributed to the perception 
it is a move away from traditional law enforcement practices to a “softer” style of 
policing; at the same time, the community can be disempowered when offering 
solutions if police dominate as the crime and disorder experts. Indeed, police 
are still reluctant to share information with the community. Other challenges 
also emanate from specialized units. As a result, the isolation of officers can 
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limit effectiveness while allocation of extra resources to community policing 
teams and special conditions of work can create internal friction.
2.4. Pillars of Community Policing
Community policing system is an organization strategy that helps to identify 
causes that potentially increase fear of crime and social disorder and take 
remedial actions through community partnership and problem-solving tactics. 
(Chene, 2012).The system has three key elements (Community Oriented 
Policing Service, 2014). These are:
Community Partnerships Aspect of Community Policing 
One of the core components of the system is a strong police community 
partnership. Within this system, it is understood that police should not be the 
sole responsible body in maintaining peace and security. The community, i.e., 
the local government, civic and business leaders, public and private agencies, 
residents, churches, schools, and hospitals should also participate in ensuring 
safety and security of society (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994). Unlike 
traditional policing, community policing takes community involvement as 
an advantage in ensuring community safety and wellness (Fridel, 2004).
To build a strong community partnership, police must have a good relation-
ship with the community, putting it in a position for better crime control and 
prevention and mobilizing the resources of the community to solve its priority 
issues (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994). This partnership may be challenged 
if a community shows resistance to the partnership as a result of low awareness, 
poor community relations with the police, and low participation of community 
in police services, among other problems (New Zealand Police, 2008).
Problem Solving Aspect of Community Policing System
This aspect focuses on the process of identifying problems of community 
and systematic examination of identified problems to take effective response 
measures by both the community and police (Community Oriented Policing 
Service, 2014). The major objectives of community policing are carefully 
studying the characteristics of crime and a neighborhood’s problems and 
taking remedial action accordingly (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994).
In problem solving, both community and police are engaged in ensuring 
community peace and order. Police officers engage in coordination and 
mobilization of the community in identifying and solving problems to enhance 
their well-being. On the other hands, the community also takes an active role, 
sharing the burden with police. This type of mutual benefit enhances the 
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police-community relationship and increases the responsiveness of the police 
(Chene, 2012.) According to Skogan (1995), it is hardly possible to create and 
maintain a safe community without community participation because every 
problem is created and committed within the community. Therefore, the 
community is a resource, support group, and source of information (Murphy, 
1993, quoted in Skogan, 1995). In order to have active participation from the 
community, it is crucial to increase the awareness level of the community. 
Community participation depends on the level of community awareness 
about the program (Skogan, 1995).
Organizational Transformation 
It is important that the structure of police institutions be transformed to ensure 
community involvement and empower officers to make decisions and make 
them accountable (Community Oriented Policing System, 2014). Organiza-
tional transformation focuses on restructuring the organization in a way that 
promotes people’s participation and proactive problem solving. However, 
mere restructuring of the organization doesn’t bring about the desired result. 
The process should also empower the community policing officers in terms 
of building their capacity, fulfilling basic communication facilities, delegating 
decision-making authority, and ensuring an equitable ordering of community 
resources (Community Oriented Policing Service, 2014). Effective community 
partnership and problem solving require the capacity of community policing 
officers to adopt a flexible management style and perform the decentralized 
responsibilities (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994).
Community policing cannot succeed without essential alterations inside 
the organization of police agencies. It not only requires a philosophical shift 
regarding police mission but also requires a commitment to alter the organiza-
tion and its structure (Sozer, 2008). Organizational changes in this context 
refer to three areas: organizational structure, organizational culture, and 
management style.
2.5. Problem-Oriented Policing
Problem-oriented policing (POP) is an approach to policing in which discrete 
pieces of police business (each consisting of a cluster of similar incidents, 
whether crime or acts of disorder, that the police are expected to handle) are 
subject to microscopic examination (drawing on the especially honed skills of 
crime analysts and the accumulated experience of operating field personnel) 
in hopes that what is freshly learned about each problem will lead to discover-
ing a new and more effective strategy for dealing with it. Problem-oriented 
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policing places a high value on new responses that are preventive in nature, 
that are not dependent on the use of the criminal justice system, and that 
engage other public agencies, the community and the private sector when 
their involvement has the potential for significantly contributing to the 
reduction of the problem. Problem-oriented policing carries a commitment 
to implementing the new strategy, rigorously evaluating its effectiveness, 
and, subsequently, reporting the results in ways that will benefit other police 
agencies and that will ultimately contribute to building a body of knowledge 
that supports the further professionalization of the police (Herman, 2001).
In other words, crime is not just a police problem; it’s a community problem. 
POP is a way of looking at community problems through the lens of a police 
agency, figuring out what to do about that problem, and bringing all resources/
stakeholders to the table to work together on the problem. It doesn’t mean 
that deputies will do all of the work, but it does require deputies to play a 
significant role in the scanning, analysis, response, and assessment of problems 
and to be actively engaged in solutions (Herman, 2001).
The SARA Model 
A commonly used problem-solving method is the SARA model (scanning, 
analysis, response, and assessment).
While the SARA model is useful as a way of organizing the approach to 
recurring problems, it is often very difficult to figure out just exactly what 
the real problem is. The problem analysis triangle (sometimes referred to as 
the crime triangle) provides a way of thinking about recurring problems of 
crime and disorder. This idea assumes that crime or disorder results when 
(1) likely offenders and (2) suitable targets come together in (3) time and 
space, in the absence of capable guardians for that target. A simple version 
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3. Research Methodology
3.1. Research Design
Research design is the blueprint (strategy) for fulfilling research objectives 
and answering the research questions (Creswell, 2009). The research design 
selected for this study was descriptive. This was an ideal methodology when 
collecting information about people‘s attitudes, opinions, habits, or any of 
a variety of social issues (Orodho & Kombo 2002).The reason for using 
descriptive research as a research design is to describe the existing practice and 
identify the major hindering factors of community policing in reducing crime.
3.2. Research Approach
This research will apply the sequential mixed methods procedure throughout 
data collection and report presentation to keep consistency. First, the quantita-
tive data was collected, and based upon the results, the interview questions 
were developed, interviews were conducted and findings are presented in 
the same manner. The findings are mixed throughout the discussion section.
3.3. Study Population, Sample, and Sampling Techniques
A study population encompasses the total collection of all units of analysis 
about which the researcher wishes to make specific conclusions. The popula-
tion of the study for quantitative purposes was the aggregate of Adama regular 
police members of all ranks working in all the six sub-city administrations. 
The total population of Adama City regular Police is 678 in number. Hence 
the researcher attempted to conduct the study of practices and challenges of 
Adama City community policing in reducing crime on a selected representa-
tive sample of the study population.
At present, Adama City administration police comprise six sub-cities 
police stations, namely the Dabe, Bole, Abba Geda, Dembela, Boku, and Lugo 
sub-cities police. The six sub-cities of city administration police are organized 
in the form of the six components of city administration police command. The 
researcher used a random sampling techniques to frame the sample. After the 
location of study population was identified and the proper size of the sample 
was determined by proportionality, sampling techniques were applied to keep 
the proportionality of participants from each sub-city. This population was 
manageable and the data collection process easy, smooth, and manageable.
The sample size was calculated by using Taro Yamane’s (Yamane, 1967) 
formula with 93 percent confidence level. (According to an Adama City police 
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official report of September 2019, the total population from the selected sub-
cities was 380.) The calculation formula of Taro Yamane is presented as follows:






e =Level of precision given that 93% confidence level and P = ±7% are assumed.
 n = 380  ______________  
 1+380(0.07)2 = 204 
n= 204
The researcher used 204 respondents as a sample. In addition, the selection 
of respondents was made by simple random sampling (probability sampling).
Table 1: Sample size
Source (Place)





Sample size Remark 
City Police depnt 73 0.192 39
Bole sub city 112 0.2947 60
Lugo sub city 80 0.210 43
Abba Gada sub city 115 0.3026 62
Total 380 100% 204
Source: Author
A purposive sampling technique was used to select key informants from Bole, 
Lugo, and Abba Gada sub-city community policing board members, city 
administration, prosecutors, and city administration police command leaders. 
Purposive sampling leads to greater depth of information from a smaller number 
of carefully selected units (Patton, 2002). A purposive sampling technique was 
applied based on the high rank and leadership experience of police officers and 
members of the community policing board. Accordingly four police leaders, 
two prosecutors, two judges of the city administration, two security and admin-
istration leaders, three religious leaders, and four community policing board 
members were selected for the study, for a total of seventeen key informants, 
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following the principle that –fifteen to thirty-five participants are adequate 
for key informant interviews (Janet 1999; USAID 1996). For a focus group 
discussion (FGD) one group (six to eight people) of police customers who 
were currently (conveniently) came for service was selected and discussion was 
conducted. This enabled the researcher to gather data in an efficient manner.
3.4. Tools of Data Collection
The researcher used data collection tools including a questionnaire, key 
informant interviews, FGD, observation, and document analysis.
3.5. Techniques of Data Analysis
The quantitative data, which was collected via questionnaires, was presented 
using tables and charts to describe the results in relation to the research 
questions. The findings of the study were analyzed using descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics were obtained by feeding the quantitative data into the 
statistical software program SPSS version 20 and analyzing the frequency 
and percentage to examine the occurrence and variation by chart and table.
The qualitative data obtained from documents, observation, and semi-
structured interviews was transcribed, edited, and organized around the 
subtopics derived from the research questions. Furthermore the data from 
the interviews, observation, and documents was triangulated, checked against 
the quantitative data. In addition the findings were discussed and interpreted 
in relation to the relevant literature.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. The Current Practice of Community Policing
To understand the practice of community policing, community policing 
officers in their respective sub-cities were asked.
As indicated in table 2, with respect to the question of the usefulness of 
mini-stations located within the tribal community areas to improve officer 
access by the community in the respective sub-cities, about 55.9 percent 
of respondents indicated that the availability of community service police 
station for delivering service was adequate.
As it can be observed from table 2, 88.64% of the respondents disagree that 
community policing is adequately practiced in Adama City administration.
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203 163 78.8 40 21.2
Source: Researcher’s Field Survey, September 2019
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What Activities Are Expected to Be Implemented in Community 
Policing?
Community policing requires discussion between society and police, and 
active participation is expected from all residents. Assessing the potential 
crime areas is also another activity that falls under the umbrella of com-
munity policing. Almost all research participants informed that the structures 
formed for community policing are not working in those situations that 
require close follow-up. On the other hand, focus group members from the 
Adama City administrative police indicated that the number of community 
policing officers is kept deliberately small in order to facilitate supervision of 
whether the structures of community policing are working according to the 
theoretical framework. On the other side, even providing job opportunities to 
the unemployed is one activity that may minimize the potential crime rates. 
Identification of the potential causes of crime is also crucial.
Different respondents explained that the practice of community policing 
varies between the rural and urban areas. FGD participants in the Adama 
City administrative police department explained that the structure and way 
of implementing the strategy can vary greatly, being most effective in rural 
areas where residents are effectively using it to prevent crime alleviate security 
concerns. In contrast, it is not as effectively implemented in the urban area 
due to the unstable nature of the residents and other constraints.
4.2. Structure of Community Policing
The community policing officer is responsible for creating the structures and 
training participants. Each structure has its own duties and responsibilities, 
wherein all the structures are mainly formed and monitored by the CP officer 
Table 3: Respondents’ views on the adequacy of community policing officers
Level of agreement/disagreement Frequency Percent
strongly agree 3 1.478
Agree 20 9.85
Disagree 132 65.02
Strongly disagree 48 23.64
Total 203 100
Source: Researcher’s Field Survey, September 2019
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assigned in the city kebele. This shows that the officers are constantly with 
society, and are in a position to improve these structures and identify the 
potential causes of crime and making society more confident in terms of 
security issues.
Nonetheless, the crime statistics of Adama City are increasing, demonstrat-
ing that the implementation of community policing is far from fully successful.
Table 4: Five year crime statistics in Adama City 







Source: Adama city police dep. five years Crime statistics report (June,2019)
4.3. Challenges of Implementing Community Policing
In an attempt to understand the challenges of implementing community 
policing, this research investigated issues related to the level of participation 
of community members in community policing activities; whether the culture 
of public disclosure of community policing has increased after its implementa-
tion; whether research participants as members of the society took community 
policing trainings and the frequency with which these trainings are offered; 
and the knowledge of community members on community policing and 
their views on their participation in community policing activities. Findings 
obtained on each of these aspects are described below.
However, prior to discussing the aforementioned issues related to the 
challenges of implementing community policing, an attempt was made to 
examine whether there are in fact challenges of implementing community 
policing. The result shows that while 68.3 percent of the respondents argued in 
favor of the existence of challenges to implementing community policing, the 
remaining 31.7 percent argued that there are no challenges in implementing it.
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Source: Own survey, 2019
Similarly, in regards with the frequency of trainings, while 49.8 percent of 
respondents reported undergoing only once, a sizable number (50.2 percent) 
of the respondents had undergone no training at all.
Table 7: Who participates in community policing
Participants Frequency Percent
Residents 2 1.7
Members of the police 12 10.2
Kebele administrators and Militia 3 2.5
Other authorities 5 4.2
All 181 81.4
Total 203 100
Source: Own survey, 2019
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Data collected from qualitative methods also showed that community polic-
ing officers participated in training. Yet, many respondents mentioned its 
short-term nature, usually lasting from two to five days; they also pointed to 
its irregular nature and recycling of similar content for the last five or more 
years. In related fashion, community policing officer focus group discussants 
in Adama City revealed that since they are not motivated by educational 
opportunities, they will leave their positions as new opportunities arise, 
after which new officers will come in and begin work as new community 
policing trainees.
Table 8: Implementation of community policing versus public disclosure of crime
Degree of agreement Frequency Percent
strongly agree 25 11.9
Agree 96 47.5
Disagree 64 31.4
Strongly disagree 18 9.3
Total 203 100
Source: Researcher’s field survey, 2019
This study also sought to find out whether new problems may crop up as a 
result of implementing community policing. A four-level response rate was of-
fered to respondents to indicate their levels of agreement or disagreement. The 
findings shows that while more that 38 percent of the respondents responded 
that they agree or strongly agree, the remaining more than 61 percent disagree 
or strongly disagree on the subject.
The term “community partnerships” can mean different things in different 
jurisdictions. In those in which there are the most examples of community 
policing strategies at work, relationships are created between police and com-
munity groups, such as faith-based organizations, tenant councils, business 
groups, local government agencies, social service providers, schools, and 
local businesses.
These partnerships are ongoing projects rather than periodic neighborhood 
watch meetings and have the objective of developing interaction between 
police and the community. Indeed, some of the most successful examples 
of community policing strategies are when police services are provided or 
co-located with other civic services, such as paying utility bills or obtaining 
parking permits.
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In addition to the above quantitative data on the challenges of implement-
ing community policing, researchers have also made use of qualitative data. 
The findings showed a number of challenges for implementing the community 
policing philosophy in the study areas. One of these is the lack of qualified 
human resources, as police officers lacked skill on how to manage/handle, 
investigate, and proactively prevent the potential occurrence of crime. Though 
advanced crimes were found to be committed in the study areas, almost none 
of community policing officers has computer skills. As one discussant in FGD 
held in Adama City stated, “there is no any police who even knows how a 
computer is opened and closed.” It is also found a high level of turnover of 
police officers as a result of low salary, a very low incentive system, and the 
challenging and tiresome nature of the work.
Indeed, the study also found that incentives for police officers for this 
type of work are very low despite the routine and tiresome work community 
policing officers perform twenty-four/seven. Furthermore, though implement-
ing community policing in rural areas was found very effective because the 
residents know each other; are homogenous and have residences, in urban 
areas, it was found to be challenging because of the instability of the popula-
tion, which includes b street children, university students, college students, 
daily laborers, and prostitutes, to list a few. Yet, it is also found that even in 
urban areas, community policing officers are not only engaged with other tasks 
but also become too busy to implement community policing. For instance, 
officers are engaged with current tasks/activities to be done, like meetings, 
sports races, new students’ arrival, students graduation ceremonies, etc. 
Furthermore, while the work by itself is routine and very tiresome, no budget 
is allocated for the implementation of the community policing program; and 
finally, low societal contribution to the budget has variously challenged its 
implementation.
4.4. The Role of Community Policing in Crime Prevention
To examine the role of community policing, data were collected on issues 
related to its role in crime prevention as well as other roles it may have played. 
With respect to the role of community policing in crime prevention, data were 
collected to understand the views of respondents on the role of community 
policing, whether community policing has reduced crime rate; to understand 
their levels of agreement about changes brought after the implementation of 
community policing; and other roles of community policing.
Many community policing officers defined community policing as the 
prevention of crime via the active participation of the society and the police, 
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in an area which was previously viewed as the sole responsibility of the police. 
It has also improved the relationship between society and police officers, 
where previously the two were seen as antagonistic.
Regarding the question on whether community policing has a role in crime 
prevention, the finding shows that while 87.3 percent indicated its positive 
role, the remaining 12.7 percent said that it has no role.






Source: Researcher’s field survey, 2019
Data collected using qualitative methods also supports the survey results. 
While almost all of the interviewees and focus group discussants expressed 
the existence of challenges for implementing community policing in their 
respective sub-cities, they explained it as an essential tool for minimizing 
crime incidence. Many also indicated their concern with levels of crime 
and that they feel more secure after the implementation of the program in 
their local area. They also highlighted that the introduction of community 
policing has not only broken down the long-lived view that crime is the sole 
purview of the police, it also minimized the number of crimes from year 
to year. As an additional role, implementation of community policing goes 
beyond identification of criminals to providing them with job opportunities 
and frequent advice and follow-up with the intent of helping them change 
their lives for the better.
4.5. Attitudes of Local Residents and Police Officers toward 
Community Policing
The attitude of local residents and police officers about community polic-
ing was assessed. Focus group discussants in Adama City explained that 
residents support the work of the police, and that rural area residents are 
especially actively engaging in community policing work Residents’ support 
can take the form of providing office materials, building houses and offices, 
and cooperating with the officers to prevent crime. Especially in the rural 
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area, the construction of houses for officers, material support, and providing 
information when necessary increased after the introduction of community 
policing. This collaborative work and active involvement of the community is 
one indicator of the residents’ positive attitude toward community policing.
As far as the police officers are concerned, despite the fact that they are 
working in a challenging environment, and even though the turnover of 
police officers high, they generally have a positive attitude toward the strategy 
itself, pointing in particular to the role and relevance of community policing 
in minimizing the occurrence of crime.
According to a FGD discussant, community partnerships are ongoing 
projects rather than periodic neighborhood watch meetings; furthermore, 
they have the objective of developing interaction between police and the com-
munity. Indeed, some of the most successful examples of community policing 
strategies at work are when police services are provided or co-located with 
other civic services, such as paying utility bills or obtaining parking permits.
Building on the organizational transformation above, much of the police 
interaction at co-location venues is provided by civilians or local volunteers, 
which helps with the identification of localized problems and the means of 
solving them. They also provide a good opportunity for law enforcement 
agencies to engage with neighborhood watch groups and share crime preven-
tion tips.
Shared Problem Solving 
The biggest consequence of organizational transformation and community 
partnerships has been the success of shared problem solving. Police departments 
with the most successful examples of community policing strategies train offic-
ers to focus on creative and active problem solving in the community and with 
the help of community members rather than simply react to crime or disorder.
One of the most common approaches to shared problem solving in com-
munity policing is the “SARA Model.” SARA stands for scanning, analysis, 
response, and assessment and involves recurring issues in the community 
being identified and analyzed, and community members being consulted, in 
order to determine the root causes of the issues and find long-term solutions 
to address them.
Evidence suggests shared problem solving based on the SARA Model can 
achieve significant reduction in crime over traditional response models. A 
2017 review of Adama City police found proactive problem solving had a 
significant impact on improving public safety and that the shift from reactive 
crime response had resulted in specific social issues being resolved and crimes 
being prevented before they happen.
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But these improvements in community policing outcomes in the Adama 
City context were somewhat dampened by constraints in the availability 
of technology and the immature levels of community partnership, social 
awareness, and police officers’ commitment.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1. Conclusion
The positive contribution of community policing to crime prevention and crime 
investigation is direct. There is no other strategy as significant as implementing 
community policing if the police organization as a whole is to prevent and 
control crime. Crime and disorders are fundamentally societal products, 
implying that community participation in crime prevention and crime inves-
tigation is of paramount importance. It should be accepted that traditional 
police methods alone are no longer capable of managing crime prevention 
and crime investigation. However, implementing community policing is chal-
lenging. Institutionalizing the community policing philosophy involves value 
system changes at all levels of police organization and the public in general. 
Implementation of community policing requires new ways of thinking and 
establishing a new organizational culture. It is about changing the entrenched 
beliefs from a traditional approach to crime control and law enforcement to a 
proactive approach to crime prevention and disorder. It is about focusing on the 
causes of crime and disorder more than on treating incidences and symptoms. 
It is not only about law enforcement but also about behavioral disorders.
Hence, the implementation of community policing strategy demands 
addressing both systemic and operational aspects of problems that police 
organizations face. From a systemic point of view, it is highly important to 
restructure police organizations, their legal frameworks, policies, strategies, 
and organizational culture. To this end, the commitment and the will of the 
government and high-level officials are indispensable.
The operational perspective focuses on the implementation aspect of 
community policing. Day-to-day follow up plays a critical role in the success 
of the community policing strategy. Hence, designing proper monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms should be prioritized. The monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms should identify strengths, weaknesses, challenges, and best 
experiences that should be scaled up to other areas.
Constructive feedback should be given to concerned bodies based on 
the results of monitoring and evaluation and so help in bridging the skill 
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and knowledge gaps. Designing and implementing trainings based on the 
practical gaps would be very helpful. Designing and implementing continu-
ous communication strategies also plays a pivotal role in implementing the 
community policing strategy. Communication plays a critical role in changing 
entrenched beliefs regarding the traditional approach to crime control and 
law enforcement.
Above all, trust building is important. The community can participate in 
crime prevention and crime investigation only when the community trusts 
the police organization. To this end, as much as possible police organizations 
and individual police members should refrain from any activity that can 
undermine their images. Within the theoretical and practical contexts of 
community policing, it is possible to roughly assess the status of Oromia police 
commission in terms of implementing community policing strategy, as the 
police commission has taken serious initiatives in designing and implementing 
community policing strategies.
Namely, it has tried to restructure its organizational setups, designed 
special incentives for community policing officers, built a number of offices 
that offer community policing services, deployed its community police officers 
to kebeles, and organized different training programs for police personnel, 
community, and other stakeholders. It has also mobilized the community 
and resources in crime prevention and crime control.
However, these positive efforts seem to have encountered serious obstacles. 
The community policing strategy has lacked continuous supervision of its 
implementation status. Support from the top seems to have deteriorated. 
Logistics and other related challenges seem to have obstructed implementa-
tion. The deeply entrenched beliefs regarding traditional approaches to crime 
prevention and law enforcement have not shifted to a proactive approach to 
crime prevention. There is no significant shift of value system or organizational 
culture. Some practice shows that police in Oromia continue to focus on 
dealing with incidents and symptoms of crimes than focusing on the root 
causes of the same. All these weaknesses and facts imply that the attempted 
fundamental departure from a traditional approach to crime prevention and 
crime control is not commensurate with the current level of crime. These 
suggest that Oromia police commission should fundamentally evaluate its 
performance regarding the whole processes of designing and the implementing 
community policing with the view to learn from the processes and to organize 
itself afresh to properly implement the same.
The research results also revealed that currently the practice of community 
policing implementation is low and mostly ineffective, as are the awareness 
of community and society about community policing.
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From the findings of this study the following major conclusions may be 
made. The old system of crime prevention and the relationship between 
the police force and society changed with the coming and functioning of 
community policing. The philosophy of community policing as indicated 
in different literatures allows proactive prevention, collaborative work, and 
developing a sense of ownership of society on security issues in general.
Community policing as a strategy for crime prevention involves collabora-
tive work between society and the police. Its achievement requires the forma-
tion of different structures, which were indeed formed and currently operate 
in the area studied in this chapter. The implementation of community policing 
in Oromia state began in 1998 as a pilot project and was later expanded in all 
sub-cities and city administrations of Adama. The theory behind community 
policing and actual practice, however, do not match in this case. Whereas 
the strategy requires trained and skilled police officers whose job involves 
actively organizing and effectively mobilizing society to actively engage on 
security issues, in our study the police officers are not exclusively assigned 
and working to implement and follow the strategy. Most police officers in 
Adama City who are placed to the position of community policing do not 
work in their position; instead the officers are expected to do tasks which 
may not be related to the specific position they hold.
All research participants in this study expressed a clear understanding of 
the central role and significance of community policing in crime prevention. 
People’s level of consciousness and concern with crime issues has improved 
after the implementation of community policing.
A low level of societal concern and participation is the major challenge 
of community policing. In the philosophy of community policing society 
is the main actor and without its involvement it cannot function. Other 
challenges include limited human resources for coordinating community 
policing activities, unmotivated police officers, decreased attention from the 
government to the program, and high turnover of police officers.
The attitude of the police officers and the community about the program 
was assessed in this study, and officers explained that they have a positive 
attitude toward the strategy despite working in an environment replete with 
challenges and problems. Officers strongly emphasized the continuity and 
relevance of community policing to overcome crime and to increase the com-
munity’s sense of security. Especially in rural areas, residents are effectively 
using this system to prevent crime, as well as actively engaging on community 
policing discussions and reporting crime incidence.
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5.2. Recommendations
Based on the findings of the study and the conclusions drawn on the practice 
and challenges of community policing in reducing crème in Adama City, the 
following recommendations have been compiled:
1. To effectively implement community policing, the Oromia police com-
mission should assign adequate number of police officers in each area. 
On the job training must be given to update and scale up police officers’ 
knowledge and skill on crime reducing management issues in general and 
community policing implementation in particular. The government of 
Oromia and any concerned body must give emphasis to the community 
policing program. A sufficient budget and adequate supply of essential 
materials to community policing officers is fundamental for the successful 
implementation of community policing.
2. Traditional society associations like the Gada system, Jigi, and Afosha 
must be used as one structure in the community policing strategy since 
accessing people is possible through these community associations.
3. Increasing awareness and mobilizing society toward peace and security-
building and crime prevention must be consistent and should not be a 
one-time activity; instead, it must be done frequently and in an organized 
and pre-scheduled manner.
4. Community policing must be taught in Oromia Police College in detail, 
with maximum hours to provide police officers with basic police skills.
5. Due to their geographical proximity, the public universities in Oromia 
and Oromia Police College must work to strengthen the strategy by 
providing training to the police officers in order to fill the knowledge 
gap, conducting research to further strengthen the community policing 
program in the region.
6. The Adama city administration’s police department should implement the 
Gada system and Taajoo in conflict resolution and to improve community 
engagement and participation in community policing.
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Bacha Kebede Debela, Geert Bouckaert, Meheret Ayenew Warota, 
and Dereje Terefe Gemechu
Introduction
The contributions in this handbook have unveiled several interesting findings 
enabling us to address the research question “How can we describe and explain 
the contexts, the processes and the results of the post-1990 politico-administrative 
reforms in Ethiopia and what are the implications for sustainable development?” 
Interestingly, although each contribution has unique features, they are increas-
ingly complementary. In this chapter, we draw conclusions and implications. 
We also connect the conclusions with SDGs, specifically with Goals 11, 16, 
and 17, and with PA teaching and research in Ethiopia.
Conclusions
Five conclusions could be drawn from the contributions on governance, 
participation, and institutions. First, it is apparent that improving democratic 
quality is a precondition to improving public trust in government and has a 
positive influence on citizens’ life satisfaction. Yet, it should be noted that for 
the sustenance of democratization and better governance, both the processes 
and results of democratic elections are equally important. Second, in the 
Ethiopian context, the contributions show that historical factors, and the 
endorsement of the Developmental State doctrine, have not only stalled the 
democratization process and progress towards good governance and multi-
stakeholders’ participation in public service delivery (e.g., health service) but 
have also restricted citizens’ participation and empowerment in development 
processes. Third, the inadequate institutional capacity of the government, 
the issue of legitimacy of the legislature, particularly since 2005, and the 
overarching power of the executive branch of the government have further 
increased the intractability of problems in the area under discussion. Partly 
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due to inadequate institutional capacity and politico-administrative and 
cultural factors, and partly due to the trade-offs between private (efficiency) 
and public values (such as impartiality and equity) (Lapuente & Van de 
Walle, 2020; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017), the net effect of NPM types of 
reform appears low. Fourth, although the representation of women in national 
parliament has been increasing, the glass ceiling and glass walls continue to 
constrain women from holding political executive leadership and managerial 
positions, particularly at local government levels. This holds true even in local 
governments with 50 percent women councilors. Fifth, interestingly and 
remarkably, the findings show that there is a significant difference between 
the indigenous Gadaa system and Western democratic systems in terms of 
democratic values and processes. Simply put, in Ethiopia multiple factors 
appeared to significantly increase citizen distrust in government and public 
administration. Consequently, therefore, the country was hit by public 
protests between 2014 and the first quarter of 2018. Distrust in government 
and public administration has continuously resurfaced despite the patchy 
official politico-administrative reforms.
We have also drawn five conclusions from the contributions on people as 
human resources. The first key conclusion is that structural and instrumental 
politico-administrative reforms introduced since mid the 1990s have changed 
many aspects of HRM at the federal, regional, and local government levels. 
The second key conclusion is that due to historical, sociological, and political 
factors, human resource recruitment, career development, and promotion in 
the civil service include a mix of meritocratic and political patronage. The third 
crucial conclusion is that historical and sociological factors, as well as top-down 
structural and instrumental politico-administrative reforms, have reinforced the 
allegiance of civil servants to the political executives. The fourth conclusion is that 
it appears that middle-level managers have played a substantial mediating role in 
institutionalizing the quasi-meritocratic civil service to a certain degree. Finally 
and importantly, politico-administrative and sociological contexts define the 
leadership contexts, which in turn have streamlined the relevance of pragmatic 
leadership, although authoritarian leadership remains deeply entrenched.
Concerning the contributions on performance and quality, we draw 
four conclusions. Urban local governments encounter trade-offs between 
economic, social, and ecological objectives in providing drinking water 
services. Second, the cost and time performance of the Ethiopian mega sugar 
construction projects were significantly weak, having substantial socioeco-
nomic and political implications. The other plausible conclusion, which is 
perhaps strongly connected to all the conclusions in this handbook, is that 
Ethiopia’s performance on good governance indicators is inconsistent with 
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trends on voice and accountability, a particularly worrisome outcome. Third, 
it appears that improving organizational and individual factors may help to 
enhance civil servants’ attitudes toward their performance. This suggests a 
promising potential for future reform programs in Ethiopia.
The contribution on the governance of policies enabled us to draw four 
conclusions. First, despite NPM-type reform programs, which have also 
adversely hit higher education in Ethiopia and its legal autonomy, the insti-
tutional autonomy of the Ethiopian higher public education was significantly 
low, particularly when compared with European universities. This is partly due 
to the fact that the ruling party uses the structural-instrumental institutional 
arrangements and legal instruments to control universities to a considerable 
degree. In addition, the influence of historical and sociological factors appears 
to be strong. Second, the institutional capacity of Ethiopian universities is 
in general inadequate for quality teaching and research. An emblematic 
example relates to the challenges of public administration teaching and 
research in Ethiopian higher institutions. The inadequate institutionalization 
of PA teaching and research, combined with the lack of a strong connection 
between PA academia and practitioners and the non-PA graduate groups/
individuals who appear to act as the “gatekeepers,” has constrained not only 
the professionalization of PA but also the employability of PA graduates, 
particularly those with bachelor credentials. Third, student enrollment in 
primary and secondary schools as well as in higher education institutions has 
been substantial. However, the quality of education and gender inequality 
at all levels of education requires significant attention. Fourth, contrary to 
popular assumptions and despite weak institutional capacity, the ruling 
party has substantially used community policing to control citizens at the 
grass-roots level instead of co-producing peace and order, which has been a 
brake on promoting good governance and trust in government.
Implications
Against the above overreaching conclusions, we now draw implications 
for the Sustainable Development Goals and PA teaching and research in 
Ethiopia. To this end, we organize our implication points into four major 
clusters. These clusters are inclusive, resilient, and sustainable cities (SDG 
11); effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions (SDG 16); effective 
partnerships (SDG 17); and PA teaching and research (present and future). 
We also connect with other SDGs whenever necessary, because all seventeen 
SDGs cannot be realized without effective public administration in place.
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Inclusive, Resilient, and Sustainable cities
The UN’s SDG 11, among others, specifies inclusive and economically, socially, 
and environmentally resilient cities. These cities should be able to substantially 
minimize the trade-offs between economic, social, and ecological goals in 
development programs and public services. In this connection, all contribu-
tions in this handbook have revealed that the progress of Ethiopian cities 
toward achieving the UN’s envisioned cities of 2030 is constrained due to the 
following: (1) trade-offs between the dimensions of the “Triple Bottom Line” 
for drinking water supply (UN Goal 6 as well as Goal 11); (2) community 
policing that is allegedly used as a political instrument for exercising control 
over citizens rather than ensuring inclusive, resilient, and sustainable cities; 
(3) inadequate government performance on good governance indicators, 
particularly the declining trend on voice and accountability; (4) an overtly 
politicized civil service; (5) lack of adequate citizen empowerment and par-
ticipation, as well as widespread corruption; and (6) a strong glass ceiling 
and glass wall that have obstructed women from holding political executive 
and managerial jobs (SDG Goal 5). Moreover, the effects of the deep-seated 
historical and sociological factors, politico-administrative culture, and the 
culture of top-down planning are equally significant. However, taking all 
factors into context, it might be crucial to develop an inter-organizational 
bench-learning platform for institutional innovation and pragmatic leadership 
to design strategic solutions.
Effective, Accountable, and Inclusive Institutions (SDG-Goal 16)
The findings in this handbook also zoom in on SDG 16, which underscores 
the necessity to develop effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all 
levels. The first implication is that, despite many reforms and capacity building 
programs, some findings suggest that Ethiopian public administration remains 
weak and ineffective at all levels (federal, regional, and local). Furthermore, 
the reform programs and reform tools used to disproportionately tilt the 
allegiance of civil servants to the political executives, and in the worst case 
to sideline or remove competent civil servants instead of improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the civil service and the institutional capacity 
of public administration. The second important implication is that the vision 
to develop inclusive institutions at all levels could be substantially hampered 
because of: (1) the non-inclusiveness of the parliament; (2) the gender-based 
occupational segregation in the civil service and political executive and 
managerial positions; (3) the limited space for vibrant citizen participation 
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in the development and governance processes, and the increasing inequality 
generated due to political historical and sociological factors; (4) the longstand-
ing problem of educational quality (primary to higher education levels); (5) 
and gender parity challenges as regards access to education at all levels. The 
third implication is the decreasing levels of voice and accountability and 
the inconsistent performance on other dimensions of governance, which 
may increasingly constrain the accountability of institutions at all levels. 
The incompatibility of the indigenous governance system with the Western 
democratic system, if not properly reconciled, may also increase the trade-offs 
between different values.
Effective Partnerships (SDG Goal 17)
The UN specifies that achieving all SDGs requires a partnership between 
actors at all levels and the participation of stakeholders, including the com-
munity, and all people (UN, 2015). Effective partnership requires effective 
vertical and horizontal interaction and mutual interdependence and collective 
accountability for performance at all levels (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008). As 
revealed by the contributions in this handbook, however, the power relation 
between state and other actors, including state-citizen interactions, are not 
optimal but rather significantly unequal. The Ethiopian hierarchical govern-
ance approach has constrained effective multi-stakeholder development and 
participative governance and development. The formal multi-stakeholder 
partnerships, such as community policing, are largely used to control ac-
tors instead of institutionalizing genuine participation at all levels. Often, 
the voices of stakeholders and citizens are either unheard or systematically 
suppressed. Indeed, the regime in power seems to use the multi-stakeholder 
approach for mobilizing resources. However, it is believed that learning and 
unlearning from historical factors and effectively building on the existing 
egalitarian culture, indigenous institutions, and pragmatic leadership could 
be helpful in balancing the top-down development planning and political 
culture. This would widen and increase the space for inclusive dialogue and 
interactive participation for the co-production of sustainable development.
PA Teaching and Research
The role of higher education in achieving sustainable development goals 
is indisputable (Pinheiro et al., 2018). More specifically, as noted in the 
introductory chapter, effective and context-appropriate PA teaching and 
research are crucial to strengthen public institutions, enhance public service 
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motivation and public interest, and solve societal problems (Bouckaert, 2020; 
Newcomer & Allen, 2015; Ongaro, 2020; Rosenbaum, 2015). Therefore, it is 
not a coincidence that the themes of Ethiopian PA conferences focused on 
strengthening institutions for sustainable development.
It also holds true that effective PA teaching and research need an effective 
institutional framework and governance system. However, as revealed in 
this handbook, the institutional autonomy of Ethiopian universities is weak. 
Recently, an initiative to ensure the quality and relevance of educational 
programs has been launched. The country’s Higher Education Relevance and 
Quality Agency (HERQA) is responsible for conducting internal program 
audits for public universities and accrediting private universities. But being 
a governmental institution, its professional autonomy may be doubted.
Concerning PA research and teaching, a contribution in this book has 
brought out the fact that Ethiopian PA universities and departments have 
inadequate institutional capacity for ensuring quality in PA teaching and 
research. In addition, although PA teaching and research should closely be 
connected to PA practice (Pollitt, 2020) in order to improve both theory and 
practice (Ongaro, 2020), the link between PA departments and the public 
sector for teaching and research has been found to be inadequate. In this 
regard, it is worth mentioning that the Ethiopian Public Administration 
Association (EPAA) was established in 2016, after over five decades of PA 
teaching in the country, to partially remedy this undesirable state of affairs. 
Moreover, while the politico-administrative contexts and cultural factors 
are significantly different, PA teaching in Ethiopia predominantly relies on 
Western models and books/journals authored by Western scholars, often 
without contextualization of the Ethiopian reality. Moreover, although the 
qualities of all program graduates are comparable, graduates in the PA field 
face institutional barriers in employment and the broad areas of career and 
professional development.
It is appropriate to observe that this first Ethiopian PA handbook means 
not only to reduce overreliance on the Western model in PA teaching but 
also to serve as a steppingstone to develop the Ethiopian PA model. Among 
other things, Ethiopian PA may be able to develop a model that reconciles the 
indigenous institutions and Western PA models. Interestingly enough, the 
contributors of this handbook are from different PA universities as well as para-
academics (representativeness), which may contribute to the achievement of 
this goal. We hope that the circle and network of academics and practitioners 
will further increase and lead to the coproduction of PA theory and practice 
as well as helping to address the employability challenges of PA graduates. 
The accreditation of PA programs is also crucial, as the many Ethiopian PA 
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programs are not accredited thus far. Ongaro (2020) rightly claims that 
enlightened knowledge (theoretical knowledge), problem-orientated knowl-
edge, and practice-extrapolation knowledge are crucial for the development 
of the practice of PA. This in turn strengthens a two-way interaction between 
academia and practitioners and helps to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice (Bouckaert, 2010; Saporito, 2020), permitting the coproduction of 
relevant knowledge that fits the purposes and demands of the present and 
the future (Bouckaert, 2019; Bouckaert & Jann, 2020). The three types of 
knowledge are important in the context of Ethiopia because the contributions 
in this handbook have revealed gaps in the existing PA teaching and research 
and revealed unjust citizen-state interaction that should profoundly change 
if we are to address existing and future problems and shortcomings in this 
regard. In addition, it is to be noted that Ethiopian PA should be informed 
by historical and sociological factors, as well as future scenarios. Bouckaert 
(2010) argues that PA research should not be only retrospective but should 
also focus on some aspects of the future. Furthermore, as rightly pointed 
out by Joyce (2020) in his recommendations on European PA, Ethiopian 
PA academics should be duty bound to contribute to the democratization 
process, strengthen public institutions, and improve the well-being of citizens. 
Indeed, this requires both learning and unlearning.
Interestingly, the EPAA, which comprises academics and practitioners, 
engages in the three types of knowledge identified by Ongaro (2020). In 
addition, the EPAA study groups comprise of Public Policy Analysis study 
group; Performance Management, and Trust Study Group; Leadership Study 
Group; Partnership Management/ co-Production Study Group; Multilevel 
Governance, and Democracy Study Group; Teaching Public Administration 
Study Group; and Indigenous Institutions and Development Study group. 
Once these different groups take off and begin functioning, they will leverage 
the dynamics of PA practice, teaching, and research in Ethiopia.
The contributions in this handbook also fit with the three complemen-
tary angles for research: theory/model, method, and data as developed by 
Bouckaert (2019). While two of the contributions were deductive theory/
model-driven, three were purely data-driven, and the remaining were a 
combination of elements of the three angles. However the proportions of the 
mix vary considerably. Furthermore, the majority of the contributions rely on 
primary and secondary data sources and mixed research design approaches. 
The other novelty of the studies in this handbook is that they build on the 
PhD studies and conference papers written by Ethiopian academics (supply) 
and para-academics/practitioners (demand). This does not only bridges the 
supply and demand sides of knowledge production (Bouckaert, 2019) but 
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also allows enhancing research and practice-driven PA teaching, as well as 
ensuring the relevance and quality of PA education and research to advance 
public interest and improve public services.
Finally, it needs to be underscored that this handbook has not only uncov-
ered the “wicked” problems facing Ethiopian public administration but also 
provides relevant context and steppingstones for PA teaching and research 
in Ethiopia. We also hope that EPAA will continue to facilitate debate and 
dialogue between different actors, including academia and practitioners and 
to play a significant role in creating space to address the crucial problems of 
the lack of accommodating diversity and effective participation of the relevant 
stakeholders. Furthermore, we also hope EPAA can help us to overcome 
“the power of the few; the powerlessness of many” and ultimately enhance 
the “collective power of the people to demand change” (UNDP, 2019: iii) 
and build the envisioned utopian, but achievable, sustainable future. We 
also hope EPAA will have the capacity to dialogue with international peers, 
which would enhance international cooperation and understanding toward 
positive goals that we all cherish.
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Building an effective, inclusive, and accountable public administration has become a 
major point of attention for policymakers and academics in Ethiopia who want to realize 
sustainable development. This first handbook on Ethiopian Public Administration is 
written by Ethiopian academics and practitioner-academics and builds on PhD studies 
and conference papers, including studies presented at the meetings of the Ethiopian 
Public Administration Association (EPAA), established in 2016.
Public Administration in Ethiopia presents a wide range of timely issues in four thematic 
parts: Governance, Human Resources, Performance and Quality, and Governance of 
Policies. Each of the individual chapters in this volume contributes in a different way to 
the overarching research questions: How can we describe and explain the contexts, the 
processes and the results of the post-1990 politico-administrative reforms in Ethiopia? 
And what are the implications for sustainable development?
This book is essential for students, practitioners, and theorists interested in public 
administration, public policy, and sustainable development. Moreover, the volume is a 
valuable stepping stone for PA teaching and PA research in Ethiopia.
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